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 Abstract 
 
Of the massive amount of failures experienced in corporate history, not every failure or banking 
distress has triggered a panic among market actors, which were just deemed as ‘bad apples’. On 
the other hand, there have been numerous instances where the weaknesses in economic 
fundamentals led to the breakdown of cooperation among market actors in the shape of bank 
runs. This research proposes an alternative reading of bank runs by its emphasis on ideas, not to 
replace but rather to supplement the explanations put forward by the banking panics literature. It 
analyses bank runs from a political economy perspective and highlights the role played by ideas. 
While not discounting the significance of the material and institutional settings, it suggests the use 
of cognitive heuristics by depositors during decision-making under uncertainty. Accordingly, 
depositor awareness towards the safety nets in place and collective memory of the past 
institutional failures are suggested as the two reference points (in addition to fundamentals) for 
depositor expectations to converge towards. This theoretical argument is tested with the banking 
crisis of 2007-09 in the United Kingdom with the aim of uncovering the following research 
puzzle: Within the period under examination, out of the four bank failures, namely Northern 
Rock, Bradford and Bingley, Alliance and Leicester, HBOS, only the first two experienced bank 
runs (although different in type) which resulted in their failures. The research objective of this 
thesis is, therefore, to explain and understand the motivations behind these depositor runs. With 
regards to research methods, empirical chapters apply a fully qualitative analysis –process tracing, 
within-case and cross-case analyses- and also utilise from counterfactuals in explaining depositor 
behaviour. 
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Introduction	  
 
 
“Indeed the likelihood of a bank run occurring in this country 
was not then perceived as a realistic possibility”  
(Goodhart 2009, 158)  
 
Northern Rock depositor: “You don’t know what’s going to 
happen and that’s the top and bottom of it. You don’t [know] 
whether this is just the beginning”  
(Roberts and Burton 2007, 5)  
     
 Northern Rock depositor: “Well, you worry don’t 
you? […] If you think other people are worried, you 
think: shouldn’t I be worried too?” 
(“‘They tell you not to panic …” 2007) 
 
 
 
A ‘nineteenth century-style bank run’ by anxious depositors queuing to withdraw their 
money was inconceivable for an advanced market economy before September 2007. Between 
September 14th and 17th, one fifth of Northern Rock’s total deposits, amounting to 
approximately £4.6bn, were withdrawn from the bank (HM Treasury 2009a, 5, 15). An 
estimated £1bn was withdrawn on the first day of the off-line run (£250m through branches 
and an even larger amount via the Internet) (Larsen 2007a, 1). Despite various efforts to 
stabilize depositor expectations, the run on Northern Rock branches continued also on 
Saturday to the point where the bank was forced to extend its opening hours and order 
additional cash to meet the withdrawal demands from depositors (Smith 2007, 14). On top 
of the £1bn withdrawn on Friday, an additional withdrawal of £500m was assumed the 
following day (Boniface and Kelly 2007, 9). 
What were the underlying motivations for the depositor run on Northern Rock? In 
addressing this question, this research puts forward the following argument: Depositor 
behaviour is not only an outcome of external shocks and/or observed institutional 
shortcomings. There are deep-seated vulnerabilities as a result of the way past crises affect 
depositor expectations and behavior. Arrival of the negative news is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition itself to trigger a change in depositor behaviour. Depositors’ collective 
memories of past crises (especially the role played by the Government in managing those) 
provide recollections of previous losses and update reference points through which the following 
crises are interpreted. In a similar way, awareness towards the institutional safety nets 
(guarantees on deposits) also affects depositors’ assessment of the crisis at hand. The fact that 
there are certain guarantees on deposits within the banking system does not suffice to 
prevent a bank run, unless an initial depositor awareness exists towards those guarantees.   
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An emphasis on collective memory suggests that a bank run takes place not only as a 
reaction to the damaged reputation of an individual institution, but also because of the loss of 
credibility of Government policies in the eyes of depositors. With respect to this, there 
remains a difference between retail and wholesale bank runs. Given that institutional 
investors possess a higher amount of ‘market information’ compared to retail depositors, 
wholesale depositors are more likely to react to news regarding the credibility of individual 
financial institutions. In other words, it is more likely that the business model of an individual 
institution and its viability in the long-term will be factored in by institutional investors. Retail 
depositors, on the other hand, process a different set of information in their decision-making. 
Given their limited access to market information and their lack of literacy in technical aspects 
of financial markets, current or previous institutional performance (as well as the 
performance of the industry as a whole) remains less relevant during bank runs by retail 
depositors. Instead, government’s role in handling previous crises and the level of awareness 
towards institutional safety nets become crucial in shaping expectations to the crisis at hand. 
This is where this research departs from traditional explanations in the banking panics 
literature.  
The economics literature on banking panics is mainly divided between sunspots (random 
withdrawals) and fundamentalist explanations. In a nutshell, the literature argues that either 
changes in the bank-specific fundamentals (which exceed a certain threshold in combination 
with a general macroeconomic downturn or a recession) or simply random events trigger an 
update in depositor expectations. The latter line of explanations emphasises random variables 
as triggers for changes in depositor behaviour. According to random withdrawals theory, 
sunspots1 are the underlying reasons for bank runs to become self-fulfilling. As opposed to 
sunspots theories that promote random variables, the second line of explanations emphasises 
information asymmetries and suggests deterioration in fundamentals as triggers for bank 
runs. These theories of bank runs put forward the threshold assumption to explain the ‘onset 
of an attack’. This assumes a rational update of expectations to a Bayesian equilibrium of a 
bank run upon the arrival of adverse news either on the bank itself, on the general economy, 
or on a combination of both. Following this logic, for two cases operating under similar 
economic vulnerabilities, an explanation based solely on immediate stimulus (to exceed a 
certain threshold condition) would require both of them to be (or not to be) exposed to bank 
run(s).  
                                                
1 Cass and Shell (1983, 194, footnote 1) define sunspots as follows: “[…] [E]xtrinsic uncertainty, that 
is, random phenomena that do not affect tastes, endowments, or production possibilities”. 
Accordingly, “[…] if consumers do not share the same beliefs about sunspot activity, then sunspots are 
bound to matter – even with perfect markets” (Cass and Shell 1983, 208). Extrinsic uncertainty, 
according to Shell and Smith (1992; referred in Ennis 2003, 55) is defined as uncertainty in economic 
outcomes, which is not based on the changes in economic fundamentals. Similarly, Kindleberger and 
Aliber (2005, 268, note 14) defines sunspots as to “[…] cover general uncertainty as opposed to the 
‘fundamentals’ that feature in rational expectations”. 
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This research rejects the sunspots arguments and embraces a fundamentals-view towards 
bank runs. Nonetheless, it argues that deterioration of fundamentals is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition itself for a change in depositor behaviour. In other words, not all changes 
in threshold conditions would lead to bank runs, as observed with numerous banking crises 
without any change in depositor behaviour. A rationalist political economy approach to bank 
runs would also put forward similar assumptions to those of the asymmetric information 
theory of bank runs.  
There have been attempts in the literature to explain the aforementioned lack of depositor 
runs with reference to the success of institutional settings. A historical analysis of the 
ninteenth-century banking crises in the United Kingdom reveals the significance of the lender 
of last resort function (‘LoLR’, hereafter) by the Bank of England in preventing banking 
panics. The banking history of the United States, on the other hand, illustrates the success of 
deposit insurance as an institutionalised guarantee on deposits. Referring to these historical 
episodes, institutionalist explanations put forward an understanding of institutions as 
reference points to constrain depositor behaviour. As formal and established institutions, 
they are expected to stabilise depositor expectations in the event of a banking crisis. 
However, as exemplified with the Northern Rock episode, neither of them had been 
sufficient enough to fulfil their roles in halting depositor panic.  
To illustrate, the LoLR commitment by the Bank of England had been available to 
financial institutions since the second half of the nineteenth century. As to be discussed in 
the following section, this commitment had successfully prevented individual bank failures 
from spreading to other banks in the system. However, while the Bank of England’s 
commitment had been perceived as credible enough to stop nineteenth-century banking 
panics, a century later it was interpreted as a signal strong enough to provoke a depositor run 
on Northern Rock. This points to an obvious change in the credibility of this specific 
institution in the eyes of depositors across centuries. As for the deposit insurance scheme, 
the Northern Rock crisis has revealed that there had been limited awareness towards its 
existence preceding the bank run episode. Therefore, the mere existence of this institutional 
safety net had not guaranteed to stabilise depositor expectations during the crisis.   
To summarise, banking panics literature suggests that depositor expectations converge 
either towards a random variable (which cannot be examined systematically across cases), 
towards the deterioration of fundamentals below of a certain threshold or, alternatively, 
towards deposit insurance as an institutional safety net to guarantee business as usual. 
Therefore, the way in which the current literature explains bank runs tends to prioritise 
material and institutional variables over ideational ones. Expectation-formation, placed at the 
centre of the analysis, is understood to be a function of changes in the material economic 
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and/or the institutional environment. Departing from traditional rationalist and 
institutionalist approaches, this research argues that there are certain reference points for 
depositors in order to interpret the current situation and act accordingly. It specifically 
highlights the role played by the Government’s handling of previous crises and awareness 
towards institutional safety nets in shaping expectations to the crisis at hand.   
This research argues that the reasons for a change in depositor behaviour may not only lie 
in the directly relevant material circumstances or in the shortcomings of the institutional 
settings, as suggested by the current literature. The current literature tends to overlook the 
influence of the past crises on expectation formation and expects deposit insurance to be 
efficient even without taking the state (level) of depositor awareness into consideration. In 
other words, the assumptions put forward by the banking panics literature fall short in paying 
adequate attention to the role played by ideas. Fundamentals explanations based on threshold 
conditions rest their analysis on the ongoing circumstances yet without incorporating the 
influence of the past experiences into their explanations. Although references are abundant 
on how deteriorating fundamentals might influence expectations, not enough attention is 
paid to how those are perceived and filtered by depositors. Studying bank runs, therefore, 
provides an opportunity to once more emphasise the significance of ideas in the functioning 
of the economy. With this aim, a constructivist political economy approach, taking both 
economic fundamentals and the role of politics into account, serves best to understand the 
nature of bank runs.  
The constructivist tradition in International Political Economy (IPE) literature has long 
emphasised the relevance and significance of ideas in analysing economic outcomes.2 As 
Abdelal (2009, 71) states in his review of constructivist approaches to IPE, “[b]y drawing 
attention to the powerful constitutive effects of collectively held ideas […] constructivism 
offers a way to describe patterns of political economy that are simply not amenable to 
rationalism”. An emphasis on explaining change rather than the status quo urged the re-
discovery of ideas, identity, culture, and norm as new causal factors (Blyth 2003, 695). Rather 
than rendering power or economic incentives insignificant in economic explanations, this 
                                                
2 As an example, analysing the role of wars and crises as mechanisms for international change, 
Widmaier, Blyth, and Seabrooke (2007, 748) argue that “[n]either state nor societal agents can react to 
material changes until they have interpreted them through diverse frameworks of understanding”. In 
an article on monetary cooperation Widmaier (2004, 449) argues “[…] that monetary understandings 
determine whether states will cooperate in the maintenance of wage, price, or currency guidelines or 
resort to austerity to stabilize monetary trends”. Similarly, in an attempt to understand why some 
international monetary regimes fail and the others succeed, McNamara (1998, 3-4) argues that “[b]oth 
changes in the structure of the international economy and the ideational factors [a ‘neoliberal policy 
consensus’] that shaped policymakers’ response to structural changes are crucial to the story of 
European monetary integration”. Analysing institutional change as an endogenous process, Blyth (2002, 7, 
8) also treats “[…] ideas and interests together as essentially embedded elements of institutional 
change”. Similarly and with an attempt to understand the IMF’s (changing) approach to capital 
controls across time, Chwieroth (2010, 3) also argues that the “[n]ormative and behavioral changes in 
[international organisations] […] are driven not just by new rules or the influence of member states but 
also by the evolving personnel configurations, beliefs, debates, and strategic agency of their staffs”.  
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emphasis on ideas, “[…] give[s] meaning to material facts so that governments and other 
actors in the IPE can interpret and react to them” (Abdelal 2009, 73). As Widmaier, Blyth, 
and Seabrooke (2007, 750) discuss, constructivist tradition values intersubjective 
understandings because of agents’ bounded rationality in employing ‘all available 
information’ in forming their expectatins. Therefore, the use of certain set of ideas in the 
diagnosis of a situation as a ‘crisis’ helps actors manage uncertainty (Blyth 2002, 10). 
This research analyses bank runs from a constructivist political economy perspective and 
with a special emphasis on the banking crisis of 2007-2009 in the United Kingdom. It argues 
that, while it is imperative to take political variables into account in analysing banks runs, the 
role played by the Government in managing previous crises has mostly been overlooked in 
the literature. It opposes to a pure Bayesian rationality and argues that depositor behaviour is 
also shaped through the use of cognitive heuristics in order to make sense of the ongoing 
uncertainty in times of crises. While deterioration in fundamentals cannot explain the 
occurrence of all bank runs; neither can the existence of deposit insurance scheme account 
for their infrequency. This research, therefore, emphasises the role played by the 
Government in managing previous crises and its implications for depositor expectations and 
awareness towards institutionalised guarantees in the banking sector.  
In addition to studying Northern Rock as the most recent example of a modern retail run, 
this research also examines the following bank failures within the period of a year, namely 
Alliance and Leicester, HBOS, and Bradford and Bingley (in order of failure). It addresses 
the following research puzzle: While all the four cases examined had been exposed to 
negative publicity either because of their falling share prices, unsuccessful right issues or the 
emergency funding received from the Bank of England, only two of them faced depositor 
runs leading to their failures, namely Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley. During the 
initial months of the crisis and in spite of the wide publicity that the Northern Rock’s 
problems had received, it was business as usual for the other banks without any generalised 
collapse of depositor confidence in the banking system. As a matter of fact, there had been a 
‘flight-to-quality (safety)’ from Northern Rock to other deposit providers, including the 
demutualised building societies (shortly ‘ex-mutuals’) that this research analyses.3 Following 
the first quarter of 2008, however, all ex-mutuals were understood to be in financial difficulty 
and on the verge of collapse. At the end of the year, they were either nationalised (Northern 
Rock and Bradford and Bingley) or taken over by their bigger rivals (Alliance and Leicester, 
HBOS, Bradford and Bingley). A detailed process tracing of the period (to the best of 
available data), reveals that while Alliance and Leicester and HBOS had not been subject to 
any significant depositor run, there had been a silent (electronic) run on Bradford and 
                                                
3 Mayes and Wood (2008, 16, footnote 15) also make a similar point: “It is noticeable that the run on 
Northern Rock was not primarily a flight from bank deposits into cash but a transfer of  deposits from 
a bank thought to be in trouble to other major banks thought to be ‘‘safe’’ ”. 
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Bingley only days before and resulting to its nationalisation.4 Explaining the motives behind 
these depositor runs is the research objective of this thesis.   
Historical comparisons in the literature have mainly concentrated on the 19th century 
National Banking Era panics in the United States or on the ones during early Great 
Depression (Bougheas 1999, 132; Calomiris and Gorton 1991, 112). Therefore, the first 
empirical contribution of this research to the banking panics literature is a detailed analysis 
on the most recent retail bank run in an advanced market economy. Secondly, the emerging 
literature on Northern Rock places special emphasis on the role played by the regulatory 
framework then in place and how this has changed as a response to the crisis. This research, 
on the other hand, specifically focuses on the retail depositor run and investigates the 
underlying motivations for depositor behaviour. Finally, this research is also an attempt to 
present a comparative analysis on the four bank failures within the banking crisis of 2007-
2009 in order to understand the reasons and the causal mechanisms for the variance on 
depositor behaviour across cases. Although Northern Rock has captured increasing scholarly 
attention from several academic disciplines, the comparison of September 2007 with the 
following cases has not been adequately addressed in the literature. This research believes 
that September 2007 (bank run on Northern Rock) and February 2008 (nationalisation of the 
bank), as the two significant turning points during the recent crisis in the United Kingdom, 
might provide a semi-controlled before-after comparison for analysing bank runs.  
Against the background of empirical evidence collected and also theoretically informed by 
the banking panics and cognitive heuristics literatures, the argument put forward with this 
research is as follows: While not discounting the significance, as well as the relevance, of the 
material and institutional settings, this research highlights the role played by ideas as an under-
analysed variable in explaining bank runs. It depicts depositors with bounded rationality and 
suggests the use of cognitive heuristics under uncertainty for a meaningful interpretation of 
the current situation. It argues that a bank run is not only a function of the prevailing 
economic circumstances (fundamentals) and/or the institutional settings, but also a function 
of the depositor awareness towards the safety nets in place and collective memory of past 
institutional failures. While the banking panics literature focuses mainly on the first two, this 
research higlights the significance of the last two as potential reference points towards which 
depositor expectations converge.  
The rest of this introductory chapter is structured as follows: The following first section 
will provide a brief background and conceptual clarification for banking crises. A detailed 
presentation of this research’s argument is the subject of the second section, where it will 
also discuss the hypotheses tested and the main empirical findings. The third section has two 
                                                
4 Anecdotal evidence suggests that HBOS had also been subject to an outflow of deposit during 
September 2008. However, this is not as well documented as the run on Bradford and Bingley and is 
only mentioned in a few newspaper articles. This point is further discussed in Chaper VII.  
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aims: While illustrating this research’s metholodgy and justifying why it serves best to this 
research’s objectives, it will also present an overall discussion on case-study and process-
tracing methods in qualitative research. To conclude, the chapter will finally provide the 
reader with the thesis structure, which will guide her through the chapters. 
 
1.1  A Short  His tor i ca l  Background on Banking Cris e s   
This short background section will start with reviewing the banking panics in the United 
Kingdom in the second half of the nineteenth-century. Following this, it will discuss the role 
assigned to ‘clearing houses’ during the National Banking Era (1863-1913) in the United 
States. Examining these two periods, this section will highlight how the nineteenth-century 
banking panics in the United Kingdom had been alleviated (1) thanks to the LoLR 
commitment by the Bank of England and (2) even without an official deposit insurance 
scheme being in place. As suggested by Gorton and Huang (2002, 32), “[t]he lender-of-last-
resort function, including money creation, monitoring, and deposit insurance arose from 
private arrangements among banks”, functions which are currently associated with public 
bodies.5 While the LoLR function is mostly performed by central banks, government 
guarantees on bank deposits (in the shape of a deposit insurance) is a recent phenomenon as 
early as the twentieth century.  Through providing a number of definitions of banking crises 
and banking panics (also bank runs), this section will also highlight the difference and the 
relationship between these concepts.  
Preceding the most recent crisis in 2007-2009, the history of banking crises shall be 
divided, in broad terms, into the following four main periods: 19th century crises (including 
also the first decades of the 20th century), the banking crises during the Great Depression, the 
Bretton Woods Era (until late 1970s), and the (post-Bretton Woods) fiat money era banking 
crises. There have been several banking panics throughout the nineteenth-century not only in 
the United States, but also in the United Kingdom during when the LoLR function of the 
Bank of England gradually evolved (Wood 1999; Wood 2000, 203). As Capie and Wood 
(1995, 215, 218) state, “[…] the lender of last resort function is a nineteenth-century 
construct […] Before 1870 there had been no consistency in the behaviour of the Bank. 
Sometimes it came to the rescue of the market and sometimes it did not. Sometimes it bailed 
out insolvent institutions and at other times it did not”. Calomiris (2011, 109) defines this as 
                                                
5 Another research by Donaldson (1992) investigates how banks experiencing depositor runs receive 
cash during panics and explores the role of interbank trade and liquidation costs. The model specifies 
that “[…] it is the endogenous cost of liquidation, along with a random productivity shock, which 
determines the number of banks that are run and whether or not there is a general panic” (Donaldson 
1992, 61). The study concludes that, despite deposit insurance schemes, the lender of last resort 
function of central banks is still required to provide the necessary funds into the banking system 
during panics.   
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“one of the most fascinating historical examples of a change from banking instability to 
stability”. 
The three biggest crises of the late nineteenth-century in the United Kingdom are the 
failure of Overend, Gurney and Co. in 18666, the City of Glasgow Bank failure in 18787, and 
the 1890 Baring crisis. During the failure of Overend, Gurney and Co., the Bank of England 
was initially reluctant to act to save the institution. The Bank’s decisive intervention to the 
City of Glasgow Bank, however, resulted in no observed bank runs during the episode 
(Wood 1999, 103). Similarly, there were none major depositor panics during the failure of 
Baring, which involved private initiatives orchestrated by the Bank of England (Wood 1999, 
104; see also Wood 2000, 216). Wood (1999, 104) argues that the difference between these 
three episodes rests in the fact that “[…] if a ‘panic’ turned into a ‘real’ crisis, the crisis could 
be stopped by prompt LoLR action”. Although it may not be necessary within an appropriate 
banking system structure (Wood 1999, 105), Wood concludes that prompt LoLR action 
should suffice to stop a banking crisis (Wood 2000, 208; Wood 1999, 105)  
In the United States, on the other hand, “[d]epositor behavior changed after 1914 (the 
founding of the Federal Reserve) and again after 1934 (the start of deposit insurance), but 
despite that, crises remained systematic, linked to the business cycle” (Wood 1999, 101).  
Before the establishment of the Federal Reserve System (the ‘Fed’, hereafter) and during the 
National Banking Era, the banking industry in the United States was supervised by a network 
of commercial bank clearing houses as private banking associations during the.8 Gorton and 
Mullineaux (1987, 457, 458) argue that the establishment of the clearing houses (in order to 
set reserve requirements, deposit-rate ceilings and perform bank examinations) had been an 
‘endogenous’ regulatory response to the information asymmetries embedded in the banking 
system. The certificates issued by those houses, which would substitute deposits if needed 
and clear mutual inter-bank transactions, were commonly used to alleviate banking panics 
(Calomiris and Gorton 1991, 119; Andrew 1908, 497, 507; Kindleberger and Aliber 2005, 
185-6).9 Clearing house certificates were secured against collaterals deposited in those houses 
and were guaranteed by all participating banks (Andrew 1908, 508). In this sense, these 
certificates would help banks to demonstrate their asset positions to their depositors in the 
case of a banking panic (Park 1991, 277). Therefore,  
 
[…] since these securities were the liability of the association of banks rather than of 
any individual bank, depositors were insured against the failure of their individual 
                                                
6 For a detailed account of the case see Batchelor 1995.  
7 For a detailed account of the case see Rosenblum 1933.  
8 As mentioned previously, the banking panics literature puts special emphasis on this period, which 
was abundant in examples of depositor panics and lacked an extablished deposit insurance scheme. 
For examples see Calomiris and Gorton 1991; Gorton 2007; Gorton 2009; Chari 1989.  
9 During the panics of 1893 and 1907, loan certificates were also issued by banks in small 
denominations to their depositors (Chari 1989, 5).  
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bank […] [Also monitoring member banks,] [t]hese institutions not only cleared 
interbank liabilities but, in response to banking panics, they acted as lenders of last 
resort, issuing private money and providing deposit insurance (Calomiris and Gorton 
1991, 119). 
 
After the Second World War until the end of the Bretton Woods system (approximately for 
30 years), only three countries experienced banking crises: Brazil in 1963, Uruguay in 1971, 
and India in 1947-48. Although the frequency of banking crises for the advanced and the 
larger emerging market economies had decreased significantly after the Second World War 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, 150-151), the post-Bretton Woods era experienced a surge in the 
number of banking crises across countries, not only for the developing and transition, but 
also for advanced market economies.10 Accompanied by non-systemic ones, there had been 
‘Big Five’ banking crises in advanced market economies prior to the most recent banking 
crisis of 2007-2009. Those were in Spain (1977), Norway (1987), Finland and Sweden (1991), 
and Japan (1992), in addition to the Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis in 1980s in the United 
States.11 Despite growing episodes of banking crises in the post-Bretton Woods era, however, 
these countries had been successful in containing individual bank runs and preventing them 
from turning into banking panics. This success, as a matter of fact, has mostly been attributed 
to the efficiency of the deposit insurance scheme. 
Despite varying across different periods, what were the determinants of banking crises?  
Even though there is not an agreed-on definition, the one provided by Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1997) has mostly been referred to in the literature. Accordingly, for an episode 
of distress to be classified as a full-fledged banking crisis, at least one of the following four 
conditions should hold:  
 
1. The ratio of non-performing assets to total assets in the banking system exceeded 
10%, 
2. The cost of the rescue operation was at least 2% of GDP, 
3. Banking sector problems resulted in a large scale nationalization of banks, 
4. Extensive bank runs took place or emergency measures such as deposit freezes, 
prolonged bank holidays, or generalized deposit guarantees were enacted by the 
government in response to the crisis (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1997, 12) 
 
 
                                                
10 Schumacher (2000) investigates the Argentinian banking panic after the ‘tequila shock’ following 
Mexico’s devaluation in 1994. Opposing to the sunspots view of bank runs, the study concludes that 
“[…] the Argentine bank runs were not due to any self-fulfillment of depositor behavior but to 
depositor concerns about the ability of individual banks to survive the currency run […] in addition to 
the fall in deposits explained by the currency run, depositors reallocated deposits from banks that were 
not likely to survive the currency run (‘bad’ banks) to banks that were likely to survive the currency run 
(‘good’ banks)” (Schumacher 2000, 259). See also Blejer, Feldman, and Feltenstein 1997. Other studies 
on the Argentinian banking crisis of 2001 investigates the causes of bank runs during this period 
(McCandless, Gabrielli, and Rouillet 2003) and the impact of deposit freezes in the aftermath of bank 
runs (See Ennis and Keister 2007; Ennis and Keister 2009). 
11 For a detailed discussion see also Reinhart and Rogoff 2008.   
 
15 
Eichengreen and Bordo (2002, 15-16) also present a definition for banking crises for whom  
 
[...] an episode to qualify as a banking crisis, we must observe either bank runs, 
widespread bank failures, and the suspension of convertibility of deposits into 
currency such that the latter circulates at a premium relative to deposits (a banking 
panic), or significant banking sector problems (including but not limited to bank 
failures) resulting in the erosion of most or all of banking system collateral that are 
reserved by a fiscally-underwritten bank restructuring.  
 
Finally, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 11) mark a banking crisis by the following two types of 
events: 
 
1.     Bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one 
or more financial institutions, 
2. If there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government 
assistance if an important financial institution (or group of institutions) that marks the 
start of string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions. 
 
All these aforementioned definitions suggest that banks’ solvency may be endangered either 
by an asset side distress or as a result of a depositor run, which might put them on the edge 
of the cliff if not contained at an early stage. To this research’s understanding and also in line 
with the asymmetric information theory of bank runs (to be explain shortly), a bank run 
occurs when a considerable amount of deposit holders expect Bank A to be not in an 
economically healthy condition to provide the depositors’ money back on demand. In these 
cases of limited bank runs, deposits withdrawn from Bank A are transferred to Bank B, which 
is regarded to be solvent in the eyes of depositors. Thus, the rest of the banking system in 
general enjoys a significant level of confidence. On the other hand, banking panics are 
defined as instances when most of the, if not the whole, banking system gets into a wavelike 
trap of bank runs, as experienced during the nineteenth century banking panics.12 In such 
circumstances, the following three outcomes emerge: (1) simultaneous withdrawals of 
deposits (funds either placed ‘under the mattresses’ or saved/invested in alternative segments 
of the financial system)13; (2) no ‘flight-to-quality’14; and (3) no ‘newcomers’ as potential 
depositors to the banking system. From the bank’s point of view, “[i]f the run is on a single 
bank, that bank may be able to borrow from a pool of other private banks that effectively 
provide deposit insurance to one another. However, if the run affects a broad enough range 
of institutions, private insurance pooling will not work” (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, 144-145; 
emphasis added).  
                                                
12 This research defines a banking panic with regards to the level of contagion and as a situation during 
when several banks become subject to a depositor run. Alternatively, a banking panic can also be 
defined through the amount of funds withdrawn from the system. 
13 Blejer, Feldman, and Feltenstein (1997, 4, footnote 2) mention a further type of flight to quality 
during when deposits are transferred to banks which are perceived to operate under implicit or explicit 
guarantees.  
14 In instances where no ‘flight to quality’ is observed, depositors do not place their money in any of 
the banks, regardless of how sound they may seem.  
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Several scholars define a banking panic as a simultaneous run on all (or many) banks, 
while defining a bank run as an individual run on a single institution (as examples see Gorton 
1988, 753, footnote 1; Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993, 26).15 According to Calomiris and 
Gorton (1991, 112), on the other hand, it is not common to observe banking panics when all 
the banks operating in the banking system are exposed to depositor runs. Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1997, 8) refer to the signalling effect of an individual bank run, which might 
turn itself into a banking panic and become contagious. In a recent study, Gorton (2009, 5) 
argues that a banking panic takes place when ‘informationally-insensitive’ debt becomes 
‘informationally-sensitive’ as a result of a shock that creates uncertainty. In their systematic 
analysis of banking crises Laeven and Valencia (2008a, 5) treat any “monthly percentage 
decline in deposits in excess of 5%” as a bank run. They argue that 62 per cent of the banking 
crises analysed in their study experienced bank runs, defined as ‘momentary sharp reductions 
in total deposits’ (Laeven and Valencia 2008a, 19, 5). In addition to the conceptual 
differentiation between a bank run and a banking panic, the terminology applied to describe a 
bank run also differentiates between the type of depositors withdrawing (whole-sale 
(institutional investors) versus retail depositors) and the nature of the run taking place (on-
line (electronic/silent) versus off-line (nineteenth-centry style)16). While electronic runs do 
not require depositors to be physically present at the branch, off-line runs are manifested in 
depositor queues in front of the branches with signalling effects on uninformed depositors.   
From a policy-perspective, a better understanding of depositor behaviour is of 
significance for the future stability of the banking system. The worst scenario including a 
bank run may have serious consequences not only for the banking sector, but also for the 
financial system and the real economy in general, such as the following:17 Debt contracts with 
short-term maturities require lenders’ decision on whether or not to roll over their debt 
(Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh 2003, 13). A bank run might be regarded as depositors’ 
refusal to roll over their short-term loans (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, xli), either in the form 
of deposit withdrawals or through their refusal to renew their maturing deposit contracts 
(Caprio and Honohan 2008, 1). It might generate a “[…] liquidity shock that will, in turn, 
reduce the quality of the bank portfolios, possibly by enough to validate the initially 
exaggerated fears that motivated the bank run” (Gavin and Hausmann 1998, 5). En masse 
withdrawals of deposits might force banks to liquidate their portfolios at fire-sale prices.18 
                                                
15 “A bank panic occurs when depositors demand such a large-scale transformation of deposits into 
currency that, at the contracted for exchange rate […], the banking system can only respond by 
suspending convertibility of deposits into currency, issuing clearinghouse loan certificates, or both” 
(Gorton 1988, 752-3).  
16 Kaufman (2000, 16) also defines them as ‘noisy paper’ bank runs.  
17 For further discussion see also Blejer, Feldman, Feltenstein (1997, 4-5) and Capie and Wood 1995, 
210-1).  
18 This whole sale of assets by numerous banks may cause normally liquid assets to become illiquid and 
the complete dry-up of the whole market (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, 144).   
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This large net resource transfer to depositors on time and at par value, therefore, destabilises 
banks’ balance sheets, the fire-sale of assets may lead to a downward spiral in asset prices and 
convert a liquidity shortage into an insolvency problem (Gavin and Hausmann 1998, 7, 5).19 
At the end, the damage on the banks’ balance sheet caused by the depositor run results in the 
run itself to become self-fulfilling (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, 144). 
While, by definition, all banking crises are caused by deteriorating fundamentals, not all 
bank runs can be explained with reference to those. The banking panics literature has been 
occupied with the following questions in order to understand the underlying motivations for 
changes in depositor behaviour: Do bank runs originate from a deterioration in bank’s 
fundamentals or are they just a panic-based phenomenon with little, if any, basis on the 
bank’s financial circumstances? In other words, can self-fulfilling expectations alone account 
for the variance in depositor behaviour or should they be grounded in fundamentals? There 
are two mainstream theories in the banking panics literature, namely sunspots and 
asymmetric information theories of bank runs, for explaining depositor behaviour. The 
following section will discuss those theories shortly, as well as the cognitive heuristics 
literature, and will illustrate this research’s hypotheses to be tested with the case studies. It 
will also present the main empirical findings of this research.  
 
1.2 Hypothese s  Tes t ed  and Empir i ca l  Findings    
 
“[…] [F]inancial crises must result from the 
combination of weak fundamentals and adverse self-
fulfilling agents’ expectations, as opposed to 
expectational shifts alone”  
(Vaugirard 2007, 405) 
 
 
The previous section has mentioned the two mainstream theories in the banking panics 
literature to explain the underlying reasons for bank runs. This current section will shortly 
present those theories, while saving a detailed discussion for the following second chapter, 
and will unpack this research’s argument against this theoretical background. This will help 
the reader to better understand where the hypotheses tested with this research are derived 
from. In doing so, it will also expand the argument as to cover the cognitive heuristics 
                                                
19 Faced with a liquidity shocks, banks may also call back the loans on their asset portfolio to meet 
depositor demands. However, bank loans are long-term illiquid assets which cannot be easily 
converted into cash on short notice (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, xl). Therefore, the extreme case is that, 
“[…] the inability of bank borrowers to make transfers that banks need to pay their depositors would 
generate bank insolvencies, runs, and a breakdown of the financial system” (Gavin and Hausmann 
1996, 11). Not directly relevant but an interesting study by Garber and Grilli (1989, 165) analyse to 
bank runs in open economies where “[…] a foreign banking system, by raising deposit rates in the 
presence of a domestic banking panic, may generate sufficient liquid resources to acquire assets sold by 
the domestic banking system at bargain prices” .  
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literature, from which this research utilises in explaining depositor behaviour. Finally, this 
section will present a full list of the hypotheses, as well as the working assumptions, and the 
main empirical findings at the end of this section.      
The literature on banking panics is mainly divided between sunspots (random 
withdrawals) and fundamentalist explanations. The first line of explanations emphasises 
random variables as triggers for changes in depositor behaviour. According to random 
withdrawals theory, sunspots are the underlying reasons for bank runs to become self-
fulfilling. Given this research’s interest in explaining bank runs through identifiable causal 
mechanisms, the main hypothesis put forward by the random withdrawal theory, that bank 
runs are triggered by random variables, is the null hypothesis of this research.  
As opposed to sunspots theories that promote random variables, the second line of 
explanations emphasises information asymmetries and suggests deterioration in 
fundamentals as triggers for bank runs. Information asymmetry theory of bank runs, which 
falls under the fundamentalist approaches, focuses on the dissemination of information and 
its effect on depositor behaviour. Several authors working on the asymmetric theory of bank 
runs prioritise different aspects of fundamentals when explaining depositor behaviour.20 
Despite prominent nuances across those various studies, however, the common denominator 
within this tradition is their objection to sunspots as random triggers for bank runs. The 
following Chapter II will present those, as well as the random withdrawal theories, in detail 
and will highlight the strengths and the weaknesses of both theories. However, a short 
overview of their testable assumptions is of significance in order to better illustrate how this 
research’s hypotheses are derived from the literature.    
According to the asymmetric information theory, the signal extraction to fill information 
asymmetries across depositors might be through observing either other depositors (in the 
queues), the state of  the bank itself  (bank-idiosyncratic fundamentals), or the state of  the 
economy in general.  To start with, Calomiris and Gorton (1991) argue that failed businesses 
possess signalling effects to point to the upcoming recession. With an attempt to understand 
the impact of  macroeconomic environment on depositor behaviour, Schotter and 
Yorulmazer (2009, 219) discover that “[…] the dynamics and the severity of  bank runs 
depend on the state of  the economy when a crisis occurs”. Bougheas (1999) also presents a 
‘common shock’ argument. Accordingly, “[…] bank runs become contagious only during 
periods of  economic downturns” (Bougheas 1999, 143).  Al-Zein (2008, 5) links bank runs to 
the liquidity position of  the bank. For him a bank run is never a possibility for a liquid bank 
even after a bad dream. Relatedly, Park (1991) highlights that the banking panics may be 
prevented with the provision of  bank-specific information. Dupont (2007) makes a similar 
point to argue that the provision of  bank specific information on a regular basis help to 
                                                
20 References to relevant studies are presented in Chapter II.  
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stabilise depositor expectations.  
Chari and Jagannathan (1988) differentiate between different groups of  depositors with 
regards to their level of  knowledge of  the ongoing problems in the banking system. There 
are some individuals who wish to withdraw since they think the current return of  
consumption is higher than the future returns of  their deposits. Others may withdraw 
without any ‘informationally based reason’. According to these scholars, there might also be 
cases where the random combination of  these different types of  depositors is large enough 
to have signalling effects on uninformed depositors and start a run on a bank (Chari and 
Jagannathan 1988, 749). Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 4) also emphasise the signalling effect 
of  ‘off-line runs’ since they suggest that the “[...] depositors’ first indication of  trouble can be 
a line of  other depositors waiting to collect their funds”.21  
The modern form of bank runs (as in the shape of electronic (silent) runs), however, 
cannot be explained with reference to the aforementioned signalling effect of the initial ‘line 
length’. Even for instances of off-line depositor runs, there should be, at least, a focal point 
among these first runners, on which a common interpretation of bank’s insolvency can be 
based. Where does this focal point come from? As stated above, random withdrawal theories 
promote sunspots as random variables that cause changes in depositor expectations. 
Nonetheless, this approach has been criticised for failing to provide testable assumptions for 
empirical scrutiny. On the other hand, the asymmetric information theories of bank runs put 
forward threshold conditions in order to explain bank runs as a unique equilibrium phenomenon. As 
an example and contrary to sunspots explanations, Goldstein and Pauzner (2005, 1294) 
model bank runs where the threshold levels of fundamentals of the economy determine the 
occurrence of a unique Bayesian equilibrium “[…] in which a bank run occurs if and only if 
the fundamentals are below some critical value”. This emphasis on threshold levels of 
fundamentals, however, points to another question: how can we explain depositor reactions 
that are not always proportionate to the ongoing situation?  
In order to tackle this, one explanation put forward by the literature has been ‘self-
fulfilling prophecies’.22 According to Merton (1948, 195), a self-fulfilling prophecy allows a 
false conception come true by evoking a new behaviour. As suggested by the Thomas 
theorem, once a considerable amount of people believe that the bank is insolvent, 
consequences becomes irrelevant of whether the insolvency was real or not. It suggests that 
actors do not only react to the objective characteristics of the situation, but to the ‘meaning 
this situation has for them’ (Merton 1948, 194). Accordingly, once this meaning becomes 
attached to the objective situation, behaviours become determined by this subjective meaning 
                                                
21 See again Chari and Jagannathan 1988. 
22 Self-fulfilling prophecies are mostly promoted by the second generation of financial crises. Ennis 
and Keister (2010a) present a summary of a number of studies on bank runs which stress self-fulfilling 
prophecies. This point will be discussedfurther in Chapter II. 
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more than the objective situation (Merton 1948, 194). Both theories of bank runs refer to 
self-fulfilling prophecies in explaining how individual expectations converge to lead to a 
collective outcome. Although they depart from each other on their interpretation of the initial 
triggers for bank runs (sunspots versus information asymmetries), they share some common 
interpretation on the process of how expectations cascade. In other words and as an example, 
for several studies within the information asymmetries theories a strong link between 
fundamentals and crises does not necessarily rule out the possibility of a panic with a self-
fulfilling element.23 However, self-fulfilling prophecies, which suggest a multiple equilibria 
approach, have mostly been criticised for “[…] not explain[ing] the shift in beliefs, which 
incites the economy to move from one equilibrium to the next” (Metz 2002, 66; see also 
Metz and Michaelis 2003). As Morris and Shin (1998, 587) also argue, pointing to self-
fulfilling prophecies falls short in explaining the onset of an attack when it occurs.  
Against the background of this criticism, several authors have acknowledged the interplay 
between fundamentals and expectations as the two aspects of self-fulfilling crises. Obstfeld 
(1996, 1039) argues that the underlying macro/microeconomic fundamentals are significant 
in shaping depositor expectations as they determine the range of possible equilibria.24 
However, despite making a collapse possible they do not render it an economic necessity 
(Obstfeld 1996, 1041). Conversely, Jeanne (2000, 33) states that even though the occurrence 
and timing of crises are dependent on multiple equilibria, which may suggest self-fulfilling 
prophecies, “[…] these equilibria can grow only on the fertile ground of deteriorated 
fundamentals”. Are fundamentals, be it bank-specific or system-wide, the only source to 
influence depositor expectations?  
While the two theories of  bank runs analyse the triggers for changes in depositor 
behaviour, a third line of  explanations discusses the business as usual with reference to deposit 
insurance as an institutionalised guarantee to stabilise depositor expectations. While, 
according to the asymmetric information theories of  bank runs, the deterioration of  the 
economic fundamentals (below a certain threshold) is a sufficient condition to prompt a 
change in depositor behaviour, deposit insurance should ideally be sufficient to prevent this in 
the first place. Therefore, the way in which the banking panics literature analyses bank runs 
prioritises fundamentals and/or institution-based explanations over ideational ones.  
With regards to the institutional dimensions of  a bank run, this research argues that in 
                                                
23 “It should be clarified that finding correlation (even if it is very strong) between fundamentals and 
crises is not a proof against the “panic” hypothesis. It is possible that the self-fulfilling expectations are 
triggered by fundamentals, in which case fundamentals are associated with crises, but crises would not 
have occurred without the coordination failure” (Goldstein 2010, 10). This point has also been 
emphasised by Starr and Yilmaz 2007. Accordingly, asymmetric information theories of bank runs 
“[…] do not rule out the possibility that runs have self-fulfilling aspects; they only establish that runs 
are not ‘sunspots’ unrelated to fundamental factors” (Starr and Yilmaz 2007, 1113). For another 
example for bank runs modeled along those lines see Goldstein and Pauzner 2005.  
24 In an earlier paper, however, Obstfeld (1984) argues that “[…] given certain expectations about 
policy, balance-of-payments crises can also be purely self-fulfiling events”.  
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order for expectations to stabilise, first there needs to be a certain level of  depositor awareness 
towards deposit insurance in place. This, as a matter of  fact, presents an additional 
information asymmetry between the bank and its depositors during a banking crisis. This 
‘perception lag’ has commonly been ignored by the banking panics literature. This research 
acknowledges the growing number of  studies that criticise the efficiency of  the deposit 
insurance scheme in preventing bank runs and thus failing to provide stability into the 
banking sector. The institutional shortcomings of  the scheme (such as its limited coverage 
limit, co-insurance principle attached and the previous compensation delays to depositors, to 
name a few) might provide depositors with negative incentives to withdraw their funds 
despite the guarantee being in place. In the absence of  a deposit insurance scheme or as a 
result of  its inefficiencies, the severity of  the situation may also require authorities to 
introduce blanket (mostly unlimited) guarantees on deposits to restore depositor confidence. 
However, as Laeven and Valencia (2008a, 10) argue, the success of  the blanket guarantee in 
stabilising depositor expectations also rests in the credibility of  the authorities in the eyes of  
depositors.  
This research argues that the self-fulfilling nature of  bank runs and the threshold models 
in the literature with a Bayesian emphasis require a better understanding of  the role ideas play 
during bank runs. A well-established body of  literature argues that complexity and 
uncertainty requires people to refer to cognitive heuristics during decision-making. Given the 
Bayesian bias in the fundamentals view of  bank runs, the literature models a ‘rational 
depositor’ who rationally updates her expectations with the arrival of  new piece of  
information. This research instead depicts depositors with bounded rationality and suggests 
the use of  cognitive heuristics under complex and uncertain situations for a meaningful 
interpretation of  the circumstances. This reference to cognitive shortcuts, especially to the 
use of  reference points, might help understand why under similar conditions depositors react 
differently. Contrary to the threshold models, news introduces ‘the new situation’ to the 
perceptions of  many; however, information processing does rarely take place in a perfect 
Bayesian sense. Cognitive shortcuts are most of  the time referred to for the definition and 
the assessment of  this new situation. A detailed critique of  the current literature and an 
analysis of  the mainstream cognitive heruistics literature, mainly by Kahneman and Tversky, 
will be presented in the following Chapter II.  
Against this background, the building blocks of  this research’s argument are the 
deterioration of  economic fundamentals (as a necessary but not a sufficient condition), 
awareness towards the institutionalised safety nets for deposit accounts and the collective 
memory of  the past institutional failures to serve as potential reference points. To this 
research’s understanding and similar to the asymmetric information theory, bank runs are not 
instances where depositor motivations are completely detached from the unfolding situation. 
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As opposed to sunspots explanations referring to random variables, this research’s argument 
is closer to the information asymmetries theories, which necessities a deterioration in 
fundamentals. It argues that the variables put forward by the literature are crucial in shaping 
depositor expectations. Nevertheless, they should not be taken into the analysis on their face 
value. Depositor responses are also shaped through references to past failures and awareness 
towards the institutional arrangements in place, which provides them with focal points to 
converge their expectations towards certain outcomes. 
Informed by the literature both on banking panics and cognitive heuristics, a set of  
hypotheses and working assumptions can be listed in three main categories. Since this 
research is an attempt to systematically analyse the reasons for depositor runs, sunspot 
explanation that promote random variables serves as this research’s null hypothesis (H0). The 
following second hypothesis (H1) is founded on the fundamentals view of  banking panics 
and suggests the deterioration of  economic fundamentals as the triggers for a change in 
depositor behaviour. Four different working assumptions are derived from the asymmetric 
information theories, which are based on the numerous studies conducted within this 
tradition. The first (WA1) and the third (WA3) of  those are related how bank runs might 
turn into banking panics and thus are not directly related to this thesis research question. 
While the second working assumption (WA2) tests the signalling effects of  off-line bank 
runs, the final fourth assumption deals with the phenomenon of  ‘flight-to-quality’ (WA4).  
A third hypothesis and a set of  related working assumptions follow those, which deal with 
the institutional dimensions of  bank runs. The third hypothesis (H2) argues that deposit 
insurance scheme, as an institutionalised guarantee on deposits, should ideally be sufficient 
enough to prevent changes in depositor behaviour. It should, in other words, provide enough 
guarantees for depositors not to panic upon adverse news. Nonetheless, the nineteenth-
century banking panics in the United Kingdom and the aforementioned LoLR function by 
the Bank of  England suggests that the deposit insurance scheme is not a necessary condition 
to prevent bank runs. In the example of  City of  Glasgow Bank’s failure, the actions by the 
Bank of  England had been sufficient to prevent a spillover in the banking system. However, 
the banking history of  the United States, especially after the Great Depression, highilghts the 
significance of  deposit insurance to stabilise depositor expectations. There is a growing body 
of  literature, discussed in Chapter II, which emphasises the effect of  deposit insurance as an 
institutionalised guarantee on the formation of  bank runs. As suggested in the literature; 
however, the efficiency of  the deposit insurance is conditioned on several aspects of  the 
scheme, which are described in the following working assumptions. The upper limit of  
deposits covered, co-insurance principle attached and the compensation delays in repayments 
are among the most important specifications of  the scheme to determine its efficiency 
(WA5). Although not tested with this research, the lack of  commitment by the Authorities on 
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deposit freezes or payment re-schedulings is another motivation for bank runs (WA6). It is 
further argued in the literature that de facto (such as the implicit ‘too-big (interconnected)-to-
fail’ understanding) or ex post (blanket) guarantees should stabilise depositor expectations in 
the case of  an inefficient deposit insurance scheme (WA7). Finally, the coherence and the 
consistency in the policies to address the ongoing crisis in the banking system also affect 
depositor expectations, and thus depositor behaviour (WA8).  
While the aforementioned H0, H1 and H2 are derived mainly from the banking panics 
literature, H3 is an addition to those by this research’s emphasis on depositor awareness 
towards the safety nets in place. It argues that the lack of  depositor awareness of  the 
institutionalised guarantees might further contribute to change depositor behaviour. In other 
words, the inefficiency of  a deposit insurance scheme in preventing a bank run might also 
originate from the lack of  depositor awareness towards its existence, in addition to the 
aforementioned shortcomings documented in the literature. As a note of  caution, in cases 
where there exists no awareness towards deposit insurance, it seems counter-intuitive to be 
able to test the efficiency of  the scheme (H2). In other words, H2 cannot be tested for cases 
where there is no depositor awareness towards existing deposit insurance schemes. As in the 
example of  Northern Rock, this research suggests that there had been a lack of  depositor 
awareness towards the safety nets in place to protect their money in case of  failure. For this 
case, any attempt to test the efficiency of  the scheme would prove fruitless. On the other 
hand, however, Bradford and Bingley case allows for testing H2, i.e. the efficiency of  deposit 
insurance scheme¸since there had been increased depositor awareness towards the scheme’s 
existence (see Chapter VI Section 2 for evidence and a detailed discussion).      
Finally, H4 is derived from the mainstream cognitive heruistics literature and is promoted 
for filling the gap in the banking panics literature’s understanding of  decision-making under 
uncertainty. Three working assumptions are argued, namely availability, representativeness, 
and anchoring heuristics, which are tested with the empirical cases, where relevant. To 
emphasise once more, the novelty with this research is, its application of  basic cognitive 
heuristics assumptions into the analysis of  bank runs, as well as its emphasis on an additional 
information asymmetry in the shape of  depositor unawareness. More specifically, the role of  
collective memory is tested throughout cases where fundamentals fall short in explaining the 
variance on the outcome. As illustrated above, this research argues that, the credibility of  past 
Government actions is of  signifance for the cases of  depositor runs. A depositor run on a 
bank, in other words, does not only illustrate a breakdown of  trust towards a certain bank, 
but also a lack of  credibility of  Government policies in the eyes of  depositors.  
As mentioned above, the collective memory, as an additional variable to explain bank runs, 
refers to the re-collections about the Government’s handling of  previous crises. In the case 
of  Northern Rock, the following Chapter IV will illustrate how collective memory of  past 
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institutional failures and the Government’s handling of  those had affected depositor 
behaviour. As aforementioned, a comparison between the failure of  City of  Glasgow Bank in 
the nineteenth-century and the Northern Rock case in 2007 illustrates the changing sentiment 
towards the Government’s efficiency in crisis management. While the LoLR action of  the 
Bank of  England had been successful in preventing City of  Glasgow Bank’s failure from 
spreading, the announcement by the Bank of  England’s support for Northern Rock was 
mostly blamed for precipitating the run on the bank. Against the background of  this 
comparison, this research argues that the lack of  credibility of  the Government’s handling of  
previous crises in the eyes of  depositors (captured by the collective memory variable) had 
been significant in shaping depositor behaviour.  
The collective memory variable, however, does not always affect depositor expectations 
negatively. Chapter III and Chapter V of  this research will illustrate the numerous efforts by the 
Tripartite Authorities in addressing the crisis situation following Northern Rock’s failure. 
There had been several announcements and policy changes (including an update on FSCS’ 
coverage limit) following the run on Northern Rock to indicate a ‘blanket guarantee’ on the 
whole banking system (as opposed to only on Northern Rock). Given these policy reactions 
to contain the crisis, this research argues that the negative sentiments preceding the Northern 
Rock crisis must have been altered throughout the period under examination. By the time of  
the failures of  Bradford and Bingley and HBOS, depositors should have been assured of  the 
Government’s willingness to save them in the cases of  future bank failures.    
Against the background of  the empirical evidence collected through within and across-
case analyses, this research draws several conclusions on the underlying reasons for bank 
runs. To start with the first set of  hypotheses, the empirical analysis of  this research rejects 
sunspot explanations. Random variables as the underlying reasons for the depositor runs are 
not found to hold for the cases of  Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley. Yet, the 
empirical evidence collected for those cases seems to support the asymmetric information 
theories (H1). In both cases, there had been a ‘flight-to-quality’ from insolvent to solvent 
banks, which is in line with the working assumptions put forward by the asymmetric 
information theories of  bank runs. Using the terminology of  ‘necessary and/or sufficient 
conditions’ (to be explained shortly in the following section), this research argues that the 
arrival of  negative news is a necessary but not a sufficient condition itself  to trigger panic 
among depositors. Pointing to this research’s empirical puzzle, while all the four cases 
examined had been exposed to negative publicity because of  either their falling share prices, 
unsuccessful right issues or emergency funding received from the Bank of  England, only two 
of  them faced depositor runs leading to their failures, namely Northern Rock and Bradford 
and Bingley. This suggests that depositors should have factored in additional variables to their 
decision-making under uncertainty.  
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With regards to the institutional dimensions of bank runs, this research remains critical 
towards the efficiency of deposit insurance in preventing bank runs (H2). Northern Rock 
case supports the hypothesis (H3) that there had been a lack of depositor awareness towards 
the FSCS, which might have contributed to the bank run. Given the increase in the depositor 
awareness following the Northern Rock crisis, (along with an implicit ‘too-big-to-fail’ 
understanding), this cannot account for the run on Bradford and Bingley. Finally, neither 
does de facto nor ex post guarantees seem to be efficient in stabilising depositor expectations in 
both of the cases. While the silent run on Northern Rock continued despite the introduction 
of the blanket guarantee, the run on Bradford and Bingely also points to the failure of the 
assurances from the Authorities, who had promised to undertake all necessary actions should 
the circumstances require.  
As the third and the final set of hypotheses, depositor comments collected during the 
Northern Rock crisis suggests to the use of collective memory when assessing the solvency of 
the bank. A lack of trust towards the Authorities prevailed within the depositor comments, 
which suggests that past institutional failures had been used as reference points to assess the 
ongoing situation with the bank. A comparative analysis between HBOS and Bradford and 
Bingley also suggests that HBOS’s failure might have served as a reference point to assess the 
perceived solvency of Bradford and Bingley. Both these cases support this research’s 
argument that motivations for depositor runs might not necessarily be grounded on the 
immediate circumstances related to the bank itself.  
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HO: Bank runs are triggered by sunspots as random variables 
(Nul l  Hypothes i s )  
 
H1: Bank runs are related to the deterioration in economic fundamentals 
 
WA1: For a bank run to become contagious, the dual observation of a bank failure and a recession is 
required. 
 
WA2: Once a run is in progess, (lines of) informed depositors have signaling effects on uninformed ones. 
 
WA3: Banking panics should not develop in information-rich environments. 
          WA3a: A banking panic might be prevented through the provision of bank-specific information    
         on the bank’s solvency. 
 
WA4: If the bank run originates from information asymmetries and fundamentals, there should be a 
‘flight-to-quality’ from insolvent to solvent institutions. 
 
H2: Triggered by either fundamentals or sunspots, ex ante  guarantees on deposits such as the 
deposit insurance scheme is promoted for preventing an inefficient outcome such as a bank run* 
 
WA5: The efficiency in stabilising depositor expectations depends on the specifications of the scheme, 
such as the upper limit of deposits covered, co-insurance principle and compensation delays.  
 
WA6: The lack of commitment by the authorities on deposit freezes and payment re-scheduling and the 
anticipation of this by depositors might generate a self-fulfilling bank run. ** 
 
WA7: De facto (such as the implicit ‘too-big (interconnected)-to-fail’ understanding) or ex post (blanket) 
guarantees should stabilise depositor expectations in the case of an inefficient deposit insurance scheme. 
 
WA8: The coherence and consistency in the actions of policy makers in addressing the crisis affect 
depositor expectations. 
 
H3: As an additional information asymmetry during a bank run, the lack of depositor awareness 
towards deposit insurance scheme also affects depositor expectations 
 
H4: Under uncertainty during crises and as a result of bounded rationality, cognitive shortcuts (in 
different forms) are used in depositor decision-making 
 
WA9: Application of availability heuristic: Previous events and failures (through collective memory) act as 
road maps to guide action. 
 
WA10: Application of representativeness heuristic (Generalisation Effects): In times of crises, institutions are 
assessed by their similarities to the problem at hand in order to measure the probability of their failure. 
 
WA11: Application of anchoring heuristic: People attach extreme weight to an initial value, which is later 
‘adjusted to yield the final answer’. 
 
 
Table 1 Hypotheses and Working Assumptions 
                                                
* This assumption is shared by both of the theories, although stronger by the sunspots view. 
** Within the period under examination, there have not been any deposit freezes or payment re-
scheduling. 
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1.3 Methodo logy  and Case  Se l e c t ion 	  
 
“Case-study researchers […] usually 
look at causes in terms of  their combination: 
How did relevant causes combine to produce 
the outcome in question? […] John Stuart Mill 
called this type of  causation “chemical” 
because the effect of  any specific causal 
condition depends on the presence and 
absence of  other conditions” 
(Ragin 2007, 8) 
 
“[…] [I]t is possible to make strong inference in just one 
or a few cases, based on one or a few pieces of  the right kind of  
evidence, if  this evidence strongly discriminates between 
alternative hypotheses” 
(Bennett 2008a, 718)  
 
 
This chapter has first introduced this research’s puzzle and its argument, and a short 
historical background for banking crises. It has also illustrated the hypotheses tested and the 
empirical findings of  this research. One last, and yet of  great significance, dimension to 
explore before finishing the chapter will be the methodological foundations of  this research. 
With this aim, this section will now discuss the methodology applied to this research in 
gathering and interpreting empirical data. While doing so, it will also present a short overview 
of  the methodological literature for qualitative research in general and will highlight the 
various methods in case selection, as well as for within-case and cross-case analyses. The 
current section will conclude the chapter by illustrating the thesis structure and outline of  the 
chapters.  
As discussed before, the banking panics literature analyses depositor expectation as a 
function of  both material circumstances and institutional settings. This research is an attempt 
to both (1) test the hypotheses of  the current literature with the most recent banking crisis in 
an advanced market economy and (2) contribute to it by its emphasis on ideas. The research 
objective of  this thesis is to explain and understand the observed variation on the dependent 
variable across the four cases under examination. To clarify once more, the dependent 
variable of  this research, in other words the outcome of  interest, is the depositor behaviour 
during banking crises, not the bank failures themselves. Depositor behaviour is a continuous 
concept with varying degrees between the positive and the negative poles (Goertz 2005, 34, 
35). It might take on the following values: (1) No bank run, (2) breakdown of  trust in the 
form of  limited bank runs, (3) a crisis of  confidence within the banking system in the form 
of  a banking panic, or (4) no banking panic.  
A qualitative researcher, interested in explaining a certain phenomenon, would prefer 
focusing on the cases where both the dependent and independent variables take on the value 
of  1, and would avoid cases where both are zero (Goertz 2008a, 13). Case-oriented research, 
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therefore, has mostly been criticised for ‘selecting on the dependent variable’, which is “[...] 
rather than studying an attribute or aspect that simply “varies” from one case to the next, as 
in variable-oriented research, case-study researchers focus on historically emergent, qualitative 
phenomena” (Ragin 2007, 7).25 By selecting cases based on their outcomes and then analysing 
the causes of  the phenomenon (Ragin 2008, 149), qualitative research is interested in the 
‘causes-of-effects’, in other words, in investigating the causes of  specific outcomes (Goertz 
and Mahoney 2010, 8; Mahoney and Goertz 2006, 230).  
Ragin (2008, 176) differentiates between ‘net-effects thinking’ and ‘configurational 
approach’. “In the net-effects thinking, estimates of  the effects of  independent variables are 
based on the assumption that each variable, by itself, is capable of  influencing the level or 
probability of  the outcome” (Ragin 2008, 177). According to this view, the impact and the 
relative importance of  an independent variable on the outcome will be the same independent 
from the values of  other variables (Ragin 2008, 112). However, “[…] it is not useful to 
generalize about the overall effect of  B without saying something about the context (i.e., 
other variable values) in which B appears” (Mahoney and Goertz 2006, 235). When there is 
‘causal complexity’ (Ragin 2008) or ‘equifinality’ (George and Bennett 2005, 8, 19, 27)26, it 
becomes difficult to assess each variable’s independent and relative effect on the outcome 
(Ragin 2000, 41-2; see also Mahoney and Goertz 2006, 234).  
Qualitative researcher’s view towards the world is one of  causal complexity where various 
combinations of  the causes might lead to the same outcome (Ragin 2008, 54). Ragin (2008, 
54, 109) defines those causal combinations as ‘causal recipes’, which aim to explain how things 
happen. For a better understanding of  this point, a closer look on ‘concept formation’ in 
qualitative research might be helpful (Goertz 2005, 19).27 There are two main differences 
between qualitative and quantitative traditions with regards to concept formation. Firstly, 
asymmetrical causation in qualitative research suggests that “[t]he opposite of  a concept is 
different from its negation” (Goertz and Mahoney 2000, 4; see also Goertz and Mahoney 
2010, 12). Secondly, for qualitative researchers “[…] the world is not neatly divided into 
mutually exclusive categories”, where each concept belongs to only one category (Goertz and 
Mahoney 2000, 1, 10). Applying those to this research, the causal mechanisms generating a 
                                                
25 For a detailed critique of the selecting on the dependent variable argument see Bennett and Elman 
2006, 460-63. Selecting on the dependent variable has been criticised to increase the number of 
positive cases where the outcome of interest occurs (Mahoney and Goertz 2006, 239). “The positive 
case concept is almost always what the researcher is trying to explain” (Goertz 2005, 19). On a related 
note, Mahoney and Goertz explain how to select negative cases based on the ‘Possibility Principle’, 
which uses the ‘rule of inclusion’ and ‘rule of exclusion’ (Mahoney and Goertz 2004, 653). “The 
Possibility Principle holds that only cases where the outcome of interest is possible should be included in 
the set of negative cases; cases where the outcome is impossible should be relegated to a set of 
uninformative and hence irrelevant observations” (Mahoney and Goertz 2004, 653).  
26 Equifinality refers to situations where there are multiple paths to the outcome observed.  
27 Goertz (2005, 6) distinguishes between three levels of concepts, namely basic (dependent variable), 
secondary (always referring to the positive concept), and indicator/data levels. 
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bank run might not be the same as the ones preventing it from happening (no bank run is not 
the reverse of  a bank run). As regards to the mutual exclusiveness of  concepts, the observation 
of  a limited bank run simultaneously belongs to the category of  ‘no banking panics’. In the 
same way, the outcomes of  ‘no bank runs’ shall also be placed under the category of  ‘no 
banking panics’. Nonetheless, this research acknowledges that the causal process leading to 
these outcomes are not identical with each other.         
Given the qualitative researcher’s view towards complex causality, what methods are 
preferred to best analyse this causality? As mentioned above, qualitative researchers “[…] do 
not look for the net effect of  a cause over a large number of  cases, but rather how causes 
interact in the context of  a particular case or a few cases to produce an outcome” (Bennett 
and Elman 2006, 458). Mahoney and Goertz (2006, 238) also emphasise that qualitative 
researchers attempt to keep the population size of  the research manageable in order not to 
overlook any key causal relationships. As a matter of  fact, case-study methods are interested 
in gaining in-depth knowledge of  a small number of  cases (Ragin 2000, 26).  
Social research tends to cluster around either qualitative, in-dept case studies or large-N 
variable-oriented quantitative studies (Ragin 2007, 2; Ragin 2000, 29). While large-N studies 
aim to reveal general patters reccuring in a large number of  cases, “[…] case study research is 
very often defined by its focus on phenomena that are of  interest because the N of  cases is 
small. Typically, these phenomena are large-scale and historically delimited, not generic in any 
sense” (Ragin 2007, 5). Thus, the difference between those two ‘cultures’, as Goertz and 
Mahoney (2010) label,28 is that while the case-study method gains its confidence from its 
depth, the variable-oriented research’s confidence is based on its breadth (Ragin 2000, 22).  
A case, according to George and Bennett (2005, 17), is an ‘instances of  a class of  events’. 
Adopting a ‘configurational view’, Ragin (2000, 39) argues that different aspects of  a case 
should not be viewed in isolation from each other. Furthermore, case study research is “the 
intensive (qualitative or quantitative) analysis of  a single unit or a small number of  units (the 
cases), where the researcher’s goal is to understand a larger class of  similar units (a 
population of  cases). There is thus an inherent problem of  inference from the sample (of  
one or several) to a larger population” (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 296). In order to 
overcome this problem, qualitative researchers define the scope of  their theories in a narrow 
way in order to reach limited generalisations applicable to a certain type of  cases (Mahoney 
and Goertz 2006, 237; Ragin 2000, 23). George and Bennett (2005, 5) label those as middle-
range typological theories, […] which identify recurring conjunctions of  mechanisms and 
provide hypotheses on the pathways through which they produce results, provide more 
contingent and specific generalizations for policymakers and allow researchers to contribute 
                                                
28 Regarding them as separate ‘cultures’, Goertz and Mahoney (2010, 2, 15) discuss the major 
differences between qualitative and quantitative research paradigms, in the areas of  research goals, 
causal inference, concepts and measurements, and theoretical orientation. 
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to more nuanced theories”. As the ‘building block’ approach suggests, the “[…] study of  each 
subtype fills a “space” in the overall theory or in a typological theory” (Goerge and Bennett 
2005, 78). Recalling the different values on the dependent variable, there have been no 
episodes of  banking panics within the specified period under examination with this 
research.29 Therefore, ‘banking panic’ presents the ‘empty cell’ in the outcome typology and is 
not covered by this research. This research is mainly interested in explaining the subclasses of  
‘bank run’ and, to a limited extent, ‘no bank run’ as the binary values on the dependent 
variable.  
Given the significance of  case-studies in order for qualitative researchers to study 
complex causality, how do they select cases that fit best for their research design and research 
objectives? Seawright and Gerring (2008) identify seven different types of  case studies 
depending on the case selection techniques, namely typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, 
influential, most similar, most different method.30 The last two types have been among the 
oldest methods suggested by Mill’s method of  agreement and method of  difference, in 
reverse order (See also Ragin 1989, 36, 37, 39, 40; Goerge and Bennett 2005, 153-160). Mill’s 
method of  agreement requires cases to be similar in their outcomes and in only one 
independent variable (the most different method). On the other hand, method of  difference 
requires cases to be similar in all independent variables saving one and to have varying 
degrees on the outcome (the most similar method).31 “These two methods, the method of  
agreement and the indirect method of  difference, form the core of  the case-oriented strategy. 
However, while they are both useful, especially as inductive techniques, both appear to be 
incapable of  handling multiple or conjunctural causation” (Ragin 1989, 42).  
As the opening quotation of  this chapter from Charles Goodhart has underlined, the run 
on Northern Rock in September 2007 presents a deviant case since no body expected a 
‘nineteenth century style’ depositor run on a British bank in the twenty-first century.32 As a 
first step in case selection, this research applies a similar approach to Mill’s ‘method of  
difference’ and selects its cases, namely Northern Rock, Alliance and Leicester, HBOS, and 
Bradford and Bingley, from those having similar economic vulnerabilities but leading to 
                                                
29 The most recent credit crunch of 2007, as a result of the liquidity concerns in the wholesale and 
interbank markets, has been defined as a wholesale banking panic by several scholars. However, this is 
not in the scope of this research. See Gorton (2007); Gorton (2008); Gorton (2009). See also Also 
Roubini and Mihm 2010. They argue that the crisis was characterised by various types of runs, or bank 
run-like panics, on the different segments of the financial markets. 
30 Also George and Bennett (2005, 75-6) specify six-different types of theory-building research 
objectives, five of which are borrowed from Lijphart and Eckstein and the sixth of their own. 
31 “[…] [C]ase-study methodologists have long argued, consistent with Bayesianism, that if a 
hypothesis appears to accurately explain a tough test case which, a priori, it looked “least likely” to 
explain, thent he hypothesis is strongly affirmed. Conversely, failure to explain a “most likely” case 
strongly undermines our confidence in a hypothesis” (Bennett 2008a, 713).  
32 “[T]he deviant case method selects that case that, by reference to some general understanding of  a 
topic (either a specific theory or common sense), demonstrates a surprising value. The deviant case is 
therefore closely linked to the investigation of  theoretical anomalies” Seawright and Gerring 2008, 302.  
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different outcomes. The point of  departure has been the banking panics literature which 
identifies common underlying economic vulnerabilities that put banks on the edge of  the 
cliff, with the potential to lead to a varying sorts of  change in depositor behaviour 
(dependent variable). As Kirshner (2003) illustrates, in most of  the cases, economic logic will 
render some of  the options possible and will eliminate the rest. However, a reference to pure 
economic theory will fail to provide any ‘definitive’ explanation for the reasons for choosing a 
specific path from the spectrum of  these ‘economically coherent’ outcomes (Kirshner 2003, 
7). While worsening fundamentals cause a bank failure, not all bank runs can be explained by 
reference to those. Within the period under examination, only in two out of  the four cases, 
namely Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley, the dependent variable took on the value 
of  1, indicating a bank run. Therefore, there seems to be more than an economic explanation 
to account for the variance on the outcome.  
The qualitative researcher’s emphasis on the necessary and/or sufficient conditions in 
causal chains points to a further difference between qualitative and quantitative research 
paradigms (Goertz and Starr 2003, 15; see also Mahoney and Goertz 2006, 232).33 As a 
matter of  fact, this emphasis on necessary conditions justifies the researcher’s selection on 
the dependent variable (Goertz and Mahoney 2010, 9). Within this tradition of  concept 
formation, there are five types of  causes in historical explanations; namely (1) necessary but 
not sufficient, (2) sufficient but not necessary, (3) necessary and sufficient, (4) INUS, and (5) 
SUIN causes (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009). While necessary variables are enabling 
ones and use the logical operator “and”, sufficient (with the logical operator “or”) or INUS 
variables are generating variables for the outcome (Goertz and Starr 2003, 6).  
Goertz defines a necessary condition as one which does not allow for substitutes within a 
causal chain (Goertz 2005, 12, 44, 45, 46; Goertz and Levy 2007, 23). The outcome of  
interest investigated does not take place in the absence of  a necessary cause, while the 
presence of  the cause does not guarantee the outcome (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009, 
118). On the other hand, “[t]hat X is sufficient for Y does not imply that if  X had been 
absent then Y would not have occurred” (Goertz and Levy 2007, 15).  Although a sufficient 
condition leads to the outcome, there are other ways leading to the outcome without the 
aforementioned sufficient cause (Mahoney, Kimball, Koivu 2009, 121). In other words, “[…] 
necessary condition causal chains are incomplete, while sufficient ones are not. The existence 
of  a necessary condition makes the next link possible, but usually other factors must be 
included to explain why it in fact did happen” (Goertz and Levy 2007, 26).  As a third option, 
“[i]ndividual causes that are necessary and sufficient for a given outcome are rarely proposed 
                                                
33 Two alternative ways of concept formation are present, namely necessary and/or sufficient 
conditions and family resemblence in the qualitative paradigm. See especially Goertz 2005, 39-46. For 
more on concept formation see Goertz 2008b. Since this research applies the language of necessary 
and sufficient conditions, a special focus will be devoted on the former. 
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in the social sciences” (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009, 123). Finally, INUS causes are the 
combination of  causal factors that are sufficient (but not necessary) for the outcome 
together, but neither necessary not sufficient individually (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 
2009, 124, 125; see also Goertz and Mahoney 2010, 11). “If  you start with an INUS view of  
the world you do not necessarily believe there is one representative causal effect of  X, since, 
depending on the path, the presence of  X or its absence X may be a cause of  Y” (Goertz 
2008a, 11). Therefore, INUS model causation suggests multiple paths each sufficient to the 
outcome, in other words, equifinality (Mahoney and Goertz 2006, 232, 236-7; see also Goertz 
and Mahoney 2010, 11; Ragin 2008, 63).  
Ragin (2007, 2) argues that general knowledge should be built through configuational 
comparative research,  which “[u]nlike the case-study approach, configurational research attends 
to cross-case patterns; unlike variable-oriented research, it also attends to the specifics of  
each case and attempts cross-case analysis of  within-case relationships” (Ragin 2007,13). 
According to Ragin (2007, 13, 15), the goal with configurational comparative research is to 
construct typologies of  cases, where cases are compared to each other as configurations in 
order to identify similarities and differences across cases. Qualitative comparative analysis, 
Ragin (2008, 23) continues, therefore accomplishes analysing complex causality where the 
outcome might occur through different ‘causal recipes’. George and Bennett also refer to 
typological theorising and structured, focused case comparisons (SFCC).34 Promoting a 
typology of  different kinds of  the phenomenon under investigation, George and Bennett 
(2005, 78) call this approach to theory development as the ‘building block’ procedure, where  
“[t]ypological theories specify the pathways through which particular types relate to specified 
outcomes” (Goerge and Bennett 2005, 235). During SFCC, on the other hand, the researcher 
asks the same set of  questions to several cases for ‘cumulative findings’ (Bennett 2008b, 490).  
Accordingly,  
 
[t]he method is “structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that 
reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked for each case under 
study to guide and standardize data collection, therey making systematic comparison 
and cumulation of  the findings of  the cases possible. The method is “focused” in 
that it deals only with certain aspects of  the historical cases examined (Goerge and 
Bennett 2005, 67). 
 
Although desired, are qualitative researchers always able to find the perfectly matching cases 
for SFCC or configurational comparative research in real world, for example for a controlled 
before-after case comparison? As George and Bennett (2005, 24) mention, rarely does 
controlled variation in independent and thus in dependent variables exist in real world. Ragin 
(2008, 154) also makes a similar point and proposes the use of  ‘counterfactual cases’ given 
                                                
34 See also Bennett and Elman 2006, 456.  
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the lack of  perfect comparatibility across cases. Levy (2008, 629) defines a counterfactual as 
“[…] a “contrary-to-fact” conditional that identifies a “possible” or “alternative” world in 
which the antecedent did not actually occur”. Recalling the discussion on the necessary 
and/or sufficient causes, “[t]o assert a necessary condition is simultaneously to assert a 
counterfactual: they are bound together” (Goertz and Levy 2007, 15). The ‘minimum rewrite 
rule’ for counterfactuals is followed by qualitative researchers as to change the variables as 
little as possible not to ‘change the real world too much’ (Goertz and Mahoney 2010, 12-3; 
see also Goertz 2008a, 12). In addition to the use of  counterfactuals to compensate for the 
lack of  diversity across cases, George and Bennett (2005, 81) also suggest ‘process-tracing’ 
“[…] to assess whether differences other than those in the main variable of  interest might 
account for the differences in outcomes”. 
While examining the four bank failures in the United Kingdom within the spite of  one 
year (between September 2007 and September 2008) this research holds several 
characteristics of  the institutional settings (such as the rule of  law, contract enforcement) 
constant across cases. Therefore, by selecting the cases from the same banking crisis period, 
no major temporal variation between cases or a possible variation between 
structural/institutional settings is allowed. In addition, the four cases share similar business 
models and backgrounds.  
 
A crucial feature of  the UK system in the run-up to the crisis, was […] the rapid 
growth of  a number of  specific banks – Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley, Alliance 
and Leicester and HBOS – which were increasingly reliant on the permanent 
availability of  a large-scale interbank funding and/or on their continuous ability to 
securitise and sell down rapidly accumulating credit assets, particularly in the 
mortgage market” (FSA 2009b, 35). 
 
As a note of caution, it acknowledges that the problems for banks in considerably different 
sizes might vary in their severity. The circumstances surrounding those banks were not 
identical in order to allow for a fully controlled comparison, nor were their business risks. 
Similar to Northern Rock, both Bradford and Bingley and HBOS were funded their long-term 
assets through short-term wholesale markets. Unlike Northern Rock, however, both of them 
were exposed to buy-to-let markets with a higher rate of risk for borrower default and rising 
arrears. In addition, deposit balances varied across those institutions, with HBOS being the 
biggest savings institution operating in the banking sector.35 Nonetheless, both market 
                                                
35 Nonetheless, according to their half year results for 2008, savings (personal customer deposit) balances 
for Alliance and Leicester, Bradford and Bingley, and Northern Rock were the following respectively: 
£24.1bn, £22.2bn and £14.2bn. This amount was much higher for HBOS. Those are available at 
http://www.aboutsantander.co.uk/investors/results-and-presentations/alliance-and-leicester.aspx (last 
accessed on 20/09/2012); http://corporate.bbg.co.uk/financial-information/results-and-
publications/2008.aspx (last accessed on 20/09/2012).  
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capitalisation and deposit/savings rates for the banks, excluding HBOS, had been similar for 
the remaining three ex-mutuals.  
Finally, the cross-case analysis across those four failures (within the same banking crisis 
period) also deploys the following, yet partically incomplete, controlled before-after 
comparisons36: As mentioned in the preceding discussion on methodology, controlled 
experiment in social sciences is highly difficult, especially for cases with complex causality 
where variables are not independent from each other, also known as the ‘Galton’s Problem’. 
However, as stated in the words of George and Bennett (2005, 34), “[a] lack of independence 
of cases is useful in research that aims to test whether the lessons of an earlier case played a 
causal role in a later one”. While the run on Northern Rock is before (1) the increase in the 
deposit insurance level (to £35,000 in October 2007), (2) the introduction of the blanket 
guarantee in September 2007 and (3) the nationalisation of the bank in February 2008; all the 
following three cases took place after these developments. Since one of the research objectives 
of this thesis is to understand the impact of the past crises and policy changes on depositor 
behaviour, the selection of the cases before and after certain turning points within the same 
period serves well for this purpose. In addition to those, the most recent bank failures 
preceeding the period under examination are also referred to as background cases.  
As regards to methods, empirical chapters apply a fully qualitative analysis –process 
tracing, within-case and cross-case analyses- in order to analyse the ideational, institutional, 
and material dimensions of  a bank run. “Process tracing involves looking at evidence within 
an individual case, or a temporally and spatially bound instance of  a specified phenomenon, 
to derive and/or test alternative explanations of  that case” (Bennett 2008a, 704). The aim, to 
emphasise once more, is not to assess the causal weight of  each individual independent 
variable, but instead is to explain the causal mechanisms for each specific case to lead to the 
outcome observed. Having defined her case studies, the next step for a qualitative researcher 
is to establish the causal links between causes and the outcome analysed. George and Bennett 
(2005, 181) propose ‘within-case analysis’ as an alternative approach to controlled 
comparison, which includes process-tracing and congruence testing. Mahoney (2010, 123) 
defines process tracing as the “[…] tool for causal inference that first comes to mind when 
one thinks of  qualitative methodology in political science”.37 Goertz and Mahoney (2010, 14) 
suggest that the use of  the language of  necessary and/or sufficient conditions facilitates 
                                                
36 The comparison is incomplete since there is more than one variable temporally changing between 
cases.  
37 Refer to this source for short review of the three areas of methodology in qualitative research – 
namely causal-process observations, concepts, and multimethod research. Goldstone (2008, 47) defines 
process tracing as consisting “of analyzing a case into a sequence (or several concatenating sequences) 
of events and showing how those events are plausibly linked given the interests and situations faced by 
groups or individual actors”. Sequence elaboration assesses the importance of necessary and/or 
sufficient causes within a sequence mainly based on their type and location on the sequence (Mahoney, 
Kimball, Koivu 2009, 114). See also Goertz and Levy 2007, 27. 
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process tracing within cases, while George and Bennett (2005, 13) recommend the method 
‘as a means of  examining complexity in detail’. Also called as mechanism and process-based 
explanations (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2008)38, as opposed to variable-based explanations, 
“[…] causal analysis consists of  identifying the mechanism that underlies and generates 
empirical regularities and outcomes” (Mahoney 2001, 578). In addition to process-tracing, a 
second method of  within-case analysis suggested by George and Bennett (2005) is 
congruence testing. Congruence testing utilises from process-tracing and “[…] provides the 
basis for claims regarding “common patterns” ” (Golstone 2008, 50). Here the aim is not one 
to provide over all generalisations (Golstone 2008, 50, 51). As a matter of  fact, “[u]sing 
process tracing, scholars seek to uncover causal sequences that produced the results or cases 
of  interest. Using congruence testing, scholars make claims about the number of  cases that 
“fit” a particular causal sequence or pattern (or “model”)” (Golstone 2008, 51).  
The research design applies a combination of  both inductive and deductive logics. As a 
first step, the identification of  the possible independent variables and hypothesised causal 
mechanisms between those has been through a deductive analysis of  the banking panics and 
cognitive heuristics literatures. Those have been summarised in the preceding section and will 
be discussed in detail in this thesis’ theoretical chapter, Chapter II. As a second step, this 
research employs an inductive logic throughout the case studies to explain the variation on 
the dependent variable. In order to investigate the hypothesised causal mechanisms 
(hypotheses) between the independent and the dependent variables, it will employ a ‘heuristic’ 
process-tracing through which new variables and hypotheses may also be revealed with the 
sequences of  events being ‘traced’ (George and Bennett 2005, 7). After detailed within-case 
analyses for each seperate case, a cross-case comparison will be presented in the Conclusion 
while taking equifinality (the presence of  multiple paths each sufficient to the outcome) into 
consideration. 
As regards to data collection, process tracing is conducted in order to identify the various 
turning points within the period under examination and to sort out which independent 
variables explain each step in the causal chain (Goerge and Bennett 2005, 92). Primary 
evidence is collected through an in-depth newspaper analysis through ‘Nexis UK’, depositor 
comment collected from this newspaper coverage, official reports such as Consumer Awareness 
of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme by the Financial Services Authority (‘FSA’, 
hereafter) and The Nationalisation of Northern Rock by the National Audit Office, committee 
hearings, written evidences and memorandums submitted to the House of Commons 
Treasury Committee. Finally, the window period has been set at minus 3 months in order to 
                                                
38 For further information on causal mechanisms and different definitions of the subject see Mahoney 
2001.  
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get a better understanding of the events preceding the bank failures. Periods covered for 
each specific case are the following:  
 
 
Case study Period Covered 
 
Northern Rock 
 
June 2007- September 2008 (inclusive) 
 
A&L 
 
April 2008 – July 2008 (inclusive) 
 
B&B 
 
May 2008 – September 2008 (inclusive) 
 
HBOS 
 
 
June 2008 – September 2008 (inclusive) 
 
 
Table 2 Period Covered for Case Studies 
 
 
In addition to the evidence gathered through process tracing, this research test its argument 
against the depositor comments collected through national and regional newspapers on Nexis 
UK during the four days of  the offline run on Northern Rock. With an attempt to 
understand the depositor motivations in forming the queues, more than three hundred 
seventy depositor comments (presented anonymously in Appendix) have been collected from 
newspaper articles. This has provided this research with an artificial interview based on 
random sampling from the ‘queuers’. The selection of  the newspapers has been made both 
on the national and on the regional level, which also included the Financial Times and the 
Evening Standard (London), in order to prevent a possible partisanship bias. Comments from 
the same depositors (collected from different news outlets) have been merged and duplicates 
have been omitted. A complete list of  all the comments and their sources is presented 
anonymously in the Appendix. Finally, opinion polls conducted by various polling houses, 
such as ICM, Ipsos MORI, Populus, and YouGov are also referred to throughout the thesis 
in order to get a better understanding of  the depositor perceptions during the crisis period. All 
the surveys and polls that have been referred to are publicly available on institutions websites. 
The off-line run on Northern Rock, during which depositors were physically present in 
the queues, provided this research with an invaluable source of  data compared to the 
following electronic on Bradford and Bingley. Ideally, the selection of  depositors to conduct 
interviews with, which in this case was done through newspaper reporters, should be based 
on an unbiased criterion and be equally representative of  the wider population. 
Unfortunately, given the infrequency of  off-line bank runs and the increasing prevalence of  
electronic deposit withdrawals, this is difficult to apply to the studies of  bank runs. 
Nonetheless, despite suffering from a possible selection bias and incomplete 
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representativeness of  the wider population, depositor comments collected are still the 
primary sources to gather first-hand evidence on the motivations for depositor runs. 
Therefore, without discarding their relevance and also acknowledging their limitations, the 
second best approach to use this source of  data is to minimise the selection bias by extending 
the search to all national newspapers. Secondly, out of  more than three hundred seventy 
depositor comments collected during the run on Northern Rock, most of  them were coded 
according to five main nodes (categories), which were derived from the banking panics 
literature. The percentages of  each of  these nodes within the comments coded were then 
analysed in relation to each other. In other words, although the collected comments might 
not possess a perfect representation of  the wider population (as a result of  a possible 
selection bias dicussed above), the frequency of  each node at least provided a general 
understanding of  the significance of  collective memory of  past crises or the lack of  trust 
towards the Authorities in relation to other categories.    
 
1.4 Struc ture  and Out l ine  o f  the  Thes i s  
To emphasise once more, the goal of  this thesis is to understand the underlying reasons for 
the depositor runs on two of  the cases across the four bank failures analysed within the same 
banking crisis period. More specifically this thesis asks: What were the triggers for the 
depositor runs on Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley? This thesis is divided between 
two main theoretical and empirical parts and structured in seven chapters (including 
introduction and conclusion). The following theoretical chapter, Chapter II, is structured in a 
way to first present the current literature on banking panics and then to discuss the 
mainstream cognitive heuristics literature in order to address the former’s shortcomings. 
After a short review of  the theories of  banking crises in general, the chapter continues with 
the two mainstream theories of  banking panics (namely sunspot explanations and asymmetric 
information theories of  bank runs) and a discussion on deposit insurance schemes as 
institutionalised safety nets for deposits. This structure allows the chapter to examine the 
possible ‘focal points’ put forward by the extant literature, towards which depositor 
expectations converge in times of  crises and led them revise their perceived risk of  bank debt. 
While the theories of  banking panics explore the reasons for a change in depositor 
behaviour, either random or based on fundamentals, deposit insurance scheme is promoted 
to keep business as usual. The second part of  the chapter starts with a critique of  the banking 
panics literature and promotes ‘cognitive heuristics’ to address its shortcomings in analysing 
decision-making under uncertainty. It re-introduces the list of  hypotheses derived from the 
literature and to be tested with the following empirical chapters.  
The empirical part of  the thesis is structured first to provide the empirical background for 
each case and then to test this research’s argument against them. Therefore, Chapter III and 
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Chapter V are both descriptive in nature in order to set the background information on the 
cases to be discussed. The former discusses the period between August 2007 and September 
2008 for Northern Rock, while the latter presents the remaining three case studies in a 
structured way to better compare the similar problems they had experienced before their 
failures. As for the remaining empirical chapters, Chapter IV (on Nortern Rock) and Chapter 
VI (on Alliance and Leicester, HBOS, Bradford and Bingley) analyse the bank failures in 
mainly three sections: (1) Fundamentals and information asymmetris (what the current 
literature can explain), (2) institutions and depositor awareness, and (3) cognitive shortcuts 
and reference points. The first section interprets the cases from the lenses of  the current 
literature and points out the strengths and weaknesses of  the literature’s explanatory power 
for each case. In other words, it tests the hypotheses of  H0 and H1. The second section 
analyses the institutional dimensions for each case (H2 and H3) and tests this research’s 
argument on ‘depositor awareness’. Finally, the third section incorporates the insights gained 
from the cognitive heuristics literature to the cases and tests the remaining hypothesis of  H4. 
Conclusion, as the final chapter of  this thesis, presents an overall discussion on the main 
empirical findings, as well as a structured, cross-case comparison for the identified common 
causal pathways to explain the changes in depositor behaviour with an eye towards 
equifinality. 
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Chapter II: Literature Review and Literature Gap: Banking Panics 
and Cognitive Heuristics	  
	  
 
“What remains a puzzle, [...] is why collectively held (or 
group) ideas sometimes radically change. Max Weber 
compared ideas to “switchmen” who work the railroads: 
they point actors, like trains, down tracks in some 
directions and divert them from others. This famous 
metaphor, however, begs a critical question: What 
decides the direction of the switch?” 
(Legro 2005, 2) 
 
 
Bank runs are shocks to the business as usual for banks. At some points in time, expectations 
cascade towards certain focal points, which lead to changes in depositor behaviour. What 
kind of external or internal stimuli do lead to bank runs and, following this, what kind of a 
new status quo does replace the old one? Can bank runs be explained through reference to 
sunspots as ‘non-fundamental (random) events’ (Goldstein 2010, 12) or through an observed 
change in fundamentals (as promoted by the asymmetric information theory), or maybe 
through a combination of both? Mainly interested in the liability side of contagion among 
depositors and its course of progress, this research investigates the underlying reasons and 
the much-neglected role played by ideas as triggers for bank runs.  
Of the massive amount of failures experienced in corporate history, not every failure or 
banking distress has triggered a panic among market actors, which were just deemed as ‘bad 
apples’. On the other hand, there have been numerous instances where the weaknesses in 
economic fundamentals led to the breakdown of cooperation among market actors in the 
shape of bank runs. This research proposes an alternative reading of bank runs by its 
emphasis on ideas, not to replace but rather to supplement the explanations put forward by 
the banking panics literature. From a constructivist political economy point of view, a 
combination of material, institutional and also ideational variables is required when 
hypothesising the causal mechanisms and the processes leading to the various outcomes.  
The current economics literature on banking panics, which is broadly divided between 
two mainstream theories (namely random withdrawal (or sunspot explanations) and 
asymmetric information theories of bank runs), puts forward several hypotheses regarding 
the material and institutional dimensions of bank runs. In a nutshell, the literature argues that 
either changes in the bank-specific fundamentals as to exceed a certain threshold (in 
combination with a general macroeconomic downturn or a recession) or simply random 
events trigger an update in depositor expectations. An institutionalist analysis of bank runs 
further suggests that when depositor confidence is fragile under uncertainty, institutions and 
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policy responses from the authorities are expected to fulfil this confidence gap between the 
bank and its depositors. As a response, deposit insurance scheme as a formal and non-
discretionary institution is promoted for stabilising expectations. As mentioned in Introduction 
above, the nineteenth-century banking history of the United Kingdom suggests that the 
LoLR function by the Bank of England had been a sufficient policy action to prevent an 
individual bnak failure spreading. This assumption has generally been supported and 
exemplified by the events surrounding the City of Glasgow Bank’s failure and the Bank of 
England’s success in containing depositor panic. However, the case of Northern Rock stands 
as an outlier since, rather than preventing the panic, this function by the central bank had 
been interpreted as a signal strong enough to actually provoke a depositor run on the bank. 
Therefore, with the aim of explaining depositor behaviour towards Northern Rock and the 
following bank failures, this research does not examine the possibility that a LoLR 
commitment can prevent an individual bank failure spreading.    
Against this background, three scenarios emerge within the literature: (1) an irrational 
bank run caused by sunspots (bad dreams), (2) a fundamental bank run (based on changes in the 
fundamentals), and (3) no bank runs (business as usual) thanks to the guarantees provided by 
the deposit insurance.39 Below table summarises those values on the dependent variable and 
the explanations offered in the literature for them.  
 
 
 
Table 3 Explanations in the Banking Panics Literature 
 
 
This research argues that the reasons for a change in depositor behaviour may lie in not only 
the directly relevant material circumstances or the shortcomings of the institutional settings, 
as suggested by the current literature. As opposed to a pure Bayesian rationality in 
expectation formation, depositor behaviour is also shaped through the use of cognitive 
heuristics in order to make sense of the ongoing uncertainty in times of crises. Depositor 
                                                
39 These three scenarios are analysed in detail by Uhlig 2009. This classification of the literature as 
three separate approaches to bank runs, namely self-fulfilling runs, rational expectations, and deposit 
insurance scheme, is also presented in Blejer, Feldman, and Feltenstein 1997. 
Value on the Dependent Variable                                                  Explanation in the Literature  
 
    (0)     No bank runs   Business as Usual  Deposit insurance scheme 
 
    (1)     Bank run                Either          Bad Dreams  Sunspot explanations 
      Or   Fundamentals  Information asymmetries  
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awareness towards institutions and re-collections about the Government’s handling of the 
current and previous crises are equally crucial in shaping depositor behaviour.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, depositor behaviour might be treated as a continuous 
process of expectation formation over the course of a banking crisis. This suggests that 
changes in depositor behaviour do not necessarily take place at a single point in time. In 
addition, as Pierson (2008, 181) argues, “[s]ocial processes take place at different speeds”. 
The ‘bank run’ outcome might take two values on the temporal structure; either to take place 
suddenly or in an incremental fashion. While, as an example, the off-line depositor run on 
Northern Rock between September 14th and 17th might be classified as a ‘sudden depositor 
run’, the following silent run on the bank for several weeks resembles more to an 
‘incremental depositor run’.40 
If and when analysed as a process, a bank run might be broken down into several phases: 
(1) Arrival of the situation (introduction), (2) interpretation, (3) policy responses to the 
ongoing crisis, (4) re-interpretation, and (5) resolution of the crisis. The literature, which is by 
and large occupied by the disciplines of economics and economic history, mostly under-
examines the ‘interpretation’ and ‘re-interpretation’ phases of the aforementioned process. 
Saving exceptions, a Bayesian bias is present within the asymmetric information theory of 
bank runs, which assumes expectations to be updated rationally once fundamentals exceed 
certain value thresholds. In this regard, this research’s emphasis on cognitive heuristics, which 
are assumed to distort decision-making process, attempts to criticise this Bayesian pre-
occupation in the literature.  
Against this background, this chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part will 
present a literature review on banking panics and the main lines of arguments to explain 
depositor behaviour. The first section of this chapter will provide the reader with a short 
account of how banking crises are approached in the literature. Following this, the second 
section will start analysing the main arguments promoted by various scholars working on 
bank runs. It will discuss the three scenarios mentioned above, while highlighting the testable 
assumptions put forward by each of them. It will identify the possible independent variables 
and hypothesised causal mechanisms between those through a deductive analysis of the 
banking panics literature. The second part of this chapter will present a critique of this 
literature and highlight the main points of departure for both theories of bank runs from each 
other. A discussion on cognitive heuristics will follow this section to summarise the 
                                                
40 A distinction between contagious and simultaneous bank runs is available in Dwyer and Gilbert 
1989. Accordingly, “[a]s a simple example, suppose that two banks are identical in all respects known 
by depositors, and one of the two fails because of loan losses. Because of the first failure, depositors 
will increase their estimate of the probability that the second bank will fail. If this estimate increases 
sufficiently, depositors will run on the second bank, even though no other information has appeared 
[…] Simultaneous runs [on the other hand] on many banks need not be contagious runs though. For 
example, an exogenous event can increase simultaneously depositors’ estimated probability that many 
banks will fail to redeem at par” (Dwyer and Gilbert 1989, 45-46). 
 
42 
mainstream literature on the subject, especially the studies by Kahneman and Tversky. The 
final section will show how the insights gained from the cognitive heuristics literature might 
be applied to understanding depositor behaviour. Before conclusion, the section will also list 
the main hypotheses put forward by this literature. Conclusion will conclude the chapter, 
summarise this research’s main argument and guide the reader on what to expect in the 
following empirical chapters of this thesis.   
 
2.1 Theor i e s  o f  Banking Cris e s  in  Genera l  
There are mainly four generation of models that examine banking crises from different 
perspectives. Breuer (2004) argues that the first generation explanations of banking crises are 
basically based on macroeconomic fundamentals and speculative attacks. “[...] [P]oor 
macroeconomic conditions that recognizably may result in consumer defaults and business 
failures and in turn led to banking problems incite a speculative attack on bank deposits” 
(Breuer 2004, 302). On the other hand, second-generation models place more emphasis on 
speculation, which is regarded to be based on self-fulfilling expectations and not necessarily 
tied to fundamentals. Unlike the first generation, in the second-generation model of financial 
crises, “[…] herding behaviour, information cascades, and contagion play a role” (Breuer 
2004, 300). Despite their differences, however, these first two generations of models both 
focus on the liability side of banks’ problems. Following those, third generation models 
address the over-borrowing/over-lending paradigm, boom and bust credit cycles, and 
highlight the occurrence of ‘twin crises’ (currency and banking crises occurring 
simultaneously).41 Finally, fourth generation models, namely institutional models of banking 
crises, are mostly interested in the role of institutional factors on the well functioning of 
banking systems and on macroeconomic outcomes (Breuer 2004, 304). Accordingly,  
 
[…] [P]olitics […], civil order including rule of law, trust, ethnic tensions, culture, 
social norms; property rights; legal origin; and types of governance be it financial 
sector or the trade sector, etc. are important determinants of economic outcomes. 
These variables are important because they impact information, uncertainty, and 
transaction costs and can affect the efficiency of decision-making (Breuer 2004, 299).  
 
Within the broader literature of banking crises, a well-developed literature exists on banking 
panics, specialising on the reasons for changes in depositor behaviour and on the policy 
                                                
41 As a leading example on the twin crisis see Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999. As an example from the 
banking panics literature, Miller (1998, 331) also works on “[…] how a domestic bank run can cause a 
speculative attack on foreign currencies”. In another article, Miller (2003, 385) argues that “[…] as a 
currency peg constrains a government’s ability to finance a bailout, bank runs are more likely in 
credible fixed exchange rate regimes than in those in which the central bank is less committed to its 
exchange rate”. Further comparing the Argentinian and Mexican banking crises in the 1990s, the 
scholar provides an explanation to the different depositor reactions across these two cases with 
reference to each country’s perceived commitment to their currency pegs.  
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responses to address those. According to random withdrawals theories, sunspots, self-
fulfilling expectations, or bad dreams serve as the underlying reasons for bank runs. These 
explanations might be classified within the second-generation models of banking crises as 
“[...] the attack can occur in the absence of weak macroeconomic or banking conditions” 
(Breuer 2004, 302). On the other hand, the second line of explanations, which shall be placed 
within the first generation of banking crises, argues that the main underlying reason(s) for 
bank runs are information asymmetries prevailing within the banking system. The theories 
within this tradition emphasise business cycles, signalling effects of corporate failures, 
increasing expectations for an upcoming recession or the deterioration of macro and/or 
micro fundamentals above a certain threshold. 
The first part of this chapter is structured as to examine the possible focal points put 
forward by the literature, towards which depositor expectations converge in times of crises 
and led them revise their ‘perceived risk of bank debt’ (Calomiris and Gorton 1991, 111). The 
following second section will review sunspots theories of bank runs, the fundamentals view 
or the asymmetric information theories and will finally present a discussion on the 
institutional environment, especially on the deposit insurance scheme, as to preserve business 
as usual despite random triggers or changes in the fundamentals. Further references to 
relevant studies, which cannot be covered in detail due to space limitations, are provided in 
footnotes.  
 
2.2 Theor i e s  o f  Banking Pani c s  
Sunspots (Random Withdrawals) Theories of Bank Runs  
 
“Who is to blame? A, causa remota? Or Y, causa proxima? 
Cause remota of any crisis is the expansion of credit and 
speculation while causa proxima is some incident that saps 
the confidence of the system and induces investors to 
sell commodities, stocks, real estate, bills of exchange, or 
promissory notes and increase their money holdings. The 
causa proxima may be trivial: a bankruptcy, a suicide, a 
flight, a revelation of fraud, a refusal of credit to some 
borrowers, or some change of view that leads a market 
participant with a large position to sell. Prices fall. 
Expectations are reversed” 
(Kindleberger and Aliber 2005, 89) 
 
“If the prophecy of hostility is thoroughly self-fulfilling, the belief 
that there is a high degree of real conflict will create a conflict that 
is no longer illusionary” 
(Jervis 1976, 77) 
 
“One is not, in tacit coordination, trying to guess what another 
will do in an objective situation; one is trying to guess what the 
other will guess one’s self to guess the other to guess, and so on 
ad infinitum [...] The reasoning becomes disconnected from the 
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objective situation, except insofar as the objective situation may 
provide some clue for a concerted choice. The analogy is not just 
trying to vote with the majority but trying to vote with a majority 
when everyone wants to be in a majority and everyone knows it” 
(Schelling 1960, 92-3-4)42    
 
 
 
This section will work through the specifications of the Diamond & Dybvig model of bank 
runs (‘D&D’, hereafter) as the prominent example of the random withdrawals theories.43 
D&D model emphasises multiple-equilibria in deposit contracts resulting from ‘differing 
levels of confidence’ (Diamond and Dybvig 2000, 15). In this model, panic runs are treated as 
‘sunspot equilibria’ (Jacklin and Bhattacharya 1988, 587) and “[…] [t]here is more than one 
self-fulfilling prophecy about who withdraws at date 1” (Diamond 2007, 196). A bank run, as 
one of the possible outcomes of multiple-equilibria, depends on the existence of extrinsic 
random variables (sunspots) and worsens as a result of self-fulfilling prophecies. Accordingly, 
“[…] the run equilibrium is played if spots appear on the sun, otherwise the no-run 
equilibrium is played” (Ennis and Keister 2009, 1598). 
As an example, Waldo (1985, 269) models bank runs as multiple equilibria when each 
depositor thinks that other depositors will also withdraw their money from the bank and 
therefore early withdrawals will always be better off. In this model, sunspots are described as 
being “[…] totally extraneous and unrelated to any fundamental factors such as changes in 
the prospective yield on the bank’s portfolio” (Waldo 1985, 273, footnote 7). Ennis also 
model bank runs as sunspot phenomena with multiple equilibrium outcomes where sunspots 
are defined as ‘coordination devices’ for depositor expectations (Ennis 2003, 55).44 In those 
models, the run results from the shift in expectations “[…] which could depend on almost 
anything, consistent with the apparently irrational observed behaviour of people running on 
banks” (Diamond and Dybvig 2000, 15). To quote these scholars in length,  
 
[...] the selection between the bank run equilibrium and the good equilibrium 
depended on some commonly observed random variable in the economy. This could 
be a bad earnings report, a commonly observed run at some other bank, a negative 
government forecast, or even sunspots [...] The observed variable need not convey 
anything fundamental about the bank’s condition. The problem is that once agents 
have deposited, anything that causes them to anticipate a run will lead to a run. This 
implies that banks with pure demand deposit contracts will be very concerned about 
                                                
42 This argument also resembles the Keynes’ ‘beauty contest’ analogy. 
43 Diamond and Dybvig published their paper in 1983, which was preceded by Bryant (1980) 
publishing on the same subject a couple of years earlier.  
44 Ennis (2003, 56) further states that “[…] the equilibrium selection story presented here strongly 
accords with the long-standing belief that some bank runs can be characterized as events resulting 
from exogenous waves of pessimism and that those mood shifts are more likely when economic 
conditions are bad or deteriorating”. Peck and Shell (2003, 118) also model bank runs with sunspots 
triggering the bank run “[…] in which the optimal mechanism tolerates a positive probability of a run”. 
See also another paper by Peck and Shell (1999) where they analyse the impact of bank portfolio 
restrictions on the probability of bank runs.  
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maintaining confidence because they realize that the good equilibrium is very fragile 
(Diamond and Dybvig 2000, 18)  
 
According to the D&D model, banks offer ‘liquidity transformation’45 for their customers 
through deposits, which are preferred over other types of contracts (such as equities) since 
they allow depositors to liquidate their assets, not on a single, but on several possible dates, 
and thus, to reduce their transaction costs (Diamond 2007, 190; Smith 1991, 231).46 The role 
assigned to banks in the D&D model is, therefore, one to insure depositors against liquidity 
risk47 and to offer optimal outcomes as long as depositors stick to their initial liquidity 
preferences.48 The model suggests that banks operate in a continuous time and serve two 
types of depositors, namely type I (patient) and type II (impatient). This classification is based 
on depositors’ liquidity needs, which are only available to them and, therefore, are 
‘unverifiable private information’ (Diamond 2007, 196). According to the specifications of 
the model, banks operate under three main limitations, which make them vulnerable to 
changes in depositor expectations. Those are (1) the sequential service constraint, (2) the 
liquidity mismatch between their assets and liabilities, and (3) the uncertain investor horizons 
for their liquidity needs. We shall discuss each of those in turn.  
The sequential service constraint, defined as successive spending by each depositor, 
requires banks to service their customers on a first-come-first-served basis (Diamond and Dybvig 
2000; Wallace 1988). Under this constraint, the payoffs to depositors become dependent on 
the order and the number of (previous) withdrawals (Diamond and Dybvig 2000, 17), thus 
creating a collective action problem among depositors (Diamond and Rajan 1999, 38). 
Therefore, in a bad equilibrium, the main reason for patient depositors to panic is their fear 
that “[...] early withdrawals [would] make their promised second-period payoffs infeasible” 
(Bhattacharya and Gale 1986, 2). Accordingly, until a bank is declared insolvent and forced to 
leave business, early withdrawals always receive full payments in line with the bank’s 
liquidation of its assets (Caprio and Honohan 2008, 11).49  
The liquidity mismatch between banks’ assets and liabilities originates from the fact that, 
traditionally, banks fund their long-term investments (such as the loans extended to their 
customers) with short-term and ‘payable-on-demand’ deposits. Since “[…] the face value of 
deposits is larger than the liquidation value of the bank’s assets” (Diamond and Dybvig 2000, 
17) and the banks operate under the sequential service constraint, exogenous random shocks 
                                                
45 Williamson (1988) also emphasise this liquidity transformation in his model of bank runs. For 
another model based on banks as liquidity creators, see Diamond and Rajan (1999).  
46 This is named as the ‘intertemporal consumption flexibility’ in banking theory (Calomiris and 
Gorton 1991, 128). For a review of the contemporary banking theory see Bhattacharya and Thakor 
1993.  
47 This point is also mentioned in Waldo (1985) and Calomiris and Gorton (1991).  
48 For a brief discussion on deposit contracts’ optimality see Postlewaite and Vives (1987, 489-491).  
49 Here, insolvency is understood as the decline of the market value of assets below the market value 
of the liabilities (Kaufman and Seelig 2001, 5). 
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to depositors’ initial liquidity preferences might trigger a demand for deposit conversions into 
currency.50 In tranquil times, a monthly average of deposit withdrawals may provide a 
benchmark for the bank to approximate the proportion of its depositors with liquidity needs 
at t 1 (see Diamond (2007, 195-6) for more information). Depositors are confident that 
withdrawals will not exceed a certain limit, which may put banks in a liquidity shortage. In 
other words, they are confident of the banking system’s intermediation of ‘funding long-term 
assets with short-term liabilities’. However, during a bank run, there is no a priori knowledge 
of either (1) the fraction of depositors to withdraw at t 1 or (2) the type of depositors that 
withdraw (Wallace 1988, 7).51 This uncertain horizons of investors for their liquidity needs 
result in the bank’s failure to diversify withdrawal risk, given that any untimely liquidity 
demand by depositors translates into a lesser level of liquidity for the bank (Wallace 1988, 6).  
Establishing their arguments on random variables, a substantial limitation of the studies 
within the tradition of the D&D model has been their failure to provide testable hypotheses 
for empirical scrutiny on the triggers of runs.52 An understanding of information-based bank 
runs as an equilibrium phenomenon, as a matter of fact, has challenged the unpredictable 
panic-based runs resting on multiple-equilibria. Information-based bank runs involve the 
following two-sided asymmetric information: While banks do not possess the information 
about the real liquidity needs of their depositors (as also mentioned by the D&D model), 
depositors also lack relevant information on their banks’ asset portfolio (Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya 1988, 568). This emphasis on the prevailing information asymmetries between 
the bank and its depositors, as well as across depositors, has paved the way for an alternative 
mainstream theory of banking panics. The following third section of this chapter will 
summarise the main arguments put forward by the asymmetric information theories of bank 
runs.   
 
 
 
                                                
50 Referring to banks’ ‘risky long-lived assets’, Diamond and Dybvig’s argument “[…] demonstrates 
that bank runs do not present a problem when long-lived assets are sufficiently liquid and depositors 
are not very risk-averse” (Jacklin and Bhattacharya 1988, 587). Al-Zein (2008) also links bank runs to 
the liquidity position of the bank. A bank run is never a possibility for a liquid bank even after a bad 
dream. “If the bank holds an illiquid position, domestic depositors will run to the bank if and only if 
they see a bad dream” (Al-Zein 2008, 5).  
51 Smith (1991) presents a classification between legitimate versus panic motivated (speculative) 
withdrawals, based on the ‘runners’ liquidity needs. He argues that ““[s]peculative” withdrawal demand 
is defined here and throughout as withdrawal demand that occurs (only) because those seeking to 
withdraw are speculating about the ability of a particular bank (or the banking system) to maintain 
payments” (Smith 1991, 231, footnote 4). Similarly, a further distinction can be made between efficient 
versus non-efficient bank runs. According to Goldstein and Pauzner (2005, 1295), the difference lies in 
the expected low long-term return of the asset for the former, and the higher one for the latter. 
52 As an example to this criticism, see Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988, 586).  
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Fundamentals - Asymmetric Information Theories of Bank Runs53  
 
 
“A key question for the original Diamond and Dybvig 
model concerned the causes of panic. Why would agents 
sometimes develop beliefs leading to a panic, while at other times 
believe that there would be no panic? This question […] was not 
really addressed” 
(Calomiris and Gorton 1991, 122) 
 
“No financial market can function normally when basic 
information about the solvency of market participants is lacking” 
(Bordo 2008, 15) 
 
The previous section illustrated a banking system in which depositors, as major creditors of 
banks, are dispersed from each other and act sequentially based on their liquidity needs, 
which are private information. Alternatively, deposit contracts might also be regarded as a 
form of cooperation among impatient and patient depositors and their expectations. As 
opposed to sunspots as random variables, asymmetric information theories of bank runs 
attribute this failure of cooperation among depositors to the prevailing information gaps on 
the state of fundamentals. At some moments in the continuum of time, depositor behaviour 
changes in line with their ‘rational revisions of perceived risks of banks’ after the arrival of 
adverse news related to the value of bank assets (Calomiris and Gorton 1991, 121, 124; 
Blejer, Feldmand, and Feltenstein 1997, 7). Accordingly, the theory suggests that “[…] bank 
runs are exclusively driven by changes in economic fundamentals” (Ennis 2003, 55) and are 
associated with business cycles which take place just after business cycle peaks (Gorton 1988, 
753).54 Also referred as the fundamentals view, “[…] a panic occurs only if it is the unique 
equilibrium outcome following an adverse shock” (Keister and Narasiman 2011, 22) and is 
closely associated with the current economic conditions.55  
The asymmetric information theory of bank runs focuses on the dissemination of several 
types of information during banking crises. The use of aggregate knowledge in the absence of 
bank-specific information, according to this theory, might result in spill-overs and panics 
across banks. This, as a matter of fact, exemplifies the ‘lemons problem’ in financial markets, 
a term coined by Akerlof (1970), which is founded on the asymmetric information on the 
quality of goods traded between buyers and sellers.56 Following institutional failures and as a 
                                                
53 For a discussion on information in capital markets see Stiglitz 1981.  
54 On the other hand, however, “[t]he panics during the Great Depression appear to be of a different 
character than earlier panics. Unlike the panics of the National Banking Era, these events did not occur 
near the peak of the business cycle and did result in widespread failures and large losses to depositors” 
(Calomiris and Gorton 1991, 114). 
55 For further discussion see Temzelides 1997. 
56 Analysing the automobile market to illustrate ‘quality uncertainties’, Akerlof (1970, 489) asserts that 
since “[...] sellers now have more knowledge about the quality of a car than the buyers […] it is 
impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good and a bad car [named as a lemon]”. In 
those situations, buyers demand to know the quality of the product to be purchased, whereas sellers 
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reaction to the uncertainty, market actors examine the riskiness of other units operating in the 
system in order to minimise their potential future losses (Kaufman 2000, 14).  
Asymmetric information theory asserts that the principal-agent problem within the 
banking system originates from the opaque nature of bank assets and the varying degrees of 
liquidity of the banks’ investments (Caprio and Honohan 2008, 10; Bhattacharya and Gale 
1986, 2-3). Depositors’ ‘lack of common knowledge’ of the bank’s portfolio composition 
creates an information asymmetry during a banking crisis. Given the lack of bank-specific 
information available to depositors, Gorton (1988, 751) argues that in times of uncertainties 
‘aggregate information’ is used to assess the riskiness of individual banks.57 In this view, 
banking panics are rational responses by uninformed depositors upon the arrival of negative 
information on the macroeconomy (Gorton and Huang 2002).58 Therefore, the hypotheses of 
the asymmetric information theory “[…] links panics to occurrences of a threshold value of 
some variable predicting the riskiness of bank deposits” (Gorton 1988, 751).  
The empirical basis for the asymmetric information theory rests mostly on the analyses of 
the National Banking Era in the United States and of the bank failures during the Great 
Depression (especially between 1929 and 1933). Accordingly, Gorton (1988, 754) documents 
three versions of asymmetric information theory depending on what sort of aggregate 
information is taken into account. Those are (1) panics caused by seasonal fluctuations,59 (2) 
panics caused by an unexpected failure of a large firm (failure hypothesis),60 and (3) panics 
caused by major recessions (recession hypothesis). In his analysis on the National Banking 
Era in the United States, Gorton (1988, 752) concludes that depositors responded 
systematically to the changing perceptions of risk with the arrival of new information.61 They 
perceived the increasing number of firm failures as a signal to an upcoming recession (named 
as the ‘liabilities signal’), which made a panic more likely to occur (Gorton 1988, 771, 778).62 
                                                                                                                                 
may be willing their ‘lemons’ to be traded at the same price as ‘not-lemons’. The cost of this dishonesty 
“[...] lies not only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include the loss 
incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence” (Akerlof 1970, 495).  
57 Gorton and Mullineaux (1987, 463) also emphasise the constraints faced by depositors when relying 
only on ‘aggregate or nonbank-specific information to assess the riskiness of deposits’. An increase in 
business failures or the failure of a significant (large) firm, they continue, might precipitate a depositor 
run on all banks (Gorton and Mullineaux 1987, 463).  
58 These scholars also suggest that banking panics are not experienced in banking systems with large, 
well-diversified, banks. 
59 Allen and Gale (1998, 1247, 1249) also suggest that the empirical evidence supports more the 
‘business cycle’ view towards banking panics, rather than the sunspot explanations.  
60 Failure hypothesis suggests that an unexpected failure of a large financial institution triggers a change 
in depositor behaviour and leads to a depositor panic. 
61 Calomiris (2009) summarises his own research with several scholars which analyses the bank failures 
between 1929 and the first several years of 1930s. The conclusions of those works also support the 
fundamentals-view of banking panics. Alonso (1996) also makes a similar point and argues that bank 
runs might occur with the arrival of negative signals and news about the bank’s investments.  
62 In an environment where business failures are abundant, banks become more cautious in their 
lending practices to non-financial firms. Since banks are the major creditors for business’ working 
capital, business failures in large numbers may be perceived as signaling the onset of a coming 
recession (see Gorton 1988, 771).  
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Gorton (1988, 766) shows that “[…] panics did correspond to spikes in the predictors of 
deposit riskiness, but in a rational way”.  
Along the same lines, Calomiris (1990) also emphasises the role and the impact of the 
macro-economy in shaping depositor expectations. Similar to Gorton’s argument above, the 
logic behind Calomiris’ model is as follows: There is a close and mutually corresponding 
relationship between the deterioration of the macro-economy and the banks’ credit extension 
to the real economy. Banks, as creditors of non-financial institutions, are threatened by those 
institutions’ insolvency, which is evidenced by an increase in the ratio of non-performing 
loans (or rising arrears) to assets.63 Therefore, even a small class of bank borrowers in 
financial distress is assumed to have the potential to result in a ‘widespread disintermediation 
from all banks’ since depositors do not have the relevant information on the degree of the 
shock or of their banks’ asset portfolio (Calomiris 1990, 284). In a more recent paper, 
Calomiris (2007, 4) similarly argues that  
 
[d]epositors have reason to believe that a loss has occurred that might cause a bank to 
become insolvent, but they cannot observe which bank has suffered the loss. In that 
circumstance, depositors may withdraw large amounts of funds from all banks, 
including those that are (unobservably) solvent, simply because they would rather not 
risk leaving their money in a bank that turns out to be insolvent. 
 
A joint paper by Calomiris and Gorton (1991) further develops the asymmetric information 
theory on bank runs. These scholars argue that the random withdrawals theory explains 
panics with reference to the unexpected depositor withdrawals related to location-specific 
economic shocks (Calomiris and Gorton 1991, 111). On the other hand, according to the 
asymmetric information theory, depositors withdraw from all banks given the lack of bank 
specific information and “[b]ecause the actual incidence of failure is unknown” (Calomiris 
and Gorton 1991, 111). The emphasis is on the “[…] sudden, but rational, revisions in the 
perceived riskiness of bank deposits when nonbank-specific, aggregate information arrives” 
(Calomiris and Gorton 1991, 121, emphasis added). Referring to Chari and Jagannathan 
(1988), Calomiris and Gorton (1991, 125) further state that, unable to distinguish between 
real liquidity (consumption) needs and informed deposit withdrawals, the lines in front of 
bank branches possess signalling effects on uninformed depositors.64  
                                                
63 Although a high ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) often accompanies banking crises, it will be 
misleading to assume that NLPs will necessarily lead to a banking crisis. Examples of high NPLs but 
no banking crises are available in Duttagupta and Cashin (2008, 9, footnote 14). Definitions of banking 
crises presented in the first chapter also suggest several possible conditions/events to take hold, in 
addition to increasing NLPs. 
64 A study by Starr and Yilmaz (2007) also presents findings which point to the signalling effects of 
larger depositors on smaller ones. In addition, “[…] although the noisy information related to the 
failure of [one of the Special Finance Houses] and the devaluation was not at all a ‘sunspot’, the 
development of runs on the SFHs did not grow inevitably out of fundamental economic and financial 
factors— rather, it likely reflected compound risks of deteriorating fundamentals and depositors' 
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Regarding bank runs as a (rational) equilibrium phenomenon, Chari and Jagannathan 
(1988) also model runs where the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
depositors is filled through the latter’s observation of the former’s actions via ‘signal-
extraction’. Referring to panic-based runs, they suggest that “[i]f individuals observe long 
“lines” at the bank, they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail 
and precipitate a bank run. However, bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse 
information” (Chari and Jagannathan 1988, 749).65  
This understanding of bank runs as ‘rational response[s] to information rather than 
mysterious panic[s]’ is also emphasised by Chen (1999, 961). In an ‘informational 
disadvantage’ and under the sequential service constraint, depositors would response to 
various sources of information, including the failures of other banks, even before the real 
value of their own bank’s assets is revealed (Chen 1999, 947). Therefore, Chen (1999, 948) 
connects panic-based bank runs to the receival of early noisy information. In addition, 
“[k]nowing that the uninformed depositors will withdraw early, the informed are forced to 
withdraw early too even if more precise information will soon become available. Therefore, 
bank runs can be contagious” (Chen 1999, 947).  
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) also model panic-based bank runs where the threshold 
levels of fundamentals of the economy determine the occurrence of a unique Bayesian 
equilibrium (i.e. a bank run). They illustrate that their “[…] model has a unique Bayesian 
equilibrium, in which a bank run occurs if and only if the fundamentals are below some 
critical value” (Goldstein and Pauzner 2005, 1294). Criticising the D&D model for failing to 
‘provide tools to derive the probability of the bank-run equilibrium’, they emphasise that the 
bank run outcome is still panic (bad expectations) based, albeit determined by the realisation 
of fundamentals which are not sunspots (Goldstein and Pauzner 2005, 1293, 1304). “In other 
words, the fundamentals do not determine agents’ actions directly, but rather serve as a 
device that coordinate agents’ beliefs on a particular outcome” (Goldstein and Pauzner 2005, 
1295). Similarly, Dasgupta (2004, 1052) also promotes a unique threshold condition for 
regional economic fundamentals below which depositor runs would cause banks to fail. Since 
the bank failure mostly depends on the arrival of negative information on local asset returns, 
Dasgupta (2004, 1053) continues, the probability of bank’s failure is determined 
endogenously. 
                                                                                                                                 
concerns about sequential servicing. […] [W]e find evidence that both informational factors and self-
fulfilling tendencies were at work in the dynamics of the run.” (Starr and Yilmaz 2007, 1130).  
65 Similarly and closer to the random withdrawals theories of bank runs, Gu (2011, 164) argues that 
“[b]ecause signals about the fundamentals are imperfect, and because signal extraction from the 
observed withdrawal history is also imperfect, a bank run can occur when the bank fundamentals are 
strong […] A bank run occurs as a result of a herd of withdrawals when all depositors withdraw due to 
unfavorable signals and/or unfavorable observations on withdrawals”.  
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Analysing the conditions for contagion among depositors, Bougheas (1999) links macro 
and micro economic environment and emphasises feedback loops between these two 
different levels. Bougheas’ (1999, 132-3) analysis takes the ‘transmission of information’ to 
the macro level and investigates the signalling effects of individual bank failures on the 
interpretation of the health of the banking system, while taking the state of the economy into 
consideration. He suggests that macroeconomic instability is a precondition for bank runs to 
become contagious and single bank failures or recession alone are not sufficient themselves 
to cause a panic among depositors (Bougheas 1999, 132). Park (1991) also emphasises the 
relationship between ‘bank-specific information and bank panics’. According to this scholar, 
bank failures become contagious in the absence of bank-specific information on bank 
solvency (Park 1991, 271).66 A banking panic (resulting from bank failure contagion) might be 
prevented through the provision of bank-specific information especially on its solvency, 
rather than on its liquidity position (Park 1991, 272).67 Since depositors base their decision on 
the general condition of the banking system, a high ratio of bank failures might result in a 
system-wide banking panic (Park 1991, 271). Dupont (2007) also puts forward a similar 
argument which focuses on the role played by bank-specific information during banking 
panics. Defining contagious bank runs as one to affect both solvent and insolvent banks, he 
asserts that the provision of bank-specific information on a regular basis would help 
depositors to differentiate between solvent and insolvent institutions (Dupont 2007, 411, 
412).68 As a note of caution, however, Dupont (2007, 430) cautions against the fact that the 
provision of bank-specific information is a necessary, yet not a sufficient condition, to 
prevent bank runs from spreading onto innocent bystanders. Saunders and Wilson (1996) 
present a similar argument. They investigate bank runs from the 1929-1933 period in order to 
examine the role of contagion and information on selective versus contagious bank runs. 
They find that, during 1930-32, there had been a significant number of informed depositors 
who were able to distinguish among solvent and insolvent banks (Saunders and Wilson 1996, 
409). As a matter of fact, the asymmetric information thesis holds true if and when “[…] 
depositors review selectively the perceived risk of holding their deposits on specific banks” 
                                                
66 Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996, 7) also support the view that the lack of bank-specific information 
on banks’ assets might trigger ‘unjustified runs against sound banks’. Accordingly, depositors’ inability 
to distinguish bank-specific problems from systemic conditions might initiate a banking panic 
(Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal 1996, 122).  
67 A logical extension of this argument is that when provided with bank-specific information, 
depositors would “[…] review, selectively, the perceived risk of banks and, as a consequence, only 
those banks that depositors perceived as less prepared to face the possible losses experienced 
substantial withdrawals” (Schumacher 2000, 264).  
68 In a similar way, according to Kaufman (2000), there are two types of contagion that take place 
among market actors, namely rational (informational one that impacts only guilty parties – firm 
specific) and random (impacts by-standers – innocent parties – industry specific) contagion. 
Accordingly, “[r]ational or informed contagion assumes that investors (depositors) can differentiate 
among parties on the basis of their fundamentals. Random contagion, based on actions by uninformed 
agents, is viewed as more frightening and dangerous as it does not differentiate among parties, 
impacting innocent as well as guilty parties” (Kaufman 2000, 15). 
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(Schumacher 2000, 275). According to Dupont (2007, 417), one indicator for an informed 
bank run, rather than a contagious one, is the presence of ‘flight to quality’ in the shape of 
deposit movements from insolvent to solvent banks.  
Yorulmazer (2003, 2-3) also suggests that “[…] [accompanied with liquidity support], 
transparency and disclosure of information on banks’ soundness and management of the 
crisis can alleviate and eliminate some of the problems related to bank runs”. The absence of 
public information about the bank’s soundness prevents liquidity support from being 
successful in containing the bank run (Yorulmazer 2003, 26). Emphasising herd behaviour, 
the model asserts that having received noisy signals on the bank’s asset quality, others’ 
behaviour become more informative and “[w]hen the public belief about bank’s prospects fall 
below a threshold, a run is triggered” (Yorulmazer 2003, 5, footnote 7). In another paper, 
Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009, 236) once more demonstrate that depositors who are more 
willing to restrain themselves from running on their banks when they receive more 
information about an ongoing crisis. In line with the previous studies presented, these 
scholars also assert that the severity and the dynamics of a bank run depend on the state of 
the economy (Schotter and Yorulmazer 2009, 219). In a previously mentioned study by 
Schumacher (2000, 276), further support is provided to “[…] the asymmetry of information 
approach to bank runs and suggest[ed] that a policy of information disclosure might be 
effective as a deterrent to bank runs caused by exogenously generated shocks on bank 
solvency, such as an attack on the domestic currency”. Finally, a recent study by Chen and 
Hasan (2008, 535, 537) also model panic-based bank runs to take place when depositors do 
not expect precise bank-specific information, especially during bad times for banks. The 
research concludes that panic-based bank runs are more likely within banking systems with 
poor future prospects (Chen and Hasan 2008, 537).  
Having presented a detailed literature review on both of the banking panics theories, the 
following section will now direct readers’ attention to the arguments put forward to prevent 
bank runs from occurring in the first place. Against the background of the 19th century 
banking panics, the prevention of costly depositor runs has been among the priorities of 
policy makers. The idea of an institutionalised guarantee on deposit contracts attracted 
scholarly attention, since it could shape expectations during crises through creating focal 
points. Since both theories underline prevailing uncertainties within the banking system, 
either on depositors’ liquidity needs or about banks’ asset compositions, anchoring 
expectations via publicly available information is of significance in order to keep the business 
as usual.   
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‘Business as Usual’ – Institutional Dimensions of Bank Runs  
 
“[...] [F]inancial crises are similar to wartimes to the 
extent that they heighten uncertainty in nearly all types 
of transactions, relationships, and decision making. 
Information and incentive problems are exacerbated [...] 
At the same time, crises reveal institutional, political, 
and economic weaknesses that may themselves 
contribute to crises in the first place” 
(Breuer 2004, 294) 
 
“The self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby fears are translated into 
reality, operates in the absence of deliberate institutional controls” 
(Merton 1948, 210) 
 
“The behavior of individuals during a banking crisis depends 
crucially on how they expect the authorities to respond to events” 
(Ennis and Keister 2009, 1604) 
 
 
Despite differences in their analysis and explanations, both theories of bank runs promote 
deposit insurance for preventing a bank run from either taking place or becoming 
contagious.69 While random variables or adverse fundamentals create focal points for bank 
runs, deposit insurance scheme aims to stabilise depositor expectations. The D&D model 
treats deposit insurance as ‘an equilibrium selection device’ (Allen, Carletti, and Leonello 2011, 
467), whereas the fundamentals view of bank runs (despite divergent opinions on the subject) 
regards deposit insurance as an efficient solution to the information asymmetries since it 
provides transparency with its very public nature (Morris and Shin 1998, 595). Given the 
significance, this section will summarise the arguments on the institutional determinants of 
bank runs and illustrate how certain institutional shortcomings make banking systems more 
prone to bank runs.  
To start with the random withdrawals theory, the D&D model offers two solutions for 
banking panics, namely suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance.70 The logic behind 
suspension of deposits into currency is that it allows authorities to examine the solvency of 
individual banks and to signal to the public that banks re-opened are actually the solvent ones 
                                                
69 While some scholars suggest deposit insurance to prevent bank runs from taking place in the first 
place, others argue that the insurance is successful in preventing spill-overs within the banking system 
under certain conditions. 
70 Engineer (1989, 444) extends the D&D model to cover a longer period and finds out that in the 
shorter-horizon model immediate suspension of convertibility is effective in averting a bank run 
compared to the long-horizon model (conditioned under aggregate consumption certainty). Similarly, 
Gorton (1985, 178) argues that, under information asymmetries, suspension of convertibility can signal 
depositors that the “[…] continuation of the long-term investment is mutually beneficial”. An 
alternative way to change depositor incentives to stop withdrawing their deposits is also to increase 
their future gains of sticking to their initial liquidity preferences (i.e., type I and type II, as referred in 
the literature). However, “[i]n periods of great uncertainty and stress, market participants increasingly 
tend to make their portfolio adjustments in quantities (runs) rather than prices (interest rates)” 
(Kaufman 2000, 15).  
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(Park 1991, 272). However, if the ultimate aim is to achieve optimal risk sharing under private 
liquidity preferences, as mentioned above, the suspension of convertibility does no longer 
make deposit contracts ‘individually incentive compatible’ (Chari 1989) for impatient people 
(Diamond and Dybvig 2000, 16, 19). Yet, it may lead to inefficiencies in cases when it is not 
possible to differentiate between patient and impatient depositors and might prevent 
depositors with early liquidity needs from withdrawing. Therefore, although it may offer some 
time for depositors, as well as policy makers, to distinguish between healthy and unhealthy 
institutions (Detragiache and Ho 2010, 7), even the possibility of suspension alone may cause 
impatient depositors to run as they have a preference for early consumption.71 Diamond 
(2007, 198) clarifies the issue in the following words: 
 
[…] [S]uspension cannot be used only as a threat. Some suspension would actually 
occur and would be unpopular. If suspension occurred regularly, depositors would 
desire another way of stopping runs caused by panics. In practice, government-
provided deposit insurance has been instituted following many financial crises.  
 
Rejecting the suspension of withdrawals as an effective solution to bank runs, the D&D 
model suggest deposit insurance to rule out runs without limiting banks from transforming 
their assets (Diamond and Dybvig 2000, 16). Comparing the two policy prescriptions and 
‘commitment devices’ (Martin 2006) during banking crises, namely the lender of last resort 
and the deposit insurance scheme, the model suggests that “[a] run can even occur in response 
to expectations about the general willingness of the lender of last resort to rescue failing banks 
[...] In contrast, deposit insurance is a binding commitment which can be structured to retain 
punishment of the bank’s owners, board of directors, and officers in the case of a failure” 
(Diamond and Dybvig 2000, 21). Accordingly, deposit insurance with a full coverage is 
regarded superior to the discretionary government policies and assumed to rule out the bank-
run equilibrium and eliminate bank runs in the multiple equilibria (Diamond 2007, 198). In 
other words: 
 
[b]ank runs should not occur when deposits are insured against the risk of bank 
insolvency; deposit insurance may be explicit, i.e. banks may purchase full or partial 
insurance on behalf of depositors from a government agency or from a private 
insurer, or it may be implicit, if depositors (correctly) believe that the government will 
either prevent the bank from failing or that, in the case of failure, it would step in and 
compensate depositors for their losses (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1997, 8). 
 
                                                
71 In addition, as the US banking crises during the 19th century illustrate, “[i]n particular, during actual 
suspension episodes, those who withdrew late, after suspension occurred, received a lower return than 
those who withdrew early; late withdrawals’ checks passed at a discount” (Wallace 1988, 15). The 
efficiency of a deposit freeze as a containment policy is also subject to question as delayed access to 
deposits may exacerbate the already existing panic among depositors. Laeven and Valencia (2008a, 20) 
argue that in some cases bank runs resumed as soon as the freeze on deposits was removed. 
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Although, as Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2006, 4) argue, “[i]mplicit and explicit 
deposit insurance are critical components of national safety nets”, the effectiveness and the 
way the scheme is applied depend on the different nature of bank runs (Allen, Carletti, and 
Leonello 2011, 467). Goldstein (2010, 3) argues that the deposit guarantee, as well as the 
lender of last resort facility and the suspension of withdrawals, has been articulated on ‘a 
panic-based view of crises’. The idea of deposit insurance scheme to bring banking panics into 
a halt has been approached with caution by the rest of the literature. However, there are 
scholars from the asymmetric information tradition, who also agree with the efficiency of the 
deposit insurance scheme.72 Gorton (1988, 775) argues that the introduction of the deposit 
insurance scheme help containing panics even in the presence of a liabilities signal. In a joint 
paper with Calomiris, they argue that the market and institutional structure of the banking 
system (branch banking versus unit banking and the existence of deposit insurance) are of 
significance in preventing banking panics from taking place (Calomiris and Gorton 1991, 
110).73 Chari (1989, 26) on the other hand argues the opposite. Accordingly, emphasising the 
‘advantages of using these central bank policies instead of deposit insurance’, he shows that 
reserve requirements and a well-functioning inter-bank market can also lead to efficient 
outcomes (Chari 1989, 17).74 Cooper and Ross (1991, 3) argue that the use of capital 
requirements on intermediaries would allow deposit insurance to eliminate bank runs without 
any moral hazard. In another article, scholars re-emphasise the need for capital requirements, 
in addition to deposit insurance schemes, to provide the first-best allocation (Cooper and 
Ross 2002). Accordingly, “[d]eposit insurance is needed to avoid bank runs. Capital 
requirements are needed to overcome the adverse incentive problems associated with the 
provision of deposit insurance” (Cooper and Ross 2002, 70).75 
Against the background of these divergent views on the issue area, three criticisms have 
been directed towards the promotion of the deposit insurance as a solution to bank runs. 
Firstly, although some defend insurance schemes for providing stability during banking crises, 
                                                
72 Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) argue that deposit insurance can be efficient in slowing down bank 
runs.  
73 Criticising the D&D model for failing to specify the events leading to panics (Calomiris and Gorton 
1991, 121-124), these scholars argue that the differences in market structure among different banking 
systems would actually help understand the underlying reasons. In addition, also emphasising the 
institutional structure of the banking system Smith (1991, 246) argues that “[…] existing models of 
bank liquidity provision that follow Diamond and Dybvig [1983] can easily be modified to incorporate 
organizational features of the banking system. When these are introduced, such models can readily 
explain observed panics without relying on informational asymmetries or multiple equilibria”.  
74 Martin also investigates the provision of liquidity by the central bank during bank runs and its 
efficiency in preventing bank runs without causing moral hazard (Martin 2006). As regards to 
interbank borrowing and lending, another study by Dasgupta (2004, 1053), on the other hand, suggests 
that although “[i]nterbank deposits thus enable banks to hedge regional liquidity shocks but expose 
them to the risk of contagion [as a result of balance sheet connections across institutions]”. 
75 As an alternative to those, an interesting article by Sun and Huangfu (2011, 859) suggests that “[…] 
allowing claims on demand deposits to circulate as a medium of exchange can help prevent bank 
runs”. Gangopadhyay and Singh (2000) argue that, when allowed to sell deposit contracts and equities, 
banks runs can be prevented even in the absence of deposit insurance. 
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there is a growing body of literature on the adverse effects of deposit insurance on both 
banks’ and depositors’ incentives. Those criticisms argue that the scheme removes market 
discipline imposed by depositors on their banks and injects moral hazard into the system. 
Since those arguments mostly refer to the trade-off between today’s stability (by eliminating 
banking panics) and the future crises (as a result of decreased discipline and increasing moral 
hazard), they are indirectly related to this research’s discussion on the insurance’s efficiency in 
stabilising depositor expectations.76  
Secondly, the institutional shortcomings of the scheme (such as the coverage limit and the 
compensation delays) might provide depositors with negative incentives to withdraw their 
funds despite the guarantee being in place.77 Emphasising the significance of the scheme’s 
design for its efficiency, Demirguc-Kunt, Kane and Laeven (2006, 3) argue that “[t]he central 
challenge of deposit- insurance management is to strike an optimal balance between the 
benefits of preventing crises and the costs of controlling bank and customer risk-taking”. The 
incentive behind the co-insurance principle is to motivate depositors to monitor their banks, 
as ‘[…] perverse incentives created by deposit insurance [might emerge] when it is not fairly 
priced’ (Calomiris 1990, 283). The theoretical support for the co-insurance system suggests an 
increasing awareness by depositors to which institutions they deposit their savings (Calomiris 
1990, 283).  
                                                
76 One strand of literature concentrates on the role of deposit insurance in the occurrence of future 
banking crises. To summarise those arguments shortly, the first line of arguments defends deposit 
insurance for providing stability during banking crises through eliminating bank runs (see Kindleberger 
and Aliber 2005, 190-2). In their model Detragiache and Ho (2010, 9) argue that deposit insurance 
facilitate crisis management through eliminating bank runs. On the other hand, although it has been 
promoted for preventing bank runs, deposit insurance has mostly been criticised for altering the 
‘incentive structure of transactions’ (Breuer 2004, 308). In their study on the determinants of banking 
crises, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997, 6) state that despite reducing the number of self-
fulfilling bank runs, the introduction of deposit insurance has promoted excessive risk taking within 
the banking sector and has worsened banking sector fragility through introducing moral hazard into 
the system. Boyd, De Nicolo, and Loukoianove (2009, 26) also argue that deposit insurance makes 
banking crisis more likely and  “[…] the probability of a government response to bank distress is 
significantly higher when an explicit deposit insurance system is in place, consistent with governments’ 
firmer commitment to intervene under explicit depositors’ protection schemes”. These scholars, at the 
same time, state that the existence of deposit insurance does not affect the probability of a systemic 
shock on the banking system (Boyd, De Nicolo, and Loukoianove 2009, 26). In another study, 
Hoggarth, Jackson, and Nier (2005, 144) also acknowledge the trade off inherent in deposit insurance 
schemes. “On the one hand, an explicit scheme might reduce the likelihood of a depositor run, on the 
other hand an explicit scheme may remove the disciplining force of the threat of a run” (Hoggarth, 
Jackson, and Nier 2005, 149). They discover that the likelihood of a banking crisis increases with an 
explicit unlimited deposit insurance scheme (Hoggarth, Jackson, and Nier 2005, 144). Accordingly, 
“[t]he group least likely to experience a crisis is that with an explicit but limited deposit protection 
scheme, and within that group those countries that require depositors to co-insure” (Hoggarth, 
Jackson, and Nier 2005, 144). Finally, Eichengreen and Arteta (2000, 31) support the view that “[t]here 
is at least as much evidence that deposit insurance reduces crisis risk by solving the depositor-run 
problem than there is of it encourages crises by weakening market discipline”.  
77 According to Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997, 26), among specific features of deposit 
insurance schemes are the extent of the coverage (and also the existence of the co-insurance principle), 
the type of premia charged to banks and the public or private nature of the scheme.  
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Finally, focusing specifically on system-wide bank runs and deposit freezes, as well as 
payment re-scheduling, from the perspective of ‘limited commitment literature’, Ennis and 
Keister (2009, 1588) examine ex post responses from the authorities to a bank runs and how 
these create ex ante incentives for depositors. Their research illustrates that the anticipation of 
a policy response can prepare the necessary conditions to generate a self-fulfilling bank run 
(Ennis and Keister 2009, 1588). Higlighting this time-inconsistency problem in banking policy 
that might lead to an inefficient outcome in multiple equilibria (Ennis and Keister 2007), the 
scholars continue, “[b]anking authorities would like depositors to believe they will be “tough” 
in response to a run. However, if a run were to actually start, the authorities would not find it 
optimal to take a tough stand. Instead, they would choose a more lenient policy, and this 
policy can end up justifying the original decision of depositors to run” (Ennis and Keister 
2009, 1589. See also Ennis and Keister 2007). They suggest that the basis for a self-fulfilling 
bank run might also be the combination of ‘the lack of commitment and optimism’ on the 
policymakers’ side (Ennis and Keister 2007, 30). Similarly, in another paper Ennis and Keister 
(2010b) also argue the impact of limited (or lack of) commitment by the authorities on the 
formation of self-fulfilling depositor runs. In the model they present, both the authorities and 
depositors are able to anticipate and react to each other’s behaviour, creating an interplay 
between depositors withdrawals and policy actions.  
Timing of policy responses is also important since government intervention to a banking 
problem may have an adverse effect on expectations. It might be perceived “[…] like shouting 
“fire” in a crowded theatre, regulatory interventions may frighten the market and thus create a 
problem where one did not previously exit” (Gavin and Hausmann 1998, 6). Equally, 
however, it is of imperative to act on a timely manner to address the ongoing crisis before it 
worsens.78 As Morris and Shin (1998, 595) states, public announcements are significant in 
restoring common knowledge of fundamentals. In another paper, they also emphasise the 
‘dual role’ of fundamentals information that “[p]ublic information has attributes that make it a 
double-edged instrument. On the one hand, it conveys information on the underlying 
fundamentals, but it also serves as a focal point for the beliefs of the group as a whole” 
(Morris and Shin 2002, 1521). They underline the trade-off between timely but noisy 
                                                
78 Prompt corrective action in the United States mainly aims timely government intervention to 
institutions which may become insolvent in the near future. However, from regulators point of view, it 
is not always easy to distinguish between cases where the cause of the problem is one arising from 
illiquidity and not insolvency. Central banks, acting as ‘lender of last resort’s during banking crisis 
exercise judgment calls, following Bagehot’s advice, to “[...] lend freely but at a penalty rate and only to 
solvent institutions with good collateral and also lend quickly before a run takes off and use LOLR 
rarely to avoid moral hazard” (Caprio and Honohan 2008, 15).  
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information and slow information as a challenge in front of policy makers (Morris and Shin 
2002, 1523).79  
Deposit insurance, however, is not the only policy response available to the authorities 
during banking crises. When a banking crisis hits an economy, the type of government 
response varies among measures and occasions (Laeven and Valencia 2008a). Two-phases 
that mark those policies are containment and resolution, where containment policies are 
immediate reactions to restore public confidence in the initial stages of a crisis (Detragiache 
and Ho 2010, 6; see also Laeven and Valencia 2008a, 7). Policies during the containment 
phrase are basically designed to give banks the time and the ‘breathing room’ to restore 
depositor confidence, as well as urging policy makers to intervene to a depositor run before it 
spills to bystanders and affects borrowers (Caprio and Honohan 2008, 15). Among policy 
responses80 during banking crises are the suspension of convertibility of deposits (deposit freeze), 
emergency liquidity support to banks (as a first line of response),81 government guarantee of depositors 
(blanket guarantees), bank holidays (as temporary suspensions of depositor rights), regulatory 
capital forbearance,82 and bank restructuring (such as nationalisation, closures, mergers, sales to 
foreigners and bank recapitalisation by public funds).83  
Public policies during or following banking crises intend to decrease negative externalities 
of bank failures.84 “[...] [S]afety nets are adopted because of the perceived benefits they will 
confer in either preventing a weak banking system from spilling over a full-blown crisis or in 
enabling the government to handle a crisis more effectively” (Hoggarth, Jackson, and Nier 
2005, 143). In the absence or as a result of the inefficiency of the deposit insurance scheme, 
the severity of the situation may also require governments to introduce blanket guarantees as 
(most of the time) unlimited guarantees on deposits to restore depositor confidence (Laeven 
and Valencia 2008a, 21). However, as Laeven and Valencia (2008b) argue, the success of the 
blanket guarantee offered by the government in stabilising depositor expectations also rests in 
its credibility in the eyes of depositors.85 Referring to the use of blanket guarantees during 
banking crises, Laeven and Valencia also suggests that  
 
[…] it may be better to announce blanket guarantees sooner rather than later. Using 
them at an early stage would imply to put them in place before public confidence 
                                                
79 Prati and Sbracia (2002) also examine the impact of the precision of public information and the state 
of fundamentals. Their theoretical model concludes that “[…] the precision of public information 
helps when the public signal is good, but hurts when it is bad” (Prati and Sbracia 2002, 23).  
80 The ones in italic are the ‘containment policies’ to address a bank run.   
81 The latter policy, however, has a signalling effect that may worsen the situation by altering 
depositors’ perception towards those banks. For a discussion see Bordo 2008, 13; Kaufman 2000, 21.  
82 “Under regulatory forbearance, banks that should be closed down are allowed to continue to 
operate” (Detragiache and Ho 2010, 7).  
83 For details see Laeven and Valencia 2008a. See also Detragiache and Ho 2010, 7.  
84 Lindgren, Garcia and Saal 1996, 105. 
85 For the cases where market does not react to the blanket guarantees, this might be because of the 
“undermined credibility of the guarantee” (Laeven and Valencia 2008b, 8).  
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deteriorates substantially. However, the final outcome will always depend on the 
credibility of the guarantee, the accompanying policies and the severity of the 
underlying shock (Laeven and Valencia 2008b, 18). 
 
As Laeven and Valencia (2008a, 21) argue, governments introduce blanket guarantees with an 
aim to gain some time for implementing a ‘credible policy package’. In their study on blanket 
guarantees, Laeven and Valencia (2008b) use liquidity support (provided by the monetary 
authorities) to financially distressed banks as a proxy for depositor confidence. Their findings 
suggest that “[...] on average, the announcement of blanket guarantees are followed by a 
statistically significant and quantitatively important slowdown in the provision of liquidity 
support [excluding foreign creditors]” (Laeven and Valencia 2008b, 4). Even for countries 
with no ex ante deposit insurance, blanket guarantees are built into market expectations to 
create moral hazard (Hoggarth, Jackson, and Nier 2005, 144).86  
The phenomenon of ‘too-big-to-fail’ or ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ is regarded to be 
another kind of an implicit guarantee by the government (Kaufman and Seelig 2001, 3).87 As 
Laeven and Valencia (2008b, 6-7) argue, the public might interpret de facto protection on the 
banking system as an implicit guarantee on banks. In some instances blanket guarantees may 
cover only specific banks or a segment of the market (Laeven and Valencia 2008a, 21).88 Still, 
even a fractional blanket guarantee may be perceived as a full coverage by depositors either 
because of the ignorance on the details of the support or as a result of the belief that the 
government support will be made available for other banks as well (Laeven and Valencia 
2008b, 6). As a criticism to the literature on limited commitment discussed above, it is 
believed that “[…] governments may end up doing more than what they have promised in 
order to avoid crises and restore the stability of the banking system” (Allen, Carletti, and 
Leonello 2011, 470-1). 
 
2.3 Cri t ique  o f  the  Curren t  Li t e ra ture   
 
“There are many shocks: only a relatively small 
proportion of shocks lead to a speculative mania” 
(Kindleberger and Aliber 2005, 51) 
                                                
86 Japan is the leading example for an implicit blanket guarantee embedded in market expectations. 
“[…] [A]necdotal evidence suggests that, there had always been a presumption on the part of 
depositors and markets in Japan that banks would not be allowed to fail” (Hoggarth, Jackson, and Nier 
2005, 146, footnote 5). See also Kindleberger and Aliber (2005, 134).  
87 An interesting argument has been presented by Miller (2008) on the relationship between the size of 
the banking sector vulnerable to bank runs and the central bank’s willingness to recapitalise unhealthy 
banks under fixed exchange regimes. Accordingly, Miller argues that “[…] when policy-makers care 
about bank solvency and currency peg stability, then a run will not occur when banks are either “too 
big” or “too small” to fail and that only medium- sized banking sectors will be vulnerable to runs” 
(2008, 558).  
88 This was the case during the Northern Rock crisis when the blanket guarantee introduced by the 
Government covered only the bank’s deposits, not the whole banking system.  
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The preceding section of this chapter has discussed that while sunspots theories of bank runs 
promote random variables as triggers, asymmetric information theories prioritise 
fundamentals - either bank-specific or system-wide. Based on their differing views on the 
nature of bank runs, four major analytical distinctions can be identified between sunspot 
explanations and asymmetric information theories of bank runs. Firstly, these two theories 
put emphasis on the opposite sides of the bank’s balance sheet. While sunspots theories 
emphasise demand side and the liquidity needs of depositors, asymmetric information 
theories focus on the asset side of the balance sheet where asset shocks are regarded as the 
sources of panics (due to solvency considerations) (Calomiris and Gorton 1991). As a result, 
their interpretation of bank runs also differs from each other. While the former regards bank 
runs as contributing to banking crises and ‘destroying optimal risk sharing among depositors’ 
(Diamond and Dybvig 2000, 15), the latter treats them as the ‘symptom of problems in the 
system’ (Laeven and Valencia 2008b, 3, footnote 2; Williamson 1988), ‘an episode of market 
discipline’ (Schumacher 2000, 258)89 and ‘monitoring devices’ (Gorton and Huang 2002, 3).90  
A second fundamental difference between the two theories rests in their view towards the 
sequential service constraint inherent in deposit contracts. As discussed in the preceding 
sections, the first line of explanations treats banks as ‘liquidity providers’ and argues that the 
sequential service constraint might endanger bank stability through motivating bank runs. 
The asymmetric information theories, on the other hand, suggest that this constraint actually 
prevents a widespread disintermediation from all banks (Calomiris and Gorton 1991, 126). 
With regards to crisis resolution, as Calomiris and Gorton (1991, 165) argue, the asymmetric 
information theories of bank runs do not regard open market operations to be effective in 
preventing or alleviating panics. According to this view, targeting individual institutions rather 
than the general system liquidity is suggested to be the key to ease depositor panics. On the 
other hand, according to random withdrawal theory, Calomiris and Gorton (1991, 154) 
continue, the inadequacy of reserves in meeting deposit withdrawals or liquidity needs is the 
main driving factor in suspensions and bank failures. Therefore, in this view, open market 
operations and/or reserve requirements would help ease depositor panic (Calomiris and 
Gorton 1991, 165). Finally, while sunspots explanations emphasise multiple-equilibria and 
regard bank runs as among the many possible outcomes, the asymmetric information theory 
                                                
89 Within this tradition, bank runs are regarded as welfare superior (Samartin 2003; Alonso 1996). Allen 
and Gale (1998, 1245) describe bank runs as “[…] first-best efficient: they allow efficient risk sharing 
between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios”. 
90 Gorton and Mullineaux (1987, 463) also define bank runs as instances of customer monitoring. 
Yorulmazer (2003, 1) also suggests that “[…] a deposit contract that allows for runs can achieve higher 
levels of depositor welfare than a contract that completely eliminates them”. Similarly and according to 
Blejen, Feldman, and Feltenstein (1997, 7) bank runs are grounded on solvency concerns and thus 
monitor bank performance. 
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mostly depicts ‘threshold models’ and thus promotes fundamentals-equilibrium.91 This 
fundamentals view suggests “[…] that panics are neither random events nor inherent to the 
function of banks or the structure of bank balance sheets” (Calomiris 2007, 25). Accordingly, 
these two approaches shall be located on a continuum where sunspots and fundamentals 
views present the two extreme ends.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Continuum of Theories of Bank Runs 
 
 
Against the background of the four analytical distinctions identified above, this section will 
first justify why this research’s argument rejects sunspots as potential triggers for changes in 
depositor behaviour but still embraces self-fulfilling prophecies. Under multiple-equilibria, 
expectations (either founded on fundamentals or not) are self-fulfilling which might 
substitute common knowledge (see Heinemann and Illing 2000, 3-4). While the good-
equilibrium presents business as usual, bank runs are the bad-equilibrium. What is the rationale 
behind promoting sunspots to explain multiple equilibria? A potential problem with 
promoting multiple-equilibria and one of the criticisms directed to the D&D model is that, 
“[…] bank runs should not be observed in equilibrium since no one would deposit 
anticipating a run. One way around this, as suggested by Diamond and Dybvig, is to suppose 
that the equilibrium is selected depending on a publicly observable random variable. Then 
agents may still deposit in the bank provided the probability of a run is small enough” 
(Postlewaite and Vives 1987, 485; see also Peck and Shell 2003, 112). However, by promoting 
the ‘random variable solution’ to the multiple-equilibria problem, the theory fails to clarify the 
causal mechanisms for change from one to another equilibrium. Yet, self-fulfilling prophecies 
(through higher order beliefs), which suggest a multiple equilibria approach and mostly 
promoted by the second generation of financial crises, have mostly been criticised for “[…] 
not explain[ing] the shift in beliefs, which incites the economy to move from one equilibrium 
                                                
91 As a further example see Green and Lin 2000. They assert that “[…] within the basic framework of 
Diamond and Dybvig—even with the sequential service constraint— an arrangement exists that 
implements the efficient allocation without leading to bank runs” (Green and Lin 2000, 9). Zhu (2001) 
also argues that bank runs are unique equilibrium outcomes without self-fulfilling prophecies. Multiple 
equilibria view of bank runs is promoted by Diamond and Dybvig 2000; Ennis and Keister 2006; Peck 
and Shell 2003.  
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to the next” (Metz 2002, 66; see also Metz and Michaelis, 2003). In their work on currency 
crises, Morris and Shin (1998, 587) argue that merely pointing to self-fulfilling prophecies 
falls short in explaining the ‘onset of an attack when it occurs’. Yet, an understanding of self-
fulfilling prophecies founded on a substantial change in the fundamentals might help us 
utilise from the analytical strengths of both theories of bank runs. 
A mid-way between the pure sunspots and the fundamentals view of bank runs has been 
the introduction of a ‘noisy signal of the state of fundamentals’ into multiple-equilibria games. 
Noisy signals that replace common knowledge, as suggested by Morris and Shin (1998), 
might lead to the unique equilibrium of a bank run.92 Here the triggers of the bank run are 
not pure sunspots, but rather the lack of common knowledge on fundamentals. These 
scholars argue that even in cases when fundamentals are sound (and this fact is acknowledged 
by individual depositors), a noisy signal of the state of fundamentals may result in higher 
order beliefs, as this would generate “[…] a failure of common knowledge of fundamentals” 
and uncertainty over others’ beliefs about the state of fundamentals (Morris and Shin 1998, 
588). These individual interpretations of common (public) knowledge are what transform 
them into private information. As a matter of fact, this shift from public to private 
information, in turn, results in the shift from multiple equilibra to the unique equilibrium of a 
bank run (Pericoli and Sbracia 2003, 591). “In standard models of […] bank runs, incomplete 
information typically rules out multiplicity of equilibria. Then, for given levels of 
fundamentals, small differences in private information or in the degree of uncertainty of 
agents’ beliefs can produce significant changes in the behaviour of economic agents” (Pericoli 
and Sbracia 2003, 575).  
As depicted in Figure 1 above, on the extreme right end of the continuum rests asymmetric 
information theories of bank runs with a fundamentals-equilibrium. Several studies within 
this tradition prioritise different aspects of fundamentals when explaining depositor 
behaviour. As a response to the criticism directed towards sunspots explanations, the 
asymmetric information theories of bank runs put forward the threshold assumption to 
explain the ‘onset of an attack’. This assumes a rational update of expectations to a Bayesian 
equilibrium of a bank run93 upon the arrival of adverse news either on the bank itself, on the 
general economy, or on a combination of both. Following this logic, for two cases operating 
under similar economic vulnerabilities, an explanation based solely on immediate stimulus (to 
exceed a certain threshold condition) would require both of them to be (or not to be) 
exposed to bank run(s).  
Economic historians were able to identify the pronounced failures that triggered changes 
in depositor behaviour during the 19th century banking crises. According to Chari (1989), 
                                                
92 Also discussed in Goldstein and Pauzner 2005, 1294-5.  
93 See again Zhu 2001.  
 
63 
there have been seven separate instances of system-wide bank runs between 1864 and 1933 in 
the United States four of which led to the widespread suspension of convertibility94: 1873 (*), 
1884 (the shortest panic), 1890, 1893 (*), 1907 (*), 1930, 1933 (*).95 Referring to Sprague’s 
study on the history of banking crises during the US National Banking Era, Chari specifies 
the failure of one or more financial institutions serving as triggers for these banking panics.96 
Accordingly, Jay Cooke & Co. (1873), Frant & Ward (1884), Decker, Howell, & Co. (1890), 
the National Cordage Company (1893), and the Knickerbocker Trust Company (1907) were 
the cases setting off the panics. However, in addition to those positive cases where a banking 
panic could be identified after a failure, there have been numerous (non)financial corporate 
failures which, contrary to the several examples from the 19th century, did not result in mass 
panic among depositors (Chari 1989).97 In other words, there have been cases where 
fundamentals-view failed to explain non-occurrences of bank runs despite deterioration in 
micro and/or macro environment. There is more than ‘a change in economic fundamentals’ 
that shape depositor expectations in those cases when depositor behaviour changes in varying 
levels. 
The banking panics literature not only examines the reasons and triggers for bank runs, 
but it also promotes certain institutions to stabilise depositor expectations. The significance 
of institutions in economic analyses has long been promoted by the institutional economics 
literature, within a special emphasis on transaction costs.98 As mentioned in the opening 
chapter of this thesis, the disappearance of nineteenth century-style bank runs has been 
attributed to the success and efficiency of the LoLR function by the Bank of England in the 
United Kingdom and of the deposit insurance schemes especially in the United States. 
Focusing on the latter, the preceding section has documented several studies discussing the 
role played by the scheme in either preventing bank runs from taking place or turning into 
system-wide banking panics. If and when the periods of bank runs are matched with the 
existence of deposit insurance schemes, however, the following puzzle reveals itself: There 
have been several episodes when either an institutionalised government guarantee on deposits 
                                                
94 Those, which included a suspension of convertibility, are marked with an asterisk (*).  
95 Except from the ones during the Great Depression, clearinghouse certificates were issued during all 
the aforementioned panics (Gorton 1988).  
96 Sprague 1910, referred in Chari 1989, 4.  
97 Gorton  (1988, 754-5) also criticise the Failure Hypothesis on the grounds that the failures of some 
large institutions did not cause any depositor panic, despite the fact that the information externality 
created by the failure creates ‘distrust’ in the future solvency of the other banks. 
98 See especially North (1990, 2000) and Coase (1988). According to North’s theory of institutions, the 
main function of institutions is the provision of certainty in human interaction by determining the 
‘rules of the game’ (North 1990, 3, 4). This function is served by both formal (rules) and informal 
constraints (conventions and codes of behaviour) on individuals, as well as enforcement mechanisms 
(North 1990, 4). These informal constraints are “[...] extensions, elaborations, and qualifications of 
rules that have tenacious survival ability, because they become an integral part of habitual behaviour” 
(North 2000, 53). 
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failed to prevent changes in depositor behaviour (bank runs) or no change was observed 
despite the absence of this guarantee.  
As Chari (1989, 3) states, “[n]either Great Britain nor Canada had federal deposit 
insurance, and neither experienced system-wide bank runs as the United States did in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries. Clearly, then, deposit insurance is not the only arrangement that 
forestalls bank panics”. The same line of argument can be applied to the cases of Japan and 
New Zealand. An implicit understanding that the Japanese Government would step in to 
protect depositors resulted in a crash without any panic (Kindleberger and Aliber 2005, 4). 
Similarly, “[s]tudies in New Zealand, where there is no deposit insurance, suggests that the 
normal depositor pays no attention to the vulnerability of their bank. Bank deposits are 
regarded as safe. There have been no bank failures in the memory of most depositors, so the 
risk is treated as nonexistent” (Mayes and Wood 2008, 17).  
Acknowledging also the shortcomings of the depositor insurance scheme, this research is 
not novel in its criticism towards the efficiency of the deposit insurance scheme. However, 
firstly it suggests that the inefficiencies of the scheme update the reference points for future 
crises and leave cognitive footprints on depositors’ memory. Secondly, the lack of depositor 
awareness towards the deposit insurance scheme might also hinder the authorities’ efforts for 
stabilising depositor expectations. Against this background, the rest of this chapter will 
introduce the mainstream arguments in the cognitive heuristics literature and illustrate how 
those shall be applied understanding bank runs. Saving exceptions, a Bayesian bias is present 
within the asymmetric information theory of bank runs, which models a ‘rational depositor’ 
that rationally updates her expectations with the arrival of new piece of information and once 
fundamentals exceed certain value thresholds. The self-fulfilling nature of depositor 
expectations and the threshold assumption in the literature with a Bayesian emphasis, however, 
require a better understanding on the decision-making process of depositors under 
uncertainty. Deterioration in fundamentals cannot explain the occurrence of all bank runs; 
neither can the existence of deposit insurance scheme account for the infrequency of bank 
runs.  
For both material and institutional dimensions, it is imperative to understand how a 
certain piece of information is interpreted by depositors. As mentioned earlier, if and when 
analysed as a process, a bank run might be broken down into several phases: (1) Arrival of the 
situation (introduction), (2) interpretation, (3) policy responses to the on-going crisis, (4) re-
interpretation, and (5) resolution of the crisis. The literature mostly under-examines the 
‘interpretation’ and ‘re-interpretation’ phases of the aforementioned process. This research 
argues that there are certain ‘reference (focal) points’ for depositors in order to interpret the 
current situation and act accordingly. Yet the current literature tends to overlook the 
influence of the past crises on expectation formation and expects deposit insurance to be 
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efficient even without taking the state (level) of depositor awareness into consideration. In 
this regard, this research’s emphasis on cognitive heuristics, which distort decision-making 
process towards certain cognitive biases, is an attempt to overcome these shortcomings.  
With this aim in mind, the following section will first present a general argument on the 
threshold models of behaviour and expectation cascades to better understand the cognitive 
heuristics literature. This will be followed by an overview of the mainstream arguments on 
cognitive heuristics, especially but not specifically by Kahneman and Tversky, and how those 
can be applied to this research’s argument. As a note of caution, however, this research does 
not cover all the variants of research on cognitive heuristics, neither does it present all 
cognitive biases documented. Given the extensive studies undertaken on the subject area, 
only the mainstream research conducted to analyse the three most common cognitive 
heuristics (namely the availability, representativeness, and anchoring heuristics) and the basic 
propositions of the Prospect Theory are taken into consideration. The final section will argue 
how the insights from the cognitive heuristics literature might be applied to better understand 
bank runs. Conclusion will conclude the chapter and introduce the reader on what to expect 
with the following empirical part of this thesis.   
 
2.4 Cogni t iv e  Heur i s t i c s  and Refer ence  Po in ts    
 
“A crisis in a market may also trigger changes in the 
interpretation given to existing information. Information 
reassessment can materialize in various forms: herd 
behavior – on the ground of asymmetric costly 
information and/or size heterogeneity; informational 
cascades – based on the combination of asymmetric 
information and sequential decisions; reappraisal of 
economic fundamentals; or alterations in how equilibria 
are selected in models of multiple equilibria (sunspots)” 
(Vaugirard 2007, 404) 
 
“An account of perceived brightness 
or temperature also requires a parameter for a 
reference value (often called adaptation level), 
which is influenced by the context of current 
and prior stimulation” 
(Kahneman 2003, 1455) 
 
 
 
In threshold models of collective behaviour, which help explain the linkage of ‘individual 
choices to aggregate behaviour’, individual action is based both on “[...] its own characteristics 
(its threshold) and on the behaviour of others (the proportion of adopters)” (Braun and 
Gilardi 2006, 315). This is also defined as ‘herd behaviour’ and resembles to peer pressure 
when behaviours tip even when one’s private information directs to another point and route 
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(Banerjee 1992, 798).99 Others’ choices and actions are assumed to be the only information on 
‘beliefs about causal relationships’ (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008, 28). In those instances 
of self-fulfilling prophecies, everyone becomes trapped in the logic that tries to analyse their 
expectations of each other (see Schelling 1960, 208). Preferences, as Jervis (1988, 321) 
suggests, are influenced by others’ responses and may be inferred from their behaviours. 
Given this interdependency of actions in an uncertain environment, when conventional 
wisdom points to one direction under a sense of crisis, it is difficult to stay calm and rational 
in front of the zeitgeist – the spirit of the times-. 
Domino theory is the most obvious example of bandwagoning (Jervis 1988, 333) and the 
‘tacit coordination of expectations’ (Schelling 1960, 71). During bandwagoning actions gain 
information content (Schelling 1960, 115) and signalling effects on others, where ‘learning 
from first movers’ (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008, 47) takes place. As Schelling (1960, 
90) suggests bandwagon behaviour under uncertainty depends on ‘mutually perceived’ signals 
when each individual prefers to be in a majority or ‘see some majority coalesce’. These signals, 
Schelling (1960, 74) continues, have the power to coordinate expectations. Within a ‘spiral of 
reciprocal expectations’, actors are able to concert their expectations (and accordingly their 
actions) with the rest, if each of them acknowledges that everyone else is also trying to do the 
same (Schelling 1960, 87). In most situations where the status quo is disrupted, “[...] some clue 
for coordinating behavior, some focal points for each person’s expectations of what the other 
expects him to expect to be expected to do” (Schelling 1960, 57) is need to be present for 
action. There becomes “successive cycles of “[h]e thinks we think he thinks we think [...] he 
thinks we think he’ll attack; so he thinks we shall; so he will; so we must […] [The] behavior 
situation in which each player’s best choice of action depends on the action he expects the 
other to take, which he knows depends, in turn, on the other’s expectations of his own” 
(Schelling 1960, 207, 86). However, where do these focal points originate from which 
conventional wisdom resides? Referring back to Jervis in length: 
 
[...] expectations create predispositions that lead actors to notice certain things and to 
neglect others, to immediately and often unconsciously draw certain inferences from 
what is noticed, and to find it difficult to consider alternatives […] this way of 
perceiving is rational. Intelligent decision-making in any sphere is impossible unless 
significant amounts of information are assimilated to pre-existing beliefs. People are 
predisposed, set, or ready to see what they expected to be present (Jervis 1976, 145). 
 
Human choices are mainly ‘structured by settings in which they arise’ and are not just 
influenced by the ‘immediate stimulus’ (Jervis 1988, 320, 321). Actors’ behaviours are mediated 
by their interpretation of others’ actions and the underlying reasons for those actions (Jervis 
1988, 336). Jervis (1976, 3, 31) argues that there are ‘perceptual errors in decision-making’, 
                                                
99 Actors, when taking decisions, are inclined to refer to the information contained by others’ decisions 
(Banerjee 1992, 798). This, in return, renders each person’s decision less informative to other actors.  
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despite cautioning that perceptions are not the sole important decision-making variables. “[...] 
[I]t is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the 
decision-makers' beliefs about the world and their images of others” (Jervis 1976, 28). 
Emphasising the role of ‘pre-existing beliefs in the perception and interpretation of new 
information’, Jervis (1976, 117, 143) suggests that people do fit new-coming information into 
pre-existing beliefs and ignore the ones that does not confirm those beliefs. While 
emphasising the stickiness of old ideas during the interpretation of new information, Jervis 
(1976, 154) suggests that “[e]vidence is being ignored, misremembered, or twisted to preserve 
old ideas”. Those ‘irrational cognitive distortion[s]’ (Jervis 1976, 154) or ‘inertial human 
mental habits’ (Legro 2005, 30) are common in human decision-making. 
To re-emphasise once more, this research argues that while variables put forward by the 
banking panics literature are crucial in shaping depositor expectations, they are not be 
factored into the analysis on their face value. It is the interaction of ideas with the institutional 
and material settings, as structural variables, that provides individuals with focal points to 
converge their expectations. This research’s argument does not endorse explanations based 
solely on sunspots and is closer to the information asymmetries theory, which necessities a 
deterioration in fundamentals. However, it is also critical towards the Bayesian bias 
embedded in the critical threshold models of bank runs, such as the rational update of 
expectations upon the arrival of adverse news. Bayesian updating suggests that the arrival of 
each new piece of data, the spectrum of hypothesis may narrow (Simmons, Dobbin, and 
Garrett 2008, 26). New information will surely affect actors’ probability assessments, 
however, these update in knowledge will not guarantee a convergence on ‘the truth’ 
(Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008, 27). Accordingly, “[e]xactly what actors learn will be 
influenced by a number of factors, including the source of new information and how it is 
processed” (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008, 27). 
The ‘rationality’ in financial modelling requires agents to update their beliefs in line with 
the Bayes’ law upon receiving a new piece of information (Barberis and Thaler 2003, 1053). 
“Economists traditionally have assumed that, when faced with uncertainty, people correctly 
form their subjective probabilistic assessments according to the laws of probability” (Rabin 
1998, 24). However, referring to cognitive heuristics, economic decision might also be biased 
to produce “[…] a wide variety of substantial and systematic reasoning errors relevant to 
economic decisions […] the evidence suggests that the magnitude and nature of the errors are 
themselves systematically related to economic confitions such as deliberation cost, incentives, 
and experience” (Conlisk 1996, 672). When information is massive, limited or not available at 
all, people tend to refer to their ‘cognitive shortcuts’ or ‘cognitive heuristics’100 in order to 
make satisficing decisions (Simon 1957). Labeling it as ‘deliberation cost’, Conlisk (1996, 671) 
                                                
100 ‘Cognitive shortcuts’ and ‘cognitive heuristics’ are used interchangeably in this research. 
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argues that “[f]or a boundedly rational individual, heuristics often provide an adequate 
solution cheaply whereas more elaborate approaches would be unduly expensive”.  
Unlike Bayesian learning (updating), actual human decision process and expectation 
formation resemble less to the norms of comprehensive rationality, but more to the empirical 
patterns of bounded rationality (Weyland 2005, 281). As Simon (1957, 198) argues, decision-
making cannot involve the evaluation of all possible alternatives and therefore, Bayesian 
rationality cannot be extended to situations characterised by uncertainty.101 According to him 
“[t]he capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very 
small compared with the size of the problems whose solutions is required for objectively 
rational behavior in the real world – or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective 
rationality” (Simon 1957, 198). One reaction that bounded rationality gives in ‘complex 
choice situations’ is to simplify the current uncertain situation where the goal of ‘maximising’ 
is replaced by the goal of ‘satisficing’ (with the course of action that is good enough to deal 
with the situation) (Simon 1957, 246, 199, 204). In these instances, ‘inferential shortcuts’ of 
the bounded rationality (Weyland 2005, 271) allow actors to gather the relevant information 
(see also Braun and Gilardi 2006, 306).  
“Psychologists hypothesize that subjects make systematic errors by using decision 
“heuristics”, or rules of thumb, which fail to accommodate the full logic of a decision, as 
when a person makes systematic forecast errors by using adaptive rather than rational 
expectations” (Conlisk 1996, 670). Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1124) highlight the 
significance of cognitive heuristics in human decision process and argue that they reduce 
complexity of assessing probabilities during judgement-formation. Accordingly, these 
scholars have conducted three different programs of research on cognitive heuristics first of 
which examined the heuristics and cognitive biases in decision-making “[…] that separate the 
beliefs that people have and the choices they make from the optimal beliefs and choices 
assumed in rational-agent models” (Kahneman 2003, 1449). This was followed by the 
‘Prospect Theory’ and the impact of ‘framing effects’ for rational-agent models (see 
Kahneman 2003). In the rest of this section I will overview those and their main assumptions 
respectively.  
To start with, three of the mostly referred principal cognitive shortcuts are the heuristics of 
availability, representativeness, and anchoring.102 The availability heuristic takes place when 
people tend to put excessive importance on large and more frequent events, which might also 
lead to several cognitive biases (Kahneman and Tversky 1982; see also Tversky and 
Kahneman 1982).103 People tend to refer to their memories for relevant information to assess 
                                                
101 For an analysis of rationality in the disciplines of psychology and economics, see Simon 1986.  
102 For a detailed discussion and the application of those heuristics see Weyland 2005, especially pages 
between 281-294.  
103 For a general overview of the cognitive biases originating from heuristics see Camerer 1995.  
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the probability of an event (Barberis and Thaler 2003, 1066). However, as Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974, 1127) argue, availability heuristics lead to the examples of large classes to be 
recalled easier than less frequent events.104 As Camerer (1995, 596) argues, expectations, based 
on these misperceived outliers, are not formed rationally “[…] because the processing of new 
information depends on the stock of old information, or familiar images”.  
Secondly, representativeness heuristic refers to cases where probabilities are assessed with 
reference to the degree of the sample to be the representative of a bigger population (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1974). “[…] [P]robabilities are evaluated by the degree to which A is 
representative of B, that is, by the degree to which A resembles B. For example, when A is 
highly representative of B, the probability that A originates from B is judged to be high” 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1124). During this process, the features of the sample are 
compared to the structures of the population in order to measure the probability of an event 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1982, 163), while ignoring the prior probabilities of an outcome 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1124). Departing from Bayesian judgment, several cognitive 
biases might arise and distort decision-making process under representativeness heuristic, such 
as insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes, insensitivity to sample size, misconception of 
chance, insensitivity to predictability, the illusion of validity, misconceptions of regression.105 
Lastly, the heuristic of anchoring takes place when people attach extreme weight to an initial 
value, which is later ‘adjusted to yield the final answer’ (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1128). 
This inferential ‘stickiness’ exerts a “[...] gravitational pull that substantially affects subsequent 
assessments” (Weyland 2005, 284, 285).  
Developed as a descriptive critique of expected utility theory, the Prospect Theory, without 
making any normative claims (Tversky and Kahneman 1986, S272), asserts “[…] the 
displeasure from a monetary loss is greater than the pleasure from a same-sized gain” (Rabin 
1998, 14). Endowment effect proposed by those scholars suggests that as a result of ‘certainty 
effect’106 and ‘loss aversion’ (Tversky and Kahneman 1986, S258). According to this theory, 
outcomes are perceived (from a reference point) as gains or losses, rather than as final states 
of wealth (Kahneman and Tversky 2000, 32).107 “A central conclusion of the study of risky 
choice has been that such choices are best explained by assuming that the significant carriers 
                                                
104 See also Kahneman and Tversky 1982, 164; Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1128. 
105 Each of these cognitive biases are explained in detail in Tversky and Kahneman 1974. In addition to 
those, Rabin and Schrag (1999) examine a model of confirmatory bias which further leads to 
overconfidence in agents.  
106 “[…] [P]eople underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that 
are obtained with certainty” (Kahneman and Tversky 2000, 17) 
107 As these scholars highlight, it was first proposed by Markowitz (1952) that utilities are defined on 
losses or gains, rather than absolute final wealth.  
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of utility are not states of wealth or welfare, but changes relative to a neutral reference point” 
(Thaler, Kahneman and Knetsch 1992, 70).108 
The theory further explains “[…] why people made different choices in situations with 
identical final wealth levels” (Barberis and Thaler 2003, 1071). In relation to their status quo, 
or in other words their reference points, people tend to dislike losses more than the pleasure 
of gains. “Perception is reference-dependent” (Kahneman 2003, 1454), in other words, changes in 
the reference point, hence the status quo, lead to reversals of preference (Tversky and 
Kahneman 2000a, 143). Prospect theory suggests two phases in decision-making, namely the 
editing (framing) phase and followed by an evaluation phase when “[…] edited prospects are 
evaluated and the prospect of highest value is chosen” (Kahneman and Tversky 2000, 28). “In 
the framing phase the decision maker constructs a representation of the acts, contingencies, 
and outcomes that are relevant to the decision” (Tversky and Kahneman 2000b, 46). Framing 
effects prevail when “[…] extensionally equivalent descriptions lead to different choices by 
altering the relative salience of different aspects of the problem” (Kahneman 2003, 1458). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986, S251) suggest that different preferences arise from the 
alternative descriptions of problems as opposed to the principle of invariance proposed by the 
rational choice theory. As an example, “[t]here has been considerable interest among 
behavioural economists in a particular type of framing effect, where a choice between two 
options A and B is affected by designating either A or B as a default option” (Kahneman 
2003, 1459). The significance of this framing effect has also been acknowledged in designing 
social policies when deciding which option to present as the default one. Against this 
background, the main hypotheses put forward by the cognitive heuristics literature shall be 
summarised as follows: 
 
Table 4 Hypotheses by Cognitive Heuristics Literature 
                                                
108 Scholars have further improved the Prospect Theory in another paper published in 2000 (Tversky 
and Kahneman 2000).  
Bounded rationality requires cognitive shortcuts to be used under uncertainty. 
The use of cognitive heuristics may result in cognitive biases in human decision-making 
Instances of large and more frequent classes are better recalled      
           (Availability heuristic) 
The features of the sample are compared to the structures of the population in order to 
          measure the probability of an event (Representativeness heuristic) 
People attach extreme weight to an initial value  
                            (Anchoring heuristic) 
Outcomes are perceived from a reference point as gains or losses (Prospect Theory) 
Changes in the reference point, hence the status quo, lead to reversals of preferences  
        (Framing Effects) 
Outcomes are perceived (from a reference point) as gains or losses, rather than as final states     
        of wealth (Endowment Effects)  
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2.5 Appl i ca t ion  o f  Cogni t iv e  Heur i s t i c s  in to  Banking Pani c s  
 
“[P]atterns of action may speak louder than words” 
(Schelling 1960, 107) 
 
 
How can we apply the insights from the cognitive heuristics literature to banking panics? In 
other words, can cognitive heuristics literature help us understand the nature of bank runs 
and their triggers? Banking panics literature suggests that depositor expectations converge 
either towards a random variable (which cannot be examined systematically across cases), 
towards the deterioration of fundamentals below of a certain threshold or, alternatively, 
towards deposit insurance as an institutional safety net to guarantee business as usual. 
Therefore, the way in which the current literature explains bank runs tends to prioritise 
material and institutional variables over ideational ones. Expectation-formation, placed at the 
centre of the analysis, is understood to be a function of interests and/or the institutional 
environment.  
As an attempt towards building this research’s argument and locating it within the current 
literature, this research has first rejected the sunspots arguments that promote random 
triggers for bank runs. Although sunspots explanations might seem more predisposed to an 
ideational analysis, they fail to provide testable assumptions for empirical scrutiny. It 
therefore has mbraced a fundamentals-view towards bank runs and argued that deterioration 
of fundamentals is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition itself for a change in depositor 
behaviour. It has finally suggested that the self-fulfilling nature of depositor expectations and 
the threshold models in the literature with a Bayesian emphasis require a better understanding 
on the decision-making processes of depositors under uncertainty.  
Despite adopting a fundamentals view towards bank runs, this research depicts depositors 
with bounded rationality and suggests the use of cognitive heuristics under complex 
situations and uncertainty. Conlisk (1996, 676) describes cognitive heuristics as “[…] rational 
in the sense that they appeal to intuition and avoid deliberation cost, but boundedly rational 
in the sense that they often lead to biased choices”. This reference to cognitive heuristics, 
especially to the use of reference points, might help understand why under similar conditions 
depositors react differently. Given the “[…] fickle nature of confidence, including its 
dependence on the public’s expectation of future events” (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, xlii), 
the argument put forward with this research highlights the significance of depositor 
awareness towards the safety nets in place and the memory of past institutional failures, as 
two alternative reference points for depositors.  
As a note of caution, this research is not the first attempt to apply this literature’s insights 
into the domain of economics. A vast amount of studies exists in behavioural economics, as 
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well as behavioural finance, which utilise from the cognitive heuristics literature in order to 
better understand market actor behaviour.109 The field, according to Barberis and Thaler 
(2003, 1052), has two building blocks: limitations on arbitrage for rational market actors to 
correct mispricing in the market and deviations from complete rationality in forming 
expectations as a result of cognitive heuristics and systematic biases. This research, however, 
is novel in applying those insights to address the shortcomings of the banking panics 
literature.  
To start with the institutional dimension, the empirical evidence on the impact of deposit 
insurance both on banking crises and on depositor motivations is mixed in the literature. As 
Bryant (1980, 343) suggests, “[...] the deposit insurance does not necessarily keep a bank run 
from occuring [...] Exactly what the effects of deposit insurance are depends upon how the 
government will meet its insurer’s obligation”. Changes in depositor behaviour may be 
difficult to alleviate when loss of confidence in the banking system is accompanied with a 
lack of confidence in the policies and institutions in place. A government policy becomes 
credible only when it reveals government’s willingness as well as its ability to rescue its banks 
and, therefore, their creditors. Coherence and the consistency in the actions of monetary 
authorities in addressing banking sector distress also affect public confidence. “If providing 
insurance is not ex post optimal, it cannot be ex ante credible either. Anticipating this, 
depositors fear they will not obtain their promised repayment and this may precipitate a crisis. 
In this framework, deposit insurance becomes ineffective in preventing even purely panic-
based runs” (Allen, Carletti, and Leonello 2011, 465). Credible government actions should 
aim to address the underlying problems that stress the banking system (Leaven and Valencia 
2008b, 20). As also in Jayanti, Whyte, and Do’s (1996, 105) words; “[...] the existence of a 
formal deposit insurance scheme may not be enough to prevent contagion effects; the actual 
and perceived response of regulators to bank failures may shape the investor response”. 
From an asymmetric information perspective, the efficiency of the deposit insurance, as 
well as the blanket guarantee, does derive not from the sum covered, but from its public 
nature (Morris and Shin 1998, 595). As stated by Ennis and Keister (2010b, 415) “[…] the 
anticipated policy response to a crisis clearly influences people’s ex ante incentives and 
behavior”. When panic starts unfolding within the banking system or the distress on the 
system has been increased due to adverse developments, what needs to be done is the 
                                                
109 For a short discussion on the economics literature’s critique of the psychologists and the application of 
their findings in the economics, see Thaler 1986. For a review on behavioral finance arguments and the 
critique of the Efficient Market Hypothesis see Shleifer 2000; Barberis and Thaler 2003. For a general 
overview of the psychological findings applied to economics by the discipline of behavioral economics see 
Rabin 1998. As a recent example, Akerlof and Shiller (2009) focus on the significance of non-economic 
motives underlying economic relations, denominated as the ‘animal spirits’ (with reference to John 
Maynard Keynes). Whilst criticising neoclassical economics for underestimating the role played by those 
animal spirits, these two scholars put special emphasis on the role played by confidence in financial markets 
and further relate this with business up and downturns. They label those as the cycles of confidence (over and 
underconfidence in times of boom and bursts, respectively).  
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‘reproduction of the depositor confidence’ through government assurances.110 This research 
argues that in order for expectations to stabilise with the deposit insurance, ‘depositor awareness’ 
towards this safety net should be in place in the first place. Without an initial awareness of the 
safety nets available, the use of those institutions cannot be expected. The efficiency of 
deposit insurance scheme should be judged to the extent of depositors’ awareness towards its 
existence. This ‘perception lag’ has commonly been ignored by the literature as the existence 
of a deposit insurance scheme is assumed to be sufficient in providing assurances to 
depositor.111 This, however, presents an additional information asymmetry between the bank 
and its depositors.112  
With regards to the fundamentals dimension and as also stated in the introduction of this 
chapter, the self-fulfilling nature of bank runs and the threshold models in the literature with a 
Bayesian emphasis require a better understanding on the decision-making process of 
depositors under uncertainty. Both theories of bank runs refer to self-fulfilling prophecies 
when depositors’ reactions are not proportionate with the on-going situation. During banking 
crises, when self-fulfilling prophecies take place among depositors, uncertainty and 
information asymmetries are intensified by the ‘inherently unknowable’ nature of the others’ 
value systems (Schelling 1960, 115). Even on the extreme assumption that individual 
depositors may be ‘well-informed’ about the state of the fundamentals, the uncertainty about 
how those are interpreted by others, as well as their motivations to withdraw, might trigger a 
panic and result in their decisions to be influenced by ‘what others are doing’ (Morris and Shin 
1998; Banerjee 1992).113 During a bank run, depositor actions become observable to others 
and the queues contain a public signal where any early action taken by depositors contains a 
‘feedback effect’ on others’ later decisions (Pericoli and Sbracia 2003, 592). This refers to the 
uncertainty caused by the transformation of common knowledge into private information, as 
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001, 284) suggest, when “[a]n individuals assessment of the 
                                                
110 An interesting study by Vaugirard examines the spread of bank panics across countries through an 
‘expectational channel’ since “[…] a banking crisis in a country leads creditors to reexamine 
policymakers’ willingness to bailouts in other countries, which eventually makes their banks more 
vulnerable to self-confirming depositors’ runs” (Vaugirard 2005, 93).  
111 Even the awareness towards the existence of the insurance does not guarantee (1) the full 
acknowledgement of the scheme’s details, and (2) confidence in the institution. 
112 In addition to those presented above, a further information asymmetry arises from the fact that 
there exists no secondary market for deposits (as banks’ liabilities) where ‘publicly observed market 
prices of different banks’ liabilities’ (Calomiris and Gorton 1991, 126) could have helped depositors 
differentiate between banks.  
113 “Information plays a subtle role in speculative crises. What is important is not the amount of 
information, per se, but rather how public and transparent this information. If market participants are 
well informed about the fundamentals, but they are unsure of the information received by other 
participants, and hence unsure of the beliefs held by others, speculative attacks may be triggered even 
though everyone knows that the fundamentals are sound” (Morris and Shin 1998, 588). Dasgupta 
(2004) labels it as ‘strategic uncertainty’ under which there prevails uncertainty about the actions of 
others. Accordingly, “[t]he presence of such strategic uncertainty prevents depositors from 
coordinating their actions with arbitrary precision and thus greatly reduces the set of potential 
equilibrium outcomes for a given level of economic fundamentals” (Dasgupta 2004, 1052).  
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quality of publicly available information is only privately known to her”. The unavailability of 
information on people’s preferences and the accompanying uncertainty put ‘increasing 
pressure on laggards to jump on the bandwagon’ (Weyland 2005, 276). Although depositors’ 
responses, acting on self-fulfilling prophecies, are individually rational (or self-interest 
motivated) under the circumstances, the decision-making process is closer to the norm of 
bounded rationality through the use of cognitive shortcuts when processing information 
under the uncertainty of a crisis.  
Complexity and uncertainty requires people to refer to cognitive heuristics during 
decision-making. Given the limitations on rationality to process all the relevant information, 
what information is perceived to be worth updating the already existing expectations? As 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1131) state, albeit being effective, these heuristics might lead 
to ‘systematic and predictable’ errors, and act as the sources of ‘significant, systematic, and 
lasting biases in human inference’ (Weyland 2005, 282). This simplification of the real 
situation for practical purposes may, at the same time, produce discrepancies between this 
simplified model and the interpreted reality (Simon 1957, 256). While the first by product of 
cognitive heuristics may be the delay in the observation of anomaly,114 secondly, and more 
importantly, there might also be inference-drawing from the past to the current situations.  
The ‘process of literary’ – “[...] a melange of narrative history, memories of past events, 
stories and conversations, etc., plus an enormous amount of usually ill-digested and carelessly 
collected current information” (Boulding 1967, 9) paves the way for a new ‘stabilized 
convergent expectations’ (Schelling 1960, 114). In cases where the current circumstances are 
similar to past, people tend to follow their past actions not because they represent the best of 
all possible responses, but because they are already the ‘known and comprehensible’ to them 
(Rockman 1994, 150). These are the moments when ‘collective memory’ becomes significant 
as past examples are recalled to provide ‘patterns’ in an unfamiliar world. This, in essence, is 
called as ‘reasoning by analogy’ by which “[t]he past may be abused as well as used, as in the 
causal drawing of analogies with the past in support of present interests and inclinations” 
(Rose 1993, 16-17).115 Old memories of crises and losses may also lead to ‘stickiness’ in 
understandings (cases of heuristic of anchoring) and prevent actors from differentiating between 
the past and present situations. Actors draw inferences from past examples and are inclined 
                                                
114 According to a mostly-referred card experiment conducted, the anomalous cards shown to actors 
were at first identified as normal and fitted to ‘one of the conceptual categories prepared by prior 
experience’ (Kuhn 1962, 63). A further exposure to anomalous cards, however, resulted in actors’ 
increasing awareness of anomaly (Kuhn 1962, 63). 
115Boudling (1967, 14) refers to the concept of ‘macro-learning (cumulative learning) process where the 
accumulation of experience and the affects of ‘the memory of disastrous feedbacks’ on the present 
images of the system gain significance.      
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to expect the same outcomes even though the present circumstances may vary from the past 
in great detail (as an example for the availability of heuristics).116  
Jervis (1976, 217-8) also cautions against the ‘tyranny of the past upon the imagination’. 
“By making accessible insights derived from previous events, analogies provide a useful 
shortcut to rationality. But they also obscure aspects of the present case that are different 
from the past one […] It is thus not true that an increase in knowledge necessarily increases 
the actor’s ability to cope with his environment” (Jervis 1976, 220). Investigating “[h]ow do 
past evens influence current perceptions?”, Jervis concludes the following: “[w]hat one learns 
from key events in international history is an important factor in determining the images that 
shape the interpretation of incoming information […] Previous international events provide 
the statesman with a range of imaginable situations and allow him to detect patterns and 
causal links that can help him understand his world” (Jervis 1976, 217).  
Against the background of the above discussion, the application of Tversky and 
Kahneman’s ‘reference points’ to banking panics provides an opportunity to incorporate 
ideas into the analysis of bank runs. Accordingly, policy actions to address the ongoing crisis 
and the institutional failures with significant losses set precedent in depositors’ perceptions 
for future crises. As mentioned previously, depositors’ collective memories of past crises 
(especially the role played by the Government in managing those) provide recollections of 
previous losses and update reference points through which the following crises are interpreted. 
Therefore, ‘doing something’ in times of crisis becomes significant in order not only to restore 
market confidence, but also to affect expectations for the future. From this discussion, a set 
of hypotheses and working assumption can be listed in the below Table 5.  
                                                
116 This is an interesting point raised by many scholars working on ideas. The ‘process of 
institutionalization’, as Berman calls (2001, 238) illustrates the way ideas become inherited in 
institutions, patterns of discourse and collective identities. They outlive the original conditions which 
gave rise to their existence (Berman 2001, 238).  
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HO: Bank runs are triggered by sunspots as random variables 
(Nul l  Hypothes i s )  
 
H1: Bank runs are related to the deterioration in economic fundamentals 
 
WA1: For a bank run to become contagious, the dual observation of a bank failure and a recession is 
required. 
 
WA2: Once a run is in progess, (lines of) informed depositors have signaling effects on uninformed ones. 
 
WA3: Banking panics should not develop in information-rich environments. 
          WA3a: A banking panic might be prevented through the provision of bank-specific information    
         on the bank’s solvency. 
 
WA4: If the bank run originates from information asymmetries and fundamentals, there should be a 
‘flight-to-quality’ from insolvent to solvent institutions. 
 
H2: Triggered by either fundamentals or sunspots, ex ante  guarantees on deposits such as the 
deposit insurance scheme is promoted for preventing an inefficient outcome such as a bank run* 
 
WA5: The efficiency in stabilising depositor expectations depends on the specifications of the scheme, 
such as the upper limit of deposits covered, co-insurance principle and compensation delays.  
 
WA6: The lack of commitment by the authorities on deposit freezes and payment re-scheduling and the 
anticipation of this by depositors might generate a self-fulfilling bank run. ** 
 
WA7: De facto (such as the implicit ‘too-big (interconnected)-to-fail’ understanding) or ex post (blanket) 
guarantees should stabilise depositor expectations in the case of an inefficient deposit insurance scheme. 
 
WA8: The coherence and consistency in the actions of policy makers in addressing the crisis affect 
depositor expectations. 
 
H3: As an additional information asymmetry during a bank run, the lack of depositor awareness 
towards deposit insurance scheme also affects depositor expectations 
 
H4: Under uncertainty during crises and as a result of bounded rationality, cognitive shortcuts (in 
different forms) are used in depositor decision-making 
 
WA9: Application of availability heuristic: Previous events and failures (through collective memory) act as 
road maps to guide action. 
 
WA10: Application of representativeness heuristic (Generalisation Effects): In times of crises, institutions are 
assessed by their similarities to the problem at hand in order to measure the probability of their failure. 
 
WA11: Application of anchoring heuristic: People attach extreme weight to an initial value, which is later 
‘adjusted to yield the final answer’. 
 
 
 
Table 5 Hypotheses and Working Assumptions, Once More 
 
                                                
* This assumption is shared by both of the theories, although stronger by the sunspots view. 
** Within the period under examination, there have not been any deposit freezes or payment re-
scheduling. 
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Conc lus ions  
Promoting the significance of ideas, this theoretical chapter has suggested that there are 
cognitive dynamics to analyse depositor behaviour, which render an economic explanation 
based solely on fundamentals inadequate. It first presented the relevant literature on and the 
institutional dimensions of banks runs. Following this, the second part of the chapter put 
forward a critique of the current literature on banking panics and presented the literature on 
cognitive heuristics. After a short discussion on threshold models and expectations cascades, 
the final section illustrated how the insights from the cognitive heuristics literature might be 
applied to banking panics. It argued that the self-fulfilling nature of bank runs and the 
threshold models in the literature with a Bayesian emphasis require a better understanding on 
the decision-making process of depositors under uncertainty. The final section provided a 
comprehensive list of the hypotheses derived from both literatures and to be tested with the 
following case studies.  
The following empirical chapters of this thesis will test this research’s argument against 
empirical evidence. Accordingly, they will assess the three dimensions of bank runs for each 
individual case, namely fundamentals, institutions, and collective memory. Cases are selected 
from the most recent banking crisis in the United Kingdom betwen 2007 and 2009 with an 
attempt to address the following research puzzle: Why, under similar circumstances, do 
depositor expectations converge to certain outcomes in some cases while they remain 
constant in others? The following Chapter III, as a background chapter, starts with the 
Northern Rock case and presents the relevant empirical data for an argumentative analysis in 
Chapter IV.  
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Chapter III: Setting the Stage for Northern Rock	  
 
 
The preceding theoretical chapter has outlined the main arguments present in the literature 
and pointed to a literature gap, which this research intends to fill through its emphasis on 
ideas. It has argued that the material circumstances (as promoted by the fundamentals view) 
and the institutionalised guarantees on deposits are significant in creating focal points. 
However, equally significant are how those are interpreted by depositors. This research 
disputes the Bayesian rationality attributed to depositors and suggests instead an emphasis 
on cognitive heuristics in decision-making. Accordingly, through changing the reference 
points (for future crises), the shadow of the past on the formation of current expectations 
(collective memory) and depositor awareness towards the safety nets in place (as an 
additional information asymmetry) are also significant in depositor decision-making.     
Against the background of this theoretical discussion, this chapter will provide an 
account of the period between September 2007 and September 2008 through process 
tracing of the major turning points for both Northern Rock and policy-making for the 
banking industry. Accordingly, this chapter is structured in four main sections. The first 
section will examine the developments during the summer of 2007 and the start of the credit 
crunch in August 2007. This section is also accompanied by a short discussion on Northern 
Rock’s business model pre-dating its nationalisation. Following this, the chapter will identify 
the turning points during the peak of the Northern Rock crisis in September 2007. This 
section will uncover the introduction of the emergency funding by the Bank of England, the 
‘offline’ depositor run on Northern Rock and the introduction of the blanket guarantee on 
September 17th. The third section will present a political economy analysis on Northern 
Rock’s nationalisation while identifying the various interest groups and institutions involved 
within the process. Finally, the fourth section will describe the ‘regulatory landscape’ and the 
policy changes introduced by the Tripartite Authorities following the Northern Rock crisis. 
This will be accomplished in three sub-sections each of which will cover a separate 
Authority (HM Treasury, FSA, and the Bank of England) operating within the Tripartite 
framework. Conclusion will conclude the chapter after having set the relevant empirical data 
for an argumentative discussion on the Northern Rock crisis in the following Chapter IV.        
 
3.1 Summer 2007 and the  Star t  o f  the  Cred i t  Crunch   
“What is clear is that the quake’s impact did 
not depend only on the quake itself but also on pre-
existing geology and building structures [...] The point 
is not that shocks are irrelevant but that their effects 
depend on preexisting structures” 
(Legro 2005, 28) 
 
79 
 
The characteristics of the banking system in the United Kingom preceding the crisis 
rendered banks vulnerable to certain kinds of shocks. Banks’ reliance on securitisation 
decreased their capital ratios, while their use of the wholesale markets for additional funding 
increased banks’, and thus the banking system’s, overall leverage. Specifically, the mortgage 
markets were characterised by the growth of buy-to-let and self-certified mortgages, as well 
as mortgages with high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios.117 Banks’ business models mostly relied 
on originate-to-distribute mortgages, which were later securitised and sold to Special 
Investment Vehicles (SIVs) or conduits (House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008a, 
19). The prevailing regulatory framework, Basel II, also provided banks with the negative 
incentives to free capital off of their mortgages (Caprio and Honohan 2008, 18). This 
resulted in an increase in the off-balance sheet activities for those banks and, subsequently, 
led to the increase of the total leverage within the banking system. Overall, securitisation 
also increased systemic uncertainty, as it resulted in the separation of the “[…] information 
held by loan originators from those exposed to the risk of default” (King 2007a, 2). This 
diversification of credit risk across institutions and countries turned to ‘a game of “hunt the 
loss” ’ (Briault 2007).  
In June 2007, the failure of two hedge funds sponsored by Bear Stearns sparked 
concerns in inter-bank money markets and resulted in an increase in spreads (FSA 2009a, 
12-13). In July, all three major rating agencies announced that they would start a review of 
the subprime bonds market (Felton and Reinhart 2009, 352).118 On August 7th IKB 
Deutsche Industriebank was bailed out in Germany and Countrywide Financial and 
American Home Mortgage Investments in the United States revealed losses due to sub-
prime mortgages (House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008a, 34). On August 9th BNP 
Paribas decided to freeze its three hedge funds exposed to the US sub-prime mortgage 
markets (“Suprime hits BNP” 2007, 14). This “[…] unexpected revelation by a French bank 
that its investment funds could no longer value their exposures to US sub-prime mortgage 
loans produced a sharp reappraisal of the risks they were taking by investors around the 
globe” (King 2007b, 3-4).  
All these developments resulted in an increase in the awareness towards counter-party 
risks (see Llewellyn 2009, 18), especially for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) 
as a result of the growing problems in the sub-prime mortgage markets.119 As stated by the 
Governor of the Bank of England, “[r]ising default rates on sub-prime mortgages in the 
United States were the trigger for the recent financial market turmoil” (King 2007a, 1). A 
                                                
117 Northern Rock’s Together product served as a leading example.  
118 For a detailed account of the developments during this period, see the ‘Chronology’ section of the 
book.  
119 For a detailed analysis on the roots of the problems see House of Commons Treasury Committee 
2008a, 28-31 and 34-7. See also FSA (2008a, 9-12). 
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reappraisal of risk in those markets (Briault 2007) and the lack of demand for these products 
exacerbated the difficulties in pricing them by market actors,120 which led to the effective 
shutdown of the secondary markets for those certain types of asset-backed securities and to 
the functioning of only the overnight debt rollover in inter-bank markets.121  
In addition to the aforementioned difficulties, as Laeven and Valencia (2008a, 25) state, 
“[h]ard-to-value structured products and other instruments created during a boom financial 
innovation had to be severely marked down due to the newly implemented fair value 
accounting and credit rating downgrades”. This, in return, resulted in banks becoming 
concerned about the financial condition of their conduits or SIVs because of previously 
arranged credit lines with those institutions (Llewellyn 2009, 19; see also speech delivered by 
Gieve 2008a). The dry up of liquidity in commercial paper market created difficulties in 
funding and thus led to a greater maturity mismatch for those investment vehicles (King 
2007a, 2). The short-term commercial papers issued by those vehicles had been purchasing 
the the bank’s asset-backed securities (Llewellyn 2009, 19; Eisenbeis and Kaufman 2009, 75). 
With the start of the credit crunch, the evaporation of the liquidity in the commercial paper 
market required banks to take vehicles’ assets back on their own balance sheets (FSA 2009a, 
13; see also FSA 2009b, 20).  
‘Self-insurance’ concerns also contributed to and intensified the dry up of liquidity in the 
markets. As the Governor of the Bank of England stated; “[f]aced with the possibility that 
they would have to finance these vehicles themselves, banks with spare cash have hoarded it 
and have become reluctant to lend to other banks beyond very short maturities” (King 
2007b, 4). In addition, “[t]here was a lack of disclosure of the underlying assets which led to 
distrust of these vehicles. Once the SIVs began to experience difficulties, the existence of 
wind-down triggers made matters worse, as they had been designed to cover idiosyncratic 
risks, not general market-wide risks” (FSA 2008a, 20). There were other classes of mortgage-
backed securities whose underlying assets were other than sub-prime mortgages. However, 
the growing suspicion regarding those instruments intensified the already prevailing 
uncertainties within these certain segments of the financial markets. As in the words of the 
Chairman of the FSA,  
 
[w]e have moved from one abnormal state of affair - too little risk aversion - to 
another abnormal state - too much risk aversion. There has been a flight to quality - a 
sharply increased demand for gilts, treasuries and other government issues; a flight to 
shorter maturities; and a flight to simplicity - a continuing demand for single name 
investment grade commercial paper or corporate bonds, but a retreat from more 
complex instruments (McCarthy 2007b). 
 
                                                
120 See BNP Paribas’ statement in Gangahar and Jones (2007, 14).  
121 A wide range of asset classes such as collaterised debt obligations, collaterised loan obligations, asset 
backed commercial papers, RMBS’ were affected during the credit crunch. See speech delivered by 
McCarthy 2007a.  
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In addition to securitisation, as mentioned, the wholesale markets had also been used as an 
alternative source of funding, which lead to higher loan-to-deposit ratios and leverage in 
banks’ portfolios.122 During the credit crunch, the gap between the money market (inter-
bank rates) and the Bank of England base rate also widened, as an illustration of the price 
for perceived risk in those markets. “A combination of the limited availability and high price 
of wholesale market funding has placed a particular strain on banks that are particularly 
reliant on securitisations and on wholesale funding to finance their assets” (Briault 2007). 
The result was the difficulties in commercial paper markets, the rise in spread of LIBOR rate 
over the Bank of England base rate and a decreased maturity for funding (McCarthy 2007a).  
This increase in the LIBOR rate and the ‘liquidity hoarding’ (Goodhart 2008, 13) in the 
markets significantly increased the funding costs for those banks which were more reliant on 
those alternative sources of funding compared to their retail deposits, such as Northern 
Rock. With the 75 per cent of its funding from the wholesale markets, Northern Rock had 
been following a risky business strategy since its de-mutualisation. Three main channels that 
the bank used for its funding needs had been the retail deposits (only 25 per cent), inter-
bank short-term lending and securitisation (HM Treasury 2009a, 13). Expectations of no 
further interest rate increases (5.75 per cent as of July 2007; see Economist Intelligence Unit 
2007a; 2007b) and a rise in inter-bank market LIBOR rate resulted in higher costs of 
borrowing for Northern Rock.123 In addition to its rising costs, the bank’s high dependence 
on short-term money and capital markets also exposed Northern Rock to a low-probability-
high-impact (LPHI) risk,124 which required liquidity to evaporate both in interbank and 
commercial paper markets to become materialised (Llewellyn 2009, 16, 20). This, as a matter 
of fact, was what happened with the credit crunch in the summer of 2007.  
Founded in 1965, Northern Rock was demutualised from a building society into a bank 
in 1997, operating with a small 76-branch network. The bank had a significant market share 
in the residential mortgage market (Llewellyn 2009, 14), which issued one in every five 
mortgages in Britain between January and June 2007 (Pratley 2007, 31). It was also the first 
lender in the United Kingdom during the late 1990s to have mortgage securitisation as its 
primary business model (Dey 2007a, 3). Under its business model, retail deposits (amounting 
to approximately £24bn) were only 25 per cent of the bank’s funding for loans, whereas the 
remaining 75 per cent was funded through the wholesale markets.125 On the positive side, 
this helped the bank to offer ambitious mortgage terms - as exemplified with its Together 
                                                
122 This period also experienced a rise in central bank reserves held by banks, which were also funded 
by overnight interbank loans. See King 2007a, 3-4. 
123 Financial indicators for July (2007b) showed an unexpected fall in consumer price inflation which 
eased expectations on a further interest rate increases by the Bank of England. See also Dennis 2007, 
44.   
124 Refer to the uncorrected transcript of oral evidence by McCarthy and Sants (2007).  
125 Just £1.7bn was deposited with the bank in the first half of 2007. See Roberts 2007, 19. 
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Loan - which allowed borrowing as much as 125 per cent of a property’s value, or up to six 
times as much as a borrower’s annual income (Collinson and Seager 2007, 4). On the 
negative side, although the bank had minimal exposure to sub-prime mortgages (amounting 
to approximately £75m) and a low percentage of borrowers in arrears,126 its unique business 
model was highly vulnerable to increasing LIBOR-interest rate spread. By early September 
2007, Northern Rock “[…] was relying almost entirely on overnight money markets to 
finance its commitments” (Giles and Larsen 2007a, 2). Therefore, the depositor run hit the 
bank when it became the most vulnerable as a result of the crisis of confidence in the 
markets. As Martin Wolf (2007, 15) from the Financial Times stated, the Northern Rock’s 
business model left the bank an accident waiting to happen. 
 
3.2 Ident i f i ca t ion  o f  the  Turning  Poin ts  -  September  2007  
 
“An accident may precipitate a crisis, but so may action 
designed to prevent it- or action by the authorities adopted to 
achieve other objectives” 
(Kindleberger and Aliber 2005, 91) 
 
 
 
June 27th, 2007 stands as the first turning point within the Northern Rock crisis. The bank 
announced a profit warning (a fall from £200m to £180m in annual profits) (Northern Rock 
2007a),127 which raised worries about its ability to fund its business through the wholesale 
markets.128 On August 13th Northern Rock approached the FSA to inform the regulator on 
the funding crisis it had been facing as a result of the conditions in the wholesale markets.129 
In response, the FSA assigned a strengthened supervisory team, which conducted daily 
conversations with Northern Rock and the bank’s situation was discussed by the Tripartite 
Standing Committee on the following day (House of Commons Treasury Select Committee 
2008b, Ev 221). While the FSA notified the Treasury directly on August 15th, the Northern 
Rock management spoke to the Bank of England about the bank’s situation the following 
day (House of Commons Treasury Select Committee 2008b, Ev 221, 60). The FSA further 
increased its contact with the bank to twice daily conversations and the Tripartite 
Committee’s Joint Crisis Coordination Team started a working group for Northern Rock 
                                                
126 On August 19th, 2007 Northern Rock issued a statement indicating that it had minimal exposure to 
US mortgage-backed securities market (see Hume and Orr 2007a, 36; Farrow 2007, 2). However, the 
bank still owned £325m in structured investment vehicles and in collateralised debt obligations 
amounting of £200m (Ho 2007, 4).  
127 For details see Croft 2007a, 1; Croft and Tett 2007, 19; Hill 2007a, 18. 
128 This announcement might also be considered as one of the triggers for the initial wholesale run on 
the bank during the summer of 2007. 
129 A summary of events during this period is documented by UK Shareholders Association 2007.  
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(House of Commons Treasury Select Committee 2008b, Ev 225, 221). Finally, on August 
29th, the Chairman of the FSA formally wrote to the Chancellor regarding Northern Rock’s 
situation and copied his letter to the Governor of the Bank of England (House of 
Commons Treasury Select Committee 2008b, Ev 221). On September 11th the bank’s 
auditors also informed the FSA that “[…] they had reasonable grounds to believe that 
Northern Rock might cease to be a going concern” (HM Treasury 2009a, 14).  
On September 12th the Governor emphasised his concern about creating moral hazard in 
the markets in a letter to the House of Commons Treasury Committee (2008c, Ev 217): “[...] 
[T]he provision of large liquidity facilities penalises those financial institutions that sat out 
the dance, encourages herd behaviour and increases the intensity of future crises”. The 
following day and to the surprise of markets, however, the Bank of England agreed to 
extend a credit line to Northern Rock as a backstop facility, after a short period of search for 
a private solution (House of Commons Treasury Select Committee 2008b, Ev 221). The 
FSA (2007a) announced that Northern Rock was solvent, exceeded its regulatory capital 
requirements and had a good quality loan book to be eligible for the Bank’s loan. 
Accordingly, Northern Rock would provide its mortgage book as collateral with the central 
bank in exchange for the credit line (on demand), on the condition that it remained solvent 
(Dey 2007b, 1; “Rock against the clock …” 2007, 16). This was essentially the second 
turning point in the Northern Rock crisis.130 On September 14th the Tripartite Authorities 
officially announced the credit line arranged for Northern Rock.131 The Chancellor 
authorised the liquidity support facility to Northern Rock on the basis of recommendations 
from the Bank of England and the FSA (HM Treasury 2007a.). The Chancellor also stated 
that “[…] the Bank of England stands ready to make available facilities in comparable 
circumstances, where institutions face short-term liquidity difficulties” (HM Treasury 
2007a). This was the first time in three decades that the central bank used its LoLR facility, -
fundamentally different than its regular standing facility- to assist a troubled bank (Seager 
2007a, 38; for details see Fletcher et al 2007, 1; Giles and Larsen 2007b, 3; Giles 2007a, 2; 
Hume and Larsen 2007a, 1).  
As the third turning point in the Northern Rock episode; however, this extension of the 
credit line from the Bank of England was followed with depositors queuing in front of the 
bank’s branches. During the first few days of the ‘off-line run’ (September 14th-17th), 
approximately deposits amounting to £4.6bn were withdrawn from Northern Rock 
accounts, one fifth of the total deposits (HM Treasury 2009a, 5, 15). An estimated £1bn was 
withdrawn on the first day of the run (£250m through branches and an even larger amount 
                                                
130 It was later understood that the Greater London Authority, Metropolitan Police, London Fire 
Authority and other local councils had already extended short-term loans to Northern Rock even 
before the Bank of England’s credit line (Goodway 2007a, 26; Prynn 2007a, 2).    
131 On the same day (September, 14th), the bank issued another profit warning stating that profits 
would be in the range of £500m-£540m, less than the City forecasts of £647m (Duncan 2007, 30). 
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via the Internet) (Larsen 2007a, 1).132 According to an Internet traffic monitoring company, 
Northern Rock’s website had been visited three times more than usual since Friday 
September 14th (Wallop 2007, 4). Despite the efforts to stabilize depositor expectations, the 
run on Northern Rock branches continued on Saturday to the point where the bank was 
forced to extend its opening hours and order more cash to meet the withdrawal demands 
from depositors (Smith 2007, 14; Dey and Hennessy 2007, 1). On top of the £1bn 
withdrawn on Friday, an additional withdrawal of £500m was assumed the following day 
(Boniface and Kelly 2007, 9).133 This figure excluded the postal accounts amounting to 
£9.9bn, which could only be withdrawn upon writing to the bank.134 On Friday, hundreds of 
Northern Rock customers also gathered in front of the bank’s Dublin office (Brady 2007b, 
4). Approximately 25,000 Northern Rock customers in Ireland (working with the bank 
through the Internet and telephone accounts) were reassured that their savings (amounting 
of €2.4billion deposits in total) were safe under the Band of England protection and the 
Financial Services Compensation Scheme (O’Keeffe 2007, 2; Johnson 2007; Doyle 2007; 
Hegarty and Phaidin 2007, 2). As a response to the ongoing situation, the FSA issued 
another statement because of “[…] the unusually high volumes of customers trying to access 
their accounts as a result of the publicity surrounding Northern Rock” (referred in Brignall 
2007, 26).  
There were efforts from various public bodies to dissolve uncertainty among depositors 
through their statements and reassurances. The chief executive of Northern Rock tried to 
calm the panicking depositors after the bank’s website had become frozen earlier in the 
morning and savers had not been able to access their account details because of high 
demand (Cecil and Prynn 2007a, 2). In his words during an interview when asked about the 
depositors who were not able to withdraw their savings from the bank: “[p]lease bear with 
us. People will have to be a little bit patient with us” (Hotten 2007, 30). He portrayed the 
emergency funding as making Northern Rock “[…] probably one of the safest places to be” 
(referred in Cecil and Prynn 2007a, 2).135 This was re-emphasised by the Chancellor during 
his interview with Channel 4 News through highlighting the fact that the FSA had approved 
Northern Rock’s solvency (Dey and Hennessy 2007, 1). The British Bankers’ Association 
(‘BBA’, hereafter) also issued a press release to ease the panic amongst depositors: “The 
                                                
132 By the time, savings in online accounts amounted of more than £4bn. One measure taken by the 
bank to prevent depositors from withdrawing those savings was to give them over-the-counter access 
to their funds (Conway and Wallop 2007, 5).  
133 Some even predicted much bigger amounts to be withdrawn from the bank. One reason to deter 
depositors from withdrawing their savings was that “[…] transferring a tax-free savings account to 
another lender is a slow and tedious business, and that savers may be unwilling to jettison ten years’ 
worth of tax concessions” (Purves 2007, 17).   
134 For details see Brady 2007a, 2; Smith, Ringshaw, and Watt 2007, 2.  
135 In his words: “If I was a depositor, and I am my funds are with Northern Rock, and given the fact 
that it is backed by the Bank of England, it is probably one of the safest places to be” (referred in Cecil 
and Prynn 2007b, 9). See also Giles and Larsen 2007a, 2.  
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Northern Rock is a sound and safe bank and there is absolutely no reason for either 
mortgage customers or savers to worry” (Northern Rock 2007b).136 On BBC’s Today 
programme, Angela Knight, the chief executive of the BBA, also asked for ‘absolute 
confidence’ in Northern Rock (Cecil and Prynn 2007b, 9).137 In her words: “[…] [Anybody 
who was] either a saver with Northern Rock or has a mortgage […] can be absolutely 
confident that they have got their money with, or they have borrowed from, a very sound 
financial institution” (Referred in Ringshaw and Smith 2007, 4). BBA’s executive director of 
retail also stated that "[w]e have to keep a sense of proportion and we have to recognise that 
we are in exceptional circumstances” (referred in Seager 2007b, 1).  
The following turning point in the Northern Rock episode arrived when the Treasury 
offered a blanket guarantee on September 17th to cover Northern Rock deposits (HM 
Treasury 2007b).138 “These guarantee arrangements supplemented but did not replace any 
compensation payable by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme” (HM Treasury 
2009a, 16). It was understood that the blanket guarantee would be extended to other lenders 
under similar circumstances, yet on a case-by-case basis (Blackman 2007, 6; Moore 2007a, 
36). After the announcement, Northern Rock management tried once more to reassure 
Northern Rock depositors that it was business as usual for the bank.139 The bank promised 
savers that any penalties for their early withdrawals would be compensated on the condition 
that they re-deposit them with the bank by October 5th (Rayner and Porter 2007, 1).   
Northern Rock also published a full-page newspaper advertisement that announced the 
blanket guarantee offered for all Northern Rock deposits (Alleyne 2007a, 5). The chairman 
of Northern Rock, who had been previously criticised for remaining silent over the crisis, 
made his first public appearance with the following statement: “If we can get through this 
and get to calm financial markets we do intend to rebuild. If other options become available 
we’ll consider those too” (referred in Larsen 2007b, 2). In an interview with the Times, he 
said that “[t]he board takes full responsibility. We’re not solely blaming the market, but the 
                                                
136 As an example from the press see Hill 2007b, 18. 
137 In another statement and as a response to the unfolding events, Angela Knight (2007) wrote the 
following: “[…] Yet British banking is more robust than ever. Our system is very efficient at 
borrowing and investing. Northern Rock is solvent. The Chancellor even said yesterday that the 
Government would guarantee the deposits of all Northern Rock customers. So what is happening? 
Last week it arranged an overdraft with the Bank of England […] The authorities united to explain it 
was not in trouble. But people panicked. Nobody can expect customers to remain calm just because 
the authorities say so. But no high street bank has gone bust in living memory”. 
138 By the time of the announcement, Northern Rock deposits consisted of estimated £22bn of retail 
deposits and £6bn of wholesale deposits (Hosking and Webster 2007, 1). 
139 In the chief executive’s words: “Your money is safe and if you want some, or all of it back, then 
you are perfectly entitled to it” (Prynn 2007b, 2). In another attempt, he advised Northern Rock 
staff to reassure savers that their deposits were guaranteed by the government with the following 
memo: “All staff, the Chancellor’s statement makes it clear beyond any doubt that all savings in 
Northern Rock are safe and secure. Consequently anybody who is in a queue outside a branch, or 
who is trying to access an online account can be fully reassured that there is no cause for concern 
whatsoever. Bloody Hurrah!” (Hosking and Webster 2007, 1).  
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credit crunch was unprecedented and foreseen by nobody” (referred in Hosking 2007, 44). 
On September 18th, Northern Rock saw queues in only four of its branches and calls from 
its customers declined to less than a tenth, compared to the previous day (Giles, Parker, 
Saigol, and Larsen 2007a, 1). This was the fifth and the final turning point in the period 
under examination. 
 
 
Date Turning Point 
June 27th, 2007 Northern Rock’s first profit warning 
September 13th, 2007 Unofficial announcement of the LoLR facility by the Bank of England 
September 14th, 2007 - Northern Rock’s second profit warning - Off-line run starts on Northern Rock 
September 17th, 2007 Introduction of the blanket guarantee by the HM Treasury 
September 18th, 2007 
 
Reduction of the depositor queues in front of Northern Rock branches 
 
 
 
Table 6 Turning Points for Northern Rock  
 
3.3 A Pol i t i ca l  Economy o f  Northern Rock’s  Nat iona l i sa t ion 
The previous section has presented the major turning points during the first days of the 
Northern Rock episode and the immediate policy responses to contain the unfolding crisis. 
This section will now illustrate the policy actions taken by the Tripartite Authorities with 
long-term implications on the banking sector in the United Kingdom. As a note of caution, 
the intention of this section is not to present an argumentative account on the necessity or 
the sufficiency of the regulatory changes. The critique of the then in place Tripartite 
framework is beyond the scope of this research. Instead, the aim is to understand the policy 
changes during this period in order to pave the way for an analytical argument on the 
empirical cases. It is imperative to analyse these changes since this research argues how 
various policy responses, through changing the ‘reference points’ for future bank failures, 
had been significant in shaping depositor expectations, and thus depositor behaviour.  
Although a system-wide depositor panic on the whole banking sector had been avoided 
in September 2007, approximately 75,000 Northern Rock customers withdrew their deposits 
from the bank (Goodway 2007c, 28). By the end of November it was revealed that more 
than £10bn, including the senior creditors of the bank, was withdrawn from Northern Rock 
despite the blanket guarantee by the Government (Croft 2007b, 18; Burgess, Croft, 
Mackintosh, Saigol, and Larsen 2007a, 21). Starting from September 18th until the end of the 
month, it was estimated that an additional £4.4bn was withdrawn from the bank (HM 
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Treasury 2009a, 6). “By October 2007, customer deposits had shrunk to 15.3 per cent of the 
company’s funding (a drop from £30 billion to £17 billion); and wholesale loans had fallen 
to 11.8 per cent (from £17 billion to £13 billion)” (HM Treasury 2009a, 16). By the third 
week of November, deposit withdrawals from the bank reached up to £200m a day, which 
was only stabilised with the selection of Virgin as the preferred bidder for the bank (Burgess, 
Croft, Mackintosh, Saigol, and Larsen 2007a, 21; see also Croft 2007c, 19). 
The cost of the Northern Rock crisis accrued to the Government was rising over time 
without any possible solution for the bank’s future. As of January 2008, the Government 
was supporting Northern Rock with £25bn in loans and approximately £30bn in guarantees 
(Croft and Parker 2008a, 1), which only started with an initial £3bn (Burgess, Croft, Giles 
and Tett 2007, 1). In a statement to the House of Commons in January 2008, the Chancellor 
made it clear that a private sector solution would be the preferable route in order to meet 
the objectives set by the Government (HM Treasury 2008c). The Government had set the 
following four conditions for any bidder to take-over Northern Rock: (1) any gain through 
bank’s sale should be shared with the taxpayers, (2) the Bank of England’s loan to the bank 
should be re-paid within a three years period, (3) the buyer should inject new capital to the 
bank, and (4) there should be a viable business plan for the bank’s future (Llewellyn 2009, 
26). However, “[i]f it does not prove possible to secure a proposal that meets our stated 
objectives and conditions, it would be necessary to take Northern Rock into temporary 
public ownership” (HM Treasury 2008c). As a matter of fact, during the months when 
private take-over plans were being discussed, nationalisation started to become more viable 
as an option closer to the European Commission’s deadline on state aid.  
The European Commission imposed a structural constraint on the emergency funding to 
and the Government guarantees on Northern Rock on the grounds that they might violate 
the European Union rules on state aid and accordingly distort market competition. For the 
loan to be considered as ‘state (rescue) aid’, rather than a ‘restructuring aid’, the European 
Union rules required it to be no more than 6 months (in this case until February 2008) 
(Croft and Tait 2007, 24). Along with Northern Rock’s rivals in the sector, Confederation of 
British Industry (‘CBI’, hereafter), BBA and the Building Society Association also raised 
their concerns about a possible impairment of market competition (Croft, Mackintosh, 
Parker, Larsen, and Tighe 2008, 1; Goff 2008a, 2). There were demands that Northern Rock 
should operate under similar guidelines as National Savings & Investments (Croft, 
Mackintosh, Parker, Larsen, and Tighe 2008, 1). In February, it was decided that the Office 
for Fair Trading (‘OFT’, hereafter) should regularly overview Northern Rock and its 
business plan to be sent to the European Commission (Croft and Parker 2008b, 5; “N Rock 
and state aid” 2008, 14). 
 
88 
As long as the bank continued to be defined as a going concern, the decision to put 
Northern Rock into administration technically rested with its board, rather than the HM 
Treasury (Croft 2007d, 20). A receiver could only be appointed to a bank after its 
insolvency, according to the insolvency regime in place back then (Mayes and Wood 2009, 
41). On the one hand, the sale of Government-subsidised Northern Rock raised political 
controversy especially if the future profits were to remain in private business where the risks 
had been underwritten by taxpayers’ money (Croft and Parker 2007a, 1). On the other hand, 
one of the deepest vested interests against nationalisation rested with the shareholders, since 
this could result in no compensation for their existing shares (Tighe 2008a, 3; Murphy and 
Peel 2008, 3; Murphy 2008, 2; Burgess and Saigol 2008, 2). By mid-October, there were 
debates on class-action suit against Northern Rock on whether or not a false market for its 
shares had been created as a result of the Government announcements on the bank and the 
absence of any preceding announcements in August (Saigol 2007, 21; Hill 2007c, 20; Hughes 
2007a, 19; Osborne 2007, 1).  
In the midst of all these political controversies and even before the official 
nationalisation of Northern Rock, on February 7th Office for National Statistics (‘ONS’, 
hereafter) classified the bank “[...] as a public sector company, saying that the controls the 
government had taken over the stricken mortgage lender were similar to a nationalised 
entity” (Atkins and Giles 2008, 1; see also Giles 2008a, 2; Giles 2008b, 2). ONS later decided 
that approximately £100bn should be added to public sector net debt after the 
nationalisation of Northern Rock (Giles 2008c, 3). This would, in return, violate the 
Government’s ‘sustainable investment rule’, which required the public sector net debt to 
stay below 40 per cent of gross domestic product (Giles 2008d, 3; see also Giles 2008e, 4). 
In the case Northern Rock remained classified as a private company, the government 
support would still be classified as contingent liability (Giles 2008d, 3; see also Croft and 
Daneshkhu 2007a, 21). On February 15th, the final proposals from the bidders were 
submitted to the Government. Finally, with the suspension of trading in its shares (at 90p 
per share (Larsen 2008a, 3)), Northern Rock was put into temporary public ownership on 
February 18th through the Banking (Special Provisions) Act of 2008 on February 22nd (HM 
Treasury 2009a, 8).  
 
3.4 Regu la tory  Landscape  and Po l i cy  Changes :  The Tr ipar t i t e  Author i t i e s   
Despite being contained to a single bank, the depositor run on Northern Rock served as a 
shock both for the banking sector and for financial regulators. The nationalisation of 
Northern Rock and the painful bidding process preceding this have emphasised the 
significance of an efficient bank insolvency regime since “[…] the bankruptcy process is 
greatly value-destroying for banks” (ICB 2011, 19). By the time of the Northern Rock crisis, 
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the banking sector in the United Kingdom was operating under the financial regulatory 
framework provided by a Memorandum of Understanding between the Tripartite 
Authorities, which shared regulatory responsibilities over the banking industry. This 
memorandum among the Authorities clarified the duties for each of these bodies. While the 
Bank of England was responsible for financial stability (as its second core purpose) as well 
as the provision of the LoLR facility, the FSA was given responsibility for the supervision of 
individual firms (‘prudential regulation’). The HM Treasury undertook responsibility for the 
overall legislative framework and the Chancellor was accountable to the Parliament (HM 
Treasury 2007c). From the very start, this division of regulatory responsibilities among three 
major authorities remained a matter of controversy for creating informational disadvantages 
and thus hindering an effective solution to the crisis. The efficiency of this Tripartite 
framework during a crisis was, as a matter of fact, put into question with the first 
nationalisation of a British bank in February 2008 after decades. 
During his interview with the Financial Times, the Chancellor mentioned that there were 
‘quite clearly lessons to be learned at several levels’ and was ‘prepared to look at the 
boundaries’ between the Tripartite Authorities (Giles and Parker 2007, 3). Lessons learnt 
from the Northern Rock crisis led to several policy responses in order to address the 
institutional shortcomings within the banking system. Both policy and academic circles have 
acknowledged the need for a specialised bank insolvency regime and an improved deposit 
insurance scheme. In a speech delivered, the Governor of the Bank of England also 
advocated the reform of the regulation of the banking sector with the following words: “[…] 
[I]f we are to create a structure for our banking system so that such scenes are not repeated, 
we must ensure that the temporary measures put in place in recent weeks evolve into 
permanent reforms in the coming months” (King 2007b, 2). The Governor mentioned that 
the two of the most significant legislatory changes due for the banking industry following 
the Northern Rock crisis would be the bank insolvency law and the deposit insurance 
scheme (King 2007b).  
On the one hand, the then prevailing insolvency regime had failed to take into account 
the vulnerabilities specific to the banking sector. This was also stated in the Turner Review 
by the FSA (2009b, 75): “The Northern Rock failure […] revealed the fact that the UK had 
not previously had in place a special bankruptcy-type regime to ensure the orderly resolution 
of a failing bank”. The high-profile failure and the nationalisation of Northern Rock raised 
the saliency of the issue on the regulatory agenda. On the other hand and as mentioned 
before, the deposit insurance scheme in place (FSCS) was also criticised for failing to 
stabilise depositor expectations during the Northern Rock crisis. While the announcement 
of the LoLR facility by the Bank of England aimed at restoring investor confidence in 
Northern Rock, the blanket guarantee by the HM Treasury addressed the collapse of the 
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depositor confidence in the bank. During the following months of the crisis, however, there 
were various attempts from the Tripartite Authorities to restore both depositor and investor 
confidence not only in Northern Rock, but also in the banking system in general. With the 
overarching aim of stabilising confidence in the markets, each of the actors of the Tripartite 
Authorities addressed a different dimension of the banking sector at various phases of the 
crisis. The following section will analyse those in three subsections, starting with the HM 
Treasury. Conclusion will conclude the chapter. 
HM Treasury and the ‘Special Resolution Regime’  
As mentioned above, the Chancellor was formally informed about Northern Rock’s 
situation on August 29th through the Chairman of the FSA’s letter (House of Commons 
Treasury Committee 2008c, Ev 221). Although calling for a return to ‘good, old-fashioned 
banking’ during his interview with Daily Telegraph on September 13th (Porter and Reece 2007, 
14), the Chancellor authorised the liquidity support to Northern Rock the following day on 
the basis of recommendations from the Bank of England and the FSA (HM Treasury 
2007a). Later in his statement to the House of Commons, the Chancellor justified the LoLR 
facility to Northern Rock through defining the bank as ‘a genuine threat to the stability of 
the financial system’ (HM Treasury 2007c). On September 16th the Tripartite Committee 
discussed the possibility of a blanket guarantee for the first time,140 which was announced 
the next day by the Chancellor (HM Treasury 2007b). As to be discussed in the following 
section, the Chancellor also emphasised the need for a better deposit protection regime and 
increased the FSCS’ coverage limit to £35,000 on October 1st (Darling 2007a). On October 
11th an extended guarantee and an additional facility for Northern Rock was announced 
(HM Treasury 2007g; HM Treasury 2007c). The Economic Secretary to the Treasury also 
announced that Northern Rock savers would be allowed to restore lost ISA tax advantages 
(HM Treasury 2007h).  
Both on September 21st, 22nd and October 9th the HM Treasury announced further 
extensions to the blanket guarantee in order to assure worried parties involved in the 
Northern Rock, in addition to the bank’s retail depositors crisis (HM Treasury 2007d; HM 
Treasury 2007e; HM Treasury 2007f). Firstly, as an update to the previous guarantee in 
place, the HM Treasury underwrote also the uncollateralized deposits, wholesale borrowing, 
and the retail bonds of Northern Rock on September 21st (Goodway 2007b, 26).141 Without 
any set deadlines, this extended guarantee was stated to “[…] remain in place during the 
current instability in the financial market” (Goodway 2007c, 28). Accordingly, “[t]his 
guarantee covers[ed] future interest payments, movements of funds between existing 
accounts, and new deposits into existing accounts. The guarantee […] [would] also cover 
                                                
140 See uncorrected oral evidence by Darling, Macpherson, Neale, Maxwell, and Hughes (2007).  
141 For further details see Coney 2007, 56. 
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accounts re-opened in the future by those who closed them between Thursday September 
13 and Wednesday September 19, inclusive” (HM Treasury 2007d). This would cover 
neither the bank’s covered bonds, securities issued by Northern Rock’s SIVs and 
subordinated debt, nor the new deposits in addition to already existing Northern Rock 
accounts (HM Treasury 2007d).142 The main reason behind this was to avoid the provision 
of any competitive advantage to Northern Rock over other banks, which had already been 
criticises by its rivals for being the recipient of extensive government support. However, 
concerns over making Northern Rock appealing to potential take-over proposals out 
weighted the worries about market competitiveness. On October 9th “[…] the Treasury 
announced that the guarantee […] would now cover all new deposits made after September 
19. That could attract new customers and make its savings business more attractive to any 
bidder” (Croft 2007e, 23). In return for the extended guarantee, the bank would be charged 
both a fee and a certain percentage of newly attracted deposits (Croft 2007e, 23). On 
December 18th, the HM Treasury announced the extension of the wholesale guarantee 
arrangements on Northern Rock (HM Treasury 2007i.). By December, “[t]he extended 
guarantee […] [accounted] for about a third of Northern Rock's Pounds 113bn balance 
sheet and […] cover[ed] any shortfalls on instruments such as covered bonds - an ultra-safe 
bond - and derivatives that are not backed by mortgage collateral” (Croft, Giles, and Parker 
2007, 1). 
In addition to those containment policies discussed, the HM Treasury launched a 
discussion paper on October 11th on reforming the banking system and protecting 
depositors (HM Treasury 2007j).143 The document acknowledged that “[…] the current 
arrangements for dealing with banks in distress, and in particular depositor protection may 
not adequately uphold that confidence thus exacerbating financial instability […] In 
particular, concerns have been raised about whether timely protection would be available for 
consumers, and whether there was a lack of understanding of the scope and operation of the 
compensation arrangements” (FSA 2007b, 8). In his statement to the House of Commons, 
the Chancellor stated the aim of the new regime as to have depositors “[…] insulated from a 
bank that has failed, greater compensation for them, and certainty their compensation can 
be paid out quickly” (HM Treasury 2007c). He further mentioned that the increase in the 
FSCS’s limit was the initial step towards a more comprehensive change (HM Treasury 
2007c). In addition to the possible improvements on the FSCS, as the Economic Secretary 
to the Treasury mentioned, it also raised “[…] the question of whether there is such a 
concept as “critical banking functions” that must be preserved for consumers in the event of 
a firm experiencing difficulties” (Ussher 2007a). On November 7th, a joint paper by the 
                                                
142 For media coverage see Kennedy 2007, 53; Goff and Lodge 2007, 1.  
143 Also see FSA 2007b; Croft and Parker 2007b, 2; Ussher 2007a.  
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Treasury and the FSA, named as Strengthening the EU regulatory and supervisory framework: a 
practical approach, was published (FSA 2007c). 
In the meanwhile, the HM Treasury stated that the choice of the preferred bidder would 
be a matter for Northern Rock’s directors, stressing that the Government advocated no 
particular blueprint for the bidder’s selection (Croft, Eaglesham, and Giles 2007, 18). 
However, as mentioned before, it published its principles for assessing the proposals on the 
basis of protecting the interests of the taxpayers, depositors and the wider financial stability 
(HM Treasury 2007k; Darling 2007b). While on November 14th, the Chancellor “[…] has 
admitted publicly for the first time that the taxpayer could end up losing money in the multi-
billion pound rescue of Northern Rock, a senior MP claimed […]” (Eaglesham and Parker 
2007, 24), in January he promised that the future of Northern Rock would be cleared within 
the next six weeks (Croft and Parker 2008c, 2). 
On December 14th, the Government hired Goldman Sachs to help Northern Rock in a 
private sale and putting together a financing package (Croft and Parker 2007c, 1). In the 
meanwhile, the HM Treasury was understood to be preparing an “[…] emergency plan for 
Rock depositors to be paid off” (Croft and Giles 2007a, 1) and further plans of 
nationalisation in the case the bidding process failed (Croft and Parker 2007d, 15). On 
January 21st the HM Treasury announced the financing option for Northern Rock prepared 
by Goldman Sachs, which suggested turning Northern Rock loans into bank bonds (HM 
Treasury 2008d, see also HM Treasury 2008c; Croft 2008a, 3; Croft, Eaglesham, Giles, Tait, 
and Larsen 2008, 1; Croft and Larsen 2008a, 2). This financing option would allow Northern 
Rock to raise funds from investors against a pool of assets, backed by the HM Treasury’s 
backstop guarantee (HM Treasury 2008d). The HM Treasury (2008d), on behalf of the 
Tripartite Authorities, stated that  
 
[t]his new financing structure would only be available for proposals that would 
protect taxpayers’ interests, as well as meeting the Tripartite Authorities’ other stated 
objectives of financial stability and the protection of consumers. If no proposal is 
received which meets these objectives, the Government would bring forward 
legislation in order to facilitate temporary public ownership of Northern Rock. 
 
Closer to the end of the bidding process, the HM Treasury asked bidders for Northern Rock 
to improve their offers (Croft and Parker 2008d, 1). Although the negotiations with the 
Virgin Group was reported on February 13th (Croft, Mackintosh, and Parker 2008, 2; Barker, 
Croft, and Saigol 2008a, 1), the Chancellor announced the nationalisation of Northern Rock 
on February 17th (HM Treasury 2008e; see also HM Treasury 2008f; Parker and Larsen 
2008, 1). In his words: “We could have chosen to pursue either of the two private sector 
options. But I have always said that I was determined to protect the taxpayers’ interest. It is 
clear that the private sector alternatives do not meet this test, when compared with public 
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ownership” (HM Treasury 2008e). On the next day, February 18th, the Chancellor published 
the Bill to take Northern Rock into temporary public ownership (HM Treasury 2008e). 
Following its nationalisation, the HM Treasury invited applications on June 5th for 
appointment as independent valuer for Northern Rock Compensation Scheme (HM 
Treasury 2008g), whose result was announced on September 8th (HM Treasury 2008h). On 
August 5th, Northern Rock announced its plans to swap £3bn of its debt to the Bank of 
England and £400m of preference shares for equity in order to strengthen the bank’s capital 
base (Croft and Eaglesham 2008, 1).  
The nationalisation of Northern Rock was accomplished through the Banking (Special 
Provisions) Bill, which received Royal Assent on February 21st, 2008. The bill enabled the 
Government to take the bank into ‘temporary public ownership’ until a private solution was 
found. This Banking Act of 2008 introduced the Special Resolution Regime for banks, which 
provided the Tripartite Authorities with several early intervention measures (‘stabilization 
options’ (Lastra 2009, 139)), before a troubled bank reached the level of insolvency 
(Llewellyn 2009, 29). Among those were the transfer of the bank to a private sector buyer 
(or a bridge bank) or temporary public ownership (Lastra 2009, 139). There had also been 
growing emphasis on the preservation of the ‘critical banking functions’ in the event of 
insolvency (HM Treasury 2007j; FSA 2007b). In addition to those, another bank insolvency 
procedure would impose “[…] a priority on the liquidator to facilitate the payout or transfer 
of the accounts of depositors insured by the FSCS” (Bank of England 2008a, 49). As the 
Governor of the Bank of England emphasised, “[a]t the heart of the case for a special 
resolution regime is the need to find a way to allow banks to fail in an orderly manner […] 
[A] clear framework for accountability should be established to give confidence that 
decisions relating to the resolution regime are exercised in line with the objectives for the 
regime set out in legislation” (King 2008, 5). Accordingly, in consultation with the Bank of 
England and the HM Treasury, the FSA would be the authority to trigger the use of Special 
Resolution Regime, on the grounds that the deposit-taking institution did not qualify for the 
threshold conditions (Bank of England 2008a, 49).144 The use of the appropriate tool, 
however, would be determined by the Bank of England and would require the Chancellor’s 
authorisation in the case of a need for additional funds from the HM Treasury (Bank of 
England 2008a, 49).  
Following the nationalisation of Northern Rock, the Chancellor extended the 
consultation period for the regime for failing institutions (Hughes and Parker 2008, 2). 
During June and July, the HM Treasury published a new outline for the banking reforms 
(Giles 2008f, 1), a further joint consultation paper on Strengthening financial stability and depositor 
                                                
144 More information on the threshold conditions can be found at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/smallfirms/new_to_regulation/how_do_i_get_authorised/threshold.shtml, 
last accessed at 21/09/2012. Also refer to House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008b, 13-4. 
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protection (FSA 2008b; see also HM Treasury 2008i; Giles 2008g, 3), launched a consultation 
period on banking Special Resolution Regime on July 22nd (FSA 2008c; see also HM Treasury 
2008j; Parker and Burgess 2008, 2). On February 2009, the Banking Act of 2009 replaced 
the old one, which had been used for the several banking failures in the preceding months.  
Financial Services Authority and the Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme  
 
“We’ll also be learning lessons at home – 
firstly from the fact that the existing Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme, the FSCS, clearly did not have 
the desired effect of giving consumers the confidence 
they need. As a first step therefore, the FSA has 
increased the coverage of the Scheme to 100 per cent 
of deposits up to £35,000”  
Kitty Ussher (2007a), Economic Secretary to the Treasury 
 
 
As mentioned previously, the FSA increased its supervisory focus on Northern Rock to 
daily conversations after the problems of the bank’s funding model were revealed under 
market distress.145 However, this focus did not include “[…] stress tests on a liquidity event 
as sudden and then sustained as the actual stress experienced this summer”.146 After a 
discussion in the Tripartite Standing Committee on August 14th,147 the FSA directly 
informed the HM Treasury about the bank’s difficulties the next day.148 Starting from 
August 21st, a strengthened supervision team from the FSA increased contact with Northern 
Rock to twice daily conversations.149 On August 22nd, the Tripartite Committee’s Joint Crisis 
Coordination Team started a working group for Northern Rock.150 As mentioned 
previously, the FSA Chairman wrote formally to the Chancellor regarding Northern Rock.151 
On September 14th the FSA approved Northern Rock’s solvency for the bank to be eligible 
for a loan from the Bank of England (FSA 2007d).  
With regards to the FSCS and the shortcomings of the deposit insurance scheme, the 
Chancellor raised the possibility to increase the limit of deposit protection scheme to 
£100,000 at the opening day of the Labour Party Conference for the first time on 
                                                
145 Memorandum by the FSA House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008, Ev 221. 
146 Memorandum by the FSA House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008, Ev 221. 
147 Memorandum by the FSA House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008, Ev 221.  
148 Memorandum by the FSA House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008, Ev 221. 
149 Memorandum by the FSA House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008, Ev 225. On March 
2008; however, “[…] it emerged that five of the seven main supervisors of Northern Rock over the 
past two years had left the FSA - a high staff turnover rate that suggested a lack of continuity might 
have had a role in the regulator's apparent failures” (Hughes 2008a, 2). Details can be found in the 
FSA’s internal report on its supervision of Northern Rock (FSA 2008d). As an example of media 
coverage, see Hughes 2008b, 7. For the press release see FSA 2008e.   
150 Memorandum by the FSA House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008, Ev 221. 
151 Memorandum by the FSA House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008, Ev 221. 
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September 23rd (Eaglesham 2007a, 3; see also Daneshku 2007a, 3). The limit was increased 
to £35,000 on the 1st of October (FSA 2007e).152 Despite an ongoing debate about a further 
increase in the limit (to either £50,000 or £100,000), it was still at £35,000 by September 
2008.  
On 29th September 2008, the HM Treasury announced that Bradford and Bingley’s retail 
deposit and branch network had been transferred to Abbey-National plc and the remainder 
of the bank’s business would be taken into public ownership (HM Treasury 2008k). 
Accordingly, “[…] [u]nder the Transfer Order, the FSCS has paid out approximately £14bn 
to enable retail deposits held in Bradford & Bingley and covered by the FSCS to be 
transferred to Abbey. The Treasury has made a payment to Abbey for retail deposit amounts 
not covered by the FSCS, amounting to approximately £4bn” (HM Treasury 2008k). In 
addition the Government guaranteed “[…] certain wholesale borrowings, and derivative 
transactions of and wholesale deposits with, Bradford & Bingley plc (“Bradford & Bingley”) 
existing as at midnight on 28 September 2008” (HM Treasury 2008l). The deposit insurance 
limit was finally increased to £50,000, which would cover 98% of the deposits, in October 
7th, 2008 (HM Treasury 2008m). In addition to increasing the compensation limit, 
addressing also the other shortcomings of the insurance scheme would ease the concerns of 
Northern Rock depositors, as well as preventing a systemic crisis of confidence. The FSCS 
was criticised for processing the received claims and payouts in a considerably long period 
of time. By the time of the Northern Rock crisis in October 2007, the FSCS was able to 
process ‘most simple deposit taking claims within four weeks’, while complex or large cases 
could possibly last longer than this (FSA 2007b, 9).  
Finally, the FSA (2008, f) launched an inquiry into speculation in the stock markets on 
March 19th.153 The move was a response to the share price collapse of HBOS in the morning 
of the same day, which was grounded on false rumours that the bank had demanded an 
emergency funding from the Bank of England (Burgess, Giles, and Masters 2008, 1). As a 
regulatory response, the FSA (2008, g) announced on June 13th the introduction of a 
‘disclosure regime for short-selling positions’ in companies that were in the process of a 
right issue.154 Accordingly, short positions for more than 0.25 per cent of the total 
outstanding shares of a company would have to be disclosed to the markets (Hughes and 
Larsen 2008, 15). Among the reasons for the FSA’s reaction was the fear that companies 
might have remained reluctant to apply to a rights issue as an alternative way for raising 
capital (Hughes 2008c, 19). On June 22nd the FSA concluded its investigation on HBOS’s 
share price decline in March and stated that there had been no sufficient evidence to prove 
market abuse (Thomas and Hughes 2008, 22). In August after a five-month investigation 
                                                
152 For media coverage see Parker 2007a, 1. 
153 See also Burgess, Giles, and Masters 2008, 1; Burgess and Orr 2008, 19. 
154 For meda coverage see Hughes and Larsen 2008, 15; Kellehar 2008a, 1. 
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period, the FSA once more emphasised that it was not able to find any ‘concerned attempt’ 
to affect the share price downwards (Croft 2008b, 13). However, on September 18th the FSA 
announced a ban on short-selling for the publicly quoted financial companies (Larsen, 
Hughes, Mackintosh, and Chung 2008, 1).  
To summarise, below listed are the turning points in the introduction and the 
improvement of the blanket guarantee, the policy responses and changes to the FSCS, as 
well as discussion papers and consultation documents on additional issues such as liquidity 
requirements. All those aforementioned updates on the blanket guarantee, as well as on the 
deposit insurance scheme, helped to increase attention to existing safeguards in the financial 
system for protecting depositor interests. As the Chancellor stated in January 2008 in the 
House of Commons, although these arrangements had not been called, they remained 
necessary to restore confidence in the eyes of depositors (HM Treasury 2008c). 
 
 
17-Sep-07 Statement by the Chancellor to offer blanket guarantee on Northern Rock deposits 
(HM Treasury 2007b) 
 
20-Sep-07 Extensions of the blanket guarantee to all accounts existing at midnight on 19th 
September (HM Treasury 2007d) 
 
21-Sep-07 HM Treasury update on the blanket guarantee on Northern Rock (HM Treasury 
2007e) 
 
01-Oct-07 Compensation Scheme updated to cover 100% of depositors’ claims up to £35,000 
(FSA 2007e) 
 
09-Oct-07 Extension of the blanket guarantee to all new retail deposits made after 19th  
September (HM Treasury 2007f) 
 
11-Oct-07 Extended guarantee and additional facility for Northern Rock (HM Treasury 
2007g) 
Joint discussion paper by the HM Treasury, the FSA and the Bank of England on 
“Banking Reform - Protecting Depositors” (HM Treasury 2007j) 
 
31-Oct-07 FSA approval of the final rules for the FSCS’ new funding model155 
 
06-Nov-07 The announcement of the reform of the deposit insurance scheme at the Queen’s 
speech (Parker 2007b, 4) 
 
13-Nov-07 FSA confirmation of the reformed funding model for Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme to operate from next year (1 April 2008) (FSA 2007f) 
 
14-Nov-07 FSA confirmation to broaden the restitution pool of the deposit insurance scheme 
(“Deposit insurance” 2007, 22) 
 
04-Dec-07 Lenders urged by the FSA to protect themselves against a possible worsening of 
liquidity and credit risks (FSA 2007g ) 
 
18-Dec-07 Extension of wholesale guarantee arrangements for Northern Rock (HM Treasury 
2007i) 
                                                
155 Letter from Chairman of the Financial Services Authority to the Chairman, available at House of 
Commons Treasury Committee 2008. 
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19 Dec- 07 FSA discussion paper: ‘Review of the liquidity requirements for banks and building 
societies’ (FSA 2007h; See also FSA 2007i) 
 
30-Jan-08 Consultation Document: Financial stability and depositor protection: strengthening 
the framework (HM Treasury 2008b)156 
 
April 2008  FSA consultation Paper: ‘FSCS funding - tariff changes’ (FSA 2008j) 
 
May 2008 Consultation Paper: Financial Services Compensation Scheme: EEA branches of 
UK insurers (FSA 2008k) 
 
27-May-08  FSA debate on ‘increasing transparency in regulation’ (FSA 2008l; see also FSA 
2008m)  
Industry feedbacks on liquidity requirements published (FSA 2008n)  
 
Jun-08  Feedback on Tripartite consultation document by the FSA: Operation of the 
Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) for deposit protection 
 
01-Jul-08 Strengthening financial stability and depositor protection – Further Consultation 
paper by the HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA (FSA 2008b)157 
 
25-Jul-08 Policy Statement - Financial Services Compensation Scheme: EEA branches of UK 
insurers feedback on CP08/9 and final rules (FSA 2008o) 
 
29-Sep-08 FSCS payout of approximately £14bn for the transfer of Bradford and Bingley 
deposits to Abbey and HM Treasury payout amounting to approximately £4bn for 
the deposits uncovered by the FSCS (HM Treasury 2008k) 
 
03-Oct-08 Consultation Paper - Financial Services Compensation Scheme: Review of limits 
(FSA 2008q) 
 
03-Oct-08 Increase in the compensation limit from £35,000 to £50,000 (FSA 2008p) 
 
 
Bank of England and the Provision of Liquidity into the Markets 
The provision of liquidity has been the main concern of the Bank of England (‘the Bank’, 
hereafter) after the problems in the financial markets were revealed in the summer of 2007. 
During the course of the unfolding events, when numerous attempts were made by the 
Tripartite Authorities to stabilize the ongoing turbulence in the financial markets, the Bank 
used its balance sheet to provide the markets with liquidity and to reverse the liquidity 
hoarding by the banks. Over the weekend of 4-5 September, the Bank put £4bn into the 
market in order to ease liquidity constraints.158 On September 13th, the Bank (2007a, 502) 
stated that extra reserves would be re-offered during the maintenance period through its 
Open Market Operations (OMOs). The first of those was conducted on September 18th, 
followed by an additional one on September 20th (Bank of England 2007a, 502). The Bank 
also made clear on September 16th that the loan extended to Northern Rock would stay in 
place in the event of a private take-over (Giles, Saigol, and Larsen 2007, 1). It also 
                                                
156 For media coverage see Croft and Pickard 2008, 2. 
157 See also HM Treasury 2008i; Giles 2008g, 3.  
158 Uncorrected Oral Evidence Darling, Macpherson, Neale, Maxwell, and Hughes 2007. 
 
98 
announced its plans “[…] to conduct a series of special auctions to provide funds at three-
month maturity against a much wider range of collateral than is eligible in the Bank’s OMOs 
and standing facilities” (Bank of England 2007a, 509).159 On September 26th, the Bank 
(2007a, 510) offered £10bn as the first term-auction, which were followed by others on 
October 2nd, 10th, and 17th. On November 29th, the Bank (2007a, 505-507) announced its 
plan to offer £10bn in the form of a five-week repo open market operation during the 
maintenance period beginning on December 6th. 
December 6th was also the first time since the Northern Rock crisis when the Bank 
reduced its Bank Rate by 0.25 percentage points to 5.5 per cent, which was maintained on 
January 10th (Bank of England 2007b; 2008c). On December 12th, with other central banks 
around the world, the Bank (2007c) announced that it would take measures in order to 
address the pressures in the short-term funding markets. The ultimate aim of this and the 
following central bank actions would be to keep overnight market rates in line with the Bank 
Rate. In its pre-scheduled OMOs on 18 December and 15 January, the total amount of 
reserves offered at the 3-month maturity would be increased with a wider range of assets 
accepted as collateral. On February 7th, the Bank further reduced its Bank Rate to 5.25 per 
cent and maintained this on March 6th (Bank of England 2008d; 2008e). On March 11th, it 
joined another coordinated central banks measure where it announced  “[…] a continuation 
of its expanded 3-month long term repo open market operations against a wider range of 
high quality collateral” (Bank of England 2008f). On April 10th, it reduced its Bank Rate by a 
further 0.25 percentage points to 5 per cent (Bank of England 2008g).  
The Bank launched its Special Liquidity Scheme on April 21st, which would “[…] allow 
banks to swap temporarily [for long terms] their high quality mortgage-backed and other 
securities for UK Treasury Bills” (Bank of England 2008h; see also Bank of England 2008i). 
According to the scheme, financial institutions that were already able to use the Bank’s 
Standing Facilities would now be allowed to have long-term swaps for Treasury bills in 
exchange of high quality but less liquid collaterals (including mortgage backed securities) 
with a haircut (Bank of England 2008b, 10). Securitised lending by banks would also be used 
as collateral for the scheme or for the overseas central banks, with a legal commitment to 
buy them back within a specified period (FSA 2010, 33; Lastra 2009, 145).  This, in fact, 
resulted in the ‘recycling; of lower value securities held by banks in exchange of central bank 
liquidity. As the Governor of the Bank emphasised in his speech at the BBA, the scheme 
was designed to be “[…] a backstop that is available every day” (King 2008, 7). In May 2008, 
the Bank (2008a, 18) also ‘[…] [a]nnounced that expanded three-month long-term repos 
would be maintained in June and July”. These were later expanded for September and 
October as well (Bank of England 2008a, 18).  
                                                
159 See also Oakley 2007, 3.  
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On September 17th the Bank (2008j) announced the extension of the drawdown period 
for the Scheme to end on January 30th, 2009. The following day, in a coordinated central 
bank action, the Bank (2008k) announced to take measures to improve US$ liquidity in US$ 
short-term markets. It committed to offer US$ funds overnight against collateral (initially 
amounting to $40bn) through a reciprocal swap agreement with the Federal Reserve (Bank 
of England 2008k). In a coordinated action with other central banks, the Bank (2008l) 
decided to provide US$ liquidity to the markets with one week maturity on September 26th. 
“An operation to lend $30bn of funds for one week will take place today, alongside an 
operation to lend funds overnight. The size of the Bank’s overnight dollar repo operation 
will be $10bn today” (Bank of England 2008l). It also announced that its “[…] long-term 
repo operations against extended collateral, including mortgage securities, will for a period 
be held weekly and enlarged”, starting from September 29th (Bank of England 2008l). On 
this day, the Bank (2008m) further announced the increase in the size of its swap line with 
the Federal Reserve up to $80bn in dollar liquidity, if needed, and the extension of the term 
of the arrangement until the end of April 2009.  
Following this operation, on October 1st the Bank (2008n) offered an additional US$ 
repo operation to lend $30bn to the market, which would further be repeated on October 
3rd. Also on the October 3rd it announced the “[…] extension of the collateral eligible in its 
current weekly sterling three-month repo operations” (Bank of England 2008o). On 
October 7th, the central banks around the world announced their schedules for term and 
forward actions of US$ liquidity (Bank of England 2008p). The Bank announced two 
forward auctions of US$ liquidity (dates being 10th and 24th of November) through its swap 
line with the Federal Reserve (Bank of England 2008p). Given the circumstances in the 
markets, the Bank (2008r) reduced its Bank Rate by 0.5 percentage points to 4.5 per cent on 
October 8t. On October 13th in another coordinated central bank action, it announced the 
removal of the fixed limit on the swap line with the Federal Reserve (Bank of England 
2008s). The Bank (2008s) stated that it would “[…] hold tenders of US dollar funding at one 
week, one month and three month maturities, at fixed interest rates with counterparties able 
to borrow any amount against eligible collateral”. On November 6th, the Bank Rate was 
further reduced by 1.5 percentage points to 3 per cent (Bank of England 2008q) and to 2 per 
cent on December 4th (Bank of England 2008t). Finally, on December 19th the schedules for 
term auctions of US$ liquidity for the first quarter of 2009 was announced (Bank of England 
2008u).  
 
Conc lus ions  
This chapter has summarised the developments between the summer of 2007 and 
September 2008 in order to set the background both for Northern Rock and the following 
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cases. It has identified the turning points within the Northern Rock crisis, its nationalisation 
and the regulatory changes initiated and accomplished by the Tripartite Authorities. The 
following Chapter IV I will refer to the first two sections focusing specifically on Northern 
Rock when testing the hypotheses against the Northern Rock case. The last two sections 
before conclusion, on the other hand, will prove useful in explaining the remaining three 
cases (namely Alliance and Leicester, HBOS, and Bradford and Bingley) and especially 
explaining the variance on the outcome for each case. Against this empirical background, the 
following chapter will now present an argumentative analysis on the Northern Rock crisis 
with an attempt to understand the material, institutional, and ideational dimensions of the 
depositor run on the bank. 
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Chapter IV: Within-Case Political Economy Analysis on Northern 
Rock  
 
 
Northern Rock depositor: “When I heard the Government 
telling us not to worry, I knew it was time to get my 
money out” 
(Hazell 2007, 57) 
 
 
 
The credit crunch of 2007 reminded the British banking industry how fragile depositor and 
investor confidence could be under uncertainty. The collapse of the former resulted in the 
first depositor run in a century, whereas the collapse of the latter ended up in the first 
nationalisation of a British bank in decades. The examination of the Northern Rock crisis 
and the depositor run on the bank are the subjects of this chapter. What counts for this 
change in depositor expectations to form a run on a bank? How can one interpret the period 
illustrated in the preceding chapter from a theoretical point of view? As has been mentioned 
previously, the assumptions put forward by the asymmetric information and the sunspots 
theories possess limited explanatory power, as they fall short in paying adequate attention to 
the role played by ideas. This research argues that bank runs are not only a function of the 
fundamentals and/or the institutional settings, but also a function of the collective memory 
of past institutional failures and the depositor awareness towards the safety nets in place.  
The previous chapter has set the empirical background for this research’s cases. In 
addition to the evidence gathered through process tracing presented in Chapter III, the 
current chapter will also test this research’s argument against the depositor comments 
collected through national and regional newspapers from Nexis UK during the four days of 
the offline run on Northern Rock. With an attempt to understand the depositor motivations 
in forming the queues, more than three hundred seventy depositor comments have been 
collected from newspaper articles between September 14th and 17th. This provided an 
artificial interview based on random sampling from the ‘queuers’. The selection of the 
newspapers has been made on both the national and the regional level in order to prevent a 
possible partisanship bias. A complete list of all the comments and their sources is presented 
anonymously in Appendix I. 
All comments have further been uploaded and processed on NVivo, a specialist software 
programme for content analysis. Based on the literature on bank runs, five different nodes 
(codes) have been identified in order to capture the common themes shared within the 
depositor comments. Those are the following: Risk aversion (i.e., taking no chances/risk, 
peace of mind, safety), panic (either positive or negative, key words are anxious/anxiety, 
alarmed, concerned, nervous, worried, fear/frightened), lack of trust (i.e., lack of trust 
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towards the Government/politicians/Bank of England/banks, references to previous 
examples of failures, keywords such as reassurances, faith, confidence), awareness towards 
the official guarantees (either the blanket guarantee or the FSCS, key words are 
guarantee/guaranteed, the coverage limit), and finally uncertainty (about Northern Rock’s 
overall situation and/or the safety of the banking system in general).  
The purpose of this exercise was to understand how significant the lack of trust appeared 
in the depositor comments in comparison and among with the other re-occurring themes. 
Ideally, the selection of depositors to conduct interviews with, which in this case was done 
by newspaper reporters, should be based on unbiased and equally representative criteria of 
the wider population. Unfortunately, given the infrequency of off-line bank runs and the 
increasing prevalence of electronic deposit withdrawals, this is difficulty to apply to the 
studies of bank runs. Therefore, despite suffering from a possible selection bias and 
incomplete representativeness of the wider population, depositor comments collected are 
still the primary sources to collect evidence on the motivations of bank runs. Therefore, 
without discarding their relevance and also acknowledging their limitations, the second best 
approach to use this source of data was to minimise the selection bias by extending the 
search to all national and regional newspapers. 
The percentages of each of these nodes within the comments coded were then analysed 
in relation to each other. In other words, although the collected comments might not possess 
a perfect representation of the wider population (as a result of a possible selection bias 
discussed above), the frequency of each node at least provided a general understanding of 
the significance of collective memory of past failures or the lack of trust towards the 
Authorities in relation to other categories.  As a caveat, however, this is not to replicate a 
statistical analysis where the relative significance of each variable can be measured with 
proper modelling. In other words, the figures intend to illustrate the recurring themes in the 
comments, which might help understand, but not to measure, the motivations behind the run. 
They help associate the abstract concepts and assumptions from the literature with real world 
examples and first-hand experience from depositors. Figure 2 presents an overall picture of 
the distribution of nodes across depositor comments. 
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Figure 2 Depositor Comments - Run on Northern Rock 
 
 
 
Against this background, this chapter is structured as follows: Following introduction, the 
second section will present a short overview of the interpretation of the Northern Rock crisis 
in the current literature. The preceding theoretical chapters of this thesis have intended to 
differentiate this research’s argument from the overall banking panics literature. The 
following section, on the other hand, will highlight this research’s departure from an 
emerging literature on Northern Rock as a case study, while surveying a number of scholars 
working on the subject area. The rest of the chapter will be structured according to the three 
sets of hypotheses, namely fundamentals (to test the asymmetric information theory), 
institutions, and the role of cognitive heuristics in depositor expectations. As a reminder, a 
full list of the hypotheses to be tested against empirical evidence has been provided in both 
the Introduction and Chapter II. The first of these three sections on fundamentals will analyse 
the Northern Rock period from the current literature’s lenses and point out the strengths and 
weaknesses of the theories’ explanatory power for the run. In other words, it will test the 
hypotheses of H0 and H1. The second section will analyse the institutional dimensions of the 
case (H2) and test this research’s argument on ‘depositor awareness’ (H3). Finally, the third 
section will incorporate the insights gained from the cognitive heuristics literature and test 
the remaining hypothesis, H4. It will read the Northern Rock crisis through this research’s 
argument on cognitive heuristics. In addition to the evidence collected through process 
tracing, all the sections will utilise the depositor comments in order to strengthen the 
arguments presented. Conclusion will summarise the argument and conclude the chapter.  
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4.1 The In terpre ta t ion  o f  the  Northern  Rock Cris i s  in  the  Li t e ra ture    
 
“While crises are often related to change, 
exogenous shock remains an indeterminate explanation. 
Similar shocks seem to have different effects: some lead 
to change, some do not. Why?” 
(Legro 2005, 11) 
 
   
 
This section will summarise the emerging literature on Northern Rock as to illustrate once 
more how this research’s argument diverges from the current studies. Banks’ financial health 
is highly vulnerable to external shocks as a result of  the maturity and liquidity 
transofmrations they provide. Gavin and Hausmann (1998, 3) identify two dimensions of  
banking crises, namely the role of  shocks and the vulnerability of  financial institutions and 
argue that banking crises are the results of  the interaction between these two. Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1997, 5) also state that systemic banking problems are not only 
grounded on a weak macroeconomic environment, but they are also influenced by the 
structural characteristics of  the banking sector. Similarly, several studies on the Northern 
Rock crisis utilise from a ‘window-catalyst framework’, borrowing from comparative-
historical analyses, in order to interpret the retail depositor run on the bank and understand 
the relationship between the underlying and immediate causes. The window-catalyst 
framework suggests that “[…] nothing can happen when a window is closed, it must be 
open: it is a necessary condition for an item to make it onto the agenda […] To use 
Aristotle’s language, the catalyst is the proximate cause of  the event while the window of  
opportunity is the prerequisite condition that gives the catalyst its causal effect” (Goertz and 
Levy 2007, 35, 36).  
Both the vulnerabilities of  Northern Rock arising from its business model, the 
insufficiency of  regulatory arrangements in place back then, and the collapse of  confidence 
in the inter-bank markets during the summer of  2007160 put the bank on the edge of  the 
cliff. In other words, as ‘exogenous conditions’, they had created a ‘window-of-opportunity’ 
for the accumulated tension in the markets to be released. Although these vulnerabilities had 
been built up throughout years, it required a shock to serve as a catalyst to shake the status quo. 
While the catalyst for the bank’s failure was the retail depositor run in September 2007, the 
catalyst for the run itself, on the other hand, had been the emergency lending (LoLR facility) 
by the Bank of  England. The explanations offered in the literature, nonetheless, tend to 
over-emphasise the catalyst (in this case the emergency funding) in explaining the depositor 
run on Northern Rock. They under-analyse the vulnerabilities built up throughout years to 
put depositor confidence on the edge of  the cliff.    
                                                
160 Refer to Chapter III for a detailed analysis and argument on those dimensions.  
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The application of  a window-catalyst framework implies a necessary condition, which in 
this case has been the deterioration of  the economic fundamentals. As mentioned 
continuously, this research is in agreement with the asymmetric information theories that the 
lack of  bank-specific information or the arrival of  the adverse news is a necessary condition 
to affect depositor expectations. However, the explanatory power of  economic fundamentals 
as an independent variable weakens under multifinality, where different outcomes are 
observed under similar conditions.161 Instead, this research argues that although the variables 
put forward by the literature are crucial in shaping depositor expectations, they should not be 
taken into the analysis on their face value. Adverse news on fundamentals “[...] do not 
determine agents’ actions directly, [...] [they] serve as a device that coordinates agents’ beliefs 
on a particular outcome” (Goldstein and Pauzner 2005, 1295). It is the interaction of  ideas 
with the institutional and material settings, or in other words the interpretation of  those 
settings through cognitive heuristics, which provides individuals with ‘focal points’ to 
converge their expectations towards certain outcomes. 
Numerous articles, both academic and policy-oriented, have been published on the role 
of  the regulatory framework in the failure of  Northern Rock, which have also analysed this 
crisis’ implications on the Tripartite framework’s future (among many others, see Hall 2009; 
Mullineux 2008; Lastra 2008 as examples). Marshall et al (2012, 174), working on the 
georgraphy of  financial crises, interpret “[…] Northern Rock’s travails as a product of  two 
decades of  weakening regulation that transformed the money culture of  building society 
management”. Llewellyn (2008, 43) also argues that “[o]ur central thesis is that NR’s 
[Northern Rock’s] highly focussed business strategy involving a high and unusual 
dependency on securitisation and short-term wholesale market funding exposed it to such a 
LPHI [low-probability-high-impact] risk”.  
Against the background of  these economic and regulatory vulnerabilities, several analyses 
on the Northern Rock crisis put forward three main lines of  argument in analysing the retail 
run on the bank. Those might be classified under the following headings: (1) the emergency 
funding by the Bank of  England as the shock, (2) the inefficiency of  the deposit insurance 
scheme, and (3) the efficiency of  the blanket guarantee in bringing the run into halt. Firstly, 
many scholars in the field regard the news on the emergency support extended to Northern 
Rock as the catalyst for the depositor run. As an example, Shin (2009, 115) defines Northern 
Rock as “[...] a “pinch point” in the financial system, where tensions would finally be 
manifested”. Although Northern Rock was not the only institution to be on the edge of  the 
                                                
161 “[…] [M]ultiple outcomes in different cases with the same value of an independent variable, 
depending on the values of other variables” (Bennett and Elman 2006, 466). 
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cliff, it was the one absent from the ‘liquidity support of  a larger sponsor’ (Shin 2009, 115).162 
Shin (2009, 101-2), Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2009, 76) and Ndong and Scialom (2008, 9) 
argue that the retail depositors started queueing in front of  their branches only after the 
announcement by the Bank of  England. Llewellyn (2009, 13, 15) also emphasises the central 
bank’s announcement sparking the run on the bank, which continued until the unlimited 
blanket guarantee was introduced by the Government (see also Eisenbeis and Kaufman 
2009, 73; Lastra 2008, 166). In their paper, Hallsworth and Skinner (2008, 282) also state that 
the use of  technical terms in their announcements (such as the emergency funding support 
or the lender of  last resort) by the Authorities did not help reassure ‘financially 
unsophisticated consumers’.  
A second argument put forward regarding the Northern Rock crisis has been the 
inefficiency of  the deposit insurance scheme in preventing bank runs. As an example, Mayes 
and Wood (2009, 37) argue that “[t]he Northern Rock episode reveals some very important 
provisos that must exist for this [deposit insurance scheme] to apply in practice”. They 
suggest that the run on Northern Rock was ‘simply a problem of  practical implementation’ 
(Mayes and Wood 2008, 5). Accordingly, they argue that the safety net and LoLR facility by 
the Bank of  England “[...] should have provided the confidence depositors and investors 
required. But they did not” (Mayes and Wood 2008, 6). Ndong and Scialom (2008, 14) also 
argue similarly: “So the UK Deposit Insurance Arrangement cumulated the incentive for 
bank runs: co-insurance, liquidity losses due to long reimbursement delays and ex-post 
funding which reinforce the payout delays”. As an example from the policy circles, during his 
speech just after the Northern Rock crisis at the Northern Ireland Chamber of  Commerce 
and Industry in Belfast, the Governor of  the Bank of  England, stated that “[m]ost of  what 
happened can be understood in terms of  […] incentives [facing banks, investors, and 
depositors]” (King 2007b). Comparing the run on Countrywide Financial with the one on 
Northern Rock, the Governor argued that  
 
[t]he depositors simply did not face the same incentives to withdraw their money. The 
United States has a well-developed insurance scheme for depositors […] Without 
such a scheme in the UK, once the queues started to form at Northern Rock, other 
depositors faced every incentive to join them. The only way to stop the run was for 
the Chancellor to announce a government guarantee of the deposits of Northern 
Rock (King 2007b). 
 
Thridly and finally, given the inefficiency of  the deposit insurance scheme, the blanket 
guarantee introduced by the HM Treasury on September 17th was assigned the role to end 
                                                
162 Acknowledging the difficulties the bank had been facing during the summer of 2007, Shin (2009, 
102) continues, “[t]he Northern Rock depositor run, although dramatic on television, was an event in 
the aftermath of the liquidity crisis at Northern Rock, rather than the event that triggered its liquidity 
crisis. In this sense, the Northern Rock episode was not an old-fashioned bank run of the sort we see 
in movies like It’s a Wonderful Life or Mary Poppins”.  
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the queues. In its Annual Report of  2007, Northern Rock (2007c, 25) also described the 
blanket guarantee to have “[…] significantly slowed the level of  customer withdrawals […] In 
the weeks following the initial announcement of  the HM Treasury guarantee arrangements, 
Northern Rock’s level of  retail deposits stabilised”. The below figure illustrates the level of  
deposit outflows from Northern Rock during September 2007.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Deposit Outflows from Northern Rock - September 2007163 
 
 
Hall (2009) argues that the “[s]ubsequent provision of  a blanket deposit guarantee duly led to 
the (eventual) disappearance of  the depositor queues from outside the bank’s branches but 
only served to heighten the sense of  panic in policymaking circles”. He states that the 
blanket guarantee on September 17th helped queues in front of  Northern Rock branches to 
disappear despite with some delays. Given the unawareness towards the deposit insurance 
scheme, Hall (2009) continues, “[...] very few people in the EU actually know about the 
existence of  deposit protection until a crisis occurs, thereby destroying its potential as a 
stabilisation device”. In a similar way, Llewellyn also mentions the lack of  depositor 
awareness during the Northern Rock crisis. Accordingly,  
 
[i]t became immediately apparent in the NR [Northern Rock] episode that few 
depositors were aware of  the DPS [Deposit Protection Scheme] or of  its limitations 
which, in any case, was brought into question by the government’s subsequent 
guarantee of  all deposits held at NR [Northern Rock] and the announcement that the 
formal DPS would be reviewed (Llewellyn 2008, 46).  
 
 
                                                
163 Figure is taken from HM Treasury 2009a, 15.  
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These arguments are, as a matter of  fact, closer to this research’s interpretation of  the 
Northern Rock crisis with its emphasis on depositor unawareness of  the safety nets. This 
research suggests that references to economic fundamentals and to the advance of  the 
deposit insurance are not enough per se to explain the variance in the different degrees of  
change in depositor behaviour. As the ‘street-car analogy’ would suggest, all banking crises 
are receptive to bank runs if  one waits long enough. In interpreting bank runs, this research 
applies a longer time-horizon to analyse depositor runs and regards depositor behaviour as 
‘incrementally changing’ over time. Instead of  treating the emergency funding as an 
immediate shock to depositor confidence, this research regards it as a ‘tipping point’ within a 
gradual change. It therefore suggests a ‘backwards looking’ understanding in analysing bank 
runs as to take the recent financial failures into consideration.  
Against this background, the rest of  this chapter is divided into three sections each of  
which discusses one building block of  this research’s argument. The following section will 
present an application of  the current literature to the Northern Rock case to better illustrate 
its shortcomings. This will be followed by the two additional sections former being on the 
institutional dimensions of  Northern Rock whereas the latter on the application of  the 
cognitive heuristics literature to the case. Conclusion will summarise the argument and 
conclude the chapter.   
 
4.2 Fundamenta l s  and In format ion Asymmetr i e s   
 
“As is illustrated by the Northern 
Rock episode, the ‘smart’ money leaves first 
and it is only when the less informed find out 
that the bank cannot raise finance on 
wholesale markets that the overt run starts” 
(Mayes and Wood 2009, 37) 
 
 
 
This section illustrates the strengths, as well as the shortcomings, of the existing literature in 
analysing the depositor run on Northern Rock. The turning points identified in the preceding 
chapter, as well as the depositor comments collected, are analysed from a theoretically 
informed point of view in order to shed light on the causal mechanisms during the retail run. 
In line with this research’s overall argument, which suggests the interplay between 
fundamentals and cognitive shortcuts in interpreting the present situation, this section argues 
that while the current literature succeeds in explaining some parts of the Northern Rock crisis, 
it still lacks a convincing account for this research’s puzzle. Accordingly, the main findings of 
this section are the followings: (1) Northern Rock case supports the asymmetric information 
theory given the ‘flight-to-quality’ from Northern Rock to other banks during the crisis; (2) 
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this can also be attributed to the relative ‘tranquillity’ of the period compared to the following 
months; and finally (3) the efficiency of the blanket guarantee is undetermined without an 
efficient bank resolution/insolvency regime in place to remove uncertainty.  
The system-wide problems in the financial markets, as well as the wholesale investor run 
on Northern Rock in the summer of 2007, forced the bank to approach the Bank of England 
for an emergency funding. The aforementioned liquidity hoarding in the money markets 
hindered the creation of any sort of private pooling of sources for Northern Rock.164 The 
search for a safe haven for the bank before the emergency funding had also proved 
unsuccessful and the credit line had to be announced on September 14th. How was the 
information conveyed to retail depositors during the first days of the Northern Rock crisis? 
Before any official statements made by the Tripartite Authorities on September 14th, the BBC 
announced the bank’s situation the preceding day.165 In the following days, with no precedent 
in the near history, the run on Northern Rock was likened to ‘Depression-era queues’ (Reece 
2007, 30), ‘scenes from the Weimar Republic’ (Halligan 2007, 6), ‘something from a fragile 
Latin American state’ (Ringshaw and Smith 2007, 4), and ‘an old-fashioned, 19th-century 
banking run’ (Warner 2007, 64)166 by the media. Below are some examples:167 
 
In extraordinary scenes more reminiscent of the Wall Street crash of 1929 than 
booming 21st-century Britain, crowds queued for hours to retrieve an estimated GBP 
1billion of their savings from the lender’s vaults on Friday. The drain continued 
yesterday as thousands more queued up to withdraw their money (Jones 2007a, 10) 
 
This is the sort of event that happened in America after the Great Crash of 1929. For 
Northern Rock, this is catastrophe. For the rest of us it marks the end of an era of 
easy money (McRae 2007, 2) 
 
[The] queues that formed outside the branches of Northern Rock last Friday brought 
back memories of newsreel footage of the run on banks during America’s Great 
Depression (Waples 2007, 6) 
 
The scenes outside Northern Rock branches since Friday are eerily reminiscent of 
New York and London in 1929 when a stock market crash obliterated the savings of 
millions and plunged the Western world into economic recession - in the process 
bringing down the Labour government (McKinstry 2007, 12) 
 
Scenes reminiscent of the Great Depression, saw queues forming at branches of the 
Rock to extract as much of their savings as possible on Friday (Holmes 2007, 2) 
                                                
164 Calomiris and Gorton (1991, 113) argue that “[p]erhaps a single bank, or group of banks at a single 
location, could honor large withdrawals, even larger than those demanded during a panic, if at the 
same time other banks were not faced with such demands”. 
165 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6994099.stm, accessed on 05/12/2011.  See also House of Commons 
Treasury Committee 2008b, 46.  
166 “Alarmed at the sight of the Bank of England being forced to bail out Northern Rock, angry 
customers rushed to withdraw their deposits in scenes of financial panic not seen since the 1970s” 
(Roberts 2007, 19). See also Freedland 2007, 33; King 2007c, 46.     
167 To be able to capture those during the period examined, I analysed the news (11 September – 21 
September, 2007) through Nexis UK from the following sources: the Financial Times, Daily Express, 
Daily Star, Daily Mirror, Daily Telegraph, Evening Standard, Metro, the Guardian, the Independent, the Sun, and 
the Times. 
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Dissemination of the news through media served crucial in informing retail depositors on the 
difficulties faced by Northern Rock. There had been two classes of informed depositors 
during the Northern Rock crisis. Firstly, even before the extension of the emergency funding 
by the Bank of England, a wholesale run on the bank had preceded the retail depositor run in 
September. In Caprio and Honohan’s (2008, 10) words “[i]n practice it is often the better-
informed wholesale market that undermines a failing bank’s liquidity and, as in the case of 
Northern Rock in 2007, leads to a run in the retail market”. By the time of the off-line run, 
the bank had already been dealing with deposit withdrawals amounting to £1.4bn (Kaletsky 
2007, 23; Roberts 2007, 19). In addition to the information asymmetries prevailing across 
different classes of depositors, a further justification for this silent run earlier on the bank 
rests with the fact that “[u]ninsured depositors [such as wholesale depositors] […] carry a 
stronger incentive to exert market discipline compared to those whose funds are insured” 
(Hamalainen 2009, 54). This discipline had been in the shape of a silent run on the bank 
during which creditors refused to rollover the bank’s debt.168 The major difference of the 
September run, however, had been the signalling effect of the queues on the uninformed 
retail depositors about Northern Rock’s financial difficulties, as suggested by WA2. The 
observation of the queues helped to close the information gap between the bank’s wholesale 
institutional investors and its retail depositors. According to the depositor comments 
analysed, both the sequential service constraint (first-come-first-served) and the signalling 
effects of the queues seem to have precipitated the crisis of confidence for uninformed 
depositors.   
As discussed in the theoretical chapters, self-fulfilling prophecies, through higher order 
beliefs, take hold as a result of the uncertainty over others’ beliefs about the state of 
fundamentals (regardless of how sounds they are). From this perspective, one might argue 
that the retail run on Northern Rock started as a self-fulfilling prophecy because of a mis-
interpreted signal from the Bank of England, which shifted common knowledge of 
fundamentals and increased uncertainty over other’s interpretation of those. While the 
extension of the LoLR facility to Northern Rock rejects the null hypothesis (H0) that the run 
was triggered by a random variable, it was confused for pointing to a solvency problem for 
the bank (despite the fact that the loan required the FSA’s seal of approval on Northern 
Rock’s solvency). Although it was initially planned as a ‘backstop facility’ to be used on 
demand, “[t]he speed and extent of [deposit] withdrawals meant that the Bank of England’s 
emergency facility […] actually needed to be called upon almost immediately” (House of 
Commons Treasury Committee 2008d, 54, 66).  
                                                
168 As also mentioned by Gu (2011, 164), similar to the Northern Rock crisis, “[d]uring the 1994–1995 
Argentine banking crisis, large depositors were responsible for most of the deposit outflows at the 
beginning of the crisis. Small depositors began to make substantial withdrawals two months later”. 
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As Morris and Shin (1998, 595) argue, in order to restore transparency and the common 
knowledge of fundamentals, “[t]he most effective means towards this would be a prominent 
public announcement which is commonly known to convey information to all relevant 
parties”. Relatedly, “[…] once a run is in progress, it will be important to be able to convince 
all depositors that it will stop and to ensure all the depositors know that all others have been 
so convinced” (Diamond 2007, 197). This is also argued by WA3, which suggests that 
banking panics should not develop in information-rich environments. Accordingly, the 
provision of bank specific information on a regular basis, especially on the state of the bank’s 
solvency, should help stabilize depositor expectations and prevent banking panics (See Park 
1991; Dupont 2007). As a matter of fact, the Tripartite Authorities, as well as Northern 
Rock’s management, emphasised the bank’s solvency in their public statements during the 
off-line run period. These public announcements, however, did little to ease depositor 
worries during the first days of the run. Uncertainty prevailed amongst depositors both on 
the situation of Northern Rock and on the banking sector in general. This is also supported 
by depositor comments, which mention the uncertainty surrounding the Northern Rock’s 
situation and how this leaves them indecisive and suspicious towards other institutions’ 
financial health.   
Recalling the arguments in Chapter II, policy responses should not delay addressing the 
on-going crisis and should instead defuse the prevailing uncertainty before panic sets off. 
Two of the most salient policy tools at the disposal of policy makers during the Northern 
Rock crisis had been the LoLR facility and the introduction of the blanket guarantee.169 As a 
matter of fact, reading through the comments, some of the depositors seemed to have been 
reassured by the involvement of the Government and the extension of the blanket guarantee. 
Although depositors refrained from banking with Northern Rock after the negative publicity 
the bank had received, the problems surrounding the bank were not generalised to the whole 
banking system in the eyes of depositors. In terms of this research’s outcome categories, 
there was no banking panic as the depositor run had been confined to Northern Rock. Despite 
the observed outflow of deposits from Northern Rock, most of the bank’s savings did not 
leave the banking system for either alternative means of investments or to be placed under 
the mattresses. However, the data reveals that although the queues in front of Northern 
Rock branches had disappeared, the banking system experienced a flight-to-quality for retail 
deposits (Jones 2007b, 5; Mayes and Wood 2009, 38, footnote 3). Banks operating within the 
banking system in the United Kingdom enjoyed a considerable amount of deposit windfalls 
during the period of Northern Rock’s troubles.  
                                                
169 A more detailed discussion on these policy tools has been presented in the preceding chapter 
theoretical chapter (Chapter II).  
 
112 
This aforementioned flight-to-quality is supported by data and anecdotal evidence 
collected through newspaper articles. As expected, the 100 per cent government backed 
National Savings & Investments (‘NS&I’, hereafter) received a 20 per cent jump in the 
number of inquiries, mostly from Northern Rock depositors (Hosking, Seib, Leroux, and 
Gilmore 2007, 1). Accordingly, NS&I received £65m in savings via phone, online and post 
office branches either directly from Northern Rock or from other bank accounts (Jones 
2007b, 5). The Easy Access Savings Account received investments totalling £1.8m on Friday, 
after the news was revealed on Northern Rock (Jones 2007b, 5). Halifax mentioned that it 
had received as much as £1bn from Northern Rock when up to £3bn savings were believed 
to be transferred to high street banks (Prynn 2007c, 1).170 A price comparison website also 
announced an increase in the number of people to compare the saving deals offered by 
various banks (Goodway 2007d, 27).171 RBS was stated to have received more than £1bn of 
deposits in September 2007 (Larsen 2007c, 21), as well as did HSBC (Croft 2007b, 18) and 
Barclays (Litterick 2007, 12). In addition to those, the Building Society Association also 
stated that the funds amounting to £3bn flew from Northern Rock into building societies in 
October 2007 (Houlder 2007, 4). At the end of January 2008, building societies “[…] 
reported the highest levels of receipts in 2007 for 20 years. According to the Building 
Societies Association, receipts were more than Pounds 7bn in the last quarter of 2007, nearly 
three times those of the last quarter of 2006” (Burgess 2008a, 1).172 
Under the light of the banking panics literature, how can one interpret this flight to safety 
of retail deposit from Northern Rock to other institutions? Recalling the theoretical 
discussion present in Chapter II, “[a] “pure” contagion implies that withdrawals occur 
indiscriminately against all banks [...] In a nonpanic situation, we would expect to find 
depositors withdraw funds from failing banks and redepositing them in solvent banks” 
(Saunders and Wilson 1996, 415, 411). Accordingly, the aforementioned flight-to-quality is in 
line with WA4, which expects to have one if the bank run is as a result of the information 
asymmetries and fundamentals.173 Against the background of this circulation of funds and 
referring back to the asymmetric information theories, the impact of the 
                                                
170 According to one Halifax spokesman: “There have been significant inflows over the past four 
days [since the Bank of England announced its rescue financing for Northern Rock]. We are not 
commenting on how much but, yes, it is hundreds of millions” (Goodway and Lea 2007, 24). 
171 According to a statement by the company’s chief executive: “We have seen a huge impact from 
Northern Rock […] There is a lot of confusion in the marketplace and we have seen a big increase in 
people doing research and making transactions” (Cunliffe 2007, 56). 
172 As an example, Nationwide Building Society reported its net deposits to rise 96 per cent in the 
preceding six months to the end of September, most of which was assumed to be coming from 
Northern Rock (Croft and Urry 2007, 23). See also Hill 2007d, 20; Croft 2008c, 20. 
173 This point was also mentioned by the Financial Risk Outlook in 2008: “There is also a risk that a lack 
of market confidence could result in investors not discriminating between different levels of risk with 
respect to different asset classes and institutions […] This did not happen in the case of Northern 
Rock, as consumer withdrawals from Northern Rock tended to flow into other deposit-taking 
institutions” (FSA 2008a, 28, 29).  
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micro/macroeconomic environment is also crucial in the formation of depositor 
expectations. Recalling WA1, a bank run is assumed and more likely to become contagious 
under the dual observation of a bank failure and a recession. From this perspective, although 
the severity of the credit crunch in September 2007 is much clearer in retrospect, by the time 
of the depositor run the macroeconomic environment had not been deteriorated as to point 
to a system-wide economic downturn, which was the case in September 2008.  
The relative tranquillity of the period, analysed compared to the following months, might 
point to the fact that one of the main reason for the funds to stay within the system, rather 
than being placed under the mattresses, had been the (perceived) health of the general 
economic environment. In order to be able to illustrate this, I have checked and compared 
the opinions polls conducted over the period of April 2007 and August 2008 (inclusive) by 
Ipsos MORI, in order to understand the perceptions towards the general economic 
conditions.174 The questions directed and the results obtained over the months are illustrated 
in Figure 4. Following the first quarter of 2008 the economy and the economic situation 
started to be a growing concern for the respondents. Still, however, perceptions towards the 
economy remained more benign during the Northern Rock crisis compared to September 
2008. In similar lines, although expectations for a worsening general economy had started 
increasing in September 2007, they remained relatively low compared to the forthcoming 
months. Therefore, aforementioned flight-to-quality might also be explained with reference 
to the relative health of the general economic conditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Ipsos MORI Opinion Polls – General Economic Conditions  
 
                                                
174 Systematic data starts from April 2007 and only data for November 2007 is missing for both 
surveys. All relevant polls can be found on http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications.aspx.  
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The other side of the coin, however, suggests that the observed flight-to-quality points to the 
failure of the blanket guarantee introduced by the Government on September 17th. This runs 
against the assumption put forward by the asymmetric information theories that the blanket 
guarantee, with its public nature, should be efficient in restoring common knowledge among 
depositors (in the case of an inefficient deposit insurance scheme) and help alleviate the 
panic. Although the off-line run in front of the branches was eased following the blanket 
guarantee, the reading of the period suggests that the deposit withdrawals even after the 
guarantee was in line with the growing uncertainty surrounding Northern Rock’s future. This 
was especially evident in late November 2007, as Figure 5 illustrates, when Northern Rock 
witnessed increasing volatility in depositor confidence as a result of the announcements on 
its bidding process.175 The announcement of Virgin Money as the preferred bidder for the 
bank lessened uncertainty over the bank’s future and seems to have positively affected 
depositor behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 November  2007  Northern Rock’s stock exchange announcement on the  
offers being ‘materially below’ the bank’s current share price 
JC Flowers offers nominal amount to shareholders 
News that Northern Rock might need additional funding 
Two largest shareholders call for an extraordinary meeting 
26 November  2007 Virgin announced as preferred bidder 
 
 
Figure 5 Deposit Outflows from Northern Rock - October and November 2007176	  
 
                                                
175 The bidding process for Northern Rock has been summarised in Chapter III and is detailed 
chronologically in the Appendices.  
176 Figure is taken from HM Treasury 2009a, 25. It is noted that the high deposit outflows at the 
beginning of October and November 2007 are mainly because of the maturity dates for fixed rate 
bonds.  
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Although initially a private take-over was preferred over public ownership, the banking 
sector in the United Kingdom experienced its first nationalisation in decades when private 
solutions for Northern Rock’s future were exhausted. Below Figure 6 illustrates media 
coverage from all national newspapers, in addition to the Evening Standard and the Financial 
Times to highlight how nationalisation increased its saliency on the headlines.177 As evident 
from the figure, the urgency of the situation and the disadvantages of putting Northern Rock 
into administration, which would technically purport a freeze of deposits for months (Croft 
and Giles 2007b, 19; Larsen 2007e, 4), resulted in nationalisation to become more viable as 
an option within the duration of the bidding process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Newspaper Coverage – Nationalisation of Northern Rock 
 
 
How can we interpret the continuation of the silent run on Northern Rock from a theoretical 
perspective? The continuation and the intensity of deposit movements until late-November 
suggests that the blanket guarantee, free from the limitations of an official deposit insurance 
scheme, proved unsuccessful in stabilising depositor expectations. Despite the difficulty in 
differentiating between a wholesale and a retail depositor run within data, the above Figure 5 
from HM Treasury (2009a) is still informative for a cross-case comparison. This suggests that 
the efficiency of the blanket guarantee is undetermined without an efficient bank 
resolution/insolvency regime in place to remove uncertainty. This, as a matter of fact, is in 
line with the WA8 put forward by the asymmetric information theory that the coherence and 
consistency in the actions of authorities (policy makers) in addressing the crisis affect 
expectations. Laeven and Valencia also argues a similar point. According to those scholars, 
                                                
177 The search is conducted through Nexis UK between September 2007 and February 2007 (both 
inclusive), keyword Northern Rock, search within results (nationalisation OR nationalise OR 
nationalised OR nationalising).  
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“[b]ank restructuring policies matter because if credible, they show policymakers’ 
commitment to clean up existing anomalies. They may enhance the credibility of a blanket 
guarantee, or may even be sufficient to restore confidence without the need for a blanket 
guarantee” (Laeven and Valencia 2008b, 11). Northern Rock example has illustrated once 
more that even a 100 per cent unlimited government guarantee may prove insufficient 
without certain policy actions to determine the bank’s future.  
As a conclusion and against the background of the above analysis, several aspects of the 
retail depositor run seem to be in line with the assumptions put forward by the asymmetric 
information of bank runs. In broad terms, the arrival of the adverse news on Northern 
Rock’s financial health (which was mis-interpreted as signalling its insolvency) affected 
depositor expectations. As anticipated by the literature and the policy-makers, the 
introduction of the blanket guarantee stopped the queues in front of the branches, with the 
aid of the relative tranquillity of the period. This suggests a bell-shaped pattern for deposit 
withdrawals from Northern Rock, which reached its peak over the weekend of September 
15/16th and finalised with the introduction of the blanket guarantee. However, the 
continuation of the silent run on the bank and the flight-to-quality illustrated the inefficiency 
of the blanket guarantee in the absence of consistent policy action to address the on-going 
crisis. With an attempt to assess the institutional dimension of the crisis, what does this tell 
about the efficiency of the deposit insurance scheme as a formal institution, which had 
already been in place by the time of the crisis? The following section will analyse this both 
through the lenses of the current literature and this research’s argument. It will once more 
emphasise that the level of depositor awareness towards the safety nets in place affect 
depositor behaviour and, thus, the course of the banking crisis.  
 
4.3 Ins t i tu t ions  and Depos i tor  Awareness   
This section now turns this chapter’s attention away from the fundamentals towards the role 
played by the deposit insurance scheme in place. What insights can we acquire about the 
workings of the deposit insurance schemes from an analysis of the Northern Rock crisis? The 
two main findings of this section are the followings: Firstly, the example of Northern Rock 
suggests that deposit insurance is not a sufficient condition itself to prevent changes in 
depositor behaviours. The conventional argument put forward by the banking panics 
literature suggests that the existence of the formal deposit insurance scheme, even without 
the need for a blanket guarantee, should ideally be sufficient alone to stabilise depositor 
expectations (business as usual). Deposit insurance as an institution is expected to create a focal 
point to shape depositor expectations. Secondly, according to this research the mere existence 
of the scheme does not always guarantee depositor awareness towards it. This section argues 
that there had been low awareness towards the deposit insurance scheme before the 
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Northern Rock crisis and therefore the shortcomings of the scheme cannot be held 
accountable for its failure or the depositor run on the bank.  
To start with a short historical background, a mandatory deposit insurance scheme was 
introduced in Britain in 1982 by the Deposit Protection Board (‘DPB’, hereafter), which was run 
by the Bank of England. During the period when retail deposits were guaranteed by the DPB, 
the banking system in the united Kingdom experienced two major bank failures, namely Bank 
of Credit and Commerce (‘BCCI’, hereafter) and Barings, neither of which had systemic 
repercussions. With an attempt to improve the existing scheme, The Financial Services and 
Markets Act of 2000 set up the current Financial Services Compensation Scheme that came into 
operation in December 2001.178 Initially operating under three sub-schemes (accepting 
deposits, insurance, and investment),179 it replaced the previous eight compensation 
arrangements among which were the Deposit Protection Board, Policyholders Protection 
Board and the Investors Compensation Scheme.180 
 
 
Year Insurance Coverage 
1982 75 per cent of up to £10,000 
1987 75 per cent of up to £20,000 
1995 90 per cent of up to £20,000 
2001 100 per cent of the first £2,000 90 per cent of the next £33,000 
2007 100 per cent of £33,000 
2008 100 per cent of £50,000 
2010 100 per cent of £85,000 
 
 
Table 7 Deposit Insurance Scheme – Coverage Limits Across Years 
 
 
By the time of the Northern Rock crisis the deposit insurance scheme, which had been 
funded through levies from the industry, covered the first £2,000 and 90 per cent of the next 
£33,000 of all deposits.181 Before October 2007, the FSCS had embraced a co-insurance 
principle to force depositors to exercise market discipline on their banks, as they would also 
be at the risk of losing a proportion of their savings in the case of a failure (Hamalainen 2009, 
53). It has been generally argued that this co-insurance principle had introduced adverse 
                                                
178 http://www.fscs.org.uk/industry/about-the-fscs/, accessed on 21 September 2011.  
179 For details see FSCS 2001/02. 
180 House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008b, Ev 230.  
181 The increase in the limit prompted further discussions on whether this would distort the market 
“[…] by encouraging savers to put money in cash deposits rather than in investment products” 
(Croft 2007f, 4).  
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incentives for depositors to run on Northern Rock. While the scheme’s resources were 
estimated to be around £4.4m (Garnham 2007, 42), no protection was offered for those 
accounts that exceeded the upper limit (of £31,700). In addition to this credit loss, the 
pressure on the depositors would intensify with a liquidity loss because of the three-month 
period that the FSCS required to repay frozen deposit accounts (Mayes and Wood 2009, 38; 
Eisenbeis and Kaufman 2009, 81).  
One striking feature of the depositor comments collected during the run is the low 
number of people aware of or at least correctly mentioning the upper limit of the deposit 
insurance scheme. Although the exact figure is mostly confused, it was estimated to be 
between £31,000 and £35,000. This is also in line with the findings of a research conducted 
for the FSCS on Consumer Awareness of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, in September 
2008 (FSA 2009c). This study analysed retail consumers and small businesses during 
September 2008 in order to better understand their perceptions toward the FSCS.182 
Accordingly, it states that when “[a]ssessed qualitatively, awareness of the compensation 
scheme and of its limits is low but increasing” (FSA 2009c, 3). Also according to the survey 
results, one factor contributing to the off-line run on Northern Rock was the lack of 
depositor awareness towards the compensation scheme and its unique way of operation, as 
most of the Northern Rock customers had not heard about the deposit protection scheme 
before the events took place (FSA 2009c, 6, 15). Depositors had decided to spread their 
funds across banks not with the intention of protecting themselves from the £35,000 limit, 
but rather as a result of rate-chasing (FSA 2009c, 9).  
Similarly and within a broader time horizon, since 2004, the FSA had systematically been 
conducting surveys to understand consumer awareness towards the financial sector. The 2004 
survey reveals that the failure of Enron and Equitable Life had increased the sense of 
insecurity and placed prudential risk among the top concerns for depositors (FSA 2004a, 4). 
A comparison between those survey results reveals that depositor awareness had decreased 
almost 10 per cent throughout the years. In 2007, as Table 8 illustrates, almost half of the 
respondents were not aware of any type of financial regulation in place. The table suggests 
that the level of confidence in the financial regulatory regime differed less than ten per cent 
between those who are aware of the FSA and those who are not. Only did 61 per cent of the 
respondents, who were aware of the FSA’s existence, report to have confidence in the 
financial regulatory regime. The percentage of respondents who were aware that some sort of 
financial regulation had been carried out decreased 10 per cent throughout 2004 and 2007. As 
                                                
182 The survey was conducted in London, Birmingham, Glasgow, and Manchester. For details and 
methodology used see FSA 2009c. Compensation scheme’s limit was raised from £35,00 to £50,000 
on 7 October 2008. Before presenting its findings, a caveat is in order: By the time the survey was 
conducted in September 2008, there had already been an increasing amount of media coverage on the 
FSCS. This possibly contributed to the increase in public awareness towards the scheme. Therefore, 
not all the findings of this survey are included in this analysis.   
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a result, the percentage of respondents who were not aware that there was any type of 
financial regulation had increased by the same amount as of 2007. In 2007, only 13 per cent 
were unpromtedly aware of the FSA’s existence.  
 
 
 
     
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Confidence in the financial regulatory regime     
Within those who are aware of the FSA 61% N/A N/A N/A 
Within those who are not aware of the FSA 52% N/A N/A N/A 
     
Assumes some sort of financial regulation being carried 
out 
63% 53% 60% 53% 
Aware of a financial regulator (including some of the legacy organizations) 
but not the FSA 
14% 9% 10% 8% 
Not aware of any specific regulator but assumed that there was an 
organization looking after financial regulation 
19% 14% 16% 17% 
Aware that the FSA regulates the industry  30% 30% 34% 28% 
Unprompted 14% 15% 15% 13% 
Prompted 16% 15% 19% 15% 
Not aware that there was any type of financial regulation 37% 47% 41% 46% 
     
 
 
Table 8 FSCS Awareness across Years (Sources: FSA 2004b; FSA 2005; FSA 2006; FSA 2007j) 
 
 
One reason for this lack of awareness might be the fact that the FSCS had not actually been 
used to compensate depositors since its establishment. As Angela Knight discussed, there had 
been no bank failures experienced since the FSCS was created in 2001 (Croft 2007f, 4). In 
fact, it was understood that no single bank had ever contributed to the scheme since 2001 
(Conway 2007, 1). As Mark Oakes, FSCS spokesman, said: “We have never paid out for the 
failure of a bank, although we have paid out about pounds 1bn in total for mortgage 
endowments and pensions mis-selling and the failure of around 27 credit unions” (Cowie 
2007a, 30). Therefore, the scheme had not been active to compensate for depositors’ losses 
preceding the Northern Rock failure. Accordingly, although the amount of compensation 
paid to depositors had increased to £1.21m across years, this amount was still a small 
proportion of the FSCS’ total compensation payments for the various financial failures. 
Between December 2001 and the end of March 2002, the total compensation payments 
amounted to £40.9m (FSCS 2001/02). During this period, the scheme continued processing 
claims for London Trust Bank and BCCI with no new claims for the scheme (FSCS 2001/02, 
14). As a matter of fact, between 2001 and 2004 there were no new bank failures to activate 
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the FSCS. For the following years, the compensation for the credit unions’ failures was the 
major line of payment by the FSCS. The total compensation payment during 2002-03 
amounted to £0.06m for the accepting deposits sub-scheme (FSCS 2002/03, 10). For the 
following year, credit unions constituted the majority of the work load for the accepting 
deposits sub-scheme, which paid £0.4m in total for compensation (FSCS 2003/04, 12). 
During 2004/05 this amount increased to £0.23m with new claims received for the recently 
failed credit unions (FSCS 2004/05, 10, 17). This figure was £0.09m for 2005/06 and £1.21m 
for 2006/07 (See FSCS 2005/05 and FSCS 2006/07). 
Finally, the following Figure 7 demonstrates the media coverage of the FSCS and the 
frequency of the number of articles referring to the scheme between December 2001 and 
September 2008. The data is collected from a number of newspapers through Nexis UK. To 
justify the cut-off points for data collection, December 2001 marks the date when the old 
scheme, Depositor Protection Scheme, was replaced with the FSCS. The two increases in the 
number of articles correspond to Northern Rock’s failure (September 2007) and the peak of 
the crisis in September 2008. Before these dates, the number of articles referring to the FSCS 
remained relatively very low throughout the 2000s. Overall the figure also supports the 
assumption of low depositor awareness before the Northern Rock crisis, as the media 
coverage of the formal insurance scheme had remained relatively limited before this date. It 
was with the run on Northern Rock that relatively an extensive coverage of the FSCS started 
taking place.183  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Newspapers Coverage for FSCS – Between December 2001 and September 2008 
 
                                                
183 For examples from media coverage see “Northern Rock crisis: FAQ…” 2007, 5; “Rock solid” 
2007; Lewis 2007; Wright 2007a, 9; “Northern Rocked…” 2007, 2.  
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To conclude, this section has argued that for the deposit insurance scheme as a formal 
institutionalised guarantee to succeed, there first needs to be depositor awareness towards the 
scheme’s existence. The conventional argument put forward in the literature, as well as in the 
policy circles, has been that the shortcomings of the scheme and especially its co-insurance 
principle have been the main culprits for its inefficiency. In retrospect, it was evident that the 
shortcomings of institutional arrangements proved it more difficult to stabilize depositor 
expectations during the course of the Northern Rock crisis. However, the scheme proved 
inefficient initially less because of its shortcomings in compensation and repayment, but more 
due to the lack of depositor awareness towards its existence. Against this background, the 
following final section of this chapter will investigate the ‘cognitive’ dimension of the bank 
run with its emphasis on collective memory of the past crisis and the spill-over of the panic 
under uncertainty. 
 
4.4 Cogni t iv e  Shor t cu t s  and Refe r ence  Po in ts  
 
“They said the Titanic was unsinkable but it did sink” 
(Hall 2007, 12) 
 
 
This research has been arguing that there are certain reference (focal) points for 
depositors in order to interpret the current situation and act accordingly. Thinking within the 
fundamentals/institutions dichotomy, the current literature suggests that these reference 
points originate from the deterioration of fundamentals or the existence of the safety nets for 
depositors. The third section above has illustrated that the deposit insurance scheme, as one 
of the potential focal points promoted by the literature, had not actually been present in 
depositor awareness previous to the Northern Rock crisis. The preceding second section of 
this chapter argued that the run on Northern Rock cannot solely be explained with reference 
to an immediate external shock, such as the Bank of England’s emergency funding 
announcement. Explaining bank runs as responses to an immediate shock remains 
insufficient in taking ideas into account, especially when self-fulfilling prophecies take control 
of depositor reaction. In addition, while the LoLR commitment by the Bank of England had 
been successful in preventing banking panics of the nineteenth-century, it was interpreted as 
a signal strong enough to provoke a depositor run on Northern Rock in September 2007. As 
discussed above, the involvement of the central bank was mis-interpreted as pointing to a 
solvency problem for the bank (despite the fact that the loan required the FSA’s seal of 
approval on Northern Rock’s solvency). In the case of Northern Rock, while the bank’s 
solvency had been emphasised through numerous policy announcements, this ‘backstop 
facility’ from the Bank of England had to be called upon against the high amount of deposit 
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withdrawals. Public announcements did little to ease depositor worries during the first days 
of the run. Uncertainty prevailed amongst depositors both on the situation of Northern 
Rock and on the banking sector in general. This is also supported by depositor comments, 
which mention the uncertainty surrounding the Northern Rock’s situation and how this left 
them indecisive and suspicious towards other institutions’ financial health. In other words, 
although the emergency funding had not been intended to address to any capital shortage, 
the difference between liquidity and capital shortages were blurred in the eyes of depositors 
against the background of previous institutional failures and the Government’s success in 
containing those.   
The above historical comparison between Northern Rock and the failure of City of 
Glasgow Bank, as well as the depositors’ perceptions towards the involvement of the central 
bank (as translating into a capital shortage), point to an obvious change in the credibility of 
this specific institution in the eyes of depositors across centuries. As mentioned in 
Introduction, given depositors’ limited access to market information and their lack of literacy in 
technical aspects of financial markets; current or previous institutional performance, as well 
as the performance of the industry as a whole, remain less relevant in retail bank runs. 
Instead, Government’s role in handling previous crises becomes crucial in shaping 
expectations to the crisis at hand. Vulnerabilities, not only for the bank itself but also for the 
depositors, are of significant in forming depositor expectations. Against this background, this 
section will argue that the market actors’ decisions are backward-looking and informed by 
the past. Collective memory of the institutional failures and the lack of confidence in the 
Authorities are important in interpreting the swings in depositor behaviour and their 
responses to the current situation.  
Recalling Table 8 from the previous section, a survey conducted by the FSA in 2004 
highlighted the low level of confidence in the financial regulatory regime. The level of 
confidence was 61 and 52 per cent respectively for respondents who were aware of the FSA 
and for those who were not. Ipsos MORI, one of the leading polling houses in the United 
Kingdom, has been surveying systematically the level of satisfaction with the Government 
and economic optimism prevailing in the general population. Accordingly, it directs the 
following questions: “Are you satisfied with the way the Government is running the 
country?” and “do you think that the general economic condition of the country will 
improve, stay the same or get worse over the next 12 months?”. Analysing these survey 
results across 1990s and 2000s reveals that a general sense of dissatisfaction with the 
Government and economic pessimism had been prevailing during this period. Below figure 
summarises those findings.184 While there have been times when the responses appeared 
                                                
184 All relevant polls can be found on http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications.aspx. 
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positive, in general terms the figure points to a consistent economic pessimism and 
dissatisfaction across respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Ipsos MORI Trends - Satisfaction with the Government and Economic Optimism 
 
Depositor comments collected during the run on Northern Rock also point to a wider loss of 
confidence in the Authorities (rather than merely one in the financial regulatory regime). Out 
of 378 depositor comments collected from national newspapers, I have coded 244 of them 
into specified nodes (categories). I have only coded comments which could fit easily into one 
of the categories. Within codes comments with 299 references in total, there were 21 
references to uncertainty, 22 references to guarantees on deposit accounts, 88 references to 
panic, 90 references to risk aversion, and finally 78 references to trust in the Government, 
Bank of England, or Northern Rock. While references to panic and risk aversion are 
expected given the emergency of the situation, the numbers point to the relevance of the past 
experiences for the interpretation of the current situation. Among the references made to the 
past crises are the followings: Titanic, foot and mouth crisis, the war in Iraq, Equitable Life, 
pensions, and Barings. In addition to those, most of the comments coded under this category 
reflected a lack of trust (confidence) in the Authorities to handle these and following failures. 
Since these comments were collected during the very first days of the Northern Rock crisis 
and even before the introduction of the blanket guarantee, they provide a clear example how 
the current crisis was not assessed in relation solely to the ongoing circumstances, but also 
with reference to the past and through the use of collective memory.        
As illustrated in the examples of British and Commonwealth Merchant Bank (‘BCMB’, 
hereafter) (1990) and the Bank of Credit and Commerce (BCCI, hereafter) (1991) preceding 
the Northern Rock crisis, the time lag between the institutions’ failures and the compensation 
made to eligible depositors remained several months. British and Commonwealth Merchant 
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Bank had a deposit base amounting to approximately £300m, half of which came from 
clients of the stockbroking and fund management subsidiaries (“Lessons from B&C” 1990, 
22). Similar to the Northern Rock crisis, the situation worsened for the bank with the loss of 
confidence in the inter-bank markets and the lack of a stand-by arrangement for the bank 
(“Lessons from B&C” 1990, 22). By the time of its failure, depositors were protected by the 
DPB and up to a maximum of £15,000 (Waters 1990, 3). When the bank was put into 
administration, the DPB was obliged to pay out approximately £24m to BCMB depositors 
(“Banking sector starts …” 1991, 9). As regards to the timeframe for repayments, while 
depositors submitted their compensation claims in August (Owen 1990, 8), direct depositors 
began to receive their pay-outs only in September (“B&C payouts” 1990, 4). There were, 
however, delays in the payouts for 8,000 indirect depositors through client accounts opened 
by subsidiaries of B&C in BCMB (“B&C payouts” 1990, 4; see also Waters 1991a, 12; 
Lascelles 1991a, 20). In March 1991, there were still delays in sending out the cheques to 
depositors (“Bank Queue” 1991, 20). 
The highest pay-out up-to-date by the DPB was made to BCCI in 1991 (Lascelles 1991b). 
BCCI was shut down worldwide on 5 July 1991 with its assets frozen and a provisional 
liquidator appointed (Lascelles and Donkin 1991, 1). The bank had approximately 120,000 
deposit accounts totaling to £750m (Lascelles 1991b) and as many as 30 local authorities had 
invested public money in the bank either through placing loans with the bank or through 
deposit accounts (Buckley and Nakamoto 1991, 6; see also “BCCI may result …” 1991, 1; 
Willman 1991, 21). DPB offered protection only for the 75 per cent of the first £20,000 and 
the customers of BCCI branches outside Britain were not covered by the scheme (Lascelles 
1991c, 2). In July 1991, it was confirmed that the local authorities banking with BCCI would 
not be bailed out (Owen, Buckley, and Lascelles 1991, 6). As an example to ‘flight to quality’, 
many of them withdrew their funds also from smaller banks and building societies (Corrigan 
and London 1991, 1). This resulted, as an example, in National Home Loans to rely on a 
lifeboat from other clearing banks and the Bank of England (Corrigan 1991, 18; Barchard 
1991, 14; “Banks step in …” 1991, 1). In another episode during the BCCI crisis, Southdown 
Building Society had to be supported by Woolwich Building Society after a depositor run on 
the former (Coggan 1991a, 16; Coggan 1991b, 3; Hughes 1991a). It was reported that up to 
£6m might have been withdrawn from the Building Society, £3m of which in a single day 
(Scott 1991, 18; see also Hughes 1991b). Among the rumours surrounding the bank was its 
association with BCCI (Jack 1991a, 6). Below are examples from the news on the situation:  
 
[…] [A] depositor […] was one of many customers withdrawing her savings ‘to be on the 
safe side’. She said: ‘There may be no truth in the rumours, but I don’t want to lose the 
little bit of money I have’. […] [A] depositor for 10 years, was concerned, the queue was 
evidence enough. ‘There must be some truth in the rumours to get people to join a queue 
this size’. ‘I’m hypersensitive of anything that puts you in the slightest bit of risk’, one 
 
125 
man with a Pounds 20,000 deposit said. ‘The Building Societies Association is only 
prepared to pay 90 per cent. If I’m not careful I could lose Pounds 2,000’ (Lawrence 
1991, 5). 
 
The High Court further postponed the Bank of England’s attempts to wind-up BCCI, which 
would have invoked the deposit protection scheme (Waters 1991b, 6). In August 1991, Abu 
Dhabi government offered a compensation scheme for the sterling accounts in English or 
Welsh branches of BCCI amounting to the 75 per cent of their deposits, up to a maximum of 
£5,000 (Jack 1991b, 6). It was only in January 1992 that the High Court issued the winding up 
order against BCCI and the DPB got activated (Waters 1992, 20). While as of May 1992, pay-
outs totalled to £1.6m to 450 depositors of BCCI (“BCCI Payouts”1992, 4), this number 
reached to £58m as of December 1992 and to £78.5m as of March 2003 (“Banks levied for 
BCCI payment” 1992, 12; FSCS 2003). 
In addition to those aforementioned failures with prolonged resolutions of the deposit 
accounts, there were also other institutional failures with less serious repercussions on the 
depositors. During the following Barings crisis of 1995, although the deposits were covered 
up to the limit of the DPB, the bank was purchased by ING for £1 (Cohen 1995, 2).185 
Between 2002 and 2007, 28 separate credit unions failed and were put into administration.186 
Deposit protection for credit unions got in effect on 2 July 2002 and became part of the 
Accepting Deposits Sub-Scheme under the FSCS (Bennett 2001, 5).187  Accordingly, 100 per 
cent of the first £2,000 and 90 per cent of the next £33,000; therefore £31,700 in total was 
covered by the scheme.  
Finally, the most recent corporate failure with widespread losses preceding the Northern 
Rock crisis was the failure of Equitable Life Assurance Society in December 2000.188 
Following the House of Lord decision on July,189 Equitable Life Assurance Society was 
closed to new business with immediate effect in December 2000 (Parliamentary Ombudsman 
2003, 1). In June 2001, the company announced reductions in policy and annuity values 
(Parliamentary Ombudsman 2003, 1; see also HM Treasury 2009d). In May 2002, the FSCS 
said “[…] it cannot [sic] necessarily honour any guarantees where policies have a guaranteed 
value” (Skypala 2002, 9). It was only in January 2009 that “[t]he Government […] [decided] 
to set up a scheme to provide ex-gratia payments for those who have been most heavily 
                                                
185 There were less than 3000 depositors eligible for protection totalling approximately to £1.5bn in 
deposits (Smith 1995a, 2). Deposits held in the bank by local authorities, private clients, and building 
societies were frozen after administration (Smith 1995b, 3).  
186 “Deposit firms declared in default by FSCS”, available at http://www.fscs.org.uk/industry/sub-
schemes/accepting-deposits/deposit-defaults/, accessed on 16/02/2012. For Taskforce Report by the 
HM Treasury on Credit Unions see http://archive.treasury.gov.uk/docs/1999/creditunion.html, 
accessed on 17/02/2012. 
187 For the FSCS press release see FSCS 2002. 
188 For the latest documents on Equitable Life see http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/fin_equitable_life.htm, accessed on 17/02/2012. 
189 See HM Treasury 2009c for details. 
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affected by the events at Equitable Life. The Government has also apologized on behalf of 
public bodies and successive Governments stretching back to 1990 for the maladministration 
that it believes took place” (HM Treasury 2009e; see also HM Treasury 2009b and HM 
Treasury 2009c). On July 2010, the Government announced the introduction of the 
Equitable Life Bill and the establishment of the Independent Commission on Equitable Life 
Payments (HM Treasury 2010a), to make recommendations on the payments.190 Accordingly, 
the Government set up the Equitable Life Payment Scheme “[…] to make fair and 
transparent payments to Equitable Life policyholders who have suffered financial losses as a 
result of Government maladministration that was found to have occurred in the regulation of 
Equitable Life”.191 Announcing that £1.5bn would be made available for compensation on 
October 2010 (HM Treasury 2010b), the scheme was launched and payments started at the 
end of June 2011.192  
Against this background, is it possible to analyse the Northern Rock crisis independently 
of the previous institutional failures given that, as the most recent example, insurance policy 
holders from Equitable Life were compensated for their losses ten years after the company’s 
failure? To quote the FSA (2004b, 11, emphasis added) in length, “[t]here are many aspects of 
consumer confidence in the financial services industry for example views on the economy, 
confidence in the products and services provided by firms, and specific examples of regulatory 
failure. Consumers’ views are likely to be driven not only by what is happening in the industry 
as a whole (which they are often made aware of through the media) but also through their 
own, and friends’ and relatives’ experiences”.  
Given this research’s interest in how depositors interpret a crisis situation, an emphasis on 
cognitive heuristics is crucial in order to understand the impact of the past (availability heuristic) 
and spill-over effects through representativeness heuristic.193 This research argues that in addition 
to the bank’s deteriorating economic circumstances, the collective memory of the most recent 
institutional failures and the policy responses to address those were also significant in shaping 
depositors’ responses to the Northern Rock crisis (H4). To repeat the discussions above, it is 
methodologically challenging to establish a direct link between the depositor comments 
collected from newspapers and the motivations for all depositors who withdrew their money 
from Northern Rock. In other words, that the depositor comments from newspapers point 
to references to past failures does not necessarily mean that this motivation can be 
generalised to all depositors. In addition, it is equally challenging to highlight all the 
institutional failures to be able to illustrate the changing sentiments towards the credibility of 
the LoLR function. Therefore, this research concentrates on the major cases after the 
                                                
190 For details see http://equitablelifepaymentscheme.independent.gov.uk/, accessed on 17/02/2012.  
191 http://equitablelifepaymentscheme.independent.gov.uk/, accessed on 17/02/2012.  
192 On the news, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13966118, accessed on 17/02/2012.  
193 Refer to Introduction and Chapter II for the details of those WAs.  
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introduction of the mandatory deposit insurance scheme (DPB) in Britain in 1982, which was 
run by the Bank of England. To recall the discussion presented in Chapter IV, during the 
period when retail deposits were guaranteed by the DPB, the banking system in the united 
Kingdom experienced two major bank failures, namely Bank of Credit and Commerce 
(‘BCCI’, hereafter) and Barings, neither of which had systemic repercussions. With an 
attempt to improve the existing scheme, The Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 set 
up the current Financial Services Compensation Scheme that came into operation in December 
2001. The most recent corporate failure with widespread losses preceding the Northern Rock 
crisis was the failure of Equitable Life Assurance Society in December 2000. Against this 
background, the above discussion mostly concentrated on those three cases in order to 
present how collective memory might have affected expectations for future crises.  
To supplement those, opinion polls also clearly illustrate that there had been a persistent 
economic pessimism and dissatisfaction with the Government policies throughout the years 
preceding the Northern Rock crisis. This research, therefore, argues that the depositor run on 
the bank should be analysed against the background of this growing dissatisfaction towards 
the Authorities in addressing institutional failures. From this perspective, the depositor 
comments referring to the past failures might be read as manifestations of these 
vulnerabilities embedded throughout the years. Below are some of those comments which 
mention the shadow of the past, while the rest is summarised in the Appendix. 
 
It didn’t affect us, but it is our generation, a lot of our friends had their money in 
Equitable Life and lost everything. It wasn’t that long ago. Our friends lost all their 
pensions because of Equitable Life (the investment group that nearly collapsed in 
2000), and Gordon Brown did nothing - he has probably forgotten about it.  We’re 
not talking about 1929 – it’s something we remember (Pavia 2007, 7; O’Doherty and 
Rotberg 2007, 2) 
 
I had a very large amount of money with Equitable Life and I thought it was secure, 
but unfortunately it clearly wasn’t. It is a case of once bitten, twice shy and I am not 
prepared for the same thing to happen this time (Whitten 2007a, 8)  
 
The problem is that people had their fingers burnt with pensions and now the 
problem could be with savings (Jenkins and de Bruxelles 2007, 7) 
 
The Government has pulled the rug out from under savers and now they are 
wondering why people are reacting in this way (Keaveny 2007) 
 
When I heard the news I just thought, ‘Oh no, not again’ (Smith, Ringshaw, and Watt 
2007, 2) 
 
 
A final discussion before closing the section should be put forward on the representativeness 
heuristics. Similar in their business models to some extent to Northern Rock, remaining ex-
mutuals (Alliance and Leicester, HBOS, Bradford and Bingley) had also started losing their 
share value and faced with an increasing media coverage (Duncan 2007, 30), amid increasing 
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fears that those also could become the victims of Northern Rock’s problems (See O’Grady 
2007a, 10; Prynn and Armitage 2007, 1 ; Larsen 2007d, 3; Inman 2007, 4; Farrell 2007, 36; 
Cowie 2007b, 4).194 These are documented in HM Treasury (2009a) and Hamalainen et al 
(2012) and will be the subject of the following Chapter V. Goldsmith-Pinkham and 
Yorulmazer (2010, 83) analyse the “[…] spillover effects during the Northern Rock episode 
and shows that both the bank run and the subsequent bailout announcement had significant 
[spillover] effects on the rest of the U.K. banking system, as measured by abnormal returns 
on the stock prices of banks”.195 A newspaper analysis conducted between January 2007 and 
September 2008 also shows that the media coverage (the number of articles) for Bradford 
and Bingley and Alliance and Leicester had also increased since August 2007.  Nonetheless, 
these two banks were still among those to receive the cash that had been withdrawn from 
Northern Rock.196  They did not become subject to a generalised banking panic and were 
shielded from a depositor run. Already supporting the asymmetric information theory, this 
runs against the working assumption on the representativeness heuristic, which assumes that in 
time of crises institutions are assessed by their similarities to the problem at hand in order to 
measure the probability of their failure. The following two chapters will attempt to answer 
this question. Despite the lack of a generalised collapse of depositor confidence in the 
banking system, why did only Bradford and Bingley become subject to a depositor run while 
all the remaining three ex-mutual had been going through similar financial problems?  
                                                
194 As an example, on September, 17th A&L, UK’s seventh-biggest bank, lost one third of its share 
value after rumours that the bank approached to the Bank of England for an emergency funding 
(Hiscott 2007, 4). Another ex-mutual, B&B, also lost 15 per cent of its share value (Shand 2007, 48). 
See also Martin 2007, 37. 
195 Aharony and Swary (1996) also model bank runs through rational depositors’ assessment of the 
bank’s assets. Accordingly, “[t]hree observable bank characteristics are examined as proxy measures for 
the interim private information by rational depositors […] [These are] the distance of the solvent 
banks' headquarters from the headquarters of each failed bank; […] the size of the solvent bank; […] 
the capital ratio as a proxy for their solvency” (Aharony and Swary 1996, 57). They further find 
evidence “[…] that the extent of the negative impact of a bank failure on the equity value of other 
banks is greater for banks that are similar to the failed bank and whose capitalization involves more 
leverage” (Aharony and Swary 1996, 58). 
196 Goodway 2007e, 27.  
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Figure 9 Newspaper Coverage for Alliance and Leicester & Bradford and Bingley - Between January 
2007 and September 2008 
 
As a Conc lus ion :  We Have Been Here  Be fore  
Against the empirical evidence on the Northern Rock crisis presented in Chapter III, this 
chapter has analysed the depositor run on the bank and tested the hypotheses put forward 
both by the current literature and this research’s argument. This has been accomplished in 
three separate sections, which analysed the role played by fundamentals, institutions and 
cognitive heuristics on depositor expectations respectively. While some of the evidence 
seemed to support the hypotheses put forward by the asymmetric information theory, the use 
of counterfactuals and the depositor comments collected through newspapers articles pointed 
to the role played by additional information asymmetries and the cognitive heuristics in the 
shape of collective memory.  
To re-emphasise this research’s main argument, depositor behaviour is not only an 
outcome of the external shocks and/or the observed institutional shortcomings. There are 
deep-seated vulnerabilities arising from past crises which affect depositor expectations and 
behaviour. Expectations are updated through the use of cognitive heuristics, which render 
collective memory more relevant to the current situation. The conclusion that this chapter 
draws from the Northern Rock period is that the arrival of the negative news has been a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition itself to trigger a change in depositor behaviour. The 
collective memory of past crises provides recollections of previous losses and updates the 
reference point through which the following crises are interpreted. In a similar way, this chapter 
has argued that deposit insurance scheme had not been among the reference points for 
depositors to assess the Northern Rock crisis.  
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The remaining empirical chapters of this research will examine the three bank failures 
following Northern Rock. As also stated in the Introduction, the selection of the cases from the 
same banking crises period with significant turning points will able this research better 
analyse the impact of the past crises through an update in reference points. This said, the 
following chapterwill provide a descriptive account of the remaining three case studies in 
order to set the background information for the cases. It will present them in a structured 
way to better compare the similar problems they had experienced before their failures. It will 
leave the argumentative analysis of the cases to test this research’s hypotheses to the final 
empirical Chapter VI.  
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Chapter V: Setting the Stage for Alliance and Leicester, HBOS, and 
Bradford and Bingley 
 
 
This research has so far discussed that the reasons for a change in depositor behaviour may 
not only lie in the directly relevant material circumstances or in the shortcomings of the 
institutional settings. Depositor behaviour is also shaped through the use of cognitive 
heuristics with an attempt to make sense of the on-going uncertainty and complexity during 
crises. This chapter will present an overall account of the common problems encountered by 
Alliance and Leicester, HBOS, and Bradford and Bingley leading to their failures. The varying 
degrees of depositor reaction to these bank failures (albeit operating under similar economic 
problems) render a fundamentals-based view insufficient to explain the run on Bradford and 
Bingley alone. Therefore, the main purpose of this short chapter is to present the empirical 
background for the three cases in order for an analytical discussion to follow in the final 
empirical chapter (Chapter VI) of this research.  
For depositors, the first phase of a banking crisis is the diagnosis of the new situation. This first 
phase requires a path-dependency explanation where the interpretation of the current 
situation partially depends on the collective memory of the past.197 The preceding empirical 
chapter on Northern Rock has illustrated, with the help of counterfactuals and depositor 
comments, how past episodes of institutional and policy failures had affected depositor 
expectations. This was evident throughout the depositor comments collected during the run 
in September 2007. A sense of ‘we have been here before’ prevailed among others, such as panic 
and risk-aversion. During this first phase, collective memory of the past and a lack of 
depositor awareness towards the deposit insurance scheme were of significance as reference 
points in shaping depositor expectations, in conjunction with the immediate material 
circumstances. 
During the resolution phase of the crises, on the other hand, the “[p]ublic confidence appears 
to respond strongly to clear and comprehensive bank restructuring policies” (Laeven and 
Valencia 2008b, 5). The preceding empirical chapter has also illustrated that the uncertainty 
surrounding Northern Rock’s future and the absence of an immediate policy response as an 
effective solution to the bank’s problems were significant in shaping depositor expectations. 
Although the blanket guarantee eased the sense of panic, the uncertainty for depositors did not 
end with its introduction. During this phase, as also suggested by the literature, the speed and 
the consistency of policy reactions to resolve the bank’s situation were crucial in bringing the 
                                                
197 “[…] [A] conventional definition of path-dependent process is that the social world often follows a 
particular trajectory; an open period during which there are a number of plausible alternatives, a critical 
juncture where contingent events results in one of these alternatives being selected, and then feedback 
that constraints actors to keep that particular path” (Bennett and Elman 2006, 464). 
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continuing silent run on the bank into a halt. Despite the lack of a generalised collapse of 
depositor confidence in the banking sector in September 2007, the banking sector in the 
United Kingdom consolidated following two nationalisations and two take-overs within the 
span of a year.198 Two of the last remaining ex-mutuals, namely HBOS and Bradford and 
Bingley, ceased to exist as independent entities in September 2008. Preceding them was 
Alliance and Leicester, which had been taken over by Santander in July 2008.  
By July 2008 Alliance and Leicester still resisted to raise capital through a right issue, 
contrary to its rivals and amid speculation that the bank would cut down on its interim 
dividend (Croft 2008e, 20). On July 8th the bank faced the biggest loss in its share value up-to-
date (Hume and Elder 2008a, 40). “The former building society’s shares have collapsed on 
fears of plunging profits and the worsening outlook for the property market, as well as worse 
than expected write downs on financial assets” (Lodge 2008a, 1). A take-over bid by 
Santander was on the headlines again after a failed attempt in December (Larsen and Burgess 
2008a, 20). It was in September that the Santander’s deal over Alliance and Leicester was 
finalised during when Bradford and Bingley’s branch base was also transferred to Abbey (also 
owned by Santander). In the meanwhile, HBOS was also taken over by Lloyds TSB to create 
Lloyds Banking Group.  
By September 2008, there were growing concerns over HBOS’ future (which held £1 out 
of every £8 of cash with a deposit base of approximately £15m (Barrow 2008, 1)) since the 
bank had been extremely exposed to mortgage-backed assets (Lindsay 2008a, 53). On 
September 16th, HBOS shares lost value almost up to 40 per cent and the bank received a 
further rating downgrade from Fitch and Standard & Poor’s (Croft 2008f, 1; Elder and Hume 
2008a, 40). The following day, which saw HBOS’ share price decline as low as 88p (Larsen, 
Parker, and Giles 2008, 6), Lloyds TSB revealed a proposed takeover plan of HBOS 
(amounting to £12bn and offering 83 shares for every 100 HBOS shares owned (Lodge 
2008b, 1)), only through a suspension of the competition rules (outlined by the Enterprise Act 
of 2002) by the Government (Peel, Parker, and Tait 2008a, 6; Croft, Larsen, Burgess, and 
Parker 2008, 6; Croft, Burgess, and Parker 2008a, 4). The bank’s 22 million customers were 
one of the main reasons for the FSA to react to HBOS’ situation without any delay in order to 
avoid another Northern Rock from taking place.199  
                                                
198 Even before September 2008, the UK mortgage market had already been adversely affected by 
the recent crisis, as the number of mortgage suppliers decreased when a number of lenders relying 
on securitisation were forced to leave the market. 
199 See, for example, Croft 2008i, 16. The merger of HBOS with Lloyds TSB would create this 
‘super bank’ with more than 23 million customers and a share of 28 per cent in the UK mortgage 
market and a share of 16 per cent in the total savings (Croft 2008j, 3). This merger would also create 
a market leader in life and household insurance (Peel and Croft 2008, 4). All those were feared to 
impair the market rates on savings, as well as market competition, because of reduced range of 
products in the market (Moore 2008, 1; Croft 2008k, 17), as well as the impact of the merger on the 
housing/real estate sector (Thomas 2008, 17).  
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In the meanwhile Bradford and Bingley was also going through similar problems in 
September 2008. Against the backdrop of the negative news and increasing uncertainty on the 
bank, the chief executive of Bradford and Bingley made the following statement only days 
before the bank’s nationalisation: “We are a strongly capitalised bank now undertaking a 
complex transition with regrettable job losses, but we are planning to put the problems of the 
past behind us and have a business which is fit for purpose going forward” (Referred in “B&B 
shares at a record…” 2008, 30).200 By September 21st the FSA had already started its 
contingency plans and its search for a potential take-over for the bank. (Kleinman 2008, 1; see 
also Treanor 2008a, 27; Costello 2008a, 36). Nonetheless the bank had denied this in the 
following words: “We’re not aware of anything in connection with these […] banks […] Our 
funding foundations are solid and we’re well capitalised” (Costello 2008a, 36). On September 
26th there were talks over the possibility of Bradford and Bingley being nationalised (Elliott 
and Hosking 2008, 3; Martin and Beattie 2008, 9). As a matter of fact, BBC reported the 
nationalisation of Bradford and Bingley the following day, while the news had been blogged 
even earlier.201 On the same day the FSA officially declared that Bradford and Bingley ceased 
to meet its threshold in order to operate as an independent deposit taker.202 On Saturday 
morning the bank was informed about the FSA Executive Committee’s decision on its 
nationalisation.203 This suggested that the bank’s £50bn of loans would be nationalised based 
on the Banking (Special Provisions) Act of 2008 (Boles and Jennings 2008, 6; Croft, Burgess, 
and Parker 2008b, 1),204 and not to be sold to a private party (Waples and Smith 2008, 1). 
It was understood that the Government had already approached other banks for a 
potential take-over of Bradford and Bingley (Griffiths 2008a, 5). However, this was not fully 
welcomed by the banks as they had already been exposed to Bradford and Bingley through 
their underwriting of the bank’s rights issue (Griffiths and Kleinman 2008, 1). As a result, the 
Government announced to take the bank’s toxic assets on its own books (Griffiths 2008b, 4; 
Griffiths and Kleinman 2008, 1). On September 28th, a deal with Santander was finalised for 
the bank to buy Bradford and Bingley’s deposit book and branch network (Croft, Burgess, 
and Parker 2008b, 1), which would not require an explicit Government guarantee on deposits 
(Giles and Parker 2008, 22). As the chief executive of the FSCS stated during her oral 
evidence before the Treasury Select Committee, the FSCS “[…] made a one-off payment of 
£14 billion on 29 September and that meant that people went to bed on Sunday night banking 
                                                
200 Nonetheless, Bradford and Bingley was later criticised because of this statement, which was also 
directed to Richard Pym during his oral evidence before the Treasury Select Committee on November 
18th, 2008. Available at House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 40-53.  
201 House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 41. For the original entry see 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/robertpeston/2008/09/; accessed at 31/03/2011.  
202 Also mentioned during Richard Pym’s oral evidence before the Treasury Select Committee (House 
of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 41). 
203 House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 41. 
204 For more information refer to House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008b. 
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with Bradford & Bingley and woke up on Monday banking with Abbey”.205 Yet, the 
Chancellor “[…] made clear he will [sic] stand behind B&B [Bradford and Bingley] depositors, 
but there are [sic] other creditors who could be put on risk, rather than leaving taxpayers to 
shoulder that burden” (Croft, Burgess, and Parker 2008b, 1). On September 29th, as the last 
remaining publicly quoted ex-mutual, Bradford and Bingley was officially nationalised. On the 
same day, the Government also announced the “[…] guarantee arrangements to safeguard 
certain wholesale borrowings, and derivative transactions of and wholesale deposits with, 
Bradford & Bingley plc (“Bradford & Bingley”) existing as at midnight on 28 September 
2008” (HM Treasury 2008l). 
Against this background, this chapter will illustrate that all the three cases had been 
through similar problems before their failures. Since the asymmetric information theories of 
bank runs prioritise fundamentals over sunspots and reject random variables, it is crucial to 
identify the problems surrounding those banks in order to test the first hypothesis of this 
research. This chapter will compare the three cases along five dimensions, namely target 
markets, share price movements, credit downgrades, write-downs and right issues. This 
comparison will illustrate that the three banks, despite operating in different segments of the 
mortgage market, had been going through similar problems before their failures. Albeit to 
varying degrees, they were all affected by the downward share price movements, credit 
downgrades and write downs in asset prices. Excluding Alliance and Leicester, the remaining 
two banks also struggled to raise capital through their rights issues, both of which ended up 
being less successful than provisioned. Therefore, neither is the deterioration of the bank-
specific fundamentals nor the negative publicity that the banks received able to explain the 
different depositor reactions across those cases. Although the extension of the Bank of 
England’s emergency funding to Northern Rock had been misperceived as the signal for the 
bank’s insolvency, neither of the banks had any turning points distinguishable to such an 
extent. Finally, conclusion will summarise and conclude the chapter.    
  
5.1 Targe t  Markets  
For a comparative analysis across the cases, it is of significance to understand their business 
models and the common characteristics shared by the three banks, such as their target 
markets in the mortgage business and their funding structure. As a matter of fact, as 
exemplified by Northern Rock, those were the two dimensions that had been threatening 
banks’ futures during the credit crunch. To start with Bradford and Bingley, the bank had 
decided to de-mutualise in 2000 to become the leader provider in buy-to-let mortgage markets 
                                                
205 House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 297. 
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(in total approximately £24bn)206 (Aldrick 2008a, 6). In numbers, 60 per cent of the bank’s 
business came from buy-to-let mortgages whereas 20 per cent relied on the self-certified 
ones.207 Those two risky asset types, however, were not funded through conventional retail 
deposits. Operating as Britain’s eight-biggest mortgage provider, Bradford and Bingley relied 
on whole-sale markets for 60 per cent of its funding (Ashton and Dey 2008, 4). As a point of 
comparison, this number was approximately 75 per cent for Northern Rock, which troubled 
the bank when the wholesale markets froze in the summer of 2007.  
On the other hand, HBOS decided to de-mutualise in 1997 and became the biggest 
mortgage provider in the banking system in the United Kingdom, especially through its 
Halifax brand. The merger of Bank of Scotland with Halifax in February 2001 created HBOS 
(Larsen, Parker, and Giles 2008, 6), with 1,100 agencies and branches (Croft 2008j, 3). The 
bank issued one fifth of all mortgages in the mortgage sector in the United Kingdom, was the 
second biggest buy-to-let mortgage lender and served to be the largest savings institution 
(Croft, Larsen, Burgess, and Parker 2008, 6). It was exposed to the housing market in the 
United Kingdom with home mortgages (as well as the commercial property market) and was 
heavily dependent on wholesale funding (only 57 per cent on retail deposits (Croft 2008l, 
20))208. It had a retail loan to deposit ratio of around 160 per cent (Hume and Orr 2008a, 42) 
and an exposure to the US mortgages (Hume and Orr 2008b, 42). Yet, this exposure was 
mostly because the bank had been forced to take one of its off-balance funding vehicles onto 
its books in 2007 (Larsen 2008c, 19). On the liability side, as of February 2008, HBOS was the 
recipient of 40 per cent of savings in the United Kingdom (along with Nationwide and 
National Savings & Investments) (Hill 2008a, 18). As of September 2008, however, it only had 
a retail deposit base amounting to £258bn, with a wholesale funding commitment of £278bn, 
which translated into a funding gap for the bank (Croft 2008f, 1). The bank’s loan portfolio of 
commercial property, house builders and corporate loans exposed HBOS to an economic 
slowdown and thus to the threat of rising arrears (Croft 2008m, 18). To compare, while the 
main problem for Bradford and Bingley was the deterioration in buy-to-let and self-certified 
markets (in addition to the problems in the wholesale markets), HBOS was especially affected 
by the rising arrears and the declining house prices in the UK housing sector.  
 
 
                                                
206 The figure was mentioned by Richard Pym during his oral evidence before the Treasury Select 
Committee on November 18th, 2008. Available at House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 
48. 
207 This was made clear by Richard Pym during his oral evidence before the Treasury Select Committee 
on November 18th, 2008. Available at House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 47. 
208 While on the contrary, Lloyd TSB “[…] meets one-third of its requirements in the money 
markets and two thirds through deposits” (“Lloyds TSB” 2007, 20).  
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5.2 Share  Pr i c e  Movements    
Although the banking system in the United Kingdom had succeeded in avoiding a system-
wide banking panic in September 2007, market conditions did not ease to guarantee no other 
bank failure. As their business structures hint, Northern Rock had not been the only 
institution relying heavily on the wholesale markets for funding. Even though they were less 
reliant compared to Northern Rock, they still lost a considerable amount of their share prices 
during the crisis period (Duncan 2007, 30). Yet, the stock market was quick to react to the 
similarities across banks’ business models, given the concerns that they could also become the 
victims of the Northern Rock’s problems.209  
To illustrate, by April 2008 Alliance and Leicester became the most shorted company in 
FTSE 100 (Hume 2008a, 42). By then the bank’s share price had already halved amid growing 
concerns over its liquidity position (Croft 2008n, 20).210 It was forced to arrange a new 
funding facility for the forthcoming year of 2009 (Croft 2008o, 24). Company’s annual report 
in April referred to Northern Rock for serving as a false benchmark for the bank (Croft 
2008n, 20). In its Chairman’s words: “A&L’s [Alliance and Leicester] business model has 
evolved markedly from its days as a building society […] but too often we found ourselves 
bracketed with Northern Rock, with little or no acknowledgement of how different we really 
are” (Croft 2008n, 20). Similarly, Bradford and Bingley had also lost more than 90 per cent of 
its market value since January 2008, as the bank’s shares fell to an all-time low (to 20p) 
towards the end of September (Treanor and Wintour 2008, 38). This resulted in the bank to 
be worth of only £300m and for shareholders to lose more than half of their stock price 
offered through the bank’s right-issue (to be discussed shortly). 
Share price movements had more extreme policy outcomes for the HBOS case. On March 
19th the FSA started its inquiry into the share price collapse (of up to 19 per cent) of HBOS in 
the morning of the same day, which was grounded on false rumours that the bank had 
demanded an emergency funding from the Bank of England (Burgess, Giles, and Masters 
2008, 1). “The potential havoc caused by the rumours provoked the Bank of England into the 
highly unusual action of ringing around news organisations to deny that it had held emergency 
meetings to discuss the viability of specific UK banks, including HBOS. It described these 
stories as an “absolute fantasy” ” (Burgess, Giles, and Masters 2008, 1). As a response to those 
rumours and the ongoing turbulence, HBOS stated that the bank had ready access to deposits 
                                                
209 A similar generalisation effect is also observed with Paragon -a buy-to-let lender- on September, 
14th. Its shares fell to a four-year low (27%) amid the growing concerns that the firm had also 
borrowed funds from the BoE (“Paragon tumbles …” 2007, 30). However, unlike Northern Rock, 
Paragon was totally dependent on commercial markets and had not gone to the Bank of England for 
an emergency funding by the time of the news. The bank made efforts to assure markets that it was 
not exposed to the same problems, as did Northern Rock. See Bland 2007, 33; “‘Don’t panic’ …” 
2007, 25; Davies 2007b, 23; Clark 2007, 66; O’Grady 2007b, 6. Since it does not accept any retail 
deposits, this research will not analyse Paragon. 
210 As of July 2008 the bank’s shares had lost 75 per cent of their value (Croft 2008e, 20).    
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and wholesale markets (Croft 2008p, 19), and its directors and senior managers bought large 
amounts of shares on March 20th, which helped the share price to balance itself (Giles 2008h, 
16; Goff 2008b, 14; Hume and Orr 2008c, 42; Croft 2008q, 21).  
 
5.3 Cred i t  Downgrades    
During the recent financial crisis, credit downgrades played a significant role. Credit rating 
agencies helped narrow the information asymmetries between the bank and its creditors, and 
thus, influenced expectations. Furthermore, as was the case with the Northern Rock episode, 
the possibility of a credit downgrade limited the range of possible options available to banks 
and policy makers, partially because of the breaches embedded in the banks’ SIVs. Those 
agencies were later questioned before the House of Commons Treasury Committee for their 
role in the recent crisis.211  
In the case of Bradford and Bingley, the ambiguity on the bank’s rights issue (to be 
explained shortly) was followed by a credit downgrade by Moody’s (Burgess 2008b, 18). The 
intensification of the bank’s problems with the advent of September further increased the 
frequency of these downgrades. On September 1st Fitch downgraded Bradford and Bingley as 
a response to the bank’s interim losses (Croft 2008r, 18; Bradley 2008, 30), which was made 
on the basis of the bank’s deteriorating asset quality and profitability (“Need to know” 2008, 
40). Nonetheless, this was only the start of a chain of rating downgrades during September. 
On September 15th Moody’s also downgraded the bank just one notch above junk status, 
which caused the bank’s share price to fall further and increased the bank’s funding costs in 
the money markets (“Bleak outlook …” 2008, 15; Clark 2008a, 31; Treanor 2008a, 27). This 
downgrade was justified partially because of the growing concerns on the Bradford and 
Bingley’s increasing dependence on the Special Liquidity Scheme and its share in risky buy-to-
let markets.212 The rating agency stated that “[…] the bank would find further equity 
fundraising difficult, while securitisations and inter-bank loans were “virtually closed” to it, 
making it dependent on swapping mortgages for cash with the Bank of England under its 
Special Liquidity Scheme”(Lindsay 2008b, 55). Finally, on September 23rd Fitch downgraded 
the bank to only one level above junk status, accompanied by another downgrade from 
Standard and Poor’s (Hosking 2008a, 45; Clark 2008b, 41). All these downgrades materially 
threatened the bank’s counter-party positions, as they would require a higher credit rating than 
the bank had at the time (Griffiths 2008c, 1; Hosking 2008b, 63). 
As for the other banks, the situation was similar, although to a lesser degree of severity. 
May started with a ratings downgrade for HSBC by Standard & Poor's (Hume 2008b, 42). 
                                                
211 House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008, Ev 105-122. 
212 “Moody's raised concerns that B&B was "particularly vulnerable to the increasingly negative 
outlook on the UK's economic and housing market". It also pointed to B&B's reduced funding 
flexibility in the wholesale market as the bank was only funded only 43 per cent through retail 
deposits” (“Bleak outlook …” 2008, 15). See also Shand 2008. 
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Amid all the negativity, HBOS managed to raise £500m, relatively a small amount, through 
the sale of mortgage-backed securities (Davies and Croft 2008, 42). This was interpreted in a 
positive way as the re-opening of markets for mortgage-backed securities (Jackson 2008, 18), 
which was later followed by a similar move from Alliance and Leicester in late August to raise 
£400m through an asset-backed bond sale (Davies 2008, 21). However, confidence collapsed 
towards bank’s ability to fund their businesses through wholesale markets after the 
repercussions of Lehman’s failure on those markets. On September 16th, the shares of HBOS 
lost value almost up to 40 per cent and the bank received a rating downgrade from Fitch and 
Standard & Poor’s (Croft 2008f, 1; Elder and Hume 2008a, 40). Finally, after having informed 
the markets on its write-downs in Treasury investments, the Moody’s downgraded Alliance 
and Leicester’s financial strength, long-term bank deposit, and debt ratings, on the basis of the 
“[…] increased funding costs on the bank’s profitability as well as the impact of impairment 
charges and falls in the fair value of its Treasury assets” (Croft 2008o, 24). 
 
5.4 Writ e -downs in  Asse t s/Pro f i t s  and Ris ing  Arrears     
Bradford and Bingley’s problems started in February 2008, when the bank stated write-downs 
amounting to £225.6m and a fall in annual pre-tax profits to £126m (Lodge 2008c, 18). On 
August 29th the bank announced that it had faced a £18m loss because of organised mortgage 
frauds and further losses of £26.7m in the first half of the year mostly because of growing 
arrears on mortgages (Costello 2008b, 39; Treanor 2008b, 23). The bank’s rate of arrears was 
understood to have risen by almost 50 per cent in the first half of 2008 (Lindsay 2008b, 55). In 
addition to the difficulties during summer, September was also a difficult for Bradford and 
Bingley, which started with the bank’s sales director’s resignation from the bank (“Business 
Digest” 2008, 40). “[…] Bradford & Bingley announced it had sunk to a first-half loss, hit by 
GBP 155 million in writedowns and investment losses, while bad debts had risen more than 
half since the end of 2007” (Bradley 2008, 30). The publicity that the bank had been receiving 
on the media increased as a result of growing concern over its future. Even though the bank 
managed to increase its core equity Tier 1 ratio up to 9.1 per cent (due to its rights issue) 
(“Bleak outlook …” 2008, 15), by this time Bradford and Bingley had one of the lowest credit 
ratings of any bank in the developed world (Croft 2008s, 20). The deal set in December 2006 
to purchase mortgages from a home loans originator also put the bank in a dire situation.213 
This deal was later restructured only with a compensation of £12-13m (“B&B agrees …” 
2008, 40; Aldrick 2008b, 3). On September 25th the bank announced that it would write down 
£133.8m because of exotic credit assets (Croft and Eaglesham 2008b, 25).  
On the HBOS’s side, the bank’s exposure to the US mortgages was mostly because the 
bank had been forced to one of its off-balance funding vehicles onto its books in 2007 
                                                
213 This was also mentioned during Richard Pym’s oral evidence before the Treasury Select Committee 
on November 18th, 2008. Available at House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 40-2. 
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(Larsen 2008c, 19). It later had to write down assets related to subprime securities amounting 
to £1.09bn (Croft 2008t, 17). However, this did not leave the bank immune to the ongoing 
problems in the international financial system. All got worse for the bank with the advance of 
March 2008 when it declared that the profit margin decreased for the bank (Hammond and 
Shamsuddin 2008, 16; Gray 2008, 19). On the last week of February, HBOS announced 
through its annual results that it had an exposure to Alt-A mortgages which were worse than 
prime mortgages in quality (Hughes 2008d, p 18) (amounting to $7bn within its bigger 
amount of Treasury assets (Hume and Orr 2008d, 44)). Amid those news came another 
announcement from the bank to change its short-term incentive scheme (Croft 2008u, 40; 
Burgess 2008c, 16).  
The annual meeting on 29 April revealed that the reduced value of the assets in HBOS’ 
treasury portfolio would be up to £2.8bn (Larsen 2008c, 19). After the rights issue, the bank 
stated that its pre-tax profits in the first half of 2008 fell 72 per cent (Croft 2008v, 16). Given 
its exposure to corporate loans, the troubles in the housing market in the United Kingdom 
were also reflected in the shape of a rise in corporate bad debts (impaired corporate loans 
approximately amounting to £469m in the first half of 2008) following corporate defaults 
(Croft 2008y, 4; “Adapting to straitened …” 2008, 17). As a response to all these growing 
strains on bank’s future, HBOS suggested to cut jobs and terminate the operation of one of 
its five mortgage brands (Croft 2008d, 15; Odedra 2008, 16). The mortgage arrears of HBOS 
had risen to 17 per cent up to £5bn towards the end of the second quarter of the year (in the 
first five months of the year) (Croft 2008x, 16). As of August, it was clear that 2 per cent of 
the bank’s mortgage books was comprised of impaired home loans in the first half of 2008 
(“Adapting to straitened …” 2008, 17). Nevertheless, worries about the bank’s future were 
intensified by HBOS’s exposure to six British house builders whose shares have declined as a 
response to the growing difficulties in the housing market, resonated in the shape of rising 
mortgage arrears for banks and falling house prices accompanied with rising unemployment 
(Croft 2008aa, 16). This resulted in HBOS to write down its equity stakes in those companies 
amounting to approximately £100m (Pignal and Croft 2008, 19).   
Alliance and Leicester also informed markets on its write-downs in its Treasury 
investments. On May 2008 the bank announced further write-downs from its Treasury assets 
amounting to £192m (Croft 2008ab, 18). “The fresh writedown was for exotic assets such as 
structured investment vehicles, which will be included in its profit and loss account […] It 
also took another £199m of writedowns through its reserves, though this will not reduce its 
regulatory capital or hit profits” (Croft 2008ab, 18). All these pointed to the fact that the bank 
was unlikely to make a pre-tax profit in the first half of 2008 (Croft 2008ab, 18). By July 2008, 
Alliance and Leicester was still resisting to raise capital through a rights issue, contrary to its 
rivals and amid speculation that the bank would cut down on its interim dividend (Croft 
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2008e, 20). The bank proposed scrip dividend option for investors which would enable them 
to take share rather than cash as dividend (Croft 2008e, 20). By this time, a take-over bid by 
Santander was in the headlines again after a failed attempt in preceding December (Larsen and 
Burgess 2008a, 20). By mid-July, the take-over deal of Alliance and Leicester by Santander was 
finally closed with a share price of 299p, in addition to the right to receive an 18p interim cash 
dividend (“Alliance & Leicester” 2008, 18; Vermeulen et al 2008, 18; Croft and Burgess 2008a, 
14). Although Alliance and Leicester had preferred not to raise capital through a rights issue, 
the remaining two cases followed this route to strengthen their Tier 1 ratios. 
 
5.5 Rights  I s sues  to  Raise  Capi ta l  
Amid growing speculation that Bradford and Bingley was preparing to raise capital through a 
rights issue, the bank “[…] ruled out suggestions that a rights issue could be announced 
before or on April 22, when the bank is due to update on trading and hold its annual meeting” 
(Lodge 2008c, 18). Only one month after this statement (in May 2008) and to the surprise of 
markets (Hughes 2008e, 20), the bank confirmed a £300m rights issue (Larsen 2008d, 14; see 
also “Aborted issue …” 2008, 21),  offering 16 shares for every 25 to be priced at 82p (Croft 
and Larsen 2008b, 21). On June 2nd, however, the bank announced the restructuring of this 
rights issue (Hume and Elder 2008b, 42; see also Hill 2008b, 24; Jung-a et al 2008, 16) and 
issued a profit warning (losses amounting to £8m in the first four months of 2008 due to 
rising mortgage arrears) (Goff 2008c, 6). This restructuring, which would raise a total of 
£400m (Croft 2008ac, 21) suggested that a US private equity firm would invest £178m (55p 
per share) in return for a 23 per cent stake in the bank, becoming the biggest shareholder of 
Bradford and Bingley with two seats on the board (“Banks left …” 2008, 25; “Warning signals 
…” 2008, 21; Arnold 2008, 21).214 In the meanwhile, a group of investors announced that 
they would prefer holding their investments in the bank through a restructuring specialist 
(“Resolution chief …” 2008, 21; see also “Problems must …” 2008, 25; Larsen, Hughes, and 
Arnold 2008a, 1). The board rejected this on the ground that the plan would effectively give 
the firm bank’s control (Larsen, Hughes, and Arnold 2008b, 21; see also Croft 2008ae, 25; 
Croft and Arnold 2008, 21). By the beginning of July both of the interested parties withdrew 
their offers for Bradford and Bingley (Croft, Burgess, and Arnold 2008, 1; Elder and Hume 
2008b, 26). In the meanwhile, the bank was forced to feed its main mortgage securitisation 
vehicle with cash and was also obliged to purchase loans from a home loans originator each 
quarter amounting to £350m until the end of 2009 (Croft 2008ag, 18; Croft 2008ah, 21).215 
After the removal of the offers on Bradford and Bingley, investors agreed on a rights issue 
                                                
214 There were growing concerns over investors’ pre-emption rights after the inclusion of TPG into 
the deal. See Croft 2008ad, 18.  
215 By the end of September, the bank reached an agreement with loan originator to restructure its 
deal with the financial group.  
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amounting to £400m (55p per share) and decided to underwrite the part of the issue which 
used to be backed by the private equity firm (Burgess and Hughes 2008, 19). At the end of 
this, however, only the 28 per cent of the offered shares were bought by retail and 
institutional investors and the remaining (597m shares with the price of £328m) by 
underwriters and sub-underwriters (Goff 2008d, 16; Croft 2008s, 20; Croft 2008ai, 16).216 This 
resulted in six of the UK high street banks to hold stakes in Bradford and Bingley (Treanor 
2008b, 23).  
By the end of April, HBOS started shrinking its mortgage range and increasing its 
mortgage rates (Goff and Kelleher 2008, 1). Despite all the negative publicity; however, the 
bank succeeded in closing a residential mortgage-backed securitisation deal amounting to 
£9bn (later to be swapped in Bank of England’s Special Liquidity Scheme) most of which 
received triple-A ratings (Croft 2008aj, 16; Cohen, Davis, and Sakoui 2008, 1). Only two days 
after this and contrary to its initial statement a few weeks earlier, the bank announced that it 
was planning for a rights issue to raise £4bn to strengthen its capital base (Croft and Larsen 
2008c, 22), preceded by the news of a £3bn Treasury asset write-downs (only £227m in 2007) 
(Croft and Burgess 2008b, 19; Croft 2008ak, 19). The rights issue was priced at 275p to offer 
two new shares for every five owned (Kelleher 2008b, 2), creating 1.45bn new shares (Hughes 
2008g, 17), Nevertheless, the bank was uncertain if the rights issue would be taken by its 2 
million retail investors (Croft 2008al, 19; Croft 2008am, 18). Royal Bank of Scotland (‘RBS’, 
hereafter) was also on its way for rights issue (amounting to £12bn) whereas Barclays 
preferred to apply to international investors for additional funding (Larsen 2008e, 21; Larsen 
2008f, 21). The rights issue for RBS was completed successfully where 95 per cent of its 
shareholders took their rights (Larsen 2008g, 18). During the course of HBOS's rights issue; 
however, the bank’s stock price constantly continued falling which prompted concerns as to 
whether it could go under the planned rights issue price (Croft 2008am, 18). June 11th saw the 
bank’s share price to fall under the price set for the rights issue for the first time (Elder 2008, 
40; Larsen and Mackintosh 2008, 21), which was quick to recover only a day after (Croft 
2008an, 18). This fluctuation in its stock price worried markets and raised expectations for 
another right issue restructuring similar to the Bradford and Bingley’s experience. However, 
although Bradford and Bingley had restructured its right issue after a profit warning, HBOS 
stated that the “[…] current trading and mortgage arrears performance were in line with the 
group’s expectations” (Croft 2008an, 18). The chairman of the bank emphasised once more 
that the underlying motivations for the rights issue was prudential in nature in order to 
increase bank’s capitalisation (Bolger 2008, 16). On July 18th the rights issue closed for the 
                                                
216 Those were Barclays, Lloyds TSB, HBOS, HSBC, and RBS that agreed to provide £20m. Those 
institutions had five days to place those shares in the market before they were banned from selling 
them for twenty days which became difficult after the drop in bank’s share price to 51p. 
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HBOS, which eventually saw most of the bank’s institutional investors not participating, only 
8.3 per cent taking their rights (Croft 2008ao, 17).  
 
Conc lus ions   
This background chapter has process traced, through primary sources, the developments 
surrounding Alliance and Leicester, HBOS, and Bradford and Bingley before their failures. As 
a result of the similarities in their business models and the deepening of the credit crunch into 
a financial crisis, one can identify several common denominators across those cases to 
pinpoint their problems. The identification of the main turning points along five separate 
dimensions has been crucial in setting the empirical background for the following 
argumentative chapter. To emphasise once more, the overarching objective of this chapter has 
been to illustrate that the three cases had been through similar problems before their failures, 
despite the varying degrees of depositor behaviour to each of them.   
Against this empirical background and the changes in the regulatory landscape identified in 
Chapter III, the following final empirical chapter will present an analytical and theoretically 
informed discussion on the three cases with an attempt to understand the different depositor 
behaviours across these failures. It will act on the assumption that the containment and 
resolution policies towards the Northern Rock, as well as the following regulatory changes 
initiated by the Tripartite Authorities have been crucial in shaping depositor perceptions 
(through changing their reference points) and expectations for the future bank failures. It will 
argue that, against the updated reference points following the Northern Rock crisis, the 
varying degrees of depositor behaviour might lie within the increasing uncertainty in both 
domestic and international markets, the growing negative sentiments in line with the 
reflections of the credit crunch onto the real economy, as well as the signalling effect of the 
failure of HBOS. The final chapter of this thesis, Conclusion, will present a cross-case 
comparison across the four cases and compare the empirical regularities and the differences in 
the outcomes.  
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Chapter VI: Three Failures and One Bank Run: Across-Case 
Political Economy Analysis on Alliance and Leicester, HBOS, and 
Bradford and Bingley	  
	  
 
Given the length and the amount of information available, the previous chapter has provided 
a descriptive account of the cases, while saving the analytical argument for the current 
chapter. It has illustrated that, despite to varying levels, all the three cases had gone through 
similar financial difficulties such as share price losses, credit downgrades, and asset write-
downs, to name a few. Therefore, it has suggested that an explanation based solely on the 
deterioration of the economic fundamentals (be it bank-specific or system-wide) could not 
account for the varying degrees of depositor behaviour across the three bank failures. As has 
been illustrated with the Northern Rock case, this research argues that there are certain 
reference points towards which depositors’ expectations converge. In addition to the 
relevance of fundamentals to depositor behaviour, depositor awareness towards the safety 
nets in place and the collective memory of the past (which is not directly related to the 
current situation) are also significant in decision-making.  
This chapter argues that the reasons for the different depositor reactions to Alliance and 
Leicester, HBOS and Bradford and Bingley might lie (1) within the growing negative 
sentiments in line with the reflections of the credit crunch onto the real economy, (2) in the 
increasing uncertainty in both domestic and international markets, and (3) in the signalling 
effect of the failure of HBOS on the perceived risk of Bradford and Bingley. The lack of 
depositor awareness cannot be held accountable for the run on Bradford and Bingley, as 
there had been an increasing awareness towards the FSCS since the Northern Rock failure. 
In addition to this, an implicit understanding of ‘too-big-to-fail’ was also set in the common 
knowledge of the market actors. The below figure summarises this research’s variables, the 
values that the dependent variable (outcome) takes across cases, and the timing of failure for 
each case. 
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Figure 10 Across-Case Analysis - Mill's Method of Difference  
 
The present chapter follows a different methodological approach than the one applied to the 
Northern Rock case. Chapter IV was structured as to analyse the three possible explanations 
for the depositor run on Northern Rock in three sub-headings. Those were the 
fundamentals, institutional background, and the cognitive heuristics. While the first two are 
derived from the literature, this research refers to depositor awareness and the use of 
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difference’ for an across-case analysis on the three cases.217 This methodological approach 
expects cases to be similar in all independent variables saving one and to have varying 
degrees on the outcome. Accordingly, variables that are constant across the three cases are 
eliminated as possible explanations since they fail to explain the variance on the outcome. 
The previous chapter has analysed the fundamentals explanations and illustrated that since all 
the three cases had gone through similar financial problems, thus similar media coverages, 
this could not account for the changes in depositor behaviour. This chapter concentrates on 
the remaining two explanations and analyses their explanatory power for the different 
depositor reactions across the cases. By eliminating the possible explanations that fail to 
account for the variance, it aims to reach to the most likely reason(s) for the depositor run on 
Bradford and Bingley.  
One of the conclusions reached with this analysis is that the failure of HBOS possessed 
signalling effects on the perceived solvency of Bradford and Bingley. Unless one treats 
Bradford and Bingley as an ‘accident waiting to happen’, the main counterfactual to this 
argument would be the following: we should not have observed a depositor run on Bradford 
and Bingley, if HBOS had not failed and taken over by Lloyds TSB. This, as a matter of fact, 
had been the case throughout the summer of 2008 during when the financial tensions for the 
bank were increasing.  As dicussed in the preceding chapter, bank-specific fundamentals had 
been deteriorating for all the three cases, including Bradford and Bingley. The timing of the 
depositor run, however, hints that exepctations deteriorated significantly in September.  
The macroeconomic environment had changed significantly during this month when 
HBOS and Bradford and Bingley failed within days from each other. While July 2008 had 
been relatively calmer in comparison to the following months, the developments in the 
international markets worsened with the advance of September 2008. As regards to the 
institutional background, the FSCS’ limit remained constant with no co-insurance principle 
attached for all the three cases. Given the increasing media attention to the deposit insurance 
scheme, this chapter acts on the assumption that the depositor awareness towards the 
scheme had increased since the Northern Rock crisis and also as a result of the policy actions 
to fix the scheme’s shortcomings. As an alternative reference point for depositor 
expectations, the Northern Rock legacy and a ‘too-big-to-fail’ understanding prevailed in all 
the three cases. However, an additional piece of information, which was the failure of 
HBOS, was also factored in depositors’ decision-making in order to assess the solvency of 
Bradford and Bingley. Against the background of the turbulence in the financial markets and 
the growing negative sentiments towards the economy, this chapter argues that the signalling 
effect of HBOS’ failure as the biggest savings insitutiton in the market serves as a convincing 
explanation for the depositor reaction to Bradford and Bingley. 
                                                
217 For a detailed discussion on Mill’s method of difference, refer to Introduction. 
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During the initial months of the credit crunch, Northern Rock had been the only 
institution to become exposed to a change in depositor behaviour. Without any generalised 
collapse of depositor confidence, it was business as usual for other banks. Following the first 
quarter of 2008, however, all demutualised building societies (ex-mutuals) were understood 
to be in financial difficulty and on the verge of collapse. Hence, at the end of the year, they 
were either nationalised (Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley) or taken over by their 
bigger rivals (Alliance and Leicester, HBOS, Bradford and Bingley). A detailed process 
tracing of the period reveals that while Alliance and Leicester and HBOS218 had not been 
subject to any depositor run (to the best of available data), there had been a silent run on 
Bradford and Bingley between September 20th and 28th 2008, only days before its 
nationalisation. Although those were not in the shape of an off-line run (as experienced 
during the Northern Rock episode), there were still “hundreds of millions” of deposits 
withdrawn quietly from the bank.219 A comparison between HBOS and Bradford and 
Bingley during September 2008, when both these institutions failed, is especially puzzling. 
Albeit operating within the same institutional settings, under similar problems and during the 
same turbulent period, only the latter became exposed to a depositor run within the spite of a 
week. The difference in the depositor behaviour across the three cases is the puzzle that this 
chapter intends to uncover while applying the insights gained through Northern Rock as a 
case study.  
Bradford and Bingley was both different from and similar to Northern Rock (“TPG's 
investment …” 2008, 21). As opposed to Northern Rock, Bradford and Bingley, with a 
deposit base amounting to approximately £20bn in total (Waples and Smith 2008, 1), had 
one of the highest core Tier 1 ratio in the banking sector ratios by September 2008 and had 
had secured funding for its operations for the following year (Croft and Parker 2008e, 21). 
Similar to Northern Rock, however, the bank issued its first profit warning in June 2008, 
which raised concerns over possible depositor reactions. Without any off-line run on the 
bank, it was later understood that there had been a silent run amounting to £800m during 
June and July mostly by institutional investors220, as the most informed among the bank’s 
creditors (Aldrick 2008c, 3; Treanor 2008b, 23; “What The Brokers Say” 2008, 6; Murray-
West 2008, 1; Hosking 2008a, 45; Croft and Saigol 2008, 14). Following the uncertainty on 
the bank’s rights issue and its profit warning (Croft and Parker 2008e, 21) the bank stated 
that there had been hundreds of millions of deposit withdrawals during when it was dealing 
                                                
218 Anecdotal evidence suggests that HBOS had also been subject to an outflow of deposit during 
September 2008. However, this is not as well documented as the run on Bradford and Bingley and is 
only mentioned in a few newspaper articles. This point is discussed further below.  
219 Refer to the oral evidence of Richard Pym and Rod Kent to the House of Commons Treasury 
Select Committee on November 18th, 2008. Available at House of Commons Treasury Committee 
2009a.   
220 Although some sources also refer to retail deposit outflows, it is not possible to be certain about the 
composition of deposit withdrawals.  
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with a troubled rights issue. When analysed through newspaper articles, no significant off-
line depositor runs captures attention.221  
Towards the end of September, however, during when uncertainty over the bank 
increased on a daily basis, there had been increasing amounts of daily withdrawals from the 
bank through its website (“Savers flock …” 2008, 5; Watkins and Ebrahimi 2008, 59; 
Watkins 2008, 8). This was emphasizes by the chief executive of Bradford and Bingley during 
his oral evidence before the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee (2009, Ev 41). 
Accordingly, he stated that the situation worsened for the bank on Friday (26th) and Saturday 
(27th). On Friday the bank was “[…] in very close contact and during high periods of 
customer activity the FSA were receiving hourly reports on our cash flows” (House of 
Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 41). Deposit outflows from the bank worsened on 
Saturday,222 while only a small number of depositors queuing in front of four (out of 197) of 
Bradford and Bingley branches (Griffiths and Kleinman 2008a, 1).223 This urged the bank to 
increase the number of staff in branches to deal with deposit withdrawals (Conway and 
Griffiths 2008, 1; Sunderland and Robinson 2008, 6). The bank closed its branches at 1 
o’clock on Saturday during ‘when every single customer’ had been served.224 Although the 
bank’s declining share price was significant, one of the overarching reasons for the FSA to 
take action for Bradford and Bingley’s situation was the increasing amount of deposit 
outflows from the bank in the spite of a week. Below is the chief executive’s oral evidence 
before the Treasury Select Committee (2009, Ev 40):  
The position on the Wednesday was we had an outflow of funds from the branches 
and from online of only £12 million. Previously that week it had been a lot higher 
because of media speculation, so by the Wednesday things had normalised, we were 
holding our own in UK deposits, but on that Thursday, after we made the statement, 
we lost £26 million. On the Friday, following further media reporting, we lost around 
£90 million and by lunchtime on the Saturday we had an outflow of around £200 
million branches and online, and it was that which forced the FSA to act. 
                                                
221 According to a Financial Times article: “The contrast with the height of the Northern Rock crisis, 
when that bank's branches were thronged with anxious customers and the queues snaked outside, 
could not have been greater […] It's fine,” said […] one of the counter staff. “We were expecting 
queues yesterday but there weren't any. And our shares have gone up today. We have good customers. 
There's no problem […] a hairdresser, was one of the few customers to emerge. A depositor, he said 
he was not worried about Bradford & Bingley. “I haven't got much [in my account]”, he said. Was this 
another Northern Rock in the making? “I don't think so.”  (“All quiet …” 2008, 25). 
 
“B&B’s lone City branch, on London Wall, saw a trickle of customers and none that the Financial 
Times talked to was walking out of the troubled bank with their life savings […] "I have a bit of money 
there and I am going to keep it," […] said. "There's a government guarantee in place so it's protected 
[...] Most other savers said that the government promise to pay out up to £35,000 of lost savings, made 
after the Northern Rock meltdown last year, had reassured their […] One staff member said: "It's been 
very calm - business as usual"” (“All calm …” 2008, 25). 
222 House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 40, 41. 
223 See also House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 44. 
224 Richard Pym’s oral evidence before the Treasury Select Committee on November, 18th 2008. See 
House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 44. 
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The current chapter will follow the same order with Chapter IV, where three sets of 
hypotheses are tested in separate sections. Accordingly, these will be (1) fundamentals and 
information asymmetries, (2) institutions and depositor awareness, and (3) cognitive 
shortcuts. The following fundamentals section will test the hypotheses put forward by the 
asymmetric information theories against the empirical evidence presented in the preceding 
chapter. The main preliminary finding of this section is that there must have been more than 
economic fundamentals in place to explain the different depositor reactions to the three 
cases given that all cases had been operating under similar economic 
conditions/vulnerabilities. Following this, the section on institutions will argue that, unlike 
the Northern Rock crisis, there had been an increase in the depositor awareness towards the 
deposit insurance scheme. Therefore, depositor reaction cannot be attributed to a lack of 
awareness towards the safety nets.  
To further support the above point, this section will further discuss how the ‘too-big 
(interconnected)-to-fail’ understanding through the ‘Northern Rock legacy’ should have 
updated depositors’ reference points for future bank failures. The analysis on Northern Rock 
has argued how collective memory of past institutional failures and the Government’s 
handling of those had left affected depositor behaviour. However, Chapter III and Chapter V 
of this research have illustrated the numerous efforts by the Tripartite Authorities in 
addressing the crisis situation following Northern Rock’s failure.  There had been several 
announcements and policy changes (including an update on FSCS’ coverage limit) following 
the run on Northern Rock to indicate a ‘blanket guarantee’ on the whole banking system, as 
opposed to only on Northern Rock. Given these policy reactions to contain the crisis, this 
research argues that the negative sentiments preceding the Northern Rock crisis must have 
altered throughout the period under examination. By the time of the failures of Bradford and 
Bingley and HBOS, depositors should have been assured of Government’s willingness to 
save them in cases of future bank failures.    
Against this background, the section on cognitive heuristics will suggest that the signalling 
effect of HBOS’s failure on the perceived solvency of Bradford and Bingley, as a potential 
reference point, was influential in shaping depositor reaction. It summarise the developments 
in the international markets between October 2007 and September 2008, with a special 
emphasis on the final month. To conclude, this chapter will argue that the run on Bradford 
and Bingley was a ‘fundamentally informed but panic driven’, which rejects the sunspots 
explanations in the literature, yet also question a pure fundamentals-view of depositor runs. 
It will instead suggest self-fulfilling prophecies, informed by the state of the domestic and 
international economic fundamentals, to have affected depositor expectations during 
September 2008.  
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Empirical findings are collected from the Financial Times through Nexis UK, HM Treasury 
Reports published during the crisis, and the oral evidences before the House of Commons 
Select Committee. Different from the Northern Rock chapter, however, there are no 
depositor comments available to analyse given that the run on Bradford and Bingley was 
mostly an electronic (silent) one. In order to compensate this, the chapter will refer to the 
opinion polls conducted by various polling houses, such as ICM, Populus, Ipsos MORI, 
YouGov, between September 2007 and September 2008 to understand the general 
perceptions towards the Government’s handling of the crisis, as well as towards the economy 
in general. For a full list of the hypotheses to be tested against empirical evidence, readers 
should refer to either Introduction or Chapter II. The first two hypotheses (H0 and H1) will be 
tested against evidence collected in the preceding chapter. H2 and H3 will be the subject of 
the section where the institutional dimensions of bank runs are analysed. Finally, the last 
hypothesis, on the role of cognitive heuristics, will be tested in the final section of the 
chapter. Conclusion will summarise the argument and conclude the chapter.  
 
6.1 Fundamenta l s  and In format ion Asymmetr i e s   
Given that the deterioration of the bank-specific fundamentals cannot account for the 
varying depositor behaviour across cases, how much explanatory power does the asymmetric 
information theories have in addressing this chapter’s puzzle? The preceding Chapter V 
presented a descriptive account of the similar problems within six dimensions faced by the 
three cases. This section will first summarise those shortly to remind the reader of the 
empirical background. Secondly, it will test the hypotheses put forward by the asymmetric 
information theory against the empirical evidence collected on the three cases. It is of 
significance to illustrate that each individual case had gone through similar economic 
problems. This rejects the null hypotheses (H0) that sunspots as random variables had 
triggered the run on Bradford and Bingley. On the contrary, there had been growing 
attention to the banks’ difficulties in conducting their businesses during the preceding 
months of each individual bank failure. Therefore, despite being non-identical, they all 
signalled the markets of the financial difficulties in their businesses. As a way of comparison, 
the first figure below, Figure 11, illustrates the media coverages of Northern Rock, Alliance 
and Leicester, and Bradford and Bingley over the years between 1997 and 2008. The second 
figure, Figure 12, presents the monthly coverage between September 2007 and September 
2008. As observed from those figures, although media coverage for Northern Rock had been 
higher compared to the other two cases, all the three cases received increasing publicity.  
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Figure 11 Newspaper Coverage for Northern Rock, Alliance and Leicester, Bradford and Bingley - 
Between 1997 and 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Newspaper Coverage for Northern Rock, Alliance and Leicester, Bradford and Bingley - 
Between September 2007 and September 2008 
 
 
To summarise the developments preceding the failure of those three cases225, by April 2008, 
the share price of Alliance and Leicester had already halved amid growing concerns over its 
liquidity position. During the following months, the bank announced several write-downs in 
its Treasury investments, which were followed by credit downgrades by the major credit 
rating agencies. At the end of the first week of July, the bank faced the biggest loss in its 
share value and by mid-July was taken over by one of its bigger rivals, Santander.   
                                                
225 All the relevant references for the empirical information are provided in the preceding chapter 
through primary sources.  
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The writedowns in credit market investments, nonetheless, were not specific to Alliance 
and Leicester. Since the Northern Rock crisis, HBOS share price had also been losing 
substantial amount of its value. By March, the bank announced the tightening of its profit 
margin and its exposure to Alt-A mortgages. Following the rumours that HBOS had reached 
Bank of England for an emergency funding, the FSA started its inquiry on March 19th into 
the bank’s share price collapse. By the end of April, the bank started shrinking its mortgage 
range and increasing its mortgage rates. Contrary to its initial statement a few weeks before, 
HBOS announced that it was planning for a rights issue in order to raise £4bn to strengthen 
its capital base, preceded by the news of a £3bn Treasury asset write-downs. Worries about 
the bank's future were further intensified by HBOS’s exposure to six British housebuilders, 
which resulted in the bank to write down its equity stakes in those companies amounting to 
approximately £100m and a rise in its mortgage arrears. In the meanwhile, the bank had been 
downgraded in May, as well as in September 2008, and its share price had been losing value. 
Eventually, the bank, with its 22 million customers, was taken over by Lloyds TSB through 
the suspension of the competition rules by the Government. 
Finally, in February, Bradford and Bingley also revealed writedowns and its share price 
had been losing value during the preceding months. Going through a difficult rights issue, the 
bank issued a profit warning as a result of rising mortgage arrears, which further led to the 
restructuring of its rights issue. These negative developments were also accompanied by 
credit downgrades and intensified during September 2008. Eventually, Bradford and Bingley, 
as the last remaining publicly quoted mortgage lender, was partially nationalised and bought 
over by Abbey on September 29th. While the bank’s declining share price was significant, one 
of the overarching reasons for the FSA to take action for Bradford and Bingley’s situation 
was the increasing amount of deposit outflows from the bank within the spite of a week. 
Against this empirical background, each individual case had gone through similar 
economic problems and been exposed to a certain amount of negative publicity. Given the 
depositor run on Bradford and Bingley, the above discussion supports the first hypothesis by 
the asymmetric information theory that bank runs are related to the deterioration in 
economic fundamentals (H1). Despite being necessary, however, it also proves that the 
deterioration is not a sufficient condition on its own to trigger a change in depositor 
behaviour.226 While all the cases had been through similar problems, only one of them was 
exposed to a silent run to the extent that the FSA had to attend to the situation.  
Recalling the working assumptions derived from the literature, the asymmetric 
information theories of bank runs expect a ‘flight-to-quality’ from insolvent to solvent banks, 
if the bank run is as a result of the fundamentals. Evidence collected through newspaper 
                                                
226 Since the run on Bradford and Bingley was an electronic one (a silent run), it is not possible to test 
the the second working assumption (WA2).  
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articles during this period also supports these theories and points to a flight-to-quality from 
insolvent to solvent banks. During September 2008, even though there had been no 
significant queues in front of banks branches, the numbers revealed that “[…] billions of 
pounds of savings […] [were] quietly being shifted” (Oxlade 2008, 66). According to Building 
Societies Association, building societies had received a net of £1.44bn compared to the 
previous year when the number was £723m (Aldrick 2008c, 3). According to one source, 
during the period where HBOS’ difficulties received increasing media coverage, other 
building societies (such as Abbey, Bradford and Bingley, Nationwide, and Northern Rock) 
started receiving deposit inflows (Prestridge 2008, 67). Northern Rock, which experienced 
the first depositor run only a year ago, was seen as one of the securest and the most attractive 
places for savings due to the explicit blanket guarantee offered by the Government 
(Prestridge 2008, 67).227 During the first half of 2008, the bank had already strengthened its 
deposit base with an increase from £10bn to £13bn (Prestridge 2008, 67). Towards the end 
of September, it was understood that more than £1bn of deposits were placed with Northern 
Rock (“Savers flock to the Rock” 2008, 5). Although anecdotal evidence suggested that “[…] 
waves of HBoS [HBOS] savers have reduced their deposits in the bank below the £35,000 
safety net - provided by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme - as a precaution 
against the Lloyds TSB takeover collapsing” (Prestridge 2008, 67)228, the bank had not 
infringed any threshold conditions for the FSA to attend to the situation. Despite the 
aforementioned flight-to-quality had affected HBOS (on the basis of this anecdotal evidence), 
it did not require any regulatory action, which  was the case with Bradford and Bingley.  
In conclusion, this section put forward two arguments: (1) given the economic 
circumstances and financial difficulties surrounding each case, the run on Bradford and 
Bingley rejects sunspots explanations. The silent run on Bradford and Bingley cannot be 
regarded as a ‘sunspot phenomena’. (2) Despite being non-random, however, it cannot also 
be explained with reference only to economic fundamentals. The varying degrees of 
depositor reactions across the three cases (albeit operating under similar economic problems) 
also render a fundamentals-based view insufficient to explain the run. There must have been 
more than economic fundamentals in place to explain the different depositor reactions to the 
failures of those cases. Those additional variables will be discussed in the following second 
and third sections. 
                                                
227 Northern Rock Retail Deposit Changes semi-annually between 2005 and 2008 can be found at 
Northern Rock end year and half year reports are available at the following sources: Northern Rock 
2008a, 2008b, 2007c, 2007d, 2006a, 2006b. 
228 “Northern Rock is believed to have first seen a surge in deposits after rumours began to circulate 
about the financial health of HBOS in the days leading up to its deal with Lloyds TSB. Barclays, HSBC 
and Royal Bank of Scotland Royal Bank of Scotland are all thought to have benefited from large flows 
of deposits as customers began to fret about the future of HBOS. Over the past two weeks about £10 
billion of savings has flowed out of HBOS into rival institutions, according to banking sources” 
(“Savers flock to the Rock” 2008, 5). 
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6.2 Ins t i tu t ions  and Depos i tor  Awareness  
Can the run on Bradford and Bingley be treated as an institutional failure for the deposit 
insurance scheme? The previous Chapter IV on the Northern Rock crisis has argued that the 
depositor run on the bank could not certainly be attributed to the failure of the institutional 
arrangements given the lack of depositor awareness towards the safety nets in place. As regards 
to the institutional dimensions, this section puts forward two main arguments. Firstly, it will 
argue that the lack of depositor awareness cannot hold true for the Bradford and Bingley case, 
as there had been an increasing awareness towards the FSCS, as well as its shortcomings and 
limitations, since the Northern Rock crisis. Secondly, in addition to an increasing awareness 
towards the formal safety nets, an implicit understanding of ‘too-big (interconnected)-to-fail’ 
had also been set in the common knowledge of the market actors, including depositors.  
To start with the former argument, the Northern Rock crisis had increased awareness 
towards the formal deposit insurance scheme (FSCS), as well as towards its shortcomings. This 
assumption is also echoed by the aforementioned FSA survey conducted in September 2008.229 
The following months of the Northern Rock crisis experienced an increased media coverage for 
the FSCS compared to the months preceding the credit crunch. Below Figure 13 illustrates this 
point. There had been on-going talks about the increase in the limit of the deposit insurance 
scheme (to either £50,000 or £100,000). Moreover, the aforementioned shuffling of deposits 
within the banking system might have also been motivated to keep the individual deposit 
accounts below the limit guaranteed by the FSCS.230   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Newspaper Coverage for FSCS - Between January 2007 and September 2008 
                                                
229 FSA 2009c. 
230 The efficiency in stabilising depositor expectations depends on the specifications of the scheme. 
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Secondly, the literature argues that in the case of an inefficient deposit protection scheme, de 
facto (such as the ‘too-big (interconnected)-to-fail’ understanding) or ex post (blanket) guarantees 
should stabilise depositor expectations. Recalling the discussion presented on Northern Rock, it 
was argued that the blanket guarantee introduced after the first days of the depositor run had 
not been sufficient in preventing a silent run on the bank as a result of the policy uncertainties 
on the bank’s future. The Tripartite Authorities addressed the loss of confidence in the markets 
and in depositors through various policy tools. The previous Chapter III has provided a 
descriptive summary of the policy actions taken ranging from bank resolution to bank 
restructuring, all of which shared the overarching aim of stabilising confidence in the markets. 
The immediate reaction of the Authorities to the Northern Rock crisis has been the classical 
policy responses with the LoLR facility by the Bank of England and the blanket guarantee 
provided by the Government. While this unlimited guarantee on Northern Rock had been an 
urgent fix to stabilise depositor expectations, there had also been various attempts from the 
Tripartite Authorities during the following months to restore confidence back in the banking 
system in general. There were policy changes addressing the shortcomings of the bank 
insolvency regime (Special Resolution Regime – with a special emphasis on preserving the 
‘critical banking’ functions in the events of insolvency), deposit insurance scheme, and the 
provision of liquidity in vast amounts into the markets by the Bank of England. Although some 
of those policies were not specifically directed towards depositors, as opposed to the blanket 
guarantees or the updates on the depositor scheme, this research argues that they still dispersed 
the too-big-to-fail understanding in the markets’ perception and served as new reference points for 
depositor expectations. In other words, any bank failure following this period would be 
interpreted under the light of the ‘Northern Rock legacy’ since it was now part of the common 
knowledge. 
This would assume that all banks operating in the UK were implicitly, although not 
officially, under the blanket government guarantee.231 As a matter of fact, the HM Treasury 
had made it known in its announcements that should the necessity arose, a similar help would 
be provided to other institutions. Below are the Chancellor’s announcements. 
 
14 September 2007 Announcement of the liquidity support facility to Northern Rock:  
 
“[…] In its role as lender of last resort, the Bank of England stands ready to make 
available facilities in comparable circumstances, where institutions face short-term 
liquidity difficulties” (HM Treasury 2007a)  
 
 
                                                
231 This point was also emphasised by Laeven and Valencia in the literature. “In other instances, the 
guarantee has been extended only for a specific institution or set of institutions, whenever bank runs 
have been contained within a segment of the system […] including the most recent case of Northern 
Rock in the United Kingdom. While in these cases guarantees are explicitly limited to specific 
institutions, the public may have interpreted them as if similar actions would be taken should problems 
at other banks arise” (Laeven and Valencia 2008b, 6).  
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17 September 2007 Announcement of the blanket guarantee to Northern Rock:  
 
“[…] As I have discussed with Secretary Paulson, we will continue to work here and 
internationally to do everything we can to maintain a stable and strong economy” 
(HM Treasury 2007b)  
 
This assumption is also echoed in the aforementioned FSA survey conducted in September 
2008, with the following comments from respondents:232  
 
“Judging by Northern Rock, the government bails them out. Whether or not they’ve put in 
place other measures I don’t know” 
 
“The government will stick its nose in and sort it out. That’s my belief […] They have done, so 
why should they not do so again?” 
 
“I don’t perceive there to be a risk you need to spread, because NR [Northern Rock] was saved 
and the two big mortgage companies in America have both been rescued. Bradford & Bingley 
will be next, though there doesn’t seem to be a rush to get money out” 
 
“The government wouldn’t even want that sort of social disorder going on…you can’t have 
banks collapsing every 6 months and people losing money” 
 
“I look at what just happened in the US with the mortgage institutions, and they’re too big to 
allow them to fail, so they’re going to print money for them, they’re in public ownership. And I 
think it would be the same with Lloyds” 
 
“I also feel that if they stepped in for Northern Rock, it’s pretty likely they’d step in for the 
likes of HSBC” 
 
“I think there is always someone to take them over or bail them out. I am sure that someone 
would help them if they got into real schtuck … Northern Rock were bailed out” 
 
 
To summarise, the two arguments put forward by this section suggested that there had been 
an increasing awareness towards both the formal (FSCS) and informal (the blanket guarantee) 
safety nets in place since the Northern Rock crisis. Therefore, since all the three cases had 
been operating under the same institutional settings and shortcomings, the variance on the 
dependent variable (i.e. the depositor behaviour) cannot be explained with reference to those 
given the unconditional implicit blanket guarantee by the Government on the banking system. 
Although the aforementioned flight-to-quality might be attributed as a reaction to the FSCS’s 
shortcomings, is also points to the fact that the blanket guarantee and de facto guarantees failed 
to stabilise depositor expectations given the silent run on Bradford and Bingley. 
One could highlight the different types of runs between Northern Rock and Bradford and 
Bingley to argue the incomparability of these two cases. While Northern Rock, at least during 
the first days after the announcement of the LoLR facility, had been exposed to an off-line 
retail run, no queues to such an extend were observed in front of Bradford and Bingley 
branches. There had been a silent run on the bank, which could include wholesale depositors 
along with retail ones. However, following the Northern Rock crisis, even the banks’ 
                                                
232 FSA 2009c. 
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wholesale depositors, who had been traditionally exempt from the deposit insurance scheme, 
were protected by the blanket guarantee. There had been several extensions to the blanket 
guarantee to cover uncollateralised deposits, wholesale borrowing and the retail bonds of 
Northern Rock (on September 20th) and all the new deposits made after September 19th (on 
October 9th). As a matter of fact, by December, “[t]he extended guarantee […] [accounted] 
for about a third of Northern Rock's Pounds 113bn balance sheet and […] cover[ed] any 
shortfalls on instruments such as covered bonds - an ultra-safe bond - and derivatives that are 
not backed by mortgage collateral” (Croft, Giles, and Parker 2007a, 1). Therefore, against the 
example of the Northern Rock crisis and its resolution, these guarantees should have also 
prevented a silent wholesale run on Bradford and Bingley. 
 
6.3 Cogni t iv e  Shor t cu t s  and Refe r ence  Po in ts  
In the previous sections, this chapter has so far argued that (1) the run on Bradford and 
Bingley resembles less to a sunspots phenomenon but more to a fundamentals equilibrium 
and (2) it cannot be explained through the lack of depositor awareness towards the FSCS. To 
further support this, it has also argued (3) how the too-big-to-fail understanding updated 
reference points for future bank failures and how common knowledge had been restored 
through the actions of the Tripartite Authorities. This final sectionwill argue that the run on 
Bradford and Bingley was ‘fundamentally informed but panic driven’ against the 
developments in the international financial markets which were not directly related to the bank 
itself, including the failure of one of the biggest savings institutions in the market, namely 
HBOS. The uncertainty on the bank’s future, accompanied with the ongoing financial 
problems, intensified the information asymmetries between the bank and its depositors. It 
will argue that the failure of HBOS within a period of economic uncertainty and increasing 
expectations for a recession had signalling effects on the perceived risk of Bradford and 
Bingley. In other words, the failure of HBOS was the most recent reference point for 
depositors to form their expectations on.  
Against this background, this section will first present the opinion polls during and after 
the Northern Rock crisis to illustrate the changing sentiments towards the Government’s 
handling of the crisis and towards the macroeconomy in general. As obvious with the 
opinion polls across months, there had been an incremental change in how the general health 
of the economy was perceived. In addition, the developments in the international financial 
markets in September 2008 also increased uncertainty within the markets. The turning points 
of this period, as well as within the preceding months, will be discussed shortly. Secondly, the 
section will also utilise from the case of Alliance and Leicester as a counterfactual. To emphasise 
once more, the outcomes that this research intends to explain are the occurrences of bank 
runs. Therefore, any assumption or the analysis on the case of Alliance and Leicester will 
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remain incomplete under the analytical tools of this research. It refers to Alliance and 
Leicester only to present a counterfactual analysis and to shed light on the reasons for the 
depositor run on Bradford and Bingley. Having said this, this section will argue that albeit 
having similar problems and operating under a similar funding structure to Bradford and 
Bingley, the arrangements put in place (i.e., the take-over by Santander) and the relatively 
calmer international financial environment during its resolution helped Alliance and Leicester 
to keep depositor expectations stable. The failure of HBOS just week before Bradford and 
Bingley’s nationalisation had constructed a reference point for the perceived riskiness of 
Bradford and Bingley. As a first step towards this analysis, this section now turns its attention 
to the opinion polls conducted by various polling houses. 
As discussed in the previous section on institutions, while the Government and the 
Tripartite Authorities had illustrated that they would take the necessary measures to restore 
market confidence, the opinion polls deteriorated during the following months of the 
Northern Rock crisis. During the initial month of the crisis (September 2007) public opinion 
towards the economy in general and the Government’s handling of the Northern Rock crisis 
in particular remained positive, in comparison to the following months. Opinion polls 
conducted by different polling houses reveal that depositor confidence in banks and building 
societies remained high (42 per cent answered to have a great deal of confidence and 44 per cent as 
moderate confidence) as of 17th September 2007 (Populus 2007). According to another poll 
conducted in September, only 20 per cent of the interviewees stated they were either very 
worried or fairly worried that their savings could be at risk with banks and building societies 
(as opposed to 74 per cent of respondents who were either not very worried or not worried at 
all) (YouGov 2007a). Finally, a further poll by Ipsos-Mori (2007) conducted in the same 
period shows that 45 per cent of the respondents (net) were satisfied with the way the 
Government had handled the problems with the Northern Rock.  
By November 2007, only 12 per cent of all respondents rated the Government’s 
performance on Northern Rock above fair, whereas fifty four per cent of them rated it as 
either poor or awful (YouGov 2007b). Sixty eight per cent of the respondents said they were 
either not very confident or not confident at all that the Government and the taxpayers would 
get all or most of their money back (as opposed to the 25 per cent of very or fairly confident). 
According to two seperate Times Northern Rock Polls by Populus (2007; 2008a), while the 
financial problems in the American mortgage market had been blamed for Northern Rock’s 
problems in September 2007, this had shifted towards domestic institutions (including the 
Government) and Northern Rock itself in the following months.  
A YouGov (2007c) poll conducted for the Sunday Times in December 2007 revealed that 
44 per cent of the respondents thought the Government had handled the problems facing 
the Northern Rock badly. Populus (2008b) directed a similar question for its Economic 
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Confidence Survey in January 2008, during which sixty one per cent of the respondents ranked 
the Government’s handling of the Northern Rock crisis either poor (24 per cent) or awful 
(37 per cent).233  In December 2007, an ICM (2007a) poll for the Guardian asked the 
respondents whether they felt less or more confident about their savings’ safety in a British 
Bank or Building Society. Only 23 per cent of the answers were positive, whereas 47 per cent 
of the interviewees replied as being less confident about their savings.  
During February 2008, the month of Northern Rock’s nationalisation, three different 
polling houses conducted opinion polls, two of which succeeding and one preceding the 
bank’s nationalisation. Seventy one per cent of the respondents stated that Virgin Money 
should be allowed to take over Northern Rock (YouGov 2008a). Another poll conducted 
immediately after the nationalisation of Northern Rock reveal that sixty nine per cent of the 
respondents believed the Government could have pursued a private option harder for 
Northern Rock (Populus 2008a). In another poll, half of the interviewees thought the 
Government did not handle the crisis surrounding Northern Rock well (Populus 2008c). A 
YouGov (2008a) poll in February 2008 also showed that fifty one per cent of the 
respondents rated the Government’s handling of the Northern Rock crisis as either poor or 
awful. These again contrast with the outcomes of the September poll by Ipsos-Mori (2007) 
where only 25 per cent of the respondents were dissatisfied with the Government’s handling 
of the problems with Northern Rock. Against this background, can the growing 
dissatisfaction with the Government’s handling of the Northern Rock crisis account for the 
run on Bradford and Bingley? 
Taking the Alliance and Leicester case as a counterfactual, depositor perceptions towards 
the Authorities’ handling of the crisis and the deterioration of the bank’s economic health 
remain insufficient in explaining the different degrees of change in depositor behaviour. 
Although the microeconomic circumstances for Bradford and Bingley and Alliance and 
Leicester were not completely identical, both banks had been exposed to negative publicity 
through the news and saw their share prices lose great value before their failures. Therefore, 
the deterioration of the bank’s economic health remains insufficient in explaining the different 
degrees of change in depositor behaviour. However, the case of Alliance and Leicester with 
no substantial depositor movements from the bank might suggest that depositor expectations 
had been stabilised compared to the Northern Rock episode, which was also assisted by a 
relatively calm international financial environment. As illustrated in the preceding section, the 
lack of institutional awareness, which had been constant across cases, cannot also explain the 
different outcomes. Neither can the negative sentiments towards the Authorities’ handling of 
the crisis. Applying Mill’s method of difference to those cases, what changed across these two 
                                                
233 In contrast, 8 per cent answered as good and 21 per cent as fair.  
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bank failures were the macroeconomic environment and the uncertainty diffused following 
the problems in the domestic and international markets.  
September 2008 has been one of the most important turning points during the recent 
financial crisis with the bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (on September, 7th), the 
takeover of Merrill Lynch by the Bank of America (‘BofA’, hereafter), the nationalisation of 
American International Group (‘AIG’, hereafter) and the collapse of Lehman Brothers (all on 
September 15th). In order for a better understanding of this period, I now present a short 
summary of the developments and major turning points in the international financial markets 
within the period under examination. 
The problems in the international financial markets had already revealed themselves since 
the credit crunch of the summer of 2007.234 In October 2007 Citigroup, JP Morgan and the 
BofA announced their plan to create a super fund, backed by the Treasury, in order to address 
the ongoing stress in the commercial paper markets. This was only to be abandoned in 
December as a result of the unwillingness from the banking industry. The Fed injected $41bn 
into the markets in November in order to reverse the widening gap between money market 
rates and the Federal funds rate. During this month and also in December, there were several 
announcements of initiatives both from the Fed and the European Central Bank to ease 
market (liquidity) conditions in the money markets. At the start of the new year, it was 
announced that the BofA had decided to buy Countrywide Financial. Ambac, and previously 
ACA Financial Guaranty in December, received ratings downgrades, which were later 
transmitted to the markets through downgrades of the bonds guaranteed by these institutions. 
In the spite of a month, the Fed announced two Federal funds rate cuts amounting to 3 per 
cent. Ambac Financial and the BofA announced losses in January, while Credit Suisse 
announced losses on structured credit products and AIG increased its estimations for the 
losses in February. A $170bn fiscal stimulus package was enacted in the United S.235  
In mid-March Bear Stearns was bailed out through an emergency funding from JPMorgan 
Chase&Co and the United States Government (Bank of England 2008b, 9; FSA 2009a, 13). 
One of the largest investment banks in the financial markets, Bear Stearns’ problems had 
started in July 2007 due to hedge fund loses during the credit crunch (Guerrera, Guha, and 
Larsen 2008, 2). On March 14th the bank stated “[…] its liquidity position had “significantly 
deteriorated” and that it would tap the Fed’s emergency finance facility - known as the 
discount window - through an arrangement with JPMorgan. The Fed took on the credit risk 
involved in the loans, which are secured against collateral” (Gangahar, Guerrera, Guha, 
Mackenzie, and White 2008, 1). It was the first time since 1960s when an emergency funding 
                                                
234 For a detailed chronology of the international developments see Felton and Reinhart 2009. 
235 All the information contained in this paragraph are a summary of the chronological events 
presented by Hall 2009.  
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by the Fed was provided to a non-deposit taking bank, during when JPMorgan acted as a 
broker between the Fed’s discount window and Bear Stearns (Guha 2008a, 2).  
Also in March, the spotlights were on the back then the government-sponsored mortgage 
providers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. They received a reduction in their surplus regulatory 
capital requirements in order to provide liquidity into the mortgage market (which would later 
be supplemented by an additional $10bn new capital raised by those enterprises). This was 
followed by a further cut in May from 20 to 15 per cent. “In a further bid to support the US 
housing market, the US Government, through the Federal Housing Finance Board, gives [sic] 
the Federal Home Loan Banks permission to increase (by over $100 billion) for two years 
their purchases of mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
the Government-chartered mortgage financiers” (Hall 2009). In April, it was revealed that 
those entities, as well as Federal Home Loan Bank, had taken a 90 per cent market share of 
the new mortgages in the United States by the end of 2007. By August 2008, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac revealed second-quarter losses.236 
After the support they had received from the United States Government during the 
summer of 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were rescued and taken into conservatorship 
on September 7th 2008. This piece of news hit the world financial markets, as the operation 
would be the biggest financial bailout back then (Guha, Giles, Scholtes, and Chung 2008, 1). 
According to its plan, the United States Government would provide each government-
sponsored enterprise capital up to $100bn, purchasing mortgage-bonds issued by these 
entities and an additional backstop liquidity arrangement for them (Guha 2008b, 2). As a 
matter of fact, the ‘too-big-to-fail’ argument was emphasised by Hank Paulson, the United 
States Treasury Secretary, in the following words: “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are so large 
and so interwoven in our financial system that a failure of either of them would cause great 
turmoil in our financial markets here at home and around the globe” (referred in Guha, Giles, 
Scholtes, and Chung 2008, 1).  
Against the background of all these developments, the international financial system was 
shaken to its foundations in the following week. In spite of a few days, some of the most 
established institutions of the financial system were either bailed out or let go bust. Yet, on 
September 15th Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy (after having announced a third-quarter 
loss a few days earlier) and Merrill Lynch was taken over by BofA (Clark 2008d, 43). It was 
announced that Merrill Lynch, one of the last remaining investment banks, had agreed to be 
                                                
236 In the meanwhile however, there have been numerous developments to illustrate the weaknesses of 
the financial markets. There were writedowns announced by UBS, Deutsche Bank, BayernLB, Citigroup, 
first quarter losses by Wachovia, Citigroup in April, and second quarter losses by Lehamn Brothers in 
June. In July, IndyMac Bancorp collapsed with depositors queueing in front of its branches. “Merrill 
Lynch announces sales of $30 billion of CDOs for $6.7 billion, raising just 22 cents on the dollar, 
intensifying pressure on other banks to make further writedowns on mortgage-related securities”. In 
Denmark, Roskilde Bank was taken control of the Danish central bank. See Hall 2009 for details.  
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sold to BofA to the amount of $50bn (Farrell 2008, 3). On the same day and to the surprise of 
markets, once though ‘too-big-to-fail’ Lehman Brothers was let fail and the bank filled 
Chapter 11 for bankruptcy.237 This, as a matter of fact, “[…] triggered a widespread crisis of 
confidence” (House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009b, 17). Writing-off Lehman 
related investment caused a general anxiety about counter-party risks which led to a freeze in 
credit and money markets (House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009b, 17).  
Problems in AIG were also revealed during the same period as the group applied to Fed 
for additional funding amounting to approximately £20bn (Clark 2008e, 31; Mackenzie, van 
Duyn, Guha, and Guerrera 2008, 1). “On 15 September, AIG’s credit rating was downgraded, 
forcing it to post a substantial amount of collateral to its counterparties. It was unable to 
liquidate sufficient assets quickly enough and on 16 September the US government 
announced a support package, agreeing to lend US$85 billion in return for a 79.9% stake” 
(Bank of England 2008a, 18-9). In addition to Fed’s actions, a private liquidity fund was 
created by eleven banks to help ailing institutions in case of a trouble (Scholtes and Guha 
2008, 4). 
 On the same day, major rating agencies downgraded Washington Mutual to junk status 
(which collapsed towards the end of the month) and Goldman Sachs announced a fall in its 
third-quarter profits. The shares of Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs crashed on 
September 17th (only to increase back in two days) and both these institutions requested to 
become bank holding companies (Hall 2009). On September 22nd Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley became regulated bank holding companies, which would provide them with 
access to the Fed’s discount lending window (Bank of England 2008a, 19). On September 
29th, Wachovia was rescued by Citigroup through a government-arranged takeover (Hall 
2009). “The pressures were also felt in Europe. At the end of September Dexia, Fortis and 
Hypo Real Estate all had to receive emergency capital injections, mostly government supplied 
[and Glitnir had to be nationalised in Iceland]” (Gieve 2008b). 
All these developments were accompanied by the domestic problems in the banking sector 
in the United Kingdom. There were the following three main issues to deal with during this 
period: The failing share price of HBOS, increasing financial problems of Bradford and 
Bingley, and the completion of the deal between Alliance and Leicester and Santander. As the 
Bank of England’s Financial Stability Report described, all these developments  
 
[…] led to the third, and most violent, phase of the turmoil, with system-wide 
financial sector fragilities emerging internationally. In response, governments 
facilitated bank mergers or nationalised firms to stabilise the banking system. In the 
United Kingdom, Bradford & Bingley was partly nationalised, Alliance & Leicester 
was taken over by Banco Santander and Lloyds TSB instigated an acquisition of 
HBOS (Bank of England 2008a, 23).  
                                                
237 For a brief recent history of Lehman Brothers see Sender, Guerrera, Larsen, and Silverman 2008, 9.  
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Below list summarises the domestic and international developments during September 2008.  
 
1st September   Fitch downgrades Bradford and Bingley (Croft 2008r, 18)  
 Group sales director leaves Bradford and Bingley (Croft 2008r, 18) 
7th September  US Treasury takes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship (Felton 
and Reinhart 2009) 
8th September  Nationwide, The Derbyshire and The Cheshire announce their intentions for a 
merger (FSA 2008h) 
10th September  Lehman Brothers announces quarterly loss (Felton and Reinhart 2009) 
15 September Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy (Felton and Reinhart 2009) 
 Bank of America buys Merrill Lynch (Felton and Reinhart 2009) 
 AIG approaches the Fed (Felton and Reinhart 2009) 
Fed expands the type of collateral for TSLF and PDCF (Felton and Reinhart 
2009) 
 Bank of England auctions an additional £5 billion (Hall 2009) 
16 September Bank of England injects £20 billion (Hall 2009) 
 Shares in HBOS falls (Croft 2008f, 1) 
 Fitch downgrades HBOS (Croft 2008f, 1) 
Positive statement by the FSA on HBOS: “We can confirm that HBOS has 
stated it has a strong capital base and continues to fund very satisfactorily” 
(Croft 2008f, 1) 
 S&P and Moody's downgrade Washington Mutual (Hall 2009) 
 Goldman Sachs announces a fall in third-quarter profits (Hall 2009) 
 Fed agrees to help AIG (Felton and Reinhart 2009) 
17th September Lloyds TSB takes over HBOS (Croft, Larsen, Burgess, and Parker  
 2008, 6) 
BBC reports the merger four hours earlier than the official confirmation of the 
deal (Hill 2008d, 22)238 
Bank of England announces the Special Liquidity Scheme (Bank of England 
2008j) 
 Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs shares crash (Hall 2009) 
 Fed extends loan to AIG (Hall 2009) 
18th September  Chancellor’s statement on the merger of Lloyds TSB and HBOS (HM Treasury 
2008a) 
Coordinated central bank action to improve US$ Liquidity (Bank of England 
2008k) 
FSA agrees to prohibit the short selling of the publicly quoted financial 
companies (FSA 2008i) 
 Fitch put HBOS and Lloyds on rating watch negative (“Lloyds TSB chief hails 
…” 2008, 4) 
19th September  Moody’s downgrades Bradford and Bingley to just one notch above junk status 
(“Bleak outlook for B&B …” 2008, 15) 
 The SEC temporarily bans short-selling in the US (Felton and Reinhart  
 2009) 
“The US Treasury announces that it will insure money market funds for a 
year” (Felton and Reinhart 2009) 
 “The US Treasury first proposes the TARP” (Felton and Reinhart    
 2009) 
21st September  “Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley announce to become bank holding 
companies” (Felton and Reinhart 2009) 
22nd September  “Morgan Stanley announces to sell a stake to MUFJ” (Hall 2009) 
“Australia, Taiwan, and the Netherlands announce temporary short-selling 
bans” (Felton and Reinhart 2009) 
                                                
238 See Robert Peston’s blog on BBC - 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/robertpeston/2008/09/lloyds_to_buy_hbos.html, 
accessed on 20/12/2011.  
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“The Chancellor announces a wide-ranging review of UK banking regulation 
to be conducted by the new Chairman of the FSA” (Hall 2009) 
“It emerged […] that Spain's Banco Santander could be willing to play a role 
difficulty” (Croft 2008ar, 23) 
24th September Bradford and Bingley arranged an agreement to avoid taking £1bn worth of 
mortgages on to its balance sheet (Larsen 2008b, 24)   
 Bradford and Bingley is downgraded by S&P and Fitch (Croft 2008aq,  
 25) 
“[…] outflow of funds from the [Bradford and Bingley] branches and from 
online of only £12 million” (House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 
40)  
Bradford and Bingley arranges a counterparty for its covered bond programme 
(Hall 2009) 
25th September B&B announces job cuts and further writedowns (Croft and Eaglesham 2008b, 
25; Croft 2008as, 25) 
 B&B shares fall and the bank’s credit default swap spreads rise (Croft 2008as, 
25) 
 B&B statement – “We are a strongly capitalised bank now  
 undertaking a complex transition with regrettable job losses, but we  
 are planning to put the problems of the past behind us and have a  
 business which is fit for purpose going forward” (Referred in “B&B shares at a 
record…” 2008, 30) 
 Bradford and Bingley loses £26million of deposits after the announcement 
(House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 40) 
 “The FDIC closes Washington Mutual and arranges a sale to  
 J.P.Morgan” (Felton and Reinhart 2009) 
26th September  Further deposit outflows amounting to approximately £90m from B&B 
following media reporting (House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 
40) 
Situation becomes public before the official annoncement (House of Commons 
Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 41) 
The Belgium Government offers reassurances to the depositors of Fortis (Hall 
2009) 
Coordinated central bank action to address pressures in the markets (Bank of 
England 2008l) 
27th September  Further deposit outflows from Bradford and Bingley - “[…] by lunchtime on the  
 Saturday we had an outflow of around £200 million online” (House of 
Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 40) 
 “The immediacy of the talks was underlined by the “tens of millions”  
 of pounds that were being withdrawn by savers from Bradford &  
 Bingley’s 200 branches and internet site on Friday and Saturday” (Croft 2008at, 
21. See also Croft 2008au, 23) 
 FSA states Bradford and Bingley no longer able to meet the threshold conditions 
(House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 41) 
 The government invited bids for Bradford and Bingley’s retail deposit base 
(Croft, Burgess, and Parker 2008b, 1; Giles and Parker 2008, 22) 
28th September  Santander agrees to buy Bradford and Bingley branches and its retail deposits 
(Croft, Burgess, and Parker 2008b, 1) 
29th September Treasury announces that Bradford and Bingley’s retail deposit and branch 
network has been transferred to Abbey-National plc, where the remainder of 
the business will be taken into public ownership (HM Treasury 2008k) 
 FSCS pays out approximately £14bn to enable Bradford and Bingley’s retail 
deposits to be transferred to Abbey. The Treasury makes addition payment to  
 Abbey in for the transfer of the deposits uncovered by the FSCS (HM 
Treasury 2008k) 
 Government guarantee arrangements are put in place for Bradford and 
Bingley’s “[…] certain wholesale borrowings, and derivative transactions of 
and wholesale deposits with, Bradford & Bingley plc (“Bradford &  
 Bingley”) existing as at midnight on 28 September 2008.” (HM Treasury 2008l) 
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In order to be able to understand the different depositor reactions across the bank failures, it 
is also of significance to understand how the state of the economy was perceived by depositors. 
The discussion belowwill once more utilise from the opinion polls conducted by various 
polling houses in order to capture perceptions towards the economy and the level of 
confidence towards economic stability. As was the case with the growing dissatisfaction 
towards the Government’s handling of the Northern Rock crisis, the negative sentiment had 
been taking place with the passage of time and the level of confidence in the overall economy 
had been declining significantly due to the repercussions of the credit crunch onto the real 
economy. The below Figure 14 illustrates a correlation between voting intensions and the 
expectations from each party to manage Britain’s economy. Especially from February 2008 
onwards the gap between the Conservative and the Labour Party widens. With a decreasing 
intention to vote for the Labour Party, respondents believe less in the Party’s ability to run 
Britain’s economy well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 YouGov Opinion Polls - Voting Intensions and Expectations on the Economy239 
 
 
The preceding chapter on Northern Rock has argued that the expectations for a worsening 
macroeconomy remained relatively low compared to September 2008. The reverse, however, 
is true for the period after December 2007, during when economy and economic situation increased 
its salience as an issue. Similarly, expectations for the economy either to ‘improve’ or at least 
‘stay the same’ remained low. This was also supported by the increasing expectations of an 
upcoming recession. The total number of respondents worried about an economic downturn 
or even a recession increased from 60 per cent in December 2007 to 70 per cent in March 
                                                
239 Complete survey results are accessible on YouGov’s website: http://labs.yougov.co.uk/.  
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2008 (YouGov 2008b). It was expected in March that the then current economic downturn 
was likely to continue into the following year (YouGov 2008c). When asked whether Britain 
was heading to a recession, 80 per cent of the respondent answered positively in July 2008 
(ICM 2008a). In July 2008, 76 per cent of the interviewees regarded Britain’s economy either 
quite bad or very bad (YouGov 2008d). This number increased to 82 per cent by September 
2008 (YouGov 2008e).  
ICM also periodically asked respondents how confident they were feeling about the 
economy in general and their financial situation in particular. Specifically, it directed the 
following question: “Please consider the economy for a moment, your current personal 
financial situation and your ability to keep up with the cost of living. Taking this into account, 
how confident do you feel about things at the moment?” While in September 2007 seventy 
per cent of the respondents felt confident, this number decreased to 38 per cent by July 2008. 
The below Figure 15 summarises the responses across months. As a matter of fact, the same 
polling house found out that the 80 per cent of the respondents for another survey thought 
Britain was heading for a recession, while only 16 per cent did not agree with this (ICM 
2008a).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 ICM Opinion Poll - Economic Confidence240 
 
 
Similarly, the GfK had been conducting another survey to assess the perceptions and the 
expectations towards the general economic situation in the UK. The below Figure 16 
illustrates the results of the October 2008 survey.241 The light gray line in the figure indicates 
consumer perceptions towards the economy: “How do you think the general economic situation in 
                                                
240 Sources: ICM 2007a; 2007b; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2008d.  
241 Available at http://www.gfknop.com/pressinfo/releases/singlearticles/003126/index.en.html, 
accessed on 12/01/2012.  
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this country has changed over the last 12 months?”. The dark gray line, on the other hand, captures 
the expectations on the general economic environment for the following 12 months: “How do 
you expect the general economic situation in this country to develop over the next 12 months?”. The dashed 
line marks September 2007. Accordingly, both perceptions and expectations had started 
worsening with the start of the credit crunch in summer 2007 and deteriorated throughout 
the crisis.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 GfK  Survey - Perceptions and Expectations Towards the Economy242 
 
 
An alternative way to comprehend the perceptions towards the economy might be through 
analysing media coverage within the period examined. Increased media coverage of the 
ongoing problems in the financial markets in general and in the banking sector in specific 
might have also had a negative effect on the perceptions of the health of the economy. In 
order to capture this, two key words (‘sub-prime or subprime or sub prime’ and ‘credit crunch’) are 
searched through national newspapers published in the UK (as well as the Financial Times and 
the Evening Standard) between October 2007 and September 2008 (inclusive). While the 
number of articles referring to sub prime had started decreasing, references to credit crunch 
increased steadily during the period under examination, almost trebled in September 2008 
compared to October 2007 (which is expected given the developments in the international 
markets). The results are illustrated in Figure 17. Although this does not suggest a one-to-one 
positive correlation between the media coverage of the financial crisis and the negative 
sentiments towards the economy, it still suggests that newspaper references might have been 
a significant input in shaping public perception towards the state of the economy and 
increasing awareness to the ongoing financial market turmoil.    
                                                
242 Source: http://www.gfknop.com/pressinfo/releases/singlearticles/003126/index.en.html, accessed 
on 12/01/2012. 
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Figure 17 Newspaper References to c r ed i t  c runch  and sub-pr ime OR sub pr ime OR sub pr ime  - Between 
October 2007 and September 2008 
 
 
 
How informative are those figures and polls in explaining depositor behaviour across the 
cases? Neither can bank-specific fundamentals, the turbulence in the international financial 
markets, nor the negative sentiments towards the economy in general account for vaeying 
depositor behaviour to HBOS and Bradford and Bingley, since all those dimensions had been 
constant across the two cases. During his oral evidence before the HM Treasury Select 
Committee, the chairman of the FSA mentioned the implications of the developments in 
September 2008 to the UK banking system. In his words: “[…] [T]he pace at which things 
were moving in those two weeks after the Lehman’s bankruptcy is almost impossible to 
exaggerate” (House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev8). As a response to the 
growing pressures after the turmoil in the US financial markets, Angela Knight underlined 
that the UK banks, in no terms, were in similar circumstances to Lehman Brothers (Williams 
and Lynch 2008, 23). However, according to the chief executive of the Bradford and Bingley, 
among the underlying reasons for the FSA’s decision [to declare that the bank had ceased to 
operate as an independent deposit taker) were the increasing media attention on the bank after 
the failure of Lehman Brothers, the nationalisation of Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac and 
Lloyds TSB’ take-over of HBOS (House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 41). 
According to him, the simple fact that Bradford and Bingley was the only remaining ex-
mutual after the failure of HBOS had intensified the attention on the bank (House of 
Commons Treasury Committee 2009a, Ev 41).  
After the take-over of HBOS by Lloyds TSB on September 16th, Bradford and Bingley 
began experiencing deposit withdrawals throughout the week of 20th-28th of September. This 
suggests that although both banks failed within a spite of weeks, the lack of a deal for 
Bradford and Bingley increased the uncertainty over the bank’s future under escalating 
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macroeconomic turmoil. Also the perceived health of the economy had been influential on 
depositor behaviour, despite not causing any generalised collapse of confidence in the 
banking sector. In addition to this, the failure of HBOS, as the biggest savings institution, 
served as the most recent reference point to assess the perceived solvency of Bradford and 
Bingley. This does not support the sunspot explanations according to which the silent run on 
the bank is perceived as a purely panic-motivated random phenomenon. On the contrary and 
as illustrated in the preceding chapter, Bradford and Bingley had been experiencing financial 
difficulties similar to the ones experienced by HBOS and Alliance and Leicester. However, 
the timing of the run on Bradford and Bingley points to the cognitive heuristics (specifically 
‘representativeness heuristics’) being in place when assessing the bank’s financial situation. 
Given (1) increasing uncertainty arising from the international turmoil, (2) the failure of 
HBOS only days before Bradford and Bingley’s nationalisation, and (3) the similarities of 
problems faced by both banks during the same period led to a ‘fundamentally informed but 
panic-based bank run’ on Bradford and Bingley.    
To conclude, the argument presented with this chapter is two-fold: A comparison of the 
failure of Alliance and Leicester with the one of Bradford and Bingley suggests that the 
relative calmness of the international financial markets as well as the implicit blanket 
guarantee on the banking system might have helped the former not to experience any 
significant change in depositor behaviour. A further comparison between HBOS and 
Bradford and Bingley within the same turbulent period in September 2008, however, points 
to another direction. As was the case with the Northern Rock experience, the increasing 
uncertainty on the bank’s future and the signalling effects of the failure of HBOS, 
accompanied with the turbulence in the international financial markets, resulted in a panic 
driven change in depositor behaviour, despite being fundamentally informed. Contrary to the 
Northern Rock case where the shock to trigger the panic was directly related to the bank 
itself (i.e. the LoLR facility by the Bank of England), for Bradford and Bingley the shock was 
indirect and interpreted through the use of the representativeness heuristic under increasing 
uncertainty.  
 
Conc lus ions  
This chapter has investigated whether a comparison between Alliance and Leicester, HBOS 
and Bradford and Bingley could provide some insights and a better understanding on the 
phenomenon of bank runs. According to the findings from this comparative analysis across 
cases, it has argued that the shortcomings of the FSCS and the deterioration of bank’s 
economic fundamentals seem insufficient on their own to explain the different degrees of 
changes in depositor behaviour. Even though the circumstances surrounding the cases were 
not identical, it still remained a puzzle to explain what was different with Bradford and 
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Bingley that lead to a change in expectations. It has argued that the most significant difference 
across the cases was the turmoil and the system-wide risk in the international financial system 
during September 2008, as well as the take-over of HBOS by Lloyds TSB.  
The findings of this chapter might help us better understand the complex nature of bank 
runs and further contribute to the literature. As opposed to the asymmetric information 
theories of bank runs, this chapter has argued that the varying values that the depositor 
behaviour takes across these three case studies, namely Alliance and Leicester, HBOS, and 
Bradford and Bingley, lie less in the deterioration of the bank-specific fundamentals or in the 
rational update of expectations upon the arrival of the negative news. This chapter has argued 
that the run on Bradford and Bingley was a ‘fundamentally informed but panic driven’ 
through the use of the representativeness heuristic, against the background of the 
developments in the international markets and in the failure of HBOS as the most recent 
reference point for depositors. The next and the final chapter of this thesis, Conclusion, will 
summarise the arguments and the findings of the empirical chapters. It will provide an overall 
cross-case comparison of the three sets of hypotheses tested with the four cases and propose 
possible directions for future research.  
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Conclusion: Why are we running? Structured, Focused Case 
Comparison	  
 
 
This research has inquired into the motivations behind depositor runs. It has argued that 
depositors do not interpret adverse news, be it bank-specific or system-wide, on its face value. 
In times of crisis information asymmetries between banks and their depositors widen as a 
result of the uncertainties over the banks’ future. In order to fill this gap, depositors require 
reference (focal) points to anchor their expectations on. As a matter of fact, cognitive 
heuristics provide inferential shortcuts under uncertainty and are factored in depositors’ 
decision-making process. While the current state of the fundamentals serves as one of them 
(which makes them a necessary condition), there are several others (including also the 
institutions), that affect common knowledge in the marketplace. 
A depositor run on a single bank might either be contained at an early stage or turn into a 
systematic collapse of depositor confidence. This research is interested in the former and has 
examined the most recent bank runs in an advanced market economy from a political 
economy perspective. The following four cases have been examined (in chronological order 
of failure) in order to shed light on the varying degrees of change in depositor behaviour 
(dependent variable): Northern Rock, Alliance and Leicester, HBOS, and Bradford and 
Bingley. It has illustrated and summarised the details of this period in Chapter III and Chapter 
V. To emphasise once more, the research puzzle addressed with this thesis is the following: 
During the banking crisis of 2007-2009, out of four bank failures only two of them 
experienced bank runs, albeit to different degrees and types. There had been no significant 
change in depositor behaviour (as to require regulatory action) for the remaining two cases.  
This research has offered an alternative reading of bank runs with an emphasis on ideas, as 
to complement the material and institutional dimensions mostly analysed in the banking 
panics literature. In order to be able accomplish this; it has challenged the understanding of a 
bank run as a function of the prevailing macro or bank-specific fundamentals and/or the 
institutional settings. To complement those, but not to replace, it has also promoted the use 
of reference points, applying the language of the cognitive heuristics literature, in times of 
crises. Two of the most salient reference points identified with this research have been the 
depositor awareness towards the safety nets in place and the collective memory of the past 
institutional failures. This, in no terms, rejects the explanations put forward by the extant 
banking panics literature. The prevalence of the information asymmetries, signaling effects of 
the adverse news in various levels and the efficiency of the institutional settings have been 
repeatedly referred to as possible reference points for depositors. What this research suggests, 
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however, is the interpretation of those through a new lens, which challenges the depiction of 
depositors as ‘rational’ market actors.  
Although sunspots explanations are found not to hold for the cases, this research still 
embraces the explanations referring to the self-fulfilling nature of bank runs. According to this 
research’s view, self-fulfilling prophecies take place in combination with the information 
asymmetries (both on the fundamentals and institutional settings) and through the use of 
cognitive shortcuts. Against this background, in what follows this chapter will put forward a 
comparative analysis in order first to summarise the variables tested and then draw the 
empirical findings of this research. In the final section it will illustrate this research’s 
limitations and possible directions for future research.   
 
7.1 Variab le s  Tes t ed  Across  Cases  and The i r  Values  
The theoretical chapter of this research (Chapter II) presented the two mainstream theories in 
the banking panics literature, namely sunspots (random withdrawals) and asymmetric 
information theories of bank runs. Against the background of a range of studies covered on 
the subject area, Chapter II has also constructed a list of the three main hypotheses and a 
number of working assumptions available in the literature. In a nutshell, the literature argues 
that either (1) changes in the fundamentals or (2) simply random events trigger an update in 
depositor expectations. On the other hand, (3) deposit insurance, as an institutionalized 
guarantee with its public nature, is regarded to keep business as usual.  
Saving the last one for a later discussion, the first two hypotheses above rest on the 
differences between the mainstream theories of bank runs. Sunspot theories, pioneered by 
the D&D model, does not put forward any single variable that can be traced through and 
empirically tested across cases in a consistent way. On the other hand, the asymmetric 
information theory of bank runs prioritises fundamentals over random variables and expects 
bank runs to take place when bank-specific fundamentals (in conjunction with a general 
macroeconomic downturn) exceed a certain threshold. As a matter of fact, there is a vast 
amount of empirical evidence in the literature (mostly from the National Banking Era in the 
United States or from early Great Depression) to support the fact that the occurrence of 
bank runs is closely associated with business cycles.  
 Against this background, the following two variables were identified from the banking 
panics literature: bank-specific fundamentals and the macroeconomic environment. To start 
with the former, the empirical chapters of this research have illustrated that all the four cases 
went through significant financial problems before their failures. Northern Rock had been 
the most publicised across the four as a result of the LoLR facility extended by the Bank of 
England. Yet, as discussed at the beginning of Chapter IV, the stigma attached to this facility 
was and still is mostly pointed out as the trigger for the depositor run on the bank. Although 
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none of the following three cases had any turning points as distinguishable as this emergency 
funding to Northern Rock, they also went through similar financial difficulties, such as 
downwards share price movements, credit downgrades, write-downs and difficult rights 
issues (for the two of the cases).  
Depositors’ behaviour becomes highly sensitive to rumours when information is not 
available (or costly to gather) and the awareness of the fragilities in the banking system 
increases (Pericoli and Sbracia 2003, 593). Public information may become private and more 
contagious because of these individual interpretations of public knowledge (Pericoli and 
Sbracia 2003, 591). Referring to the significance of the state of the economy, the asymmetric 
information theory of bank runs combines the two levels of fundamentals and suggests it to 
be more likely that idiosyncratic adverse news towards specific banks will precipitate a change 
in depositor expectations under adverse macroeconomic circumstances. Therefore, an 
additional variable analysed in this research has been the state of the macroeconomy, or more 
accurately, how this is perceived by the market actors.  
In cases of larger episodes of systemic crisis, expectations about macroeconomic and 
business prospects are generally subject to change (Caprio and Honohan 2008, 2, 7). This 
research has argued that the Northern Rock period and the months of Alliance and 
Leicester’s failure remained relatively calm compared to September 2008. The developments 
in both domestic and international markets were traced in Chapter III, V, and VI. Despite the 
fact that the beginning of the credit crunch in financial markets dates back to July/August 
2007, this turned to be a full-fledged financial crisis in September 2008. In the meanwhile, as 
illustrated through several opinion polls, perceptions towards the health of the economy, as 
well as towards the success of the Government to handle the crisis, had been deteriorating 
with the repercussions of the credit crunch onto the real economy. Therefore, while 
Northern Rock and Alliance and Leicester fell under a relatively calmer macroeconomic 
environment (in retrospect), Bradford and Bingley and HBOS failed as independent entities 
at the peak of the crisis.  
Recalling the beginning of this section, there is a third hypothesis in the literature, which 
focuses on the prevention of changes in depositor behaviour. In addition to the material 
circumstances (fundamentals), the banking panics literature also discusses the institutional 
dimensions of bank runs, the most salient one being the deposit insurance scheme. Chapter II 
has also presented a detailed argument on how the current literature analyses the institutional 
background of banking panics. Accordingly, two of the most important variables regarding 
deposit insurance are the coverage limit and the co-insurance principle.243 While the coverage 
                                                
243 “[...] [E]ven with such guarantees, bank failures still invoke widespread fear. In part, this reflects a 
concern that protected and/or unprotected depositors may not receive full and immediate access to 
their claims on the insolvent banks at the time that the institutions are declared insolvent and placed in 
receivership” (Kaufman and Seelig 2001, 3). Four potential sources of economic losses to depositors 
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limit of the FSCS before and during the Northern Rock crisis had been £31,900 with co-
insurance attached, this amount was raised to £35,000 with co-insurance principle removed in 
October 2008.  
Against this background, this research has argued that it is the interaction of ideas with the 
material and institutional settings that provides depositors with reference points to facilitate 
‘stabilised convergent expectations’ (Schelling 1960, 114). In addition to fundamentals as 
necessary conditions, depositor responses are shaped through collective memory of past 
failures and depositor awareness towards the safety nets in place. Starting with the latter, this 
research has argued that the mere existence of the deposit insurance is not sufficient to test 
the scheme’s efficiency in times of crises. As a matter of fact, depositor awareness towards 
the existence of this institutionalised safety net was crucial in shaping expectations. An 
analysis on the newspaper coverage of the FSCS revealed the low media coverage of the 
deposit insurance preceding the recent crisis. This was also echoed by the FSCS’ own study 
that discovered a low level of awareness amongst depositors. Across the four cases, however, 
Northern Rock served as a turning point in increasing this level. As discussed in Chapter IV 
and Chapter VI, the newspaper coverage for the FSCS thus and depositor awareness towards 
the scheme had increased significantly following the Northern Rock crisis.  
In addition to promoting the relevance of depositor awareness during bank runs, the 
second main argument of this thesis has been the use of cognitive heuristics under 
uncertainty by depositors. Supported theoretically by the Prospect Theory put forward by 
Kahneman and Tversky, this research argued that perceptions are ‘reference-dependent’, 
which logically concludes that changes in reference points lead to reversals of preferences. 
What sorts of reference points, or in other words focal points, are there for depositors to 
converge their expectations towards? As mentioned above, the current banking panics 
literature suggests either fundamentals or the institutional settings as focal points. This 
research, on the other hand, argues that the selection of these focal points is not conducted 
through a perfect Bayesian updating but with references to cognitive shortcuts.  
In addition to de facto (‘too-big-ro-fail’ understanding) or ex post (blanket) guarantees on the 
banking system, a further reference (focal) point promoted by this research has been the 
collective memory of the past institutional failures. The former two has already been 
promoted by the critiques of the efficiency of the deposit insurance scheme, which suggest 
the use of blanket guarantees to stabilise depositor expectations. As for the Northern Rock 
case, the blanket guarantee had proved inefficient in stabilizing depositor expectations until 
the Government announced a preferred bidder for the bank. As explained in Chapter IV and 
also illustrated through depositor comments collected from various newspapers, legacy of 
                                                                                                                                 
are poor disclosure rule, regulatory forbearance, bad market conditions after resolution, and inefficient 
receiver (Kaufman and Seelig 2001). In cases of deposits not being full of their par value, this 
effectively translates into a ‘freeze’ on deposits.  
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past failures and the inefficiencies of policies to address those had been factored in depositor 
behaviour during the Northern Rock crisis. As mentioned in the previous chapters, collective 
memory, as an additional variable to explain bank runs, refers to the re-collections about the 
Government’s handling of previous crises. In the case of Northern Rock, Chapter IV 
illustrated how collective memory of past institutional failures and the Government’s 
handling of those had affected depositor behaviour. A comparison between the failure of 
City of Glasgow Bank in the nineteenth-century and the Northern Rock case in 2007 
illustrates the changing sentiment towards Government’s efficiency in crisis management. 
While the LoLR action of the Bank of England had been successful in preventing City of 
Glasgow Bank’s failure from spreading, the announcement by the Bank of England’s support 
for Northern Rock was mostly blamed for precipitating the run on the bank. Against the 
background of this comparison, this research argued that the lack of credibility of 
Government actions (captured by the collective memory variable) had been significant in 
shaping depositor behaviour.  
On the other hand, Chapter III and Chapter V of  this research illustrated the numerous 
efforts by the Tripartite Authorities in addressing the crisis situation following Northern 
Rock’s failure. Given these policy reactions to contain the crisis, this research argued that the 
negative sentiments preceding the Northern Rock crisis must have altered throughout the 
period under examination. By the time of  the failures of  Bradford and Bingley and HBOS, 
depositors should have been assured of  Government’s willingness to save them in cases of  
future bank failures. As Chapter VI discussed, a ‘too-big-to-fail’ understanding had been set in 
market perceptions following the Northern Rock crisis. However, given the run on Bradford 
and Bingley, that understanding also proved unsuccessful in stabilising depositor expectations.  
Instead, the empirical Chapter VI has suggested that, in addition to the resolution of  the 
Northern Rock crisis and the policy actions taken by the Tripartite Authorities, the failure and 
take-over of  HBOS by Lloyds TSB should also have filled the information asymmetries 
across depositors and served as a potential reference point for the following bank failures (i.e. 
Bradford and Bingley). 
As a note of caution and recalling the INUS conditionality discussed in the Introduction, the 
variables analysed with this research are not treated individually. Multivariate causal 
explanations suggest ‘a variety of causally relevant factors’ (Mahoney and Goertz 2006, 234). 
Although, for example, the lack of depositor awareness is regarded to be a crucial ingredient 
in depositor behaviour, equifinality suggests several pathways to the same outcome. 
Therefore, more than the variables individually, their interaction with each other as causal 
processes is investigated as triggers. Having clarified this, the following section will now 
illustrate the empirical findings and causal mechanisms across the four cases.   
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7.2 Empir i ca l  Findings  a cross  Cases  
The empirical cases of this research aimed at testing the hypotheses identified in the 
literature, as well the ones put forward by this research. This section will summarise the 
empirical findings through a structured, focused cross case analysis. The hypotheses and 
working assumptions tested with this research were classified into three main headings: (1) 
fundamentals, (2) institutions, and (3) cognitive heuristics (reference points). While the first 
two include hypotheses from the banking crises literature, as well as this research’s own 
argument, the final hypothesis and the set of working assumptions are derived from the 
cognitive heuristics literature. This thesis draws several conclusions by testing those 
hypotheses against empirical evidence.  
To start with the first one, as discussed in the preceding section, there are two main 
hypotheses in the literature, namely bank runs being triggered by either sunspots or the 
deterioration of economic fundamentals. The empirical cases of this research invalidated the 
first hypothesis in evidence and were supportive towards the fundamentals-view of bank 
runs. However, they have also revealed that the deterioration of fundamentals is not 
sufficient on its own for bank runs to take place. As a critique to the current literature, this 
research has argued that the deterioration of economic fundamentals is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition on its own to trigger a bank run. Although all the bank run periods were 
preceded by bank-specific financial problems, only two of them became exposed to bank 
runs.  
The four working assumptions regarding fundamentals are summarised in Figure 18. 
Accordingly, WA1 and WA3 require further research on the occurrence and non-occurrence 
of banking panics, as the two cells in the typology of depositor behaviour. This will be 
discussed in the following section. To further support the asymmetric information theory of 
bank runs, Northern Rock crisis revealed that informed depositors had possessed ‘signalling 
effects’ on uninformed ones. Since there were no bank runs on Alliance and Leicester and 
HBOS and only a silent run on Bradford and Bingley, this outcome could not be cross-tested 
with the other cases. Finally, in all the cases there had been a flight-to-quality from insolvent 
to solvent banks. While in the beginning the deposit movement had been in the shape of 
outflows from Northern Rock to other banks or building societies in the banking system, by 
September 2008 this trend was understood to have reversed towards Northern Rock, as one 
of the safest places with a hundred percent Government guarantee. As a result, this evidence 
is also supportive of the asymmetric information theory of bank runs rather than suggesting a 
pure contagion. All these are summarized in the below figure.  
Moving onto the third hypothesis put forward by the literature, this research remained 
critical towards the efficiency of deposit insurance schemes in preventing bank runs. Several 
studies on bank runs promote deposit insurance as an efficient way to prevent bank runs (or 
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to stabilize depositor expectations). On the other hand, there are equally convincing 
arguments against the efficiency of the scheme and its long-term effects on market incentives. 
This research criticised the current literature for failing to take ‘depositor awareness’ into 
account. It has argued that first there needed to be an initial depositor awareness in place 
towards the scheme’s existence so that its efficiency can be tested in times of crises. This has 
been, as a matter of fact, the fourth hypothesis tested with this research. On the institutional 
dimension of bank runs, the sixth working assumption put forward by the literature was not 
applicable to this research since there had been neither depositor freezes nor payment re-
scheduling by the Authorities during the crisis period. Northern Rock case supported the 
hypothesis (H3) that there had been a lack of depositor awareness towards the FSCS, which 
might have contributed to the change in depositor behaviour. As regards to Bradford and 
Bingley, the depositor awareness had increased since the Northern Rock crisis, along with a 
‘too-big-to-fail’ understanding, which cannot account for the run on the bank. Finally, neither 
de facto nor ex post guarantees seemed to be efficient to stabilize depositor expectations in both 
of the cases.    
The final and the fifth hypothesis put forward by this research’s argument was related to 
the role of cognitive heuristics in depositors’ decision making during banking crises. Derived 
from the three main cognitive heuristics identified in the literature, there are three working 
assumptions relevant and applicable to banking crises. As mentioned above, the relevance of 
cognitive heuristics to understand depositor behaviour is theoretically supported by the 
Prospect Theory. This theory assumes that perceptions are reference dependent and updated 
through the use of cognitive heuristics. As illustrated in Chapter IV, depositor comments 
collected during the Northern Rock crisis also pointed to the use of collective memory and a 
sense of ‘we have been before’ when analyzing the ongoing situation. Since the run on Bradford 
and Bingley was an electronic one, the relevance of the collective memory was more difficult 
to assess. This presented a further challenge and a possible direction for improvement for 
this research. However, a comparative analysis between HBOS and Bradford and Bingley has 
suggested that HBOS’s failure might have served as a reference point to assess the perceived 
solvency of Bradford and Bingley. The preceding Chapter VI has argued that the run on 
Bradford and Bingley was a ‘fundamentally informed but panic driven’, against the 
background of the developments in the international and domestic markets, especially with 
the failure of HBOS.  
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 Northern Rock Alliance and Leicester HBOS Bradford and Bingley 
 
(In order of failure) September 2007 July 2008 September 2008 September 2008 
Variables Tested Across Cases and Their Values 
 
Fundamentals  
(Bank-specific) 
 
 
LoLR by the Bank of 
England Similar across cases (See Chapter VI for details) 
Macroeconomic Environment 
 
Start of the crisis 
(Relatively calm) 
 
Relatively calm Peak of the crisis Peak of the crisis 
 
Institutional Background 
 
FSCS coverage limit 
 
 Co-insurance principle 
 
 
 
£31,700 
 
Present 
 
 
£35,000 
 
Absent 
 
 
£35,000 
 
Absent 
 
 
£35,000 
 
Absent 
 
Depositor Awareness  
Towards the FSCS 
 
Low Increased Increased Increased 
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Collective memory of 
past crises 
 
 
 
De facto or ex post 
guarantees 
 
 
BCCI, Barings, 
Equitable Life 
 
 
Blanket guarantee 
 
Northern Rock 
 
 
 
Too-big-to-fail 
 
Northern Rock + 
Alliance Leicester 
 
 
Too-big-to-fail 
 
Northern Rock + 
Alliance Leicester + 
HBOS 
 
Too-big-to-fail 
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e Depositor Behaviour 
 
 
Banking Panic  
Reported bank run 
 
 
Absent 
No reported bank 
run 
 
Absent 
No reported bank 
run 
 
Absent 
Reported bank run 
 
 
Absent 
Empirical Findings Across Cases 
 Northern Rock Alliance and 
Leicester 
HBOS Bradford and Bingley 
HO: Bank runs are triggered 
by sunspots as random 
variables 
(Nul l  Hypothes i s )  
Rejects 
 
Research Puzzle   
 
Not can all bank runs be explained with reference to 
economic fundamentals only 
 
Economic fundamentals 1 
Bank run 0 
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H1: Bank runs are related to 
the deterioration in 
economic fundamentals. 
Supports 
 
 Cri t ique o f  the  current  l i t e rature  
 
Deterioration of economic fundamentals is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient variable to trigger a bank run 
 
 
Supports 
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WA1: For a bank run to 
become contagious, the dual 
observation of a bank failure 
and a recession is required.  
Directions for future research – Investigation of the occurrence and non-occurrence of banking panics  
as the two cells in the typology of ‘depositor behaviour’ 
Observed 
 
Not applicable  
(no bank run) 
Not applicable  
(silent run) 
WA2: Once a run is in 
progress, (lines of) informed 
depositors have signaling 
effects on uninformed ones. 
 
Directions for future research –Further investigation of relationship between silent and off-line runs  
 
WA3: Banking panics should 
not develop in information-rich 
environments  
WA3a: A banking panic might 
be prevented through the 
provision of bank-specific 
information on the bank’s 
solvency. 
Directions for future research – Investigation of the occurrence and non-occurrence of banking panics 
as the two cells in the typology of ‘depositor behaviour’ 
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WA4: If the bank run 
originated form information 
asymmetries and fundamentals, 
there should be a ‘flight-to-
quality’ from insolvent to 
solvent banks. 
Observed Not applicable  (no bank run) Observed 
Empirical Findings 
 
 
-­‐ Both Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley cases reject the null hypothesis (H0) 
and assert that the reasons for the depositor runs did not originate from sunspots. The 
empirical evidence seemed to support more the asymmetric information theory (H1).  
 
-­‐ To support the asymmetric information theory of bank runs, queuing (informed) 
depositors had ‘signalling effects’ on uninformed ones during the Northern Rock 
crisis.  
 
-­‐ In both cases, there had been a ‘flight-to-quality’ from insolvent to solvent banks. This 
evidence also supports the asymmetric information theory of bank runs  
 
 
Crit ique o f  the  current  l i t e rature  
 
There needs to be an initial depositor awareness towards the scheme’s existence to be able to assess its efficiency 
Not applicable 
(no deposit freeze or re-scheduling) 
 
 
H2: Deposit insurance scheme 
should prevent bank runs. 
 
WA5: The efficiency of the 
scheme depends on its 
specifications.  
 
WA6: The lack of commitment 
by the Authorities on deposit 
freezes and payment re-
scheduling might generate self-
fulfilling bank runs. 
 
 
WA7: De facto or ex post 
guarantees should stabilize 
depositor expectations.     
  
 
WA8: The coherence and 
consistency in the actions of 
policy makers in addressing the 
crisis affect depositor 
expectations.  
 
 
 
Directions for future research –Investigation of ‘no-
bank run’ outcomes 
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H3: An additional information 
asymmetry during a bank run 
is the lack of depositor 
awareness towards deposit 
insurance scheme. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Contr ibut ion to  the  current  l i t e rature  on the  ins t i tu t ional  de t erminants  o f  bank runs  
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Empirical Findings 
 
-­‐ This research remained critical towards the efficiency in deposit insurance to prevent 
bank runs (H2). 
 
-­‐ Northern Rock case supports the hypothesis (H3) that there had been a lack of 
depositor awareness towards the FSCS, which might have contributed to the change 
in depositor behaviour.  
 
-­‐ As regards to Bradford and Bingley, the depositor awareness had increased since the 
Northern Rock crisis, along with a ‘too-big-to-fail’ understanding, which cannot 
account for the run on the bank.  
 
-­‐ Finally, neither de facto nor ex post guarantees seemed to be efficient to stabilize 
depositor expectations in both of the cases.    
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s H4: Under uncertainty 
during crises and as a 
result of bounded 
rationality, cognitive 
shortcuts (in different 
forms) are used in 
depositor decision-
making.  
 
Contr ibut ion to  the  current  l i t e rature  on the  ideat ional  de t erminants  o f  bank runs  
 
Empirical Findings 
 
-­‐ Depositor comments collected during the Northern Rock crisis also pointed to the 
use of collective memory and a sense of ‘we have been before’ when analyzing the 
ongoing situation. 
 
-­‐ A comparative analysis between HBOS and Bradford and Bingley suggested that 
HBOS’s failure served as a reference point to assess the perceived solvency of 
Bradford and Bingley. 
 
 
 
Figure 18 Variables Tested and Main Empirical Findings 
 
7.3 Limita t ions  and Dire c t ions  fo r  Future  Resear ch   
 
Future expectations are formed as a function of today’s actions and their success in addressing 
the crisis situation. While the emphasis is on the material and institutional circumstances in 
the literature, the overall argument of this research has emphasised the significance of ideas in 
explaining bank runs. In this respect, it has referred to reference points, such as collective 
memory of past crises and depositor awareness towards the institutional safety guards in 
place.  
This research possesses mainly two limitations. Firstly, cognitive heuristics literature has 
mostly been criticised for having ‘so many degrees of freedom’ as “[…] there are […] 
competing behavioral explanations for some of the empirical facts” (Barberis and Thaler 
2003, 1112). As a response this criticism, this research has mainly concentrated on the concept 
of reference points and specifically on collective memory. Additional case studies might 
further strengthen this research’s argument on cognitive heuristics. The most serious 
limitation of this research, however, is the infrequency of bank runs. As seen with the 
Northern Rock example, they are ‘one-in-a-lifetime’ events for advanced market economies, 
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which prove difficult for a medium or lage N analysis, yet make Northern Rock all the more 
interesting as a case study to analyse. Relatedly, since the unit of analysis is depositors, it is 
highly problematic to gather direct data on the spot without any intervening variables. To the best 
of available data, this research has referred to depositor comments collected during the off-
line bank run period and the opinion polls conducted during the crisis period in order to 
understand the perceptions towards the economy in general. However, it has also utilised 
from indirect comparative analyses and counterfactuals, which still helped explain the different 
depositor reaction across the cases.  
Against these limitations, the analytical emphasis has been on the explanation of the 
occurrence and the underlying triggers for bank runs. Introduction has discussed the 
‘asymmetrical formulation of concepts’ in the social sciences, which suggests that the lack of 
the processes leading to a bank run might not directly translate into a non-bank run situation. 
Therefore, this research possesses limited explanatory power in explaining either the 
occurrence of no bank runs, banking panics, or no banking panics.244 As a most interesting 
area of study, conditions under which bank runs turn into banking panics (either through the 
dual observation of a recession or within information-poor environments, as suggested by the 
literature) require further research. Finally, a natural extension of this research might also be 
the investigation of the relationship between silent electronic runs with off-line, 19th century 
depositor runs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
244 A detailed discussion on the values that the dependent variable takes has been presented in 
Introduction.  
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Appendix: Northern Rock Depositor Comments Collected During the 
Off-line Run in September 2007 
 
 
I have collected over three hundred and seventy comments from various newspapers and coded 
them according to the following common themes shared: Trust in the Government/Bank of 
England/Northern Rock, guarantees on deposit accounts, risk aversion, uncertainty, and panic. 
Details of those categories can be found in Chapter IV.  
 
1. “All my money is with them so I don't want to have all my eggs in one basket. We are being 
told not to panic and that everything will be alright [sic] but people said the ‘Titanic’ could never 
sink” (“Panicking customers take …” 2007, 2). 
2. “All my savings are in Northern Rock. I’m leaving them in for now. But it’s a worry. You don’t 
know what’s going to happen next” (Whitten 2007d, 8-9). 
3. “All these people coming – it’s creating a domino effect. If everybody pulls their money out of 
Northern Rock, then what will be left of it? And if it spreads to other building societies, what 
happens to us then? Is the Bank of England going to bail all of us out? I don’t think so” 
(Morgan 2007, 4). 
4. “Although the Government says it will bail them out, we are still not certain about that. We will 
be going to either another bank or building society - somewhere our money is a little bit more 
secure” (“Troubled bank fails …” 2007, 2). 
5. “Anyone can get credit these days regardless of whether you can pay it back or not. But the real 
losers aren’t them – it’s us. The customer always pays” (Hiscott 2007, 4). 
6. “As a pensioner I can’t afford to take any risks with my savings. I take with a pinch of salt the 
promises that we have been given through the media” (“Hundreds queue over …” 2007). 
7. “At 2pm on Saturday they said they were shutting and a police officer came up. It was amazing. 
Without a word the crowds just turned and went away. People had been queuing four or five 
hours. If they were young people there would have been riots. The people were in such a state 
of abject misery. We were told we did not have a hope of getting in on the day. One woman, 
had just sold her business and all that money was in Northern Rock. Another woman had sold 
her father's bungalow and thought she was going to lose it all. In the end it was almost like the 
Blitz. People were holding your place in the queue so you could go and have a cup of tea. On 
Friday they promised us that even if it took until midnight they would stay open. They closed 
eventually at 11pm. It was an extraordinary situation but the crowd was so well behaved. The 
Natwest [sic] manager was going up and down the line handing out cards and telling people 
when you have been in come to us” (Menhinnitt 2007). 
8. “Believe it or not I wanted to take some money out. I could have done it over the internet but 
we wanted to shuffle a few things around. We have been trying all weekend. We were supposed 
to be in Spain (until Thursday) but we cut that short and came back because there’s been a bit 
of a panic about this. It’s just that panic thing. The Bank of England said it had given Northern 
Rock a loan to tide them over if they need it, but I think people would have been more 
confident if the Bank of England had said your money is definitely safe. There’s still a worry 
with people” (“Comedy star queues …” 2007). 
9. “Best not to have all your eggs in one basket, but where else do you put your money - will this 
happen elsewhere? The Government says not to panic but they’ve said that before. They said 
that about foot and mouth” (“Northern Rock customers in savgins panic…” 2007). 
10. “Despite all the assurances, I have decided to take no chances and will be withdrawing GBP 
70,000 and taking it elsewhere” (Jones 2007a, 10). 
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11. “Despite the Government’s assurance, I am still sceptical that if the Rock does roll and it’s sold, 
it will take a long time to get our money. I want the money now so I can have peace of mind. I 
just can’t afford to take the risk” (“Queues fade away …” 2007). 
12. “Even though the bank is urging customers to be calm, I still want to withdraw my life savings. 
Everything I’ve got is in this bank” (“Northern Rock customers show …” 2007). 
13. “Everybody’s panicking. I’ve got too much in the bank to not do anything. I don’t believe what 
the politicians are saying” (Wilson 2007a, 8). 
14. “Everyone knows panic has set in, but nobody wants to risk losing their [sic] savings” (Coles 
2007). 
15. “Everyone’s anxious because we’re all in the same boat. Most of these people have their life 
savings in there – it’s the same for us. You don’t want to lose everything you’ve got and end up 
with a few pennies” (Morrall 2007, 2). 
16. “Everything I’ve got is in this bank. When it’s all you’ve got, you’d just rather play it safe” (Judd 
2007, 25). 
17. “How can we trust him when you see how badly organised this is? If the phone lines don’t 
work, the website doesn’t work and they haven’t even got a numbering system for the queue, 
then I have no faith” (Hardman 2007, 15). 
18. “I am a little alarmed” (Grier 2007). 
19. “I am a shareholder, it is a concern but I will hang on to my shares. I am taking my savings out 
because there are other one-year bonds available” (Jamieson 2007, 4). 
20. “I am extremely concerned so I have come to get my money out. This situation should not be 
happening in England in 2007” (Dellafiora 2007a). 
21. “I am furious. There are 200 people inside and they are not letting us in. I have come down 
here especially and told them we are their customers” (Cameron 2007, 11). 
22. “I am going to clear my account. As soon as I heard, I knew straight away that I would have to 
take the money away” (Caroe 2007, 8-9). 
23. “I am going to close my accounts, both bonds and savings. There was worry before and they 
said it was all OK but I would be much happier if all my money was out. We will wait as long as 
it takes” (Jenkins and de Bruxelles 2007, 7). 
24. “I am going to take out all of my savings. I know Northern Rock is saying ‘don’t panic’ but I am 
not going to take the risk. I worked hard for my money, it’s my life savings and I’m not 
prepared to lose it” (Cullwick 2007a, 4). 
25. “I am going to transfer some of my money. I am not going to close my account. I am going to 
leave it open because I have direct debits coming out and my wages going in. I know they keep 
saying they are not in trouble, but you don’t get all this madness if they aren’t in trouble. I feel 
really sorry for the staff. There are rumours that jobs might be lost and I have seen customers 
be really horrible” (Roberts and Burton 2007, 5). 
26. “I am here to reduce the amount I have got in the bank to the level that’s guaranteed” (Keaveny 
2007). 
27. “I am just withdrawing some money. I have been with Northern Rock for about 20 years. It’s 
just another global problem with finance. It could have happened to any building society. We’ve 
been guaranteed everything is safe” (Wilson 2007a, 8). 
28. “I am not at all concerned, if I had any spare cash I would buy shares in Northern Rock” (Watts 
and Donnelly 2007, 8). 
29. “I am not happy about it, especially when we have all worked all our lives for this money. I am 
not going to take any chances” (Caroe 2007, 8-9). 
30. “I am obviously very worried. I spoke to my financial adviser and he told me to withdraw my 
money so it is safe, because nothing is guaranteed” (“Northern Rock: Pleas for calm ignored” 
2007). 
31. “I am so angry, they are not letting me transfer my money. It’s unbelievable. They threatened to 
call the police on me” (Kirby 2007 and Cameron 2007, 11). 
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32. “I am taking my money out but I don’t want to. It is my money, my life, I would rather be safe 
than sorry” (Roberts and Burton 2007, 5). 
33. “I called a friend who lives in Spain and she told me Northern Rock was being bailed out by the 
Bank of England. I thought ‘Oh hell, I’ve got a lot of money in that bank. I didn't expect to see 
so many people here though, I was amazed. I am going to clear out every last penny to give me 
peace of mind. This is the only branch in Birmingham and I have got a special passbook 
account which means I can only withdraw money by coming into the bank. I had a feeling 
Northern Rock was not one of the best places to leave all my money but the interest is so good. 
I wish I had put it all in an ISA now” (Scotney 2007, 3). 
34. “I came down to withdraw £32,000 from a fixed rate bond. Today I cancelled that withdrawal” 
(“Investor says northern rock …” 2007, 8). 
35. “I came down to withdraw most of my money. I have been a customer for many years and I 
have always been happy with them, so it is a shame I have had to do this. But it is my savings 
and I just can’t afford to take any chances” (“Northern rock customers withdraw cash” 2007). 
36. “I come here every Friday and I’ve never seen anything like this. I am very concerned, but I 
can’t take my money out straight away because I have to give notice. Why haven’t we been told 
before this? They must have known. They sponsor a lot of charities and sports teams so what is 
going to happen to that?” (“'They tell you not to panic …” 2007).  
37. “I couldn’t take it anymore. It’s a shambles in there. The staff are [sic] bang out of order for 
refusing to allow people in. Some scared old folk are trying to get their hands on tens of 
thousands. I feel really sorry for them” (Kirby 2007). 
38. “I didn’t want to keep my money in a sinking ship. This is what you expect from a cowboy 
builder” (Pukas 2007, 24). 
39. “I don’t 100 per cent trust the Chancellor or the Government. We have quite recently been lied 
to over the war in Iraq and I can’t 100 per cent believe them” (Pavia 2007, 7). 
40. “I don’t believe anything they say, I’m not prepared to take the risk” (Miles 2007, 17). 
41. “I don’t care how long I have to wait as long as I get my money. It is always the little people 
that get hurt in these situations” (Dayani 2007, 2). 
42. “I don’t have any loyalty to Northern Rock – I’m loyal to my money” (Boniface and Kelly 2007, 
9). 
43. “I don’t mind going home as long as Northern Rock gives me a reassurance I won’t lose any 
money by Monday. But they can’t” (“AND STILL SAVERS QUEUE …” 2007, 3). 
44. “I don’t really know what is going on, but I want to talk to someone about my savings. I am 
considering taking my money elsewhere” (“Another day dawns in the …” 2007). 
45. “I don’t really want to withdraw my savings but I’ve not had enough reassurance that my 
money’s safe and I’m not going to leave [the branch] until I’ve got it out” (“All-night drive to 
get his money” 2007, 6). 
46. “I don’t think people should be worried now. Not after hearing the news everything is 
guaranteed. I don’t think the government could go back on its word when they have said no-
one’s going to lose a penny. It would be dangerous, they would be completely finished” (Settle 
and Donnelly 2007, 4). 
47. “I don’t trust any more banks. I’m going to put my money under the mattress” (Hiscott 2007, 
4). 
48. “I don’t trust banks or what they say and I think it’s the little savers that are affected each time. 
I feel that if Northern Rock went under everybody would, so I’m definitely jumping ship” 
(Wilson 2007b, 4). 
49. “I don’t trust the bank. I need to close the account and take my money elsewhere” (Smith, 
Ringshaw, and Watt 2007, 2). 
50. “I don’t want to be sitting this time next week, wishing I had moved in time. I am not going to 
close my account - just lift a few thousand as a precaution” (Jamieson 2007, 4). 
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51. “I don’t want to be the mug left without my savings” (Hosking, Seib, Leroux, and Gilmore 
2007, 1). 
52. “I don’t know what they were thinking offering these ridiculous mortgages. It’s their own 
bloody fault they are in this mess and its just greed. Basically they’ve just gambled with 
everyone’s savings and they’ve lost. But the real losers aren’t them its us the customers always 
pays” (Prynn 2007d, 5). 
53. “I don’t trust any more banks. I’m going to put [my money] under the mattress when I get it 
[…] Too bad. Its [sic] my money” (Prynn 2007d, 5).  
54. “I feel a bit safer because the Bank of England have [sic] stepped in but I’m still taking a little 
out” (“Northern Rock customers 'calmed'” 2007a). 
55. “I feel too nervous leaving it there at the moment” (Bailey 2007a). 
56. “I feel totally confident in the Government, although they could have prevented the panic by 
acting earlier” (Whitten 2007c, 6-7). 
57. “I feel very sorry for them because they are sweet, helpful people and the pressure is on them. 
They might lose their jobs if there is a takeover and they are doing their very best. I was told 
that I would have my cheque from head office in a week. Obviously, I would like to have my 
money now, but I’m not going to and it's not the staff’s fault. I don’t think there is any need to 
panic. They’ve got big assets and they are underwritten. I compare the situation to when it’s 
announced there is going to be a water or bread shortage and everyone rushes to the shops to 
stock up” (“Troubled bank fails to persuade …”  2007, 2). 
58. “I feel very strongly they should all be forced to resign they've put profit before people. They’ve 
taken risks where they shouldn't have and it’s with ordinary people’s money. They should be 
held accountable. I’ve worked hard all my life and been frugal with my money, and it’s hard to 
save in this current climate, so then to be punished like this. It’s a matter of trust. When that’s 
gone then the relationship has gone, so I’ve taken everything out. And if I hadn’t been able to 
withdraw my money today I would have gone down to Northern Rock’s head office with the 
bailiffs and ordered them to seize goods to the value of my savings. I feel that strongly about it. 
For now I’ve put the cash in another bank but I’m going to investigate to see where the safest 
place to keep it is. I think this will have a knock-on effect across all banks so I’m going to have 
to think long and hard” (Mckenzie 2007, 6). 
59. “I got here at 5.30 but I got up at two this morning because I couldn’t sleep. I’m here for my 
mother. She’s 88 and she’s terrified because we’re talking about her life’s savings in this bank. I 
got here in advance so she wouldn’t have to queue, but she got here at 7am anyway because she 
was so scared. She has spoken to someone on the phone but they didn’t offer much 
reassurance. They said your money’s safe, but obviously we don’t believe them” (Alleyne 2007b, 
3). 
60. “I got out of Northern Rock just in time.  It is interesting that everyone is panicking. I would 
not want to risk it either” (Caroe 2007, 8-9). 
61. “I had a very large amount of money with Equitable Life and I thought it was secure, but 
unfortunately it clearly wasn’t. It is a case of once bitten, twice shy and I am not prepared for 
the same thing to happen this time” (Whitten 2007a, 8). 
62. “I had’t [sic] intended to, but the panic sets in ... with all the television, the panic spreads. My 
pension goes in there and I do not want to lose my livelihood and savings” (Woods 2007, 15). 
63. “I hadn’t taken any action until I saw all the people queueing [sic] at the weekend. Then I began 
to panic.  But as soon as the Government guaranteed that all savings would be safe and that 
there was no chance of money being lost I put my faith back into Northern Rock. As soon as I 
got my cheque yesterday morning I opened another account with them and reinvested it all. I 
think far too many people are panicking even after these guarantees from the Chancellor. I 
would advise Northern Rock customers to keep their money where it is, it is as safe as anywhere 
else” (“Customer puts faith in troubled …”  2007). 
64. “I have a lot of savings which I can’t afford to lose. I am hoping to get them out today” 
(Dellafiora 2007b). 
65. “I have a substantial amount in a savings account. I’m here to draw my money out. I want to 
make sure my money is safe, that’s all” (Gabriel 2007). 
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66. “I have all my savings in here and I can tell you that is not much but I tell you, a bird in the 
hand is worth two in the bush. I will only leave when I get my money” (“WE'RE CASHING 
IN; HUNDREDS QUEUE …” 2007, 8). 
67. “I have banked here for 60 years. A bank is supposed to be safe but it doesn’t feel very safe 
right now. I’m closing my account” (“Panicking customers take £1.5bn from Northern Rock 
…” 2007, 2). 
68. “I have banked with them for 40 years. I have got lots of confidence in my bank to recover 
from this, especially if the Government is backing them. I'm going to keep with them, I have 
never had any bother with them. I’m not scared to stay with them” (Stokes 2007, 4). 
69. “I have been with the bank for seven years and I’m concerned about what is going to happen 
with my pension.  However, I do have confidence that it’ll all be sorted out. I’m going to leave 
my savings in there for now. Gordon Brown says it’s going to be all right and I trust him” 
(Whitten 2007d, 8-9). 
70. “I have come to get my money out. You can’t take a chance when it’s your life savings” 
(“Northern Rock savers withdraw billions as …” 2007). 
71. “I have drawn all of my savings out. I wasn’t going to, but when the Government injected 
money into them everyone started taking their money out. I decided I had to get on the 
bandwagon in case there was nothing left. I feel better now I’ve got my savings out and I’m 
going to put them into my other bank account. I know the Government has guaranteed the 
money now, but I’ve got no faith in governments” (“Is wave of panic subsiding?” 2007, 4). 
72. “I have drawn my savings out. I am really anxious. When you’re old you think your money is 
safe. I don’t understand how this could happen. It was quite a shock seeing it on the television 
this morning” (Stokes 2007, 4). 
73. “I have got 100 per cent confidence in the bank. I have got my mortgage with them and I’m 
quite happy to leave my savings with them as well. The Government’s announcement has 
boosted my confidence and I believe what the bank has said. I don’t think anyone is in any 
danger of losing out” (“Is wave of panic subsiding?” 2007, 4). 
74. “I have got a lump sum invested and I don’t want to just leave it. I know I’m helping to make 
the problem worse but you have got to look after yourself. Myself and my wife are relying on 
the money in our retirement so we can’t afford to lose it” (Sims and Poulter 2007b , 6). 
75. “I have kept my account open with a small amount in there, but I took the bulk of my savings 
out. I saw a financial adviser on the television who said it was safe, but when she was asked if 
she would withdraw funds, she said she would. I have had bad experiences in the past so I am 
wary and I didn’t want to take any chances” (“Is wave of panic subsiding?” 2007, 4). 
76. “I have lost all confidence in this Government. How can we trust people who consistently says 
[sic] all kinds of things and then cannot stand them up. It’s always no jam today, jam tomorrow” 
(Alleyne 2007a, 5). 
77. “I have lost confidence. They have gone too heavily into the US market” (Lawrie 2007, 6). 
78. “I’m taking most of it out, I am losing a month of interest but it’s all about peace of mind” 
(Jenkins and de Bruxelles 2007, 7). 
79. “I have nearly a million pounds in here. I am not going to take any chances. They shouldn’t 
have lent to so many people” (Perrie 2007). 
80. “I have no confidence in what the Government has said. I can’t afford to lose my redundancy 
money. I feel guilty about clearing my account and adding to Northern Rock’s problems, but I 
can’t risk it” (Whitten 2007c, 6-7). 
81. “I have thousands of pounds in savings with Northern Rock. You put your trust into a 
company with such a good reputation and I never expected anything like this to happen. I’m 
angry that this has just suddenly been dropped on customers without even so much as a letter 
or phone call from Northern Rock” (Cullwick 2007b, 4). 
82. “I have two savings accounts with Northern Rock and as soon as I heard the news I decided to 
withdraw all my money. I haven’t got many years left of my working life so my savings are more 
important than ever” (Valler 2007, 2). 
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83. “I have withdrawn all my money. I got here at about 8.40am and was about 12th in the queue. 
It took me well over an hour to be served and by the time I got outside there must have been at 
least 50 people queuing out into the street. I know everyone has been urged not to panic 
20%off but I just felt safer moving the money somewhere else rather than worrying about 
Northern Rock's financial position over the next few days” (Cecil and Prynn 2007b, 9). 
84. “I heard about it on the news. I am prepared to wait as long as it takes to make sure I get every 
penny I have deposited” (Perrie 2007). 
85. “I heard about the problems on the news and thought I’d better come and make sure my 
money is safe. It’s my life savings so I’m worried. I've put all my money in this one bank. 
Whether it’s for a new car or for your daughter’s wedding, you put your money into a bank for 
it to be there when you want it. I only called them last week and they didn’t mention anything 
like this” (“'I'm making sure my money is safe'” 2007, 7). 
86. “I heard about this on the news on Thursday night, and when I looked on the website, 
Northern Rock’s share price had dropped. The Bank of England is lending them a lot of cash 
so I think there is a 95 per cent chance they will be alright now - but I don’t want to risk that 
five per cent. I’m moving all my savings. I remember Equitable Life, one of the biggest pension 
providers, suddenly went bust and people lost their pensions” (“Chaotic scenes at branch as 
bank's shares plunge” 2007). 
87. “I heard Northern Rock was opening at 8am and wanted to make sure I wasn’t at the back of 
the queue. It was a total shock when I heard the bank was in trouble last week and when 
politicians tell you not to panic, it’s the first thing you do” (Dayani 2007, 2). 
88. “I hope people will listen to them rather than getting caught up in the misdirected levels of 
concern” (Jenkins 2007, 8). 
89. “I just want to close my account. Give me my money and let’s go...get it paid straight into my 
bank account” (“Northern Rock customers in run on the bank” 2007). 
90. “I just wasn't taking any chances. I don’t believe a word the Government says. People have 
been stung before by these financial institutions. I do not think it has restored confidence” 
(“Cash pledge helps ease panic at Northern Rock; …” 2007, 8). 
91. “I know they’re saying not to panic, but you see everyone else taking out their money and we 
don’t want to be the ones left losing our savings” (Haddon 2007, 2). 
92. “I listened to Gordon Brown saying people shouldn’t worry and I decided not to do anything. 
But then I thought this is all my money and I just couldn’t risk it. I am not going to take all my 
money out, but it will be a lot of it and I’ll transfer it somewhere else to spread the risk a bit. 
But I’m not sure any institution is safe because of the crisis in America” (Jamieson 2007, 4). 
93. “I might still come back tomorrow to the branch but I feel easier after the statement” 
(Wainwright and Allen 2007, 4). 
94. “I never believe anything this Government tells me. They said there were weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq and how many of our lads have died?” (Hall 2007, 12). 
95. “I picked up my paper this morning, had a look, then put it on the table. Quarter of an hour 
later I looked at it again. I thought I’d better come down here. I’m going to try to take money 
out” (“'They tell you not to panic - …” 2007). 
96. “I plan to close my savings account. I wonder what Northern Rock’s been up to. I’m just being 
cautious, I thought to myself: why wait until next week or the week after?” (Stokes 2007, 4). 
97. “I put all my savings in one basket and the best thing to do is to get out of this basket” 
(Braithwaite et al 2007, 1). 
98. “I queued all day yesterday from 8am to 6 pm and was one of around 20 people told that we 
would have to come back today. I was in disbelief they could have dealt with all of us in less 
than an hour. There were some elderly people here, and some even in wheelchairs. It doesn’t 
make you feel any more positive about the company. I’m now seventh in the queue. Six others 
got here before 3am. The first person began queuing at 1 am” (Prynn, Waugh, and Bar-Hillel 
2007, 1). 
99. “I queued up for four hours outside the branch in Cardiff but they couldn’t, or wouldn’t, help 
me. They said I should telephone the helpline that everyone else is ringing. I pleaded with them 
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but they wouldn’t help. No matter what time, day or night, the problems are still there - you just 
can’t access your personal account. I have been up early in the morning and gone to bed late at 
night but it doesn’t seem to make any difference whatsoever. Initially, I hadn’t wanted to do 
that. I just wanted to pay a bill. But because of the problems and the way I’ve been treated, I’ve 
had enough. I’m no expert but it looks to me as if their website is not functioning. On Friday I 
was getting to put my security details in before it crashed. Now, I can’t even seem to get that 
far. At the moment I have no way of accessing my account” (Sims and Poulter 2007a, 4). 
100. “I realise we are going to lose out on a lot of interest by closing our account. We had invested a 
not unsubstantial amount of money and our bond only had one more year to go. We could have 
waited for the interest, but my wife didn’t sleep at all for worrying last night” (Morgan 2007, 4). 
101. “I reckon I will be waiting at least a couple of hours. I’m going to take all my money out to be 
on the safe side - I fear for the safety of it. If my husband can get here he will do the same” 
(“Northern exposure” 2007). 
102. “I saw the news and I wasn’t too worried, but after seeing this I’m going to go home and get my 
bank book and join the queue” (“'I'm going to cash my cheque in and put my savings 
elsewhere'” 2007, 2). 
103. “I sent an e-mail to them on Saturday saying, ‘if you tell me my money is safe, then I won’t take 
any further action’. But I didn’t get a reply. We’re panicking now. This is really serious” (Doyle 
2007). 
104. “I spoke to my financial adviser this morning. He said, ‘Let me put it this way: if it was my 
sister’s money, I would be urging her to get it out’” (Jenkins and de Bruxelles 2007, 7). 
105. “I suppose I am being a little bit irrational, but safety comes first. I do believe Northern Rock 
when they say my money will be safe, but I’ve got a lot of money in that account and there is no 
point in taking an unnecessary risk” (“'I'm going to cash my cheque in and put my savings 
elsewhere'” 2007, 2). 
106. “I suppose it was inevitable you’d get a lot of people turning out who are worried. I’ve got a 
savings account with them, I’m not sure if I’ll move, but I just want to have a word with them 
about what’s going on” (Scotney 2007, 3). 
107. “I suppose this is the price we pay for always looking for a bit extra in interest” (Brady 2007b, 
4). 
108. “I tell you I am worried enough to make me stand here for hours. I am going to look for 
another safe home for my money in one of the major banks. You felt like you could not access 
your money. You felt like it was being hidden from you - kept at arms length” (“WE'RE 
CASHING IN; HUNDREDS QUEUE …” 2007, 8). 
109. “I think everybody is over- reacting. Panicking like this is not going to alter anything” 
(“Northern Rock customers 'calmed'” 2007a). 
110. “I think it’s just a hiccup and am not too worried. People are just panicking that’s all. I just 
came down to draw money out as usual and am going to go home and finish the decorating and 
not think about it” (Whitten 2007d, 8-9). 
111. “I think it’s perfectly safe to keep your money with Northern Rock and the panic that’s going 
on is quite ridiculous. I really hope people don’t sell their shares because it’s a regional 
company” (Wilson 2007b, 4). 
112. “I think the money will be safe eventually - but they might say ‘your money is safe but you can't 
have it until a certain time’. I don’t have all of my savings at Northern Rock but if I did I would 
be concerned. The bank has handled it wrongly. The guys on the board have not done a good 
job. The other leading banks will take Northern Rock over but they are waiting for it to go to 
the wall first. The Bank of England should put pressure on the other banks to take it over if the 
situation gets worse. Whatever happens, the boys who run it will come away without getting 
hurt too much financially” (Alleyne 2007b, 3; Hiscott 2007, 4) 
113. “I think the whole thing is dodgy. Yes, we’ve got these reassurances from the Government now 
but we don’t know how long they will last for” (Watts and Donnelly 2007, 8). 
114. “I think these people are bloody stupid. If the Bank of England is willing to stand by Northern 
Rock, why are these people worrying about their measly savings. If there is a crisis, it is people 
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like these that will have caused it. It’s like panic buying in the war - it just makes things 10 times 
worse. Having lived through the war, I think this is madness” (Watts and Donnelly 2007, 8). 
115. “I think things are looking better now. I was worried at first, but I think my money’s safe after 
what the Government have said. I can’t see Northern Rock slumping now” (Whitten 2007c, 6-
7). 
116. “I think this goes to show how shoddy the banking industry is. We need more regulation” 
(Kirby 2007). 
117. “I think this has been on the cards for about a month. In my case it’s a big part of my life’s 
retirement savings and it’s worrying. We’re being reassured everything is okay, but how can you 
take the chance? The only way you know you are safe is to take your money out and put it 
somewhere else” (“'I'm making sure my money is safe'” 2007, 7). 
118. “I think you are quite safe up to £33,000” (“Anxious customers hit northern rock” 2007, 7). 
119. “I tried the website several times but couldn’t get on. I tried the helplines but there was no 
answer” (Carroll 2007, 12). 
120. “I tried to get on the website to see what was happening with my account, but it seemed to be 
down and I couldn’t get anywhere, so I thought I’d better get in here quickly” (Scotney 2007, 3). 
121. “I understand why people panic and it has a knock-on effect when you see other people 
panicking. After last night people can stop panicking now. If you can trust the Government, but 
I think it’s unlikely they would say that if they couldn’t carry it through. But I am amazed there 
are big queues this morning, although I think people in Newcastle are quite sympathetic” 
(Wescott 2007). 
122. “I used to work in the financial services for a number of years. I will come back if the bank 
survives. I have to keep my money safe. It is my life savings I don’t want to risk it” (“Another 
day dawns in the big cash scramble” 2007). 
123. “I want my money and I am going to get it. I don’t care how long I have to stay” (“WE'RE 
CASHING IN;  HUNDREDS QUEUE…” 2007, 8). 
124. “I want the money for my old age, I have got my life savings in there and I want it for my 
family when I hop off” (Alleyne 2007b, 3). 
125. “I want to draw my money from my savings account. It may not be much but it is a lot to me. 
Today's generation is one that borrows. We are the generation that saved and only bought 
something if we could afford it. I'm not prepared to risk losing my savings now. I don't know 
what we will do with the money yet but I don't trust what the Government says. We were here 
yesterday but were told we had no chance of getting in, so we are back today and will wait as 
long as we have to” (Prynn, Waugh, and Bar-Hillel 2007, 1). 
126. “I want to spend my cash before someone else does” (Roberts and White 2007a, 4). 
127. “I wanted to see what the situation was - I have been a bit panicked by the press coverage.  I 
have got quite a lot of money in there. I'm not sure what I'm going to do with it, so I'll wait and 
see what I'm told” (“Northern rock customers withdraw cash” 2007). 
128. “I was adamant that I would not join the panic but was totally unconvinced by Alistair Darling 
on the radio this morning. It’s my money and I need it for my future” (Alleyne 2007b. 3). 
129. “I was away at the weekend and my husband queued to get his money out. Unfortunately he 
caught a cold and has taken to his bed. He called me and I have come down here today. The 
trouble is nobody trusts the Government any more and so everyone just wants to be safe rather 
than sorry. It's your savings and you have worked hard for them. You don't want to lose them 
at the time when you should be enjoying them” (Alleyne 2007a, 5). 
130. “I was here on Friday but the queues were horrendous. I have just decided to close my 
account” (Pascoe-Watson and Perrie 2007). 
131. “I was here yesterday but the queue was too large. I have another account and want to empty 
my savings into that. What the Government has said gives us more hope but there is still doubt 
and I am not taking any chances” (Prynn and Waugh 2007, 1). 
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132. “I was hoping it would have been done by now, but it hasn't come through. I'll have to wait 
until Monday. The staff have [sic] been under a lot of pressure but they have been very kind” 
(Cameron 2007, 11). 
133. “I was listening to all the news and I don't really think there's a problem, but I was going to take 
it out anyway. "It was my mother's money and I was going to put it somewhere else. I was 
planning to do it a while ago, but this has just made me do it now” (“Another day dawns in the 
big cash scramble” 2007). 
134. “I was midway through a holiday and decided to come back because it's my money and I can't 
take any risks with it. I don't feel loyalty to Northern Rock. The bank has been mismanaged to 
get into this situation” (Wilson 2007a, 8). 
135. “I was shocked when I heard. The last of all the banks and building societies I would have 
expected to have problems would be Northern Rock. I have moved my money today as I have 
saved for years and I don't want to see it go. I know they've said not to panic and that might be 
good enough for the big clients but not for me” (Wilson 2007b, 4). 
136. “I was supposed to be flying to Madrid, but I caught a plane back home to Liverpool instead to 
come and sort this mess out” (“City savers queue at crisis bank” 2007, 1). 
137. “I was worried for a few days but held back from closing my account. I'm happy I did because I 
think it's been sorted out now” (Whitten 2007c, 6-7). 
138. “I was worried they'd shut at 5pm. If they had, this place would have been stormed” (“'They tell 
you not to panic - …'” 2007). 
139. “I wasn't going to withdraw my savings at first, but when everyone else started, I felt I had to in 
case there wasn't anything left” (“'We could see some customers return cash to the bank'” 2007, 
10). 
140. “I wasn't panicking until I saw the queues on television and now I want to get my money out to 
guarantee my savings are safe” (Dayani 2007, 2). 
141. “I wasn't particularly happy about Alistair Darling's U-turn, I don't think it was very confidence 
inspiring, and I don't think the buck will stop with Northern Rock. There's more bad news to 
come” (O’Doherty and Rotberg 2007, 2). 
142. “I went in on Friday and they said I didn't have the right ID - I   needed a driving licence. I 
rushed home and came back and they took my details and promised me the money would be 
transferred to my account today. I looked and it wasn't so I had to come back. It's a very big 
sum of money and they've issued me with a cheque now, but I don't know why they didn't do 
that on Friday. These are my life savings” (Peplow and Wright 2007, 3). 
143. “I worry, not everyone will be covered financially” (Gibney 2007, 8). 
144. “I would not be here if I was not worried” (Pascoe-Watson and Perrie 2007). 
145. “I'd be surprised if they let Northern Rock go under. But who wants to risk it? I'm still here” 
(“Patience, good humour and a touch of the Blitz spirit” 2007, 2). 
146. “I'm a borrower, an investor, and a shareholder - and I'm not worried. The fact the Bank of 
England has offered to lend them money is the best guarantee you can get” (“'They tell you not 
to panic - then you see hundreds in the queues'” 2007). 
147. “I'm at the back of the queue and I can't see myself getting in by 12. It's a disgrace. I just want 
to get all my money out and close my account” (“Police called to calm bank customers” 2007). 
148. “I'm attracted for two reasons. With the new guarantee it's like having the security of a 
Government bond and they also offer very attractive rates of interest. With the Government 
now backing them with this 100 percent guarantee, Northern Rock is the safest bank out there. 
Sharp investors will now go there. I'm opening a savings account and investing a six-figure 
sum” (“Investor says northern rock is 'safest bank'” 2007, 8). 
149. “I'm deliberating whether to act or not. I may well do something this week but it's a case of wait 
and see what happens over the next few days” (“Northern Rock customers look for their 
money” 2007). 
150. “I'm extremely concerned about what is going to happen. As soon as I heard the news I 
immediately tried to get on to the internet to find out more information and attempted to 
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phone the bank, but I could not get through. All my life savings are at the bank and I am here 
to withdraw them” (Whitten 2007a, 8). 
151. “I'm frantic. I need the money to live” (Boniface and Kelly 2007, 9). 
152. “I'm frightened in case I lose everything. But there were two people in front of us opening 
accounts, and one of them said her husband was a financial adviser, and they've taken all their 
money from the Halifax” (Carrell 2007, 4). 
153. “I'm going to cash my cheque in case it bounces. They should have used more precautions 
instead of giving mortgages away like confetti. They are lending too much, that's the trouble” 
(Brown 2007, 6; Perrie 2007; Roberts and White 2007b, 10). 
154. “I'm going to cash my money in, get a cheque and put my savings into another bank. Northern 
Rock has lost its reputation over this. Once you lose your reputation it's hard to get back. If 
people up and down the country are closing accounts the company might not be in business 
next week so I think it's wise to get out quickly” (“'I'm going to cash my cheque in and put my 
savings elsewhere'” 2007, 2). 
155. “I'm here to get my money out. It's a concern. It looks like they might go under as other 
financial bodies won't lend to them. I wouldn't like to say how much I have in there but they're 
only guaranteeing to safeguard up to £31,000 and I have more than that. I will move my money 
to the NatWest. I do internet banking but have been locked out of the system and had no word 
from Northern Rock. They've told us that transfers will take several days and even then we'll 
only get cheques. The closest branches we can get a cheque from are Reading and Birmingham. 
It's disappointing” (“Stampede to pull out cash” 2007, 13). 
156. “I'm here to move my money to my other bank. I hope the same doesn't happen there” (Lyons 
2007, 1). 
157. “I'm here to take the lot out, because they're going under, aren't they?” (Braithwaite et al 2007, 
1). 
158. “I'm just going to let them get on with it, because I think everyone has a down time and people 
are panicking unnecessarily” (Carrell and Hodgson 2007, 5). 
159. “I'm just worried that I will lose what I have been saving for over many years. I've had to pay a 
£35 charge, but it's worth it for the peace of mind. I've moved between £50,000 and £80,000, 
but will be looking to open a new account somewhere else. I decided to move the cash because 
I didn't want to take the risk of something terrible happening” (Moroz and Hanif 2007, 8). 
160. “I'm looking to take everything in my name out of Northern Rock today. I fear I could lose it if 
I don't act now. I do think the media have played a large part in this and probably blown it out 
of all proportion but I dare not take the risk” (“Northern Rock customers look for their 
money” 2007). 
161. “I'm looking to take out all the deposits I can and I'm going to put them into another bank; I 
need the interest as I'm retired” (“Northern Rock customers show little faith in new assurances” 
2007). 
162. “I'm not reassured by the Bank of England. I just want my money out. I will reinvest it 
somewhere else and if the bank is still here in the future, I will bring it back” (Authi 2007, 8). 
163. “I'm not young and don't have a chance to make it back again” (Braithwaite et al 2007, 1). 
164. “I'm only here because I'm panicking. I saw the queue and decided I'd better join it” (Drury 
2007, 2). 
165. “I'm playing it safe. My life savings are in that bank” (Brown 2007, 6). 
166. “I'm prepared to wait as long as it takes. I'm taking the lot out if they'll let me have it. I'm 
absolutely appalled that they should be so badly run and so badly regulated. I thought they were 
totally reliable and secure - they're supposed to be regulated, these companies. My confidence 
has been shattered. I would not put a penny into that company. There are a lot of older people 
who must be really scared” (Griffiths 2007, 31; Sims and Poulter 2007b, 6). 
167. “I'm quite sure they have done that in order to stop us withdrawing our money. I don't for one 
minute believe it's technical difficulties. I will be back here on Monday to withdraw my savings. 
It's money I cannot afford to lose and I'm not willing to take any chances” (Leake 2007, 6). 
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168. “I'm sure it will clear, but frankly I could have done without this whole episode” (Brignall 2007, 
26). 
169. “I'm taking my money out while I still can. At my time of life my savings are more important 
than ever. If I stay with them I am putting my future in their hands” (“Panicking customers take 
£1.5bn from Northern Rock;…” 2007, 2). 
170. “I'm taking out my savings, I'm really worried” (Roberts and White 2007a, 4). 
171. “I'm thinking there might be more trouble ahead. It is better not to take a chance because they 
have big problems. I've got a bit of financial security at the moment, but I'm worried I could 
lose my savings” (Devey 2007). 
172. “I'm under tremendous stress. I am going to buy a house” (Kirby 2007). 
173. “I'm withdrawing a retirement fund. I'm going to leave part of it in though. I do feel a bit sorry 
for the bank but I've debated all weekend whether to do it or not. I don't want to put all my 
eggs in one basket” (Wilson 2007a, 8). 
174. “I'm withdrawing some of my money but not all of it. I don't think customers are reassured. 
There must be some problem and I'd rather not be part of the problem” (Wilson 2007a, 8). 
175. “I'm worried about losing money which I had earmarked for my retirement. I think a lot of old 
people have saved at the Northern Rock and they are naturally worried” (Devey 2007). 
176. “I'm coming to close my account if they'll let me. I don't trust them” (Jenkins and de Bruxelles 
2007, 7). 
177. “I'm worried and I can't afford to risk losing my money. I've heard so many reports, it's hard to 
know what to do” (Hedley 2007, 8-9). 
178. “I've already got pounds 15,000 invested with the Northern Rock and this morning I put in 
another pounds 1,000. I take great comfort from the Bank of England backing for Northern 
Rock. If the Bank is prepared to back it, then it's secure” (Alleyne 2007b, 3). 
179. “I've been a bit on edge for a week but people are really beginning to panic now. We are lucky 
as we've got help and have been promised we will get our bond money in three to four days. 
There are still lots of questions to be asked” (“Clients flock to branch” 2007, 3). 
180. “I've been a customer with them for 20 years and have been quite happy up until now. I would 
like to be relaxed and feel that this will blow over but there seems to have been a stampede of 
people withdrawing their savings. It must reach a point where there's not enough money to 
fund Northern Rock business. The Bank of England are not going to write a blank cheque and 
I am genuinely concerned my savings will disappear. Despite assurances from the Government, 
we unfortunately live in an age where we simply don’t trust officialdom” (Leake 2007, 6). 
181. “I've been following what's been happening, and I'm convinced there's no problem. When the 
Government and the Bank of England guarantee support, it must be OK. It actually makes the 
accounts safer than anywhere else” (Whitten 2007c, 6-7). 
182. “I've been here for about four hours now. There is no way everyone will get seen today. The 
bank says our money is safe but it's not worth taking the risk” (Doyle 2007). 
183. “I've been here since 6am. It's a lot of money.  I'm retired. I saved it and don't want to lose” 
(“Stampede to pull out cash” 2007, 13). 
184. “I've been queueing [sic] since about 7.45 am. I've got a lot of money in here. I am sure they 
won't go bust but I can't take that risk” (Alleyne 2007b, 3). 
185. “I've been thinking about it all night, it's our burial money and everything” (Braithwaite et al 
2007, 1). 
186. “I've been with Northern Rock for 15 years and I am not worried at all. Everybody seems to be 
panicking, which is just a knee-jerk reaction and is totally unnecessary” (Whitten 2007d, 8-9). 
187. “I've been with Northern Rock for 40 years but I want to get all my money out. Most people 
can't afford not to play it safe. It's pandemonium here and I can see it getting worse” 
(“Panicking customers take £1.5bn from Northern Rock; …” 2007, 2). 
188. “I've brought a flask and some sandwiches because it looks like I'm in for a long wait” (Pascoe-
Watson and Perrie 2007). 
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189. “I've closed two ISAs and withdrawn money from my current account. I wasn't going to do 
anything but when I woke up it was the first thing on my mind. I had to take action. I would 
normally be in bed at this time on a Saturday morning but I decided I had to come down and 
do something. I opened my first ever bank account with Northern Rock when I was 18 and this 
is the first problem I have ever had” (Watts and Donnelly 2007, 8). 
190. “I've come in from Evesham to get my money out. It's my life savings in there. If the bank went 
under, I wouldn't know what to do. I want my money out and in another account” (“Customers 
keep up dash for their cash” 2007, 2). 
191. “I've come to withdraw all my money as I don't particularly trust the firm's financial viability” 
(Perrie 2007). 
192. “I've got a number of accounts here. It's my life savings. I think the risk is pretty low but you 
never know” (Leake 2007, 6). 
193. “I've got GBP 20,000 in there that I would never have let them have if I had known they were 
over-stretching themselves so much” (O'Grady 2007b, 6). 
194. “I've got savings in Northern Rock which I've worked a long time to build up so I just want to 
get it out so I know it's safe” (Hedley 2007, 8-9). 
195. “I've got to hope now that my money comes through” (Lyons 2007, 1). 
196. “I've had a savings account at the branch for six or seven years. But when I heard on the news 
that the Northern Rock was in crisis I decided it might be time to come down here and get my 
money out. Everyone else in the queue seems to be doing the same” (“Northern Rock 
customers panic” 2007). 
197. “I've heard all the reassurances about our money being safe. But when you see headlines like 
'Northern Wreck' then what do you do? I couldn't get through on the phone, so we came 
straight down here. I'm withdrawing it all - absolutely every penny. We put all our eggs in this 
one basket. Never again” (Morgan 2007, 4). 
198. “I've just found out how the bank really operates and I'm not very keen on it. It relies a lot less 
on savers like me” (Judd 2007, 25). 
199. “I've just got back from Italy, so I don't know much about the situation, except we just want to 
get our money. I'm just a bit worried at the moment - I fear for the safety of my money” 
(“Northern exposure” 2007). 
200. “I've just taken out what I normally take out. Some people are in there withdrawing all their 
savings. But I don't think there's any need” (Whitten 2007d, 8-9). 
201. “I've recently taken early retirement and my nest egg is my savings. It's all very well being told 
not to panic, but this is my future at stake. I'm not prepared to sit back idly and wait to watch 
my 40 years of hard graft being flushed down the toilet” (Cullwick 2007b, 4). 
202. “I've thought of nothing else so I had to get down here and try to take my money out. I can't 
afford to lose it” (Whitten 2007b, 8-9). 
203. “I've withdrawn about £60,000 in savings which I will reinvest, because I just don't want to take 
the chance” (Moroz and Hanif 2007, 8). 
204. “I’m missing work but I had to tell them I’m coming here to get the money. My husband died 
two years ago and the money in there is what he left me. I can’t take a chance that I don’t get 
the money& it’s got to last me the rest of my life” (Prynn 2007d, 5). 
205. “If everyone takes all their money out of this bank, then I don't want to be left at the end with 
nothing. I'm buying a house with my partner and I need it for the deposit. It's been a bad 
financial time for us with property and we can't afford to lose what we've got. We're taking the 
safer option and turning up and taking the money out” (Morrall 2007, 2). 
206. “If I wanted to withdraw money with a fixed interest account I could lose up to 160 days 
interest. I was trying to get through to them on the phone for an hour and a half this morning” 
(Devey 2007). 
207. “If it closes, how long will it take before you get your money back? I'm on permanent sick - we 
can't afford to lose anything” (“Jobs are safe vow Northern Rock bosses” 2007). 
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208. “If Northern Rock had wanted to cause me to panic, they couldn't have done better. I asked the 
sales manager what right he's got to withhold my money. He told me they have been 
overwhelmed by requests. You expect a friend to say they will pay you next week, but not your 
financial institution” (Jenkins and de Bruxelles 2007, 7). 
209. “If the bank closes this afternoon and I am not seen there's going to be a riot” (“WE'RE 
CASHING IN; HUNDREDS QUEUE …” 2007, 8). 
210. “If you do get in and manage to get your money out in a cheque, you probably won't get it 
lodged in another financial institution for a while. If AIB or Bank of Ireland see you coming 
with a Northern Rock cheque they'll want a guarantee that the cheque is safe before they lodge 
anything” (Doyle 2007). 
211. “It did help us feel a bit better when we heard he did that. But you work all your life for your 
savings and it's just not worth the risk” (“Cash pledge helps ease panic at Northern Rock;  …” 
2007, 8). 
212. “It has been a bit stirred up by the media. I don't think it will fold” (“AND STILL SAVERS 
QUEUE FOR THEIR CASH” 2007, 3). 
213. “It has been terrible. I've stood here for three hours because I believed the branch would be 
open until 2pm, only to be told just before noon that the doors would be closing. I was 
prepared to queue because I thought I would be able to withdraw my money, but that hasn't 
happened and I'm now feeling more anxious than ever” (Lavender 2007a). 
214. “It is my inheritance. My father left me some money when he died and I want to take it out just 
in case. I would be devastated if I lost it” (Jenkins 2007, 8). 
215. “It is not much but it's all I have in the world” (Pascoe-Watson 2007). 
216. “It is quite simple. I would rather have the money in my hand than in a bank that I am worried 
might go bust. I choked on my breakfast coffee when I heard the news this morning. I arrived 
at 9.30am when there were more than 100 people queueing out of the door and around the 
block. It took me an hour of waiting before I was served” (Dyson and Walne 2007, 13). 
217. “It is these queues that are causing the panic. Apparently, 90 per cent of our money is 
guaranteed but we don't want to lose the ten per cent. I don't know whether to leave it and see 
what happens next week” (“AND STILL SAVERS QUEUE FOR THEIR CASH” 2007, 3). 
218. “It may just be a glitch but who knows and we are not prepared to take that risk. After watching 
the news we knew we had to come down this morning and ensure our money was safe. We are 
laughing now because our money is safe” (Adams 2007). 
219. “It may not seem a lot to some people but is all I have and need it to pay for my funeral. It 
might go back in there once this is over” (Whitten 2007d, 8-9). 
220. “It was absolutely dreadful. Everything we have in our lives is in that bank - we would be left 
with nothing if it is lost. We were trying to buy a place in Cyprus and have put a deposit down 
but it may now fall through as we can't get the rest of the funds. The website crashed overnight 
and the help lines were cut off by the morning. We were sick with worry. When we got to the 
bank the manageress just didn't want to know. I'm losing weight from stress. I feel nervous 
waiting for the money. When we got to the bank I couldn't believe their attitude. The 
manageress just didn't want to know. That was it. They had our money, would not give it to us 
and refused to help so we said we weren't leaving till they did and we would sleep there if we 
had to. She tried to usher us out of her office so I sat in the doorway. Then she called the 
police. It was only when the officer arrived, having been told to throw us out, that he saw sense 
and told her to sort things out. Then she finally made some phone calls. It took about two 
hours, but hopefully we'll hear from them within the next 24 hours” (“Northern Shock: I want 
my £1m” 2007, 3; “Couple are waiting for life savings 2007, 3). 
221. “It was my wife who told me about this. I was in bed and was about to get up to take the dog 
for a walk when she heard it on the radio. There's probably nothing to worry about, but it's 
better to be safe than sorry” (“Rock customers caught in a hard place” 2007). 
222. “It was only when the Government started to make reassuring noises that I got worried” (Hall 
2007, 12). 
223. “It was worth the wait to know my money was safe” (Wright 2007b, 3). 
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224. “It's a disgrace they had so few staff on to deal with the situation” (Cusick 2007, 2). 
225. “It's a long time to wait but when you don't know what's going to happen with your money, it's 
better to be safe” (Peplow and Wright 2007, 3). 
226. “It's a panic, but all our life savings are here. All the staff have [sic] been very good and have 
looked after us” (Peplow and Wright 2007, 3). 
227. “It's all I have in the world. But then, when I think of the staff, not knowing how this will turn 
out and their whole livelihoods are at stake, I feel rotten” (Wilson 2007a, 8). 
228. “It's all right for the Bank of England and other institutions to say, 'sit tight and everything will 
be fine', but it isn't their life savings that are at risk. I'd never forgive myself if I lost all my 
grandchildren's inheritance. We haven't thought about where we'll put our money next, but we 
can't leave it here. Everyone is jittery about the situation in the States. I'm worried about the 
economic climate” (Jenkins and de Bruxelles 2007, 7). 
229. “It's all right people saying don't panic, but at the end of the day you've worked hard for what 
you have in the bank” (Braithwaite et al 2007, 1). 
230. “It's better for us to queue for two hours now and have a bit of piece of mind than worry all 
weekend. They tell you not to worry but when it's yours, trust me, you worry. It's all the savings 
we've got” (Braithwaite et al 2007, 1). 
231. “It's better to be safe than sorry and have peace of mind, my brother was talking to a 
stockbroker and he said it was best to get it out. I saw all the crowds yesterday and decided I'd 
better come today” (Westcott 2007). 
232. “It's better to have the money in your hand” (Meneely 2007). 
233. “It's bound to be worrying. I'm going to take my money from here and put it somewhere else, 
but you can't be sure it's safe anywhere” (“Northern Rock customers 'calmed'” 2007a). 
234. “It's good for the Bank of England to say that, but I'm not reassured enough to leave my 
money in there - they said the Titanic couldn't sink, didn't they? I will put my savings in a 
couple of different places and not one place now” (Authi 2007, 8). 
235. “It's hard not to panic. Look what happened to Equitable Life and to Barings” (Watts and 
Donnelly 2007, 8). 
236. “It's hard to know what to do because nobody knows which bank will be the next to get in 
trouble” (Brady 2007b, 4). 
237. “It's hard to trust them when they say not to worry. All they keep saying is that there isn't a 
problem but aren't telling us anything else” (“Anxious customers in bank fury” 2007, 2).  
238. “It's just like football managers. Their jobs are guaranteed - then they are sacked the next day” 
(Braithwaite et al 2007, 1). 
239. “It's just stupid, it's perfectly safe. If I could get in there I would get some money out and buy 
some Northern Rock shares. They've come down from £ 12 to £ 4” (Woods 2007, 15). 
240. “It's like a banana republic. When I saw the newspapers over the weekend, I decided it was time 
to get my money out. There were problems also getting on the website. People don't want to 
lose their savings and if it means taking a half day off work, so be it. It's been a long time 
building it all up, so I didn't want anything to happen to it. I think people will be wary and stick 
to their bricks and mortar banks for a while where they can access their funds” (“Panicked 
customers queue for savings” 2007).  
241. “It's my life savings we're talking about, my pension. I'll have nothing left if they go under” 
(Hosking, Seib, Leroux, and Gilmore 2007, 1). 
242. “It's not big money like some of them only about E30,000 but it's taken me 60 years to save 
that up. I've been burnt before. I lost thousands in investments after September 11 and didn't 
want to go through that again. All I want back is the money I put in nothing more, nothing less. 
We were on holiday watching the situation on the telly and yes, they're saying people will be 
reimbursed, but it's just too much of a risk. How sure can you be really be with financial 
institutions? We'll probably put it with one of the Irish ones now better the devil you know I 
suppose” (Fleming 2007, 14). 
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243. “It's not good news when you think that life is going to be comfortable and then this happens. 
I've been advised to move all my savings into batches of £30,000 but we are only here because 
everyone else has withdrawn money - it is a self-perpetuating problem. It's been caused by bad 
public relations not getting the bank's situation across and people are panicking” (“Troubled 
bank fails to persuade savers that their money is secure” 2007, 2). 
244. “It's people like him who got us into this mess and now they are trying to say that we are the 
stupid ones” (Carroll 2007, 12). 
245. “It's really upsetting because I've been with them for years and this has come out of the blue. It 
is especially difficult at our time in life, and also my husband has dementia” (“Savers withdraw 
pounds 2 billion from bank; BANKING CRISIS” 2007, 7). 
246. “It's very sloppy, very badly regulated. I've no confidence in them whatsoever. I thought I was 
going to pay for winning the All Ireland yesterday. I want my money, not a guarantee. There are 
risks when you have to travel a couple of hundred miles just to make sure” (“Panicked 
customers queue for savings” 2007). 
247. “Lucky for us, at least the sun is shining. It could have been a lot worse. We left home this 
morning at 7.30am so we didn't have to wait. But we couldn't believe our eyes when we arrived 
to find 20 people already waiting outside the branch” (Roberts and White 2007a, 4). 
248. “Most of the queue here are of a certain age. We've all been loyal customers to Northern Rock 
for years, but we just can't take the chance with our money. It might seem a bit of a knee-jerk 
reaction, but when it's your life-savings at stake you have to act” (Jamieson 2007, 4). 
249. “Most people with savings accounts fear what will happen if people continue to take all their 
money out. If the bank went bust, we would lose everything” (“Savers withdraw pounds 2 
billion from bank; BANKING CRISIS” 2007, 7). 
250. “My 72-year-old grandad has come to the bank today to withdraw all his savings.  He got up 
early to make sure he got to the bank quickly today” (Whitten 2007d, 8-9). 
251. “My account matures next July and there is no guarantee what will happen in that time. I do 
believe the Bank of England, but I can't leave my money in that long. We are retired and I 
would rather take it out and lose a couple of hundred pounds than have something else 
happen” (Authi 2007, 8). 
252. “My daughter had said not to panic because the Bank of England had stepped in, but when I 
saw the people queuing I had to come back. I've got my silver savings here and have been all 
jittery and unable to sleep with the worry” (“Northern rock - massive queues” 2007, 1). 
253. “My head tells me the bank is totally solvent and there is no risk to depositors' money, however 
my heart tells me it's better to be safe than sorry” (Grier 2007). 
254. “My husband is an accountant and he said trust them, but I didn't want to lose my savings” 
(Bailey 2007a). 
255. “My life savings are in that bank. You can never be too careful when money is involved” (Sims 
and Poulter 2007b, 6). 
256. “My life savings are in the Northern Rock and I was preparing to use a significant amount of 
money for a business deal. My partner is pregnant and is facing being made redundant. If 
Northern Rock does go under, we will be in dire straits” (Hunter 2007, 10). 
257. “My savings are in there, all my life's savings. I could hardly stay on holiday when I saw all this 
unfolding on Sky News. I couldn't get through on the phone so I have come up in person. The 
past few weeks have been the most stressful experience you could imagine. And now they want 
to reduce me to a bag lady and make me sleep out here all night just to get my own money back 
...' At this point, it is all too much. […] I'm sorry, I really can't believe how British we are being 
about all this. There really should have been a riot by now. The docility of this crowd makes me 
very cross” (Hardman 2007, 15). 
258. “My son's a financial adviser and he says I'm silly to draw it out, but he knows I will not sleep 
unless I do. The problem is where to put it - who knows where is going to be safe?” (Stokes 
2007, 4). 
259. “Northern Rock are ruined now, nobody is going to trust them. People here are not 
adventurous investors we are not looking to make a killing” (Prynn 2007d, 5). 
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260. “Northern Rock are [sic] saying there's no need to be concerned but that's hard to believe. I 
can't afford to gamble with my money” (Hedley 2007, 8-9). 
261. “Northern Rock have [sic] handled this extremely badly. They did not answer the phone or have 
any information on the internet. I am going to get my money back now and I'm not going until 
I do” (“WE'RE CASHING IN;  HUNDREDS QUEUE …” 2007, 8). 
262. “Northern Rock keep telling us not to panic but I can't help it. It was very easy to do the 
transaction and my account is now closed. To be fair, the staff were [sic] great. I really don't 
know what I'm going to do with the money I've withdrawn” (Moroz and Hanif 2007, 8). 
263. “On August 9 we saw it was getting difficult, so we took out most of our money. We never had 
more than Pounds 33,000 (in deposit). Now, we just want to get the rest. It didn't affect us, but 
it is our generation, a lot of our friends had their money in Equitable Life and lost everything. It 
wasn't that long ago. Our friends lost all their pensions because of Equitable Life (the 
investment group that nearly collapsed in 2000), and Gordon Brown did nothing - he has 
probably forgotten about it. That was not that long ago. We're not talking about 1929 - it's 
something we remember” (O’Dohorty and Rotberg 2007, 2; Pavia 2007, 7). 
264. “Out of tragedy comes togetherness - that's something you don't get very often these days. It’s 
the same sort of experience as in the air-raid shelters. It has brought people together. People say 
if you've got £31,700, you should be happy, but that's not the point. It's hard-earned money, 
and it’s taxed money as well. And people say don't you trust the banking system? Well, in my 
old shop we had a notice up saying 'We trust in God - everybody else pays cash’” (“Patience, 
good humour and a touch of the Blitz spirit” 2007, 2). 
265. “People have travelled far to deal with this” (“Panicked customers queue for savings” 2007). 
266. “Perhaps we should just stick it under the bed” (Roberts and White 2007b, 10). 
267. “Right away, I turned the car round. Everything I've ever earned and saved is in that bank. I 
would rather face the dentist's drill than this” (Morgan 2007, 4). 
268. “She once lost a lot of money in shares and she's adamant she won't be caught out again” 
(O'Grady 2007, 10). 
269. “That didn't reassure me. It makes me think they've got a real problem, if they've got a director 
in the branch. When you're our age, you can't afford to risk it. We've our pensions but if 
something catastrophic was to happen, we can't come back and get it again. We just thought 
there's no smoke without fire. The money people don't appear to have confidence and we heard 
in the news this morning that Northern Rock lost £100m on the stock exchange, so that was an 
important factor. We'll hang on to the money and wait until the market improves and we think 
it's stable” (Carrell and Hodgson 2007, 5). 
270. “That's [Bank of England] good enough for me” (Braithwaite et al 2007, 1). 
271. “the bank needed “to repay the loyalty of its customers”” (Wainwright and Allen 2007, 4). 
272. “The Bank of England should not have made the stupid statement in the first place that it had 
put the facility in place for Northern Rock - it should have said it had made funds available in 
the market place” (“Northern Rock customers show little faith in new assurances” 2007). 
273. “The banking code says people have the first £35,000 of their savings protected but the rest 
isn't. We have significant savings and just didn't want them to be put at risk. We have worked 
hard for our savings and we want to make sure we will be financially secure in the future” 
(Moroz and Hanif 2007, 8). 
274. “The captain of the Titanic said there was no need to panic and look what happened there” 
(Woods 2007, 15). 
275. “The fact that the Government has stepped in doesn't make me feel any more confident. I'm 
putting my savings in a building society -I trust them more than the banks” (Hosking, Seib, and 
Webster 2007, 6). 
276. “The first I knew of it was hearing it on the radio on Friday - I felt panic” (Bailey 2007a). 
277. “The Government can talk plenty but talk is cheap and a certain age group, which a lot of these 
people are in, has no faith in the Government” (Alleyne 2007a, 5). 
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278. “The Government has pulled the rug out from under savers and now they are wondering why 
people are reacting in this way” (Keaveny 2007). 
279. “The Government no longer retains the trust of the majority of the country. The more one is 
assured on TV, the worse it becomes -particularly when 24 hours after Mr Darling said he 
wasn't going to rescue a private company he then says he would. How is anybody to trust or 
believe and have faith in that sort of behaviour?” (Pavia 2007, 7). 
280. “The government won't let it go under - they'd get slaughtered in the North at the next election, 
so they'll bust a gut to keep it going” (Carter and Tighe 2007, 2). 
281. “The interest was great and it was a good pension. But what everyone’s worried about is losing 
their pension” (Prynn 2007d, 5). 
282. “The number of people here today shows we no longer believe what we are told these days” 
(Walker 2007, 35). 
283. “The only information we've had is from the media” (“Anxious customers in bank fury” 2007, 
2). 
284. “The only thing that will put my mind at rest is taking my money out” (Whitten 2007b, 8-9). 
285. “The problem is that people had their fingers burnt with pensions and now the problem could 
be with savings” (Jenkins and de Bruxelles 2007, 7). 
286. “[…] [T]he system was 'disgraceful' and vowed she ‘would never bank with them again’” 
(Gibney 2007, 8). 
287. “The thing which always attracted me to Northern Rock was that it never had any queues. It 
was always empty. Now look! I want to get this cheque into my HSBC account before it 
bounces” (Hardman 2007, 15). 
288. “The way they had organised everything was shocking” (Cusick 2007, 2). 
289. “The website has always been pretty bad compared to other banks but now it's useless. I rang 
them last week and they never got back to me and now I've been in this queue for five hours 
and I'm not going to get any money out today. So I'll just have to stay here overnight” 
(Hardman 2007, 15). 
290. “There are not enough safeguards in place. There should be legislation to protect people” 
(“Clients flock to branch” 2007, 3). 
291. “There is a concern. We don't know what the future will hold. The Scottish Government and 
the Bank of England have said we shouldn't panic. But we've all heard the politicians say things 
before” (Lawrie 2007, 6). 
292. “There were about a dozen people in front of me when I arrived. There have been conflicting 
reports. You have just got to go by your own feeling” (“Anxious customers hit northern rock” 
2007, 7). 
293. “They are telling us our money is safe. But nobody is taking any notice. It is probably right what 
they have said. The money probably is safe but people have their money saved and are not 
prepared to risk it. Nobody within my sight has left the queue” (Police calmed to calm bank 
customers 2007; Northern Rock savers withdraw billions as takeover … 2007).  
294. “They said the Titanic was unsinkable but it did sink. I have no faith in the Government” (Hall 
2007, 12). 
295. “They tell you not to panic, but then you see hundreds of people in the queues. I didn't panic, 
but then everyone else is, so you think - well I'd better panic too” (“'They tell you not to panic - 
…” 2007). 
296. “They tell you not to panic, so of course you're going to panic. My life savings are with this 
bank and I do not want to lose it” (Doward et al 2007, 24). 
297. “They tell you not to worry, but you do. I'm drawing most of my money out. I was thinking 
about doing it anyway and going to a financial advisor. I would think everybody is here because 
of Northern Rock's problems. There's not normally a queue like this at 9 o'clock in the 
morning” (“Northern Rock customers 'calmed'” 2007b). 
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298. “They tell you one thing but nothing's sure at the minute. They'll say whatever they must to get 
you off their back. Weren't we told the Titanic wouldn't sink? It's frightening listening to the 
radio. By God, I've been in a terrible panic, I've a lot of money in there and couldn't take the 
risk, I've four children to look after when I'm gone. I'll have my cheque in my hand now at 
three o' clock but I won't stop worrying for the next four days until it clears” (Fleming 2007, 
14). 
299. “They were confident everything would be okay” (Bailey 2007a). 
300. “They were incredibly nice even though their jobs could be affected” (Bailey 2007a). 
301. “They won't let me take out my money. It is my money” (Drury 2007, 2). 
302. “They're saying people are making things worse. But it's their earnings they've made over years” 
(Carter and Tighe 2007, 2). 
303. “They're telling us not to worry, but we've heard it before, with Marconi” (Hosking, Seib, 
Leroux, and Gilmore 2007, 1). 
304. “They're trying to tell us everything is fine. We're not all stupid though” (“Panicked customers 
queue for savings” 2007). 
305. “This is a question of the Government allowing free and easy access to debt. When I left school 
and got a job you had to jump through hoops to borrow money” (“Northern Rock customers 
'calmed'” 2007b). 
306. “This is a state of controlled panic and I know I am adding to it. I have been trying all week to 
get online and no joy. Every time I tried this pop-up came up on screen telling you that the log 
in time would be longer than normal. I am not overly worried though. I have some faith in the 
Bank of England but I feel they are not giving it full backing” (“WE'RE CASHING IN;  
HUNDREDS QUEUE …” 2007, 8). 
307. “This is all panic but also a reflection of the society of today . . . There are no leaders, everybody 
just follows on” (Carter and Tighe 2007, 2). 
308. “This is capitalism gone mad. It's a nightmare having to queue here for hours, and I'm going to 
have to do it again, and again. I'm going to take it all out, go on a holiday, and put what's left in 
the post office” (“Patience, good humour and a touch of the Blitz spirit” 2007, 2). 
309. “This is just silly, absolute madness. I'm just here to pay in a cheque and I'm amazed. 
Everyone's just panicking and it's ridiculous. I've got shares but I'm not going to sell them. 
They'll go up again” (Wilson 2007b, 4). 
310. “This is money I had set aside for my retirement and I do not want to take any chances with it. 
I blame the government and Gordon Brown. If they had come out earlier and said they were 
going to back the bank instead of pussyfooting around I think customers would have been 
more confident” (Pascoe-Watson and Perrie 2007). 
311. “This is the only money we have in savings and we want it somewhere we know it is safe. I was 
made redundant from GKN and all that money is in Northern Rock to help with my pension. 
If another bank takes over, I may not be able to get access to it straight away and it's the savers 
who are always bottom of the queue” (Dayani 2007, 2). 
312. “This money is a large part of our life savings. We retired early and moved to France, but if this 
bank goes down, we'll have to move back and start working again” (“All-night drive to get his 
money” 2007, 6). 
313. “This morning I was hanging on the phone for an hour and a half and I just couldn't get 
through. I have come down to the bank because I want to try and get my money out but I don't 
know if I will be able to” (“Hundreds queue over Northern Rock crisis” 2007). 
314. “To be honest, we've got most of our life savings here and we're not happy that we might lose 
everything. We've never had a day when we haven't worked...but people are living longer so the 
money's got to last” (“Northern Rock customers in run on the bank” 2007). 
315. “Unfortunately I'm doing what everybody else is doing and panicking. I don't think I'll lose 
anything but I'm joining the herd” (Pascoe-Watson 2007). 
316. “We all like the bank, and this branch is excellent, with really pleasant staff. But you can't wait 
for real resassurances [sic] for ever. How stupid you would look if the unthinkable happened, 
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and you'd had the chance to get your money out but failed to take it” (Wainwright and Allen 
2007, 4). 
317. “We are all worried for our life savings. I am buying a brand new car next week and the money 
for that is in Northern Rock” (“Hundreds queue over Northern Rock crisis” 2007). 
318. “We are elderly and this is our life saving, we can't afford to lose it” (Braithwaite et al 2007, 1). 
319. “We are not being irrational, we just want our money back before it all goes down the drain. If 
his money was in here I think he would be taking it out pretty quickly as well” (Carroll 2007, 
12). 
320. “We are old age pensioners and we can't afford to lose everything. We were willing to go along 
with it to start with, but it was beginning to get a bit scary, so we decided to close the account” 
(Wright 2007b, 3). 
321. “We are pensioners and this is all the money we have in the world. If it goes, we won't survive” 
(Roberts and White 2007a, 4). 
322. “We became very concerned as soon as we heard the news last night because we have all our 
retirement savings in this bank. We wanted to make sure we emptied the account before it is 
too late. We are going to move all our funds to another bank. You can't afford to take any 
chances with your money. We haven't even been told anything by Northern Rock or been 
reassured that our money is secure, so why take the risk?” (Scotney 2007, 3).  
323. “We got in the queue at 9.30am. It's 11.30am now, and we still haven't been seen, but we were 
told we could be waiting until 2pm. We are just concerned, like everyone here, about what is 
happening. We want to make sure our money is safe, and that may mean withdrawing all of our 
money. I feel very sorry for the staff here, as they are being bombarded with questions. They are 
doing the best they can to help us get sorted” (Video: Queue resumes as staff … 2007).  
324. “We had a lump sum of cash which is our retirement fund that we put into the savings account. 
Since I saw the announcement on the news last night I've been worried sick and I barely slept. I 
am not prepared to give Northern Rock the benefit of the doubt. If everyone is doing what we 
are and taking their money out too that can't be a sign that the business is going to recover. By 
that time, the bank could have gone bust and we could have lost everything” (Cullwick 2007a, 
4).  
325. “We had heard some rumours, but nothing at all from the bank itself. The news, when it finally 
came out, didn't instil confidence in us. A relative who works for Northern Rock mentioned 
something to us about a week ago, but we didn't think much of it, to be honest. We could well 
be taking our money away, we don't want to seem like we're panicking, but when news like this 
comes out so suddenly it makes you paranoid” (Scotney 2007, 3). 
326. “We had no idea there would be this many people here. It looks like it might take hours, there's 
only a few people helping in there, but we've no choice so I suppose we'll have to wait. We 
haven't even been told anything by Northern Rock or been reassured that our money is secure, 
so why take the risk?” (Scotney 2007, 3). 
327. “We had to fight our way into the shop to get information. We were told all our cheques were 
guaranteed and we could withdraw pounds 500 cash but we're just so unsure we really want to 
close the account and get our money” (“Anxious customers in bank fury” 2007, 2). 
328. “We have got a cheque but we are worried it will bounce and won't feel completely happy until 
the funds are in our account” (Coles 2007). 
329. “We have money and bonds in here and we're trying to get them out. We don't know what the 
future will hold. The politicians and the Bank of England say we shouldn't panic but we've all 
heard the politicians say things before” (Lyons 2007, 1). 
330. “We have to look after our own interests. I'm closing my accounts and my ISAs. It's my life 
savings -about £ 60,000” (Brown 2007, 6; Jenkins and de Bruxelles 2007, 7).  
331. “We haven't got a pension apart from that money. It would be devastating if we lost it” (Morrall 
2007, 2). 
332. “We just kept seeing it in the news and thinking about it more and more” (Bailey 2007b). 
333. “We just think it is better to be safe than sorry” (Wright 2007b, 3). 
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334. “We just wanted to put it somewhere until the market settles down” (“Lesley's Express delivery; 
Your Money” 2007, 35). 
335. “We may have to wait in the cold, but at least we know we will have the money by the end of 
the day” (Wainwright and Allen 2007, 4). 
336. “We shouldn't have to queue in the cold from 5am to keep our money safe. My mother's 95, 
and I have a lot of money saved with Northern Rock to pay for her care - it's been a nightmare 
weekend with all this to worry about” (Carter and Tighe 2007, 2). 
337. “We think it's best if we take it all out, then we've got peace of mind” (“Northern Rock 
customers in run on the bank” 2007). 
338. “We thought that if there's this many people coming to get money out, then most banks would 
be in trouble. We don't want to risk it, so we'll close the account. It's a concern. It's all very well 
them saying that our money's okay, but it's not going to be them that lose it. It's our future” 
(“Another day dawns in the big cash scramble” 2007). 
339. “We travelled to the Dundee branch from Aberdeen as Aberdeen doesn't have a branch to deal 
with this, only a mortgage advisor” (“Customers decend on crisis-hit bank” 2007). 
340. “We were never told they would be closing the doors at 12noon. This is disgusting, we've been 
here since before 9am and there has just been a complete lack of information, which is appalling 
and causing this panic. I've completely lost confidence in Northern Rock and just want to get 
my money out of there, and this situation really hasn't helped” (Lavender 2007b). 
341. “We're here for the same reason as everyone else. We are taking some of my savings out so we 
can share it about a bit instead of having it all in one place” (“Chaotic scenes at branch as bank's 
shares plunge” 2007). 
342. “We're here to collect our savings. It's everything we've got and we didn't want to take the risk 
with our future” (O’Grady 2007b, 6). 
343. “We're just getting more and more annoyed that no-one's coming out here to address this queue 
and explain things to us all” (“Anxious customers in bank fury” 2007, 2). 
344. “We're not taking any chances. We just want to take our money out!” (Morrall 2007, 2). 
345. “We've all been talking about this in the queue and the thing is we don't have the confidence 
not to be here. Nothing that we've seen or heard has reassured us. I'm going to be keeping my 
current account and closing my savings. That's all I have in my life. This all stems back to the 
pensions situation when a lot of people lost their pensions and I just keep thinking that the 
same thing might happen here. I'm blaming the Government because they should have 
controlled this” (Roberts and Burton 2007, 5). 
346. “We've been standing here for hours and it's just not good enough” (Doyle 2007). 
347. “We've been trying to access an online account for my Mum overnight but we just can't get on 
there. My brother lives in Singapore, and the time difference meant we could pass it on to him 
to keep trying, but it's just busy all the time. We thought the site might have shut down” 
(Morrall 2007, 2). 
348. “We've been with Northern Rock for years. They're very good. Once it's okay, we will be back” 
(“Patience, good humour and a touch of the Blitz spirit” 2007, 2). 
349. “We've been with Northern Rock since it opened in Liverpool 15-20 years ago and I'm sure it 
will all work out fine in the end, but we can't afford to take any chances. This money is all we 
have. We've no loyalty to Northern Rock because we've been trying to get a straight answer out 
of them for days” (“City savers queue at crisis bank” 2007, 1). 
350. “We've had an account here for three years because it pays better interest than other banks. It is 
only a few thousand pounds but we are not prepared to risk losing it. I haven't decided where to 
put the money yet because from what I have heard other banks could be going the same way, so 
I will wait for a few days and see if things settle down” (Perrie 2007; Stokes 2007, 4).  
351. “We've heard that it was closing and that it was going bankrupt. You're not guaranteed of 
keeping your money. You hear about other banks going like this, but this one has borrowed too 
much and they shouldn't have borrowed it” (“Another day dawns in the big cash scramble” 
2007). 
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352. “We've more than £20,000 saved for our old age. We can't lose it as it is our lifetime's savings” 
(“Rock cash rescue bid” 2007, 2). 
353. “We've too much money with them to risk” (Wilson 2007a, 8). 
354. “Well, I'm not thinking about depositing!” (“Northern Rock customers 'calmed'” 2007a). 
355. “Well, you worry don't you? If you think other people are worried, you think: shouldn't I be 
worried too?” (“'They tell you not to panic - …” 2007). 
356. “What do they expect when the phone lines are jammed and you can't get through on the 
internet? They've no branches around the country so we all assume the worst. I've nothing like 
the e90,000 or more lots of them this morning were taking out but it's my little investment and I 
don't want to lose it. People just want to come up, get a cheque and be rid of it” (Fleming 2007, 
14). 
357. “What kind of way is this to do business? We have been treated abysmally. This note is not 
worth the paper it's written on. I don't believe a word of it so I'll have to waste another day 
back here tomorrow. It's disgraceful” (Poulter 2007, 4). 
358. “When I couldn't get online or talk to someone over three days, I lost faith. Online banking 
works fine when you can get onto it but you really can't beat a branch network where you can 
talk to someone” (“Panicked customers queue for savings” 2007). 
359. “When I heard the Government telling us not to worry, I knew it was time to get my money 
out” (Hazell 2007, 57). 
360. “When I heard the news I just thought, ‘Oh no, not again’” (Smith, Ringshaw, and Watt 2007, 
2). 
361. “When I saw all the people, I wondered what was going on, so I called my son, and he told me 
to pull all my money out. My whole life is in there. But I think it's better to take every penny 
out. What I'm going to do after that, I don't know. I'm retired sick and I'm too unwell to stand 
here for an hour, waiting. But I don't have any other choice” (Morgan 2007, 4). 
362. “When I saw so many people taking their money out it was scary. Everyone is saying the panic 
is only making things worse, but people need to be careful about their money” (Walker 2007, 
35; Cusick 2007, 2).  
363. “When you get to our age you want to look after your savings and make sure they are totally 
safe. I know the Government have said the money is safe but I don't trust that. We came down 
here early because we expected to queue for hours so we were thrilled to be able to walk 
straight in and close our accounts” (Adams 2007). 
364. “When you have been stung once you get frightened” (Pavia 2007, 7). 
365. “When you have large savings in an account that is unreliable, you want to get it out” (Seib, 
Rossiter, Gilmore, and Sheard 2007, 6). 
366. “When you phone them, you can't get through and when you go to the website, it just crashes. 
When you read all the reports over the weekend and you think about your money, I decided it 
just was not worth the risk” (“Northern Rock customers show little faith in new assurances” 
2007). 
367. “Whether the cheque they will give me will clear NatWest I just do not know” (Jenkins and de 
Bruxelles 2007, 7). 
368. “Who's to say this won't happen at Halifax or Bradford & Bingley next? People won't take any 
chances with their money nowadays. We all stand to lose too much” (“City savers queue at 
crisis bank” 2007, 1). 
369. “Why did they have to make this public? If the Bank of England had supported Northern Rock 
privately, without the announcement, there would have been none of this panic” (Watts and 
Donnelly 2007, 8). 
370. “Why do we have to fill in forms and why does it take half an hour or more to close one 
account?” (“Northern Rock customers show little faith in new assurances” 2007). 
371. “Yes, we are making matters worse. But people need reassurance that their money is safe” 
(Smith 2007, 14). 
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372. “You don't know what's going to happen and that's the top and bottom of it. You don't 
whether this is just the beginning” (“Another day dawns in the big cash scramble” 2007). 
373. “You feel a bit more pressure when it's charitable money” (Wilson 2007a, 8). 
374. “You get your chairman on the phone and tell him to get his bloody branch open. I am so 
furious about this. We have been here since 8.30 this morning and it is only now that we have 
heard that they will close. We are desperate” (Watts and Donnelly 2007, 8). 
375. “You have to worry when something like this happens. We have decided to be cautious and 
move all our money to a different bank. We came straight to the bank when we heard the news 
but were surprised to see such a long queue. It shows a lot of people are very worried about 
their savings” (Scotney 2007, 3). 
376. “You look at this queue, and it's this long - what will it be like at other branches? This is just 
one branch. It will probably be worse elsewhere” (“'They tell you not to panic - …” 2007). 
377. “You put your faith in the banks, but then something like this happens” (Hiscott 2007, 4). 
378. “You put your money in a bank because you want some security. If I had wanted to gamble it I 
would have put it on the stock market” (Prynn 2007d, 5). 
 
